April 1942 Alternate Indian Ocean

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1600 Hours, 9 December 1942, Chittagong, India – The destroyer transport USS Waters, the commando carrier HMS Albatross, the destroyer HMS Javelin, and the light cruiser HMS Capetown were back at Chittagong after their most recent run to Ramree Island. They were getting a couple of days in port to make repairs, take on additional supplies and equipment, and logistics and administrative specialists to support the lodgment on Ramree Island. To the relief of the ships’ crews, they were not due to depart again until the morning of 12 December. Their departure timed to coincide with the clearing weather and the arrival of the main landing force on its way from Trincomalee.
 
1700 Hours, 9 December 1942, Colombo Harbor, Ceylon – Ten loaded freighters arrived in Colombo from Bombay. Some of goods they were carrying were already getting unloaded while some supplies remained on the freighters, bound for Chittagong as soon as additional escorts arrived to take the ships north. As the freighters made port, their escorts, the sloops HMS Falmouth and HMIS Jumna and the merchant cruiser HMS Carthage turned south with six freighter, bound for Port T and then Diego Garcia.
 
1700 Hours, 9 December 1942, Darwin, Australia – Their missions to Christmas Island, Port C, and Exmouth Gulf complete, the destroyer transports USS McKean and USS Talbot arrived in Darwin. The American ships were getting three days to make essential repairs and rest their crews and after that it would be time for their next mission. The destroyer HMAS Stuart and the three French destroyers were already ready to go. Operations by the 48th Infantry Division on Timor were putting a great deal of pressure on the troops of Lancer Force and Tern Force and Australian commander in Darwin decided it was time to get most of the troops off the island while there was still time.
 
1700 Hours, 9 December 1942, Darwin, Australia ....the 48th Infantry Division on Timor were putting a great deal of pressure on the troops of Lancer Force and Tern Force and Australian commander in Darwin decided it was time to get most of the troops off the island while there was still time.

I wonder what will happen to the unlucky troops who must stay behind. I guess they must hold the line while the majority of the Allied troops are taken off. After that? Heaven help them.
 
I wonder what will happen to the unlucky troops who must stay behind. I guess they must hold the line while the majority of the Allied troops are taken off. After that? Heaven help them.

At a guess, they will try to go bush and retreat into the jungles. The only way I can see them leaving the island is if the Allies can spare the ships for a massive covering bombardment.
 
0800 Hours, 9 December 1942, Chittagong, India – For General William Slim, commander of the XV Corps things had certainly changed since May. Then he and everyone else welcomed the onset of the monsoons as they covered the ignominious Allied retreat from Burma and saved thousands of soldiers and civilians. Now, Slim could not wait for the monsoons to end. Not only did the rains keep Allied aircraft on the ground, they made the 14th Indian Division’s advance down the Arakan coast that much more difficult.

Still, the news was not all negative. The East African and Indian troops holding Akyab were dug in and had easily rebuffed the initial Japanese probes, the assault on Ramree Island was going forward, and when the weather was good, Allied aircraft owned the skies over the Arakan. The biggest concern was the 14th Indian Division’s overland advance toward Ramree Island. The Japanese were holding fortified positions and the Indian troops had encountered something that would plague Allied troops throughout the Pacific and South East Asia for the rest of the war, the coconut log bunker. So well-constructed were these fortifications that the defending Japanese troops had already displayed a willingness to call in artillery strikes against attacking Allied troops on top of the bunkers. Obviously new tactics would be necessary to dislodge the dug in Japanese. Slim also had his staff drawing up contingency plans to send the 6th Infantry Brigade, XV Corps’ reserve formation for a landing on the coast near Ramree Island as soon as the shipping became available. Slim was not quite ready to release his Corps reserve but intelligence indicated that the troops opposing the garrison Akyab were no more than a single division and he was starting to think that the garrison in place would be sufficient to defend the key objective.

If he can get a good sized force behind enemy lines that would be great.

So what are the overall objectives of this offensive? What is the bigger priority, gaining ground or destroying the Japanese formations they are fighting.
 
I thought that is an urban legend?

Here is a portion of the Wikipedia article on the Battle of Ramree Island. This excerpt concerns the crocodile attack on the retreating Japanese soldiers. There is some dispute over the number of crocodile attacks.


