I believe you are thinking about the MK XIV. The Mk X of the S boats was pretty reliable.
April 1942 Alternate Indian Ocean
- Thread starter Zheng He
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I believe you are thinking about the MK XIV. The Mk X of the S boats was pretty reliable.
I have also read that the Mk X also had a depth problem but not as great as the Mk IX
0200 Hours, 8 December 1942, Ramree Island, Burma – It was a difficult operation for the skippers and navigation officers on the warships. The destroyer transports USS Dent and USS Waters and the commando HMS Albatross were anchored less than two miles off the northern tip of Ramree Island under the coal black sky of the new moon. The destroyer HMS Javelin and the light cruiser HMS Capetown maneuvered 15 miles out to sea while 50 miles to the northwest the light cruiser USS St. Louis monitored the skies with her CXAM-1 radar. The minelayer HMS Manxman had detached from the task force and sped to the south, her mission to mine the most likely approach routes on the southern end of Ramree Island. The commando team on the island was on the beach and 12 LCVPs were bringing almost 500 men to the landing zone chosen by the commandoes.
The commandoes had chosen the landing zone because it was on a relatively flat plain and it was near the area a small group of Japanese soldiers and engineers and Korean construction workers were doing site survey work for an airfield. Getting the troops ashore was easy and with the assistance of four of the commandoes, a company from No. 5 Commando and a detachment of East African troops from Riain’s Raiders rushed the area where the Japanese had made camp while the rest of the troops on the beach organized supplies. Landing all of the troops and supplies took three trips and the warships were not underway for Akyab until just after 0500 hours. During the task force’s egress, USS Dent scraped her hull on a small shoal and while the ship was not in danger, there was still a gash in her bow that would require time in Trincomalee’s drydock.
HMS Manxman’s mission entailed sailing an additional 100 miles to the southeast and she was not headed out to open sea until 0530 hours after depositing all 156 of her mines in the waters off the southern tips of Ramree Island and Cheduba Island. His mission complete, Captain Robert Dickson had his ship heading northwest at 35 knots. Alone and in enemy waters with the sun rising, speed was now his best friend.
The commandoes had chosen the landing zone because it was on a relatively flat plain and it was near the area a small group of Japanese soldiers and engineers and Korean construction workers were doing site survey work for an airfield. Getting the troops ashore was easy and with the assistance of four of the commandoes, a company from No. 5 Commando and a detachment of East African troops from Riain’s Raiders rushed the area where the Japanese had made camp while the rest of the troops on the beach organized supplies. Landing all of the troops and supplies took three trips and the warships were not underway for Akyab until just after 0500 hours. During the task force’s egress, USS Dent scraped her hull on a small shoal and while the ship was not in danger, there was still a gash in her bow that would require time in Trincomalee’s drydock.
HMS Manxman’s mission entailed sailing an additional 100 miles to the southeast and she was not headed out to open sea until 0530 hours after depositing all 156 of her mines in the waters off the southern tips of Ramree Island and Cheduba Island. His mission complete, Captain Robert Dickson had his ship heading northwest at 35 knots. Alone and in enemy waters with the sun rising, speed was now his best friend.
The depth problem existed, but was pretty well solved by early 1942 by Asiatic Fleet Skippers and Tender techs.
The Mk 10 was first deployed in 1915
and was up to Mod 3 by the 1930s (with Mod 1 & 2 being badly regarded).It would seem the USN was fixing quite a few problems on the MK 10 before work began on its replacement, Mk 14.
Edit added later: on further research, it seems that not all the changes were successful.
For example, increasing the warhead on the Mk 10 Mod 3 changed the balance and contributed to its deep running.
Similarly, the Mk 10 only used early exploders that were more robust than those built for the MK 14
(or at least were robust enough to cope with the Mk 10s lower impact speed).
Also, being contact only, these did not suffer the issues with the additional magnetic feature included later.
Operationally, the Mk 10 was both slower and shorter ranged than the Mk 14 at it's normal setting.
Further, the Mk14 had an extra slow setting for long range which the Mk 10 lacked.
Taking both into account I would expect that, on average, a Mk 10 was fired from closer to the target than a Mk 14.
Obviously problems with depth keeping and wandering off track are worse at a longer range.
(AIUI the Mk 10 and Mk 14 used the same guidance technology, the ULAN system
Apologies I have no info on how that works or how it compared to other designs)
However, as always it was human factors, not technical factors that were the most intractable.
