April 1942 Alternate Indian Ocean

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This area is very isolated between rail depots, in some cases they are a single path through the jungle or in cuts on through the ridges. The only way to reach the area is the railroad. You do this at a few spots between each other they cannot support even repair very easily. No roads are along the RR like in the rest of the world. everything is carried by the rr including rails, ties, ballast and anything needed to rebuild the roadbed and all done with hand tools. Like I said chew up the ground, knock the trees down over the tracks, blow the ties and rails all over the place. Everything to fix this is done by hand at a distance from the nearest depot unit to support this.
It wouldn't even take that much, if you can locate the end of a rail and heat it up, you can bend it, which will derail a train. It's also a saboutage that can be done anywhere on the track.
 
1200 Hours, 2 February 1943, Akyab, Burma – Both No. 25 Squadron of the RAAF and No. 800 Squadron of the FAA were departing Burma after serving as the only two long-range fighter squadrons in theater for the Allies. Combat losses, accidents, and a lack of steady replacement aircraft for the two squadrons’ Brewster Buffalo and Fairey Fulmar fighters had worn both units down. For two months both squadrons had served well as the Allies’ only two fighter squadrons capable of escorting bombing raids to Rangoon, doing a difficult job with hand me down fighters that had largely been phased out of frontline service in other theaters. That most recent attack against Rangoon was their final operation for the time being. No. 25 Squadron was down to nine Buffaloes, three of which were best suited to be hangar queens and No. 800 Squadron was down to nine Fulmars, eight of which were flyable.

Squadron Leader Jack Brandt, commander of the CATS was on hand to take possession of No. 25 Squadron’s Buffaloes. The three non-flyable fighters were getting loaded onto a cargo ship so they could serve as a source of spare parts for Brandt’s unit while Brandt and five of his instructor pilots were flying the other six planes back to Colombo. The tubby Brewster’s days as a frontline fighter were over but when stripped of all extraneous weight it was an outstanding adversary trainer and Brandt was happy to take on the additional airframes. No. 25 Squadron’s pilots and ground personnel were getting driven to Chittagong where they would board transport aircraft for a flight to the Allied air depot at Karachi to take possession of replacement planes.

No. 800 Squadron was headed back to Ceylon as well. The non-flyable Fulmar was also getting loaded onto a ship while its remaining eight fighters were flying back to rejoin the Eastern Fleet. With the fleet reconstituting its carrier task force, the big fighters were needed for shipboard duty where their versatility and long-range were still valued. Unlike the Buffaloes that needed to fly to Ceylon in stages, the Fulmars with the help of drop tanks and a Hudson from No. 453 Squadron were making the trip over water in one hop.

For No. 224 Group, the loss of its only two dedicated long-range fighter squadrons stung but everyone knew the Buffaloes and Fulmars were only a temporary solution and No. 25 Squadron was due back in several weeks after it received its replacement aircraft in Karachi. Even with the departures, No. 224 Group’s strength still stood at 10 Hurricane and two Mohawk squadrons with an additional Hurricane squadron (No. 261) due in from Ceylon at the end of the month. Plus, the Indian Air Force was in the process of establishing two additional Hurricane squadrons (No. 2 and No. 6) to go along with No. 1 Squadron based near Imphal where it was operating with two American P-40 Squadrons. There was also approximately a squadron’s worth of British and American navy fighters based at Ramree Island and the new airfield brought Rangoon within range of the P-36s and F4Fs, balancing out the loss of the longer legged Buffaloes and Fulmars.
 
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Well, it does not seem too much of a loss TBH, as the Allies have airfields far forward enough ATM, that other aircraft can also escort the bombers to Rangoon. Though, I really must admit that Fulmars are really becoming a rather dear aircraft to me, and I am really hoping they do continue to perform valuable service ITTL.

Another thing, is the mention of the various squadrons and groups in the area, perhaps slow, but seemingly constant. Do we perhaps know how many aircraft are in the area, Japanese and Allied, or at least the various squadrons and the like? What is the comparison between them?

Too bad about the Carriers though, what they have in the area is likely going to be all they have, at least until Sicily and Italy landings are wrapped up...
 
Just fighters - this does not include carrier based fighters or the fighters on Ceylon, the Allies have about 400 fighters of all types in Burma and in eastern India and that number is getting bigger, the Japanese have probably no more than 150 fighters in Burma and they are not going to have more than that.
 
Just a basic editorial note that a number of us have made on this thread and others. When you look at the resources the Allies were able to devote to India and Burma which was not exactly their highest priority theater of operations, you realize just how well and truly f--ked the Japanese were.
 
Just a basic editorial note that a number of us have made on this thread and others. When you look at the resources the Allies were able to devote to India and Burma which was not exactly their highest priority theater of operations, you realize just how well and truly f--ked the Japanese were.

what else is interesting is that they are winning the fight with second and third string equipment!!!! when are the P-40's going to start flowing into theater? I don't think there are a lot of P-36's left to send...be interesting to see what would happen if a couple of squadrons of P-38's could be scrounged up...then to add the ingredient of all those M-3's (Stuarts not Grants at this point) that were in North Africa

now some questions...what does what's going on in Burma do to road transport into China? Does the Burma Road get reopened in 1943 or is there an earlier effort to open the Ledo road?
 