"Some British soldiers, including the naturalist Bruce Stanley Wright, who participated in the battle, claimed that the large population of saltwater crocodiles native to the mangrove swamps on Ramree Island preyed on the trapped Japanese force at night and ate many soldiers. Wright gave a description in Wildlife Sketches Near and Far (1962), quoted by Frank McLynn,

That night [of the 19 February 1945] was the most horrible that any member of the M. L. [motor launch] crews ever experienced. The scattered rifle shots in the pitch black swamp punctured by the screams of wounded men crushed in the jaws of huge reptiles, and the blurred worrying sound of spinning crocodiles made a cacophony of hell that has rarely been duplicated on earth. At dawn the vultures arrived to clean up what the crocodiles had left.... Of about one thousand Japanese soldiers that entered the swamps of Ramree, only about twenty were found alive.

— Wright[11]
If Wright was correct, the Ramree Island crocodile attacks were the worst recorded in history. The British Burma Star Association seems to lend credence to the swamp attack stories but appears to draw a distinction between the 20 Japanese survivors of one attack and the 900 Japanese who were left to fend for themselves in the swamp. There is no corroboration of the event by contemporary British military reports or by interviewed Japanese soldiers and local Burmese civilians. Wright is the only source for a mass crocodile attack and his figures have been disputed by other historians, who call the event an urban myth.[12] McLynn wrote

Most of all, there is a single zoological problem. If 'thousands of crocodiles' were involved in the massacre, as in the urban (jungle) myth, how had these ravening monsters survived before and how were they to survive later? The ecosystem of a mangrove swamp, with an exiguous mammal life, simply would not have permitted the existence of so many saurians before the coming of the Japanese (animals are not exempt from the laws of overpopulation and starvation).[13]

The British official history (War against Japan volume IV, The Reconquest of Burma, 1965 [2004]) referred only to "crocodile-infested mangrove swamps".[8]"

-excerpted from Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Ramree_Island#Crocodile_attack
 
I wonder what will happen to the unlucky troops who must stay behind. I guess they must hold the line while the majority of the Allied troops are taken off. After that? Heaven help them.

The British were quite good at conducting an evacuation

The Evacuation at Gallipoli for example while heavy losses were feared only cost the life of one sailor due to a prematurely exploding artillery magazine.

At Dunkirk the French rear guard 'should' have been evacuated had it not been for a far higher than expected number of French and Belgium soldiers hiding in the town who swamped the DDs and other craft preventing those gallant men from being lifted.

If its planned well then every chance that most if not all of the men should get out - transport and guns though???

Thin out the supply and LOC units

Then quietly thin out the fighting units

Then the rear guard using a combination of guile, skull duggery, remaining arty units firing off ammo and then making staged withdrawal to the evacuation points with guns, transport and ammo dumps being destroyed just as they pull out
 
The British were quite good at conducting an evacuation

The Evacuation at Gallipoli for example while heavy losses were feared only cost the life of one sailor due to a prematurely exploding artillery magazine.

At Dunkirk the French rear guard 'should' have been evacuated had it not been for a far higher than expected number of French and Belgium soldiers hiding in the town who swamped the DDs and other craft preventing those gallant men from being lifted.

If its planned well then every chance that most if not all of the men should get out - transport and guns though???

Thin out the supply and LOC units

Then quietly thin out the fighting units

Then the rear guard using a combination of guile, skull duggery, remaining arty units firing off ammo and then making staged withdrawal to the evacuation points with guns, transport and ammo dumps being destroyed just as they pull out

This is the Collapsing Bag style of retreat or evacuation.
 

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
The Evacuation at Gallipoli for example while heavy losses were feared only cost the life of one sailor due to a prematurely exploding artillery magazine.
Military operations tend to go well when the enemy decides not to contest them, having other uses for the resources available.
 
Military operations tend to go well when the enemy decides not to contest them, having other uses for the resources available.

Yes the Ottomans at Gallipoli had all of those other missions that prevented them from interfering

And at Dunkirk - well the Germans heart wasn't really in it at all!
 

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
Yes the Ottomans at Gallipoli had all of those other missions that prevented them from interfering

And at Dunkirk - well the Germans heart wasn't really in it at all!

I didn't say anything about Dunkirk.
The Ottomans were statically defending the theater (for winter anyway), and 3-day rainstorms and a blizzard don't encourage active patrolling in any case. They could have chosen to kill conscripts and morale to gather intel to strike at the right time (using available forces that are adequate to defend), but didn't. When reinforced post-ANZAC/Suvla withdrawal they attacked Helles, paid a heavy price, and didn't attack during the night of evacuation.
Good planning and execution by the allies, making use of the extensive fixed perimeter defenses and naval superiority to substantially evacuate in a single night. Somewhat trickier for Timor, where the Japanese are on the attack, and have daytime aerial superiority.
 
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