The MK 14 was the new shiny toy and the Navy would not accept it could possibly have problems
while the MK 10 was old-fashioned and needed to be replaced ASAP.
AIUI as early as January 5 1942, the Bureau of Ordnance informed Commander, Submarines, Pacific Fleet the Mk 10 torpedoes ran four feet deeper than set.
Despite this USN senior commanders still disbelieved Captains reports of problems with the Mk 14 till Mid 42 and some did not pass them on to BuOrd. (Some Captains may even have been censured for bad performance )
As late as mid-1943 BuOrd was still denying some of the issues found with the Mk14
even those found by the ad-hoc tests made at Pearl which started in August 42, after ~ 1000 Mk 14 were expended.
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0500 Hours, 8 December 1942, Chittagong, India – Better weather meant flight operations and with the first Allied troops now ashore on Ramree Island, keeping the Japanese busy was essential. Most of the Allied effort was against Japanese troops in the Arakan hills that were in contact with the Indian and East African troops around Akyab. The 14th Indian Division was making another push against the 123rd Japanese Infantry Regiment in an attempt to reach Ramree Island via land while the troops of the 21st East African Brigade were launching spoiling attacks against the Japanese 55th Infantry Division opposing them, mainly to tie them down as opposed to expanding their defensive perimeter. In support of these efforts, 12 Vengeance dive bombers from No. 82 Squadron, 12 Hudsons from No. 62 Squadron, 12 Beaufighters from No. 27 Squadron, 12 Battles from No. 7 Squadron of the IAF, and 16 FAA Albacores from HMS Indomitable’s No. 821 and No. 827 Squadrons were tasked to spend the day bombing and strafing Japanese troops and in general making their lives as miserable as possible. The attacking aircraft were not receiving direct fighter escorts but would be flying under an umbrella of RAF Hurricanes and Mohawks from bases around Akyab and Cox’s Bazaar.
Although most of the air effort was aimed at supporting ground operations in the Arakan, 24 Wellingtons from No. 215 and No. 99 Squadrons were tasked to bomb Rangoon’s docks. No. 215 Squadron drew an escort of 16 RAAF Buffaloes from No. 25 Squadron with No. 99 Squadron’s bombers getting an escort of 16 FAA Fulmars from HMS Indomitable. The US 10th Air Force promised to make attacks against the forward Japanese airfields at Magwe and Myitkyina in the event the Japanese had managed sneak fighters in under the noses of Allied PRU aircraft. Patrolling offshore for Japanese submarines were additional Battles from No. 7 Squadron and Hudsons from No. 353 Squadron. The scale of the day’s operations highlighted the growing quantity and quality of Allied air forces in the region.
Although most of the air effort was aimed at supporting ground operations in the Arakan, 24 Wellingtons from No. 215 and No. 99 Squadrons were tasked to bomb Rangoon’s docks. No. 215 Squadron drew an escort of 16 RAAF Buffaloes from No. 25 Squadron with No. 99 Squadron’s bombers getting an escort of 16 FAA Fulmars from HMS Indomitable. The US 10th Air Force promised to make attacks against the forward Japanese airfields at Magwe and Myitkyina in the event the Japanese had managed sneak fighters in under the noses of Allied PRU aircraft. Patrolling offshore for Japanese submarines were additional Battles from No. 7 Squadron and Hudsons from No. 353 Squadron. The scale of the day’s operations highlighted the growing quantity and quality of Allied air forces in the region.
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0600 Hours, 8 December 1942, Mergui, Burma – The Japanese were launching attacks as well but their efforts were nowhere near as comprehensive. While the Allies did not realize it at the time, IJN and JAAF units in region were dealing with shortages of all types – fuel, spare parts, replacement aircraft, and replacement aircrews. The inability of Japanese maintenance personnel to improvise often meant that planes did not fly due to fairly minor amounts of damage or wear and tear.
However, like the Allies the Japanese were not about to pass up the opportunities afforded by a clear day and the Kanoya NAG at Mergui, Burma launched 18 Betties escorted by 21 Zeroes to attack Allied shipping concentrated near Akyab. As with previous attacks, the fighters would have to recover at JAAF bases near Rangoon before returning to Mergui.
However, like the Allies the Japanese were not about to pass up the opportunities afforded by a clear day and the Kanoya NAG at Mergui, Burma launched 18 Betties escorted by 21 Zeroes to attack Allied shipping concentrated near Akyab. As with previous attacks, the fighters would have to recover at JAAF bases near Rangoon before returning to Mergui.
