April 1942 Alternate Indian Ocean

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Stilwell got on well enough with Slim, didn't he?

Depends on the situation. Slim commented that a lot of Stilwell being an arsehole was pure show, and talking to him one-to-one was a completely different prospect than "Vinegar Joe with an audience". In the latter situation even Slim would run into a brick wall, and he made sure it happened as little as possible.

At times, the fact that he was the only individual in theatre (and one of the few on the planet) the idiot would listen to caused more problems than it solved - the period when Stillwell was simultaneously Slim's superior (as Deputy SACSEA) and subordinate (as Commander NCAC) being one of the worst.
 
It's all a lot of lousy options but this proposed route has the advantages of being over 100 miles shorter, it takes better advantage of some existing routes in certain parts, and it also supports a thrust by IV Corps into north-central Burma. Still a pain in the ass though.

There is another option that exists in your timeline that didn't exist in OTL. I'm having difficulty assessing whether my suggested option is a good one or a really lousy idea. Presuming the Allies hold Ramree Island and its connection to the Arakan peninsula. That gives them a base of operations with air fields and a good harbour at Kyaukpyu going into 1943.

One wonders what TTL commanders would do with that. Using the same resources and troops that are being directed to build TTLs' Ledo Road would it be possible to punch through the Japanese lines in the Arakan range so as to break out in the Irrawaddy River valley. At that point just East of the Arakan Range the valley opens up into flat wide open country with existing roads, railroads and river traffic going North to Mandalay and East toward Rangoon. You have broken into the existing Burmese railroad and road network.

The distance through the Arakan Range at Ramree is about 40 miles and it's steep with no roads. But is it worst then the mountains East of Imphal? If a road can be built over the Arakan range by the Allied engineering units using whatever tracks or natural passes could a mechanized army be supported through the harbour and improved roads of Ramree Island? How big an Allied army could be supplied this way? Big enough to take Rangoon?

Take Rangoon then you have Rangoon harbour and the railway to Lashio. Clear out the IJA and you have the Burma Road open again supplied through Rangoon. By mid-1944?
 
Depends on the situation. Slim commented that a lot of Stilwell being an arsehole was pure show, and talking to him one-to-one was a completely different prospect than "Vinegar Joe with an audience". In the latter situation even Slim would run into a brick wall, and he made sure it happened as little as possible.

At times, the fact that he was the only individual in theatre (and one of the few on the planet) the idiot would listen to caused more problems than it solved - the period when Stillwell was simultaneously Slim's superior (as Deputy SACSEA) and subordinate (as Commander NCAC) being one of the worst.

The more I read about this theater of operations, the more I learn just how messed up the command arrangements were - not just because you are dealing with British, Americans, and Chinese but also within the Allies themselves. Americans who did not like Stillwell (Wedemeyer) and worked to undermine him, Mountbatten having MacArthur like delusions of grandeur and a number of senior British officers who did not like him, Pierse doinking Auchinleck's wife, etc. so on and so forth. It's amazing anything got done.
 
There is another option that exists in your timeline that didn't exist in OTL. I'm having difficulty assessing whether my suggested option is a good one or a really lousy idea. Presuming the Allies hold Ramree Island and its connection to the Arakan peninsula. That gives them a base of operations with air fields and a good harbour at Kyaukpyu going into 1943.

One wonders what TTL commanders would do with that. Using the same resources and troops that are being directed to build TTLs' Ledo Road would it be possible to punch through the Japanese lines in the Arakan range so as to break out in the Irrawaddy River valley. At that point just East of the Arakan Range the valley opens up into flat wide open country with existing roads, railroads and river traffic going North to Mandalay and East toward Rangoon. You have broken into the existing Burmese railroad and road network.

The distance through the Arakan Range at Ramree is about 40 miles and it's steep with no roads. But is it worst then the mountains East of Imphal? If a road can be built over the Arakan range by the Allied engineering units using whatever tracks or natural passes could a mechanized army be supported through the harbour and improved roads of Ramree Island? How big an Allied army could be supplied this way? Big enough to take Rangoon?

Take Rangoon then you have Rangoon harbour and the railway to Lashio. Clear out the IJA and you have the Burma Road open again supplied through Rangoon. By mid-1944?

Other options are being looked at will be pursued, the road from Imphal across Burma to Loiwing and Wanting is being pursued because something can be done about it right away and it has Stillwell's buy in meaning you get the participation of his Chinese divisions and the growing American contingent (particularly US Army engineering units).
 
Other options are being looked at will be pursued, the road from Imphal across Burma to Loiwing and Wanting is being pursued because something can be done about it right away and it has Stillwell's buy in meaning you get the participation of his Chinese divisions and the growing American contingent (particularly US Army engineering units).
When you have two or more people involved in anything politics rears it's ugly head. War time makes it worse.
 