1200 Hours, 2 February 1943, Akyab, Burma – Both No. 25 Squadron of the RAAF and No. 800 Squadron of the FAA were departing Burma after serving as the only two long-range fighter squadrons in theater for the Allies. Combat losses, accidents, and a lack of steady replacement aircraft for the two squadrons’ Brewster Buffalo and Fairey Fulmar fighters had worn both units down. For two months both squadrons had served well as the Allies’ only two fighter squadrons capable of escorting bombing raids to Rangoon, doing a difficult job with hand me down fighters that had largely been phased out of frontline service in other theaters. That most recent attack against Rangoon was their final operation for the time being. No. 25 Squadron was down to Buffaloes, three of which were best suited to be hangar queens and No. 800 Squadron was down to nine Fulmars, eight of which were flyable.

Squadron Leader Jack Brandt, commander of the CATS was on hand to take possession of No. 25 Squadron’s Buffaloes. The three non-flyable fighters were getting loaded onto a cargo ship so they could serve as a source of spare parts for Brandt’s unit while Brandt and five of his instructor pilots were flying the other six planes back to Colombo. The tubby Brewster’s days as a frontline fighter were over but when stripped of all extraneous weight it was an outstanding adversary trainer and Brandt was happy to take on the additional airframes. No. 25 Squadron’s pilots and ground personnel were getting driven to Chittagong where they would board transport aircraft for a flight to the Allied air depot at Karachi to take possession of replacement planes.

No. 800 Squadron was headed back to Ceylon as well. The non-flyable Fulmar was also getting loaded onto a ship while its remaining eight fighters were flying back to rejoin the Eastern Fleet. With the fleet reconstituting its carrier task force, the big fighters were needed for shipboard duty where their versatility and long-range were still valued. Unlike the Buffaloes that needed to fly to Ceylon in stages, the Fulmars with the help of drop tanks and a Hudson from No. 453 Squadron were making the trip over water in one hop.

For No. 224 Group, the loss of its only two dedicated long-range fighter squadrons stung but everyone knew the Buffaloes and Fulmars were only a temporary solution and No. 25 Squadron was due back in several weeks after it received its replacement aircraft in Karachi. Even with the departures, No. 224 Group’s strength still stood at 10 Hurricane and two Mohawk squadrons with an additional Hurricane squadron (No. 261) due in from Ceylon at the end of the month. Plus, the Indian Air Force was in the process of establishing two additional Hurricane squadrons (No. 2 and No. 6) to go along with No. 1 Squadron based near Imphal where it was operating with two American P-40 Squadrons. There was also approximately a squadron’s worth of British and American navy fighters based at Ramree Island and the new airfield brought Rangoon within range of the P-36s and F4Fs, balancing out the loss of the longer legged Buffaloes and Fulmars.

Zheng, down to how many Buffalos?
 
what else is interesting is that they are winning the fight with second and third string equipment!!!! when are the P-40's going to start flowing into theater? I don't think there are a lot of P-36's left to send...be interesting to see what would happen if a couple of squadrons of P-38's could be scrounged up...then to add the ingredient of all those M-3's (Stuarts not Grants at this point) that were in North Africa

now some questions...what does what's going on in Burma do to road transport into China? Does the Burma Road get reopened in 1943 or is there an earlier effort to open the Ledo road?

For the Allied plans for road transport back into China, see these posts - https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...2-alternate-indian-ocean.305957/post-19950595 and https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...2-alternate-indian-ocean.305957/post-19951747
 
thanks Zheng, I remember now reading the first post and for some reason, didn't see the second.

A very sensible plan, and ITL one that has a pretty good chance of achievement.
 
400 to 150. That is more then 2 to 1 advantage, and as it was said, it is still growing. Also worth considering is that Allies are going to have less issues with fuel and spare parts availlability, for all they are a tertiary front, not to mention various nice things like radar or equipment to maintain and build more airfields. Truly, what were they thinking!?!

Also, if we assume this theatre is primarily IJAAF resposibility, that is 3 or 4 areas they will have to stretch their limited resources over. I mean, we have C-B-I and Solomons/New Guinea which are likely the main attrition areas, where Allied strength just keeps growing, not only in quantity, but quality as well. Then we have to add in China, as well, where losses might be substantially lower, but are still losses, which require more aircraft and pilots, not to mention requirements to defend Home Islands as well. Quality wise, their most numerous fighter was Ki-43, which will start to look rather lacking, as more and better Allied aircraft make an appearance. There were some decent aircraft around, Ki-44/61, rather comparable to Allied Aircraft of the period, but produced in rather low numbers, thus forcing the IJAAF to soldier on with Ki-43s.