0800 Hours, 8 December 1942, 200 Miles Northeast of Trincomalee, Indian Ocean – The destroyers HMS Scout, Spetsai, and Kountouriotis and the minelayer HNLMS Willen van der Zaan were shepherding 12 empty freighters back to Trincomalee. The captains of the escorts already knew their next mission, escorting the assault transports for the 29th Infantry Brigade to Ramree Island, due to depart on 9 December. That meant they could look forward to being in port for less than 24 hours.
Commander Tomiichi Muraoka of I-18 could not believe his luck as the convoy walked across his periscope at 4000 yards. He let loose a full salvo of eight Type 95 torpedoes, scoring direct hits on the American cargo ships SS Baker and SS Mayfield, leaving both ships sinking. The destroyer HMS Scout subjected I-18 to a withering barrage of depth charges aided by a Beaufort from No. 22 Squadron out of China Bay. Commander Tomiichi kept his cool and slowly pulled his boat away from his tormentors. The convoy continued on and the oil slick and debris on the surface convinced the escort captains they had probably sunk the submarine. Tomiichi did not bring his boat to the surface until 1600 hours, when he and his crew were down to less than an hour of breathable air. He had won the fight for his men, but I-18 was heavily damaged and Tomiichi who had been enjoying a successful patrol up to this point with three ships sunk reluctantly ordered his navigation officer to set a course for Penang.
Commander Tomiichi Muraoka of I-18 could not believe his luck as the convoy walked across his periscope at 4000 yards. He let loose a full salvo of eight Type 95 torpedoes, scoring direct hits on the American cargo ships SS Baker and SS Mayfield, leaving both ships sinking. The destroyer HMS Scout subjected I-18 to a withering barrage of depth charges aided by a Beaufort from No. 22 Squadron out of China Bay. Commander Tomiichi kept his cool and slowly pulled his boat away from his tormentors. The convoy continued on and the oil slick and debris on the surface convinced the escort captains they had probably sunk the submarine. Tomiichi did not bring his boat to the surface until 1600 hours, when he and his crew were down to less than an hour of breathable air. He had won the fight for his men, but I-18 was heavily damaged and Tomiichi who had been enjoying a successful patrol up to this point with three ships sunk reluctantly ordered his navigation officer to set a course for Penang.
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Who is Drew, you mean Drew Lock from the University of Missouri? I don't know, I'm a Browns fan so I had to give a nod our quarterback.
Note - for those who do not follow American Football, Baker Mayfield (hence SS Baker and SS Mayfield) is the quarterback for the Cleveland Browns of the NFL. He also won the Heisman Trophy while playing at the University of Oklahoma and was the first pick in the 2018 NFL Draft.
I’m a Saints fan....Drew Brees of course ....
Then again ther could be an SS Odell and a SS Jarvis....I’m excited to see them on the same team again...
Adding on to Zheng’s clarification Odell Beckham, Jr and Jarvis Landry were recently brought back together again by the Cleveland Browns....they played together at Louisiana State University...
Baker has some good targets to throw at!!!!!!!
Then again ther could be an SS Odell and a SS Jarvis....I’m excited to see them on the same team again...
Adding on to Zheng’s clarification Odell Beckham, Jr and Jarvis Landry were recently brought back together again by the Cleveland Browns....they played together at Louisiana State University...
Baker has some good targets to throw at!!!!!!!
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SsgtC
Banned
Can we not discuss the Odell Beckham Jr trade? Giants fan here...I’m a Saints fan....Drew Brees of course ....
Then again ther could be an SS Odell and a SS Jarvis....I’m excited to see them on the same team again...
Adding on to Zheng’s clarification Odell Beckham, Jr and Jarvis Landry were recently brought back together again by the Cleveland Browns....they played together at Louisiana State University...
Baker has some good targets to throw at!!!!!!!
0800 Hours, 8 December 1942, Colombo, Ceylon – Admiral Somerville was receiving an intelligence briefing before hopping on a plane for the short flight to China Bay. He was going to Trincomalee to see off the Ramree Island invasion task force due to depart the next morning, the main line of effort in what was now dubbed OPERATION ZIPPER.