2200 Hours, 26 December 1942, Calcutta, India – With Allied pressure on Japanese airfields throughout the region increasing, the Japanese knew they had to do something different to tie down Allied forces. Eight Ki-21s of the 98th Sentai were sent on a night raid against Calcutta while six Ki-48s of the 8th Sentai attacked shipping near Akyab. The raids caught the Allies by surprise and attempts at interceptions were ineffective. The Ki-21s attacking Calcutta were lightly armed due to the distance involved and very little damage was done but the raid caused near panic with the population and number of fighters were launched from airfields near the city to calm the fears of the population who did appreciate the sound of fighter aircraft taking to the air to defend them. Ironically this led to one near instance of fratricide when a Hurricane pilot from No. 79 Squadron almost shot down a P-36 from No. 155 Squadron when he mistook it for a Ki-43.

The Ki-48s dive bombed two small cargo ships near Akyab, hitting the M/V Black Dragon with several bombs setting the ship on fire and causing her master Captain Seafort to run her aground to keep her from sinking.
 
When you have two or more people involved in anything politics rears it's ugly head. War time makes it worse.

Ironically Wavell's instinct OTL (and ITTL) was to not worry about the ground link to China and instead focus on building a whole lot of airfields to support the airlift. He ended up being right, when you look at what the Hump ended up delivering it's pretty amazing the basic assessment by the British that by the time the ground links to China were re-established they would be over taken by events proved to be spot on. This quote from Slim on the issue pretty much says it all:

  • I agreed with Stilwell that the road could be built. I believed that, properly equipped and efficiently led, Chinese troops could defeat Japanese if, as would be the case with his Ledo force, they had a considerable numerical superiority. On the engineering side I had no doubts. We had built roads over country as difficult, with much less technical equipment than the Americans would have. My British engineers, who had surveyed the trace for the road for the first eighty miles [130 km], were quite confident about that. We were already, on the Central front, maintaining great labour forces over equally gimcrack lines of communication. Thus far Stilwell and I were in complete agreement, but I did not hold two articles of his faith. I doubted the overwhelming war-winning value of this road, and, in any case, I believed it was starting from the wrong place. The American amphibious strategy in the Pacific, of hopping from island to island would, I was sure, bring much quicker results than an overland advance across Asia with a Chinese army yet to be formed. In any case, if the road was to be really effective, its feeder railway should start from Rangoon, not Calcutta.
 
Of note, the December night raids against Calcutta by the JAAF caused actual panic with maybe more than one million people fleeing the city. Not a bad result given the minimal actual effort expended by the Japanese. However, ITTL with the Allies doing better the panic is much reduced.
 
0800 Hours, 27 December 1942, Port Blair, Andaman Islands – The light cruiser Tama, the second line destroyer Kuretake, the Italian sloop Eritrea, and now six empty merchant ships departed Port Blair with two Jake floatplanes keeping watch for Allied submarines. Their destination was Penang and then on to Singapore followed by short refits for the warships while additional convoys assembled.
 
1200 Hours, 27 December 1942, Washington, DC – The late 1942 Allied Naval Staff Planning talks in Washington, DC wrapped up two days after Christmas. Naturally, aircraft carrier and battleship dispositions along with the allocation of amphibious shipping dominated the sessions. The crippling of the battleship Tirpitz eased the pressure on the Royal Navy but the Admiralty was not yet ready to release capital warships from duty with the Home Fleet. The Germans still had the battleship Scharnhorst working up in the Baltic Sea, the exact status of the battleship Gneisenau was not known, and the Admiralty was concerned the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin was close to achieving operational capability. This meant the Admiralty still wanted to maintain two modern battleships and two modern aircraft carriers with the Home Fleet for the time being. Additionally, the upcoming invasion of Sicily (OPERATION HUSKY) planned for July of 1943 would draw at least two modern battleships from the Home Fleet along with cruisers and destroyers and possibly one aircraft carrier. There was still some debate regarding whether or not the smaller and older carriers with Force H, HMS Eagle and HMS Argus supplemented by escort carriers would satisfy the requirement for naval air cover for the invasion fleet or if one of the Home Fleet’s modern carriers would need to be detached to the Mediterranean as well.

Similarly, the Americans preferred to keep two modern carriers and at least two modern fast battleships in the South Pacific, supporting operations on Guadalcanal and guarding against additional moves by the Japanese. With USS Enterprise under repair in Bremerton and USS Yorktown, USS Ranger, and HMS Indomitable all underway for the United States for their own refits, late 1942 represented something of a nadir for the carrier fleets of the US and Royal Navies. This meant that among other things, the Eastern Fleet was going to have to make do with HMS Hermes and whatever escort carriers could be spared for the foreseeable future.

