April 1942 Alternate Indian Ocean

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It is unlikely the P40s will encounter the Japanese aircraft heading south. The other problem is that if the P40s get in to a combat situation, they may very well fins themselves without enough fuel to reach a base at either end.
 
On buying the Northern Territory from South Australia, the Commonwealth was supposed to build a rail link, similar to the Trans-Pacific to Darwin. Unfortunately, unlike the West Australians, SA did not get a target date. Hence a combination of the costs of WW 1, the Depression and opposition from business interests in Sydney and Melbourne meant it only got as far north as Alice and south to Katharine ( I think), at this point.
Just to add to the fun, there was a break of gauge at Terowie.
 
0800 Hours, 6 October, Darwin, Australia – Word of the incoming raid was reported by coast watchers on Bathurst Island and by the destroyer HMAS Stuart, on a routine local shake-down cruise after wrapping up repairs to her engines. RAAF pilots were already racing to their fighters when the radar stations first picked up the attacking aircraft 50 miles out. Captain Spurgeon on HMAS Stuart even reported two separate groups of aircraft approaching from the northwest at different altitudes.

The attack groups Spurgeon sighted were the Ki-21s flying at 20,000 feet, a standard bombing altitude for the Japanese and the Ki-48s coming in at 15,000 feet. While the defending fighters clawed for altitude, the radar operators and fighter controllers tried to sort the situation out. The 16 Spitfires of No. 452 Squadron that got airborne were vectored toward the lead attack group at high altitude while 16 P-39s of No. 24 Squadron were sent after the lower flying trailing group, and 10 Beaufighters of No. 31 Squadron, coming up from Batchelor Field further to the south were ordered to orbit just south of RAAF Base Darwin and pick off targets of opportunity.

The Japanese were prepared for a hot reception. The escorting Ki-43s were divided evenly between the two separate groups of bombers. After two Spitfires were forced to turn back with engine problems, the 14 fighters from No. 452 Squadron found themselves fully engaged by 15 Oscars and were unable to get through to the Ki-21s. Despite the extra training they had received on Ceylon, the Spitfire pilots still found the maneuverability of the smaller Japanese fighters to be something of a surprise while the Japanese pilots had trouble getting their guns on to the much faster Spitfires. The dogfight saw four Ki-43s shot down in exchange for two Spitfires with another Spitfire damaged. The Australians also managed to bring down two of the Ki-21s.

The P-39s from No. 24 Squadron had a similar experience. The Aircobra pilots were struggling to get up to 15,000 feet to engage the Ki-48s when they were set upon by the bombers’ 15 escorting Oscars. The Australian pilots instinctively jammed their throttles forward and put their fighters into shallow turning dives to ensure they maintained a speed and maneuvering advantage over their adversaries. Altitude quickly bled away and the Australians were able to maintain the upper hand in the ensuing furball and four Oscars were shot down in exchange for one P-39 down with a second damaged, but the Japanese fighter pilots did their job and kept the defending fighters off of the Ki-48s.

Free of harassment, the Ki-48s nosed over into dives and attacked shipping and targets on shore in Darwin’s harbor. Two coastal freighters and two ferries were sunk along with the 10,000 ton American merchant ship MV Pittsburgh Bob. The sloops HMAS Swan and HMAS Warrego and the French destroyer Leopard were all damaged while several buildings along the waterfront were set on fire. Two of the Ki-48s were brought down by anti-aircraft fire with one crashing into a large supply warehouse.

The Ki-21s attacking RAAF Base Darwin had a rougher time. After getting through the defending Spitfires with acceptable losses, they approached the airfield in formation at 20,000 feet where they were met by No. 31 Squadron’s Beaufighters that came at them head on with their nose mounted cannons blazing. The big twin engine fighters downed four Ki-21s and damaged two others and also disrupted the bombers’ formation as the normally highly disciplined Japanese pilots were unnerved by the unexpected attack. Expecting to jumped by escorting fighters at any moment, the rookie Beaufighter pilots dove for the deck.

With their tight formation disrupted, the bombing was not as accurate as it could have been. Still the Japanese managed to scatter over 90 250kg bombs around the base, destroying a parked Spitfire and damaging two others while a Hudson from No. 2 Squadron was also wrecked. Additionally, enough craters were made in the runway that the fighters were ordered to divert to auxiliary fields until repairs could be made.