Japanese submarines were continuing to make an annoyance of themselves and the weather had kept the enemy’s planes although Somerville was sure that was about to change. Regardless, while those were elements that were going to impose their costs on the Eastern Fleet’s operations and Somerville felt his forces had the threats more or less under control. His main concern was what the Japanese were up to in the Andaman Sea. His submarines had detected a significant uptick in Japanese convoys and his FECB analysts had picked up a great deal of traffic between shore commands in Burma, Java, Malaya, and the Andaman Islands. Unfortunately, the whiz kids were still trying to figure out what it all meant. The one thing they had teased out of the message traffic was that the 65th Infantry Brigade was on the move once again. Somerville remarked on how that unit seemed to get around it usually meant trouble since it was part of the Japanese attempt to retake Christmas Island in August and then it took part in the Japanese offensive on Timor against the Allied troops still clinging to their enclave there.
The intelligence team had figured out the 65th was large (three regiments in a single brigade) but lightly equipped formation making it easy to move and use to plug holes. The assessment was the two most likely destinations for the 65th were either Port Blair or Burma. If the brigade was going to Port Blair then it would be out of the picture, if it was going to Burma then that was potentially trouble for the Allies. Somerville told the FECB team to keep digging while a junior intelligence officer was told to get on the next plane bound for Calcutta to inform Allied commanders there that reinforcements may be on their way to Burma. With that Somerville took his leave and headed for Ratmalana to board his flight for China Bay.
Japanese submarines were continuing to make an annoyance of themselves and the weather had kept the enemy’s planes although Somerville was sure that was about to change. Regardless, while those were elements that were going to impose their costs on the Eastern Fleet’s operations and Somerville felt his forces had the threats more or less under control. His main concern was what the Japanese were up to in the Andaman Sea. His submarines had detected a significant uptick in Japanese convoys and his FECB analysts had picked up a great deal of traffic between shore commands in Burma, Java, Malaya, and the Andaman Islands. Unfortunately, the whiz kids were still trying to figure out what it all meant. The one thing they had teased out of the message traffic was that the 65th Infantry Brigade was on the move once again. Somerville remarked on how that unit seemed to get around it usually meant trouble since it was part of the Japanese attempt to retake Christmas Island in August and then it took part in the Japanese offensive on Timor against the Allied troops still clinging to their enclave there.
The intelligence team had figured out the 65th was large (three regiments in a single brigade) but lightly equipped formation making it easy to move and use to plug holes. The assessment was the two most likely destinations for the 65th were either Port Blair or Burma. If the brigade was going to Port Blair then it would be out of the picture, if it was going to Burma then that was potentially trouble for the Allies. Somerville told the FECB team to keep digging while a junior intelligence officer was told to get on the next plane bound for Calcutta to inform Allied commanders there that reinforcements may be on their way to Burma. With that Somerville took his leave and headed for Ratmalana to board his flight for China Bay.
I'm finally caught up on this epic tale!
Great work Zheng! You've shown well how one thing going the right way has redounded to the Allies favor in so many other ways. The dominoes fall...
Personalities do play a role, and Ralph Christie was the driver. The Mk 6 exploder was his baby, and he wasn't going to have any criticism of his creation.
Admiral Lockwood figured out the torpedoes were running deep when he was in Freemantle (May '42 to July '43 as COMSUBSOWESPAC). He bought a fishing net and shot torpedoes against a cliff and used the Skipjack to fire torpedoes at it. He found they ran 11 ft deep; set for a depth of 10 ft, they were piercing the net at 21.
In prewar testing BuOrd had used water in place of the warhead on the Mk 14 (no one wanting to 'waste' a $10,000 torpedo during the Depression. So we wasted them at war instead....) But the water didn't weigh as much as the Torpex, so with live warheads they ran deep. What did Jackie Fisher say, "The best scale for any test is 12 inches to 1 foot"? But that wasn't the end of the problems.
The magnetic exploder was supposed to detonate under a ship's keel. When ships are closer to the poles, their magnetic field is more spherical. Closer the equator, those fields flatten, like a disk. So the torpedo would encounter the magnetic field long before it got to the ship and detonate early.
In addition, the firing pin for the contact exploder were too heavy and on steep angle strikes, like 90 degrees, it would jam and never reach the detonator. When Admiral Lockwood got to Pearl Harbor, he set about fixing this as well. If you've ever seen the movie Operation Pacific with Ward Bond, John Wayne, and Patricia Neal, there's a scene where the crew of the fictional Thunderfish are dropping torpedo warheads from a crane onto concrete. It documents what was done at Pearl Harbor. One Charles Lockwood was a technical adviser on the movie, and his name can be found in the opening credits.