However, contrary to what many general histories claim, Somerville’s fleet was not considered a backwater nor was it a forgotten fleet. The Admiralty was keen to strengthen Somerville’s forces and they had an ally in Ernest J. King who recognized the benefits a strong Eastern Fleet provided to US efforts in the South Pacific. The British representatives at the talks proposed to send two aircraft carriers to the Indian Ocean as soon as they were available, most likely when HMS Indomitable’s refit was complete and HMS Illustrious was no longer needed in the South Pacific. Additionally, while none of the King George V class battleships would be going to the Indian Ocean for at least a year, the Admiralty did plan to send the battlecruiser HMS Renown and the modernized battleship HMS Queen Elizabeth to the Eastern Fleet as soon as their refits were complete. The Americans at King’s direction agreed to retain a task force built around USS Ranger and the battleship USS Alabama in the Atlantic to serve as a reserve for the Home Fleet for at least the first half of 1943 in order to afford the Royal Navy more flexibility in terms of how its assets were deployed.
 
oh man, the Royal Navy is really stretched across the world.
Question: Is there more Axis co-op in this ATL?
because it seems like the Axis navies are helping each other
if there is more co-op, how's the Monsoon Gruppe ITTL?
 
0800 Hours, 28 December 1942, Altafjord, Norway – Despite his best efforts, Grand Admiral Raeder could not convince Hitler to permit him to order the pocket battleship Lutzow and the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper to intercept the Allied convoy (JW-51B) currently bound for the Soviet Union. In fact, Hitler was so concerned the convoy was a trap to lure Hipper and Lutzow out that he personally contacted the captains of both ships and Vice Admiral Oskar Kummetz and ordered them to return to Germany for refitting with the rest of the Kreigsmarine’s surviving heavy ships.

With a front of poor weather moving through area, Kummetz decided the morning of 28 December was an ideal time to get his ships moving south, hoping the combination of bad weather and near total darkness would shield them from Allied reconnaissance aircraft and the Royal Navy’s submarines. Hipper departed first escorted by two destroyers and the light cruiser Koln with Lutzow departing two hours later accompanied by three destroyers. Kummetz decided to separate the ships into two groups because Lutzow’s engines were acting up and he did not want her slowing down Hipper and Koln.
 
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0800 Hours, 28 December 1942, Colombo Harbor, Ceylon – The merchant cruise HMCS Prince David was in port, her mission to Ramree Island complete. The fast AMC had been seeing hard use since arriving in theater several months earlier so she was getting a short refit in Colombo and her crew was going to get to spend two weeks onshore.

Also, during the morning of 28 December, the RFA Athelstane escorted by the destroyer HMS Duncan and the sloop HMS Egret met up with Force A of the Eastern Fleet to refuel Admiral Somerville’s destroyers. Also refueling from Athelstane were the Indian sloops HMIS Indus, HMIS Sutlej, HMIS Hindustan, and HMIS Cornwallis. Once the operation was complete, Athelstane and her escorts turned south for Trincomalee while the Indian ships returned to their patrol station closer to the coast.
 
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0800 Hours, 28 December 1942, Altafjord, Norway – Despite his best efforts, Grand Admiral Raeder could not convince Hitler to permit him to order the pocket battleship Lutzow and the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper to intercept the Allied convoy (JW-51B) currently bound for the Soviet Union. In fact, Hitler was so concerned the convoy was a trap to lure Hipper and Lutzow out that he personally contacted the captains of both ships and Vice Admiral Oskar Kummetz and ordered them to return to Germany for refitting with the rest of the Kreigsmarine’s surviving heavy ships.

With a front of poor weather moving through area, Kummetz decided the morning of 28 December was an ideal time to get his ships moving south, hoping the combination of bad weather and near total darkness would shield them from Allied reconnaissance aircraft and the Royal Navy’s submarines. Hipper departed first escorted by two destroyers and the light cruiser Koln with Lutzow departing two hours later accompanied by three destroyers. Kummetz decided to separate the ships into two groups because Lutzow’s engines were acting up and he did not want her slowing down Hipper and Koln.

It looks like Robert St. Vincent Sherbrooke is going to keep his other eye . . .
 
OTL the US really didn't have a large ground force in the region. ITTL with the Aleutians theater butterflied away, while the US and possibly Canada will still likely have garrison forces in the region, are there and Army troops that could redeploy elsewhere?

A couple battalions of engineering or construction troops could be useful. I don't know about division sized forces, but a brigade or regiment sized force perhaps could go to Burma.
 
1000 Hours, 28 December 1942, Bassein River Delta, Burma – Not all victories make headlines or are even immediately noticeable. During the late morning of 28 December 1942, two Pete, two Dave, and one Jake floatplane took off from the Bassein River Delta bound for the seaplane base at Port Blair. Shortly after the seaplanes departed a small convoy of coastal steamers, supply barges, and tugboats escorted a pair of armed fishing boats cleared the mouth of the river bound for Rangoon, hugging the coast to avoid Allied submarines. Several more supply barges headed up river to carry their supplies to Japanese ground forces dug in south of the Arakan. The recent attack by the RAF and the mining mission by HMS Manxman combined with the Eastern Fleet’s dominance of the Bay of Bengal had led Vice Admiral Okawachi to decide that maintaining a forward base in the Bassein River Delta was not worth the effort. A small but still noteworthy retreat on the part of the Japanese.
 
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