Once Allies really start conducting large scale offensives, and IJAAF is forced to fight it out, it is really going to get bad. I mean, they might have 150 fighters, but there is always a certain amount that is kept in reserve/undergoing maintenance, further reducing the number of aircraft which will have to fight immense odds. When we add RN carrier forces raiding, and becoming rather willing to duke it out with land based aviation, as well as operational attrition and losses, it really becomes a downwards spiral. I would not be suprised if, by '44 or so, most likely cause of Allied aircraft losses is by AA fire, not enemy fighter activity.
 
On bombing actual railway lines*, as I understand it the British had trouble enough doing that in the original timeline in Europe, with all the newest shiniest toys in the British arsenal available straight out of the factory, guidance systems and pathfinder marker planes to hand, and elite bomber squadrons such as 617 squadron.

I suspect that giving Orde Wingate some troops and explosives and dropping him off behind enemy lines should be more likely to be effective against a single track railway line than trying to hit it with whatever aerial bombing capacity is currently available in Burma. In fact at some point he may insist (insomuch as his rank permits) on being given the opportunity to try out his ideas, and cite this as a perfect opportunity to test them out.

* as opposed to larger targets such as cities with extensive marshalling yards
 
On bombing actual railway lines*, as I understand it the British had trouble enough doing that in the original timeline in Europe, with all the newest shiniest toys in the British arsenal available straight out of the factory, guidance systems and pathfinder marker planes to hand, and elite bomber squadrons such as 617 squadron.

I suspect that giving Orde Wingate some troops and explosives and dropping him off behind enemy lines should be more likely to be effective against a single track railway line than trying to hit it with whatever aerial bombing capacity is currently available in Burma. In fact at some point he may insist (insomuch as his rank permits) on being given the opportunity to try out his ideas, and cite this as a perfect opportunity to test them out.

* as opposed to larger targets such as cities with extensive marshalling yards
You are not trying to bomb the rail line itself you want to bomb an 1 klick wide area up to a mile long or more centered on the rail line. Where it is at there is nothing but the Railroad, all the rivers are perpendicular to it and there are no roads any where around. The only way to bring materials in to fill in the craters, redo the ballets, lay new ties and rail is by the railroad and the only way to do the work is pick, shovel, wheelbarrow, and water buffalo power all by manpower.
 
You are not trying to bomb the rail line itself you want to bomb an 1 klick wide area up to a mile long or more centered on the rail line. Where it is at there is nothing but the Railroad, all the rivers are perpendicular to it and there are no roads any where around. The only way to bring materials in to fill in the craters, redo the ballets, lay new ties and rail is by the railroad and the only way to do the work is pick, shovel, wheelbarrow, and water buffalo power all by manpower.

That is both a good and bad thing. On the one hand, there's nothing else to hit or look for besides the rail line. OTOH, in a lot of areas, the only thing that might stand out is the rail line, and depending on local geography, it might be difficult to spot it through the jungle, or could be obscured by other geographic features. Getting most or all of the bombs in the general area is good, but doesn't help much if the bombs are still 500 feet short, or fall in a river. Unlike developed Europe, where a bomb that misses an intended target might by chance hit something of secondary or tertiary value, ripping up a few acres of uninhabited jungle isn't going to matter.
Now that's not to say dumping a few hundred thousand pounds of bombs on the Burma rail line isn't a bad idea, but for every strike that will do damage, other strikes will not, or at least do less damage then hoped for.
 
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Other considerations. The Allies don't have a large bombing force to work with and the weather is frequently unflyable. Sporadic missions of a squadron or two of Wellingtons. With the other demands on their small air forces they have to make these raids count.
 

McPherson

Banned
That is both a good and bad thing. On the one hand, there's nothing else to hit or look for besides the rail line. OTOH, in a lot of areas, the only thing that might stand out is the rail line, and depending on local geography, it might be difficult to spot it through the jungle, or could be obscured by other geographic features. Getting most or all of the bombs in the general area is good, but doesn't help much if the bombs are still 500 feet short, or fall in a river. Unlike developed Europe, where a bomb that misses an intended target might by chance hit something of secondary or tertiary value, ripping up a few acres of uninhabited jungle isn't going to matter.
Now that's not to say dumping a few hundred thousand pounds of bombs on the Burma rail line isn't a bad idea, but for every strike that will do damage, other strikes will not, or at least do less damage then hoped for.

Bridges are the only infrastructure worth hitting from the air or by commando raid. Now if one ARCLIGHTS the construction crews, that poses a grim moral problem. How many allied prisoners of war in the work gangs being used as slave labor in the war-crime the IJA perpetrates to build that railroad are the British willing to kill to disrupt construction?
 
The Japanese do not have enough AAA to cover all the bridges, let alone all the cuttings and embankments. A 500lb bomb dropped by a Vengence will do enough damage to cause problems. spread that up and down the line and you give the repair gangs a real headache.
 
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