Around the same time the JAAF was attacking Darwin, 12 Vals and six Zeroes attacked Drysdale River Mission. The Japanese had still not figured out that the Allies by and large stopped using the airfield as anything other than an emergency divert field for transport flights and patrol aircraft. On this day the deception was fed by the presence of a No. 13 Squadron Hudson that had landed earlier that morning with engine trouble and a DC-3, both of which were destroyed by direct hits from the attacking dive bombers. Several of the derelicts and mockups the Australians continued to maintain at the field were also hit causing the attacking Japanese pilots to claim up to 20 aircraft destroyed or damaged. One strafing Zero was brought down and its pilot was captured by local militia troops.
 
0900 Hours, 6 October, Wyndham, Australia – The last Japanese attack of the morning hit the airbase at Wyndham just before 0900 hours. Radar and Wyndham’s location further inland meant this raid had plenty of warning and 16 P-40s were on hand to greet the attackers. However, while the veteran pilots of No. 77 Squadron knew how to handle themselves against Zeroes, they were still outnumbered by the 24 escorting fighters meaning that like the other raids, they could not get through to the bombers. The dogfight resulted in an even exchange of three P-40s and three Zeroes shot down although all three Japanese pilots were lost while two of the Australian pilots managed to bail out of their fighters.

The 24 IJN Betties followed by 12 Kates were able to drop their 250kg high explosive bombs without interference. As usual, the formation wide bombing tactics of the Japanese were not devastating but they ensured that a number of targets around the airfield received some damage including two hangars and a repair shed while two parked P-40s were destroyed. Enough craters were put in the airfield that the airborne fighter pilots had a nervous hour after the raiders departed watching their gauges while emergency repairs were made to the runways. Anti-aircraft fire claimed one Kate and one Betty.
 
This was a maximum effort raid, and the results were basically mediocre. Losses were not too high but between losses and damage a third of the force is out of action for a while, of course all short down aircrew were lost, and the odds favor some that make it back dying or being out of action for some time. The Allied losses, while not negligible, are not serious. The airfields will be back in action quickly, and the shipping losses made good.
 
This was a maximum effort raid, and the results were basically mediocre. Losses were not too high but between losses and damage a third of the force is out of action for a while, of course all short down aircrew were lost, and the odds favor some that make it back dying or being out of action for some time. The Allied losses, while not negligible, are not serious. The airfields will be back in action quickly, and the shipping losses made good.
This is 1942 still, and transport/cargo shipping losses, it seems to me, are going to hurt at the moment.
The question is how do the losses compare when matched up to the original timeline, and if they are reduced as compared, how does that factor when the need to supply and maintain Christmas Island is taken into account?
It seems to me that Allied logistics are stretched fairly thin at the moment - especially with Operation Torch due to happen any day now, over in the Atlantic theatre - and will be for a while until the U-boats finally start to lose significantly on the built versus sunk graph, and the Mediterranean completely reopens.
 
And the Imperial Japanese forces can't afford replacements, are expending fuel worth more than solid gold, and eventually the quality of the pilots will sink, the aircraft will be unable to fly for want of fuel or will have been lost on totally fruitless raids.
6 P-39/40s.
3 Spitfires.
1 DC-3.
2 Hudsons.

6+ Ki-21 Sallys.
8 Ki-43 Oscars.
2 Ki-48 Lilys.
4 A6M Zeros.

12 losses, plus some damage against 20+ Japanese casualties.
 
12 losses, plus some damage against 20+ Japanese casualties.

That's a bit blinkered view ... the allies lost more than just planes
  • 5 valuable merchantmen sunk (presumably some with cargo still on board)
  • 3 escorts damaged,
  • degrading of facilities at ports and airfields
plus
  • unloaded materiel in the warehouses and stores
Not too bad a return against defended targets.
 
That's a bit blinkered view ... the allies lost more than just planes
  • 5 valuable merchantmen sunk (presumably some with cargo still on board)
  • 3 escorts damaged,
  • degrading of facilities at ports and airfields
plus
  • unloaded materiel in the warehouses and stores
Not too bad a return against defended targets.
But I think the point being made was the percentage of loss that's quickly replaceable plus that which is certainly replaceable just shortly thereafter. Japan can't afford the attrition game, even now when she's strongest...
 
But I think the point being made was the percentage of loss that's quickly replaceable plus that which is certainly replaceable just shortly thereafter. Japan can't afford the attrition game, even now when she's strongest...

Agreed that attrition favors the Allies in the long term but the phrase used was
totally fruitless raids.

and in the short term these raids may just be enough to gain the Japanese a breathing space in the immediate future

and as to Allies replacements in this theater in the immediate or even short term ?