The solution was a firing pinned milled from a propeller of one of the Japanese planes downed at Pearl Harbor. ( I believe the one that struck Curtiss). So the IJN gave the USN the answer, the Americans just had to figure it out.
To return to Christie, when he was in charge of subs in Brisbane (April '42 to November '42) and later Freemantle (July '43 to November '44), he carried out a vendetta against captains who criticized the Mk 6, and crews were not allowed to deactivate it, as crews operating from Pearl Harbor were, from June '43 under Lockwood. As I recall he beached Fearless Freddy Warder for that reason. Crews operating from Freemantle had to be very careful about operating on the Mk 6, and they had return any torpedoes they brought back to 'factory new' lest their skipper face Christie's wrath.
All in all, the Mk 14 and Mk 6 should be studied in business schools and by militaries around the world for an example of how NOT to conduct project management.
Regards,
Great work Zheng! You've shown well how one thing going the right way has redounded to the Allies favor in so many other ways. The dominoes fall...
Personalities do play a role, and Ralph Christie was the driver. The Mk 6 exploder was his baby, and he wasn't going to have any criticism of his creation.
Admiral Lockwood figured out the torpedoes were running deep when he was in Freemantle (May '42 to July '43 as COMSUBSOWESPAC). He bought a fishing net and shot torpedoes against a cliff and used the Skipjack to fire torpedoes at it. He found they ran 11 ft deep; set for a depth of 10 ft, they were piercing the net at 21.
In prewar testing BuOrd had used water in place of the warhead on the Mk 14 (no one wanting to 'waste' a $10,000 torpedo during the Depression. So we wasted them at war instead....) But the water didn't weigh as much as the Torpex, so with live warheads they ran deep. What did Jackie Fisher say, "The best scale for any test is 12 inches to 1 foot"? But that wasn't the end of the problems.
The magnetic exploder was supposed to detonate under a ship's keel. When ships are closer to the poles, their magnetic field is more spherical. Closer the equator, those fields flatten, like a disk. So the torpedo would encounter the magnetic field long before it got to the ship and detonate early.
In addition, the firing pin for the contact exploder were too heavy and on steep angle strikes, like 90 degrees, it would jam and never reach the detonator. When Admiral Lockwood got to Pearl Harbor, he set about fixing this as well. If you've ever seen the movie Operation Pacific with Ward Bond, John Wayne, and Patricia Neal, there's a scene where the crew of the fictional Thunderfish are dropping torpedo warheads from a crane onto concrete. It documents what was done at Pearl Harbor. One Charles Lockwood was a technical adviser on the movie, and his name can be found in the opening credits.
The solution was a firing pinned milled from a propeller of one of the Japanese planes downed at Pearl Harbor. ( I believe the one that struck Curtiss). So the IJN gave the USN the answer, the Americans just had to figure it out.
To return to Christie, when he was in charge of subs in Brisbane (April '42 to November '42) and later Freemantle (July '43 to November '44), he carried out a vendetta against captains who criticized the Mk 6, and crews were not allowed to deactivate it, as crews operating from Pearl Harbor were, from June '43 under Lockwood. As I recall he beached Fearless Freddy Warder for that reason. Crews operating from Freemantle had to be very careful about operating on the Mk 6, and they had return any torpedoes they brought back to 'factory new' lest their skipper face Christie's wrath.
All in all, the Mk 14 and Mk 6 should be studied in business schools and by militaries around the world for an example of how NOT to conduct project management.
Regards,
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What is the state of Allied Ground Forces in the area? I mean it is nearly 1943, and while British are still heavily engaged in N.Africa, some reinforcements are bound to arrive soon. India is also ramping up its war effort, so some Indian troops are certainly going to appear as well.
Lastly, what of the armored forces availlable to the Allies? Some tanks should be availlable, if only because they are becoming obsolete against Germans, things like Matilda II and Valentine tanks.
Lastly, what of the armored forces availlable to the Allies? Some tanks should be availlable, if only because they are becoming obsolete against Germans, things like Matilda II and Valentine tanks.
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When are you colonials gonna learn to speak the Queens English properly. The term football is made up of two words. 1/ FOOT this indicates which part of the body you use.
2/ BALL this indicates what object is.
Ie the word football therefore involves moving a’ball’ with the ‘foot.
Football is a sport played by Real Madrid, Liverpool, Ajax Amsterdam, Rangers etc
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