Not so sure of that ...
even the Americans were far from full productivity in Q3 42 ... remember that the nickname for Watchtower OTL was "Shoestring"
and though the British/Empire have done better iTTL they are just as stretched ... perhaps even more than OTL by trying to do more

The time gained to Japan may be small and only applicable to this (relative) backwater
but as one of the great captains said "ask anything of me except time" ...
 
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With the Allies doing better in the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific - in this universe; might the defenses of Darwin be upgraded more than they were historically? (I did not realize how many times Darwin and Northern Australia came under Japanese air attacks)

This timeline isn't so much a case of the Allies having more resources available, so much as British naval commanders early on getting lucky, and using their skills and experience to remove a number of key Japanese assets from the board much earlier then OTL, thus giving allied forces a bit of wiggle room.

While Darwin can and likely will see at least some additional reinforcements ITTL, fact of the matter is Darwin, Christmas Island, Port C, etc are in many ways a secondary theater that could easily go from front line to backwater pretty fast. One of the biggest factors, which we've really not seen much lately, us the slightly better British position in Burma ITTL.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arakan_Campaign_1942–43

The British will not have to fight the disaster that was 1st Arakan since they still control much of that territory. That's not to say that operations in late 1942 and into 1943 will be easy or successful, but given slightly improved conditions in the region, the possibility of the British enjoying limited success can't be ruled out.
 
Agreed that attrition favors the Allies in the long term but the phrase used was


and in the short term these raids may just be enough to gain the Japanese a breathing space in the immediate future

and as to Allies replacements in this theater in the immediate or even short term ?

Not so sure of that ...
even the Americans were far from full productivity in Q3 42 ... remember that the nickname for Watchtower OTL was "Shoestring"
and though the British/Empire have done better iTTL they are just as stretched ... perhaps even more than OTL by trying to do more

The time gained to Japan may be small and only applicable to this (relative) backwater
but as one of the great captains said "ask anything of me except time" ...

This raid and the next couple are specifically meant to cover the arrival of convoy with a brigade of troops to Timor. The last time the Japanese brought a large convoy to Timor, the Allies hit the ships pretty hard while in port. They are trying to keep the Allies knocked back on their heels for a couple of days.
 
With the Allies doing better in the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific - in this universe; might the defenses of Darwin be upgraded more than they were historically? (I did not realize how many times Darwin and Northern Australia came under Japanese air attacks)

True but a lot of those were small scale night raids that did not do much damage. By mid-spring OTL and ITTL Allied air defenses around Darwin (particularly the 49th Fighter Group) started taking their measure of the Japanese during daylight raids.
 
1200 Hours, 6 October 1942, Christmas Island, Indian Ocean – No. 76 Squadron’s 23 P-40s were on the ground at Christmas Island along with both of the LB-30s. One of the P-40s had developed engine trouble along the way but the pilot had managed to putter along long enough to the point where he reached the small convoy on its way from Exmouth Gulf before ditching. He was now safely onboard the light cruiser USS Richmond.

While the garrison unloaded the LB-30s and wrestled the P-40s into shelters and revetments, two Martlets and two P-40s were armed and fueled to fly out to provide fighter cover to the approaching convoy, still about seven hours out.

On hand to greet the arriving Australian pilots was Admiral Somerville. He had arrived in an AIRCOS Hudson earlier that morning to continue his tour of Allied bases in the area and to consult with the commanders to help determine what they needed and what level of offensive operations they could support.

The arrival of No. 15 and No. 76 Squadrons fundamentally changed the makeup of the Phosphate Air Force. Instead of an ad-hoc collection of FAA aircraft and crews contributed by the Eastern Fleet’s carrier air groups with a few American planes and aircrews thrown in, the Phosphate Air Force now had a distinctly RAAF character and was built around a squadron structure that could draw support from Australia’s growing industrial base.
 
1200 Hours, 6 October 1942, Darwin, Australia – With most of the main runways repaired at RAAF Base Darwin, the fighters from No. 24 and No. 452 Squadrons were drifting back to their home station after receiving repairs and servicing at the divert fields. Already commanders and pilots were assessing the results from the morning’s engagement. Between planes shot down and destroyed on the ground along with damaged planes written off, the fighter squadrons had lost four Spitfires and two P-39s but only two pilots were killed, unlike the Japanese who almost always suffered the loss of the crew with the aircraft.

The tactical lessons of encountering Ki-43 Oscars for the first time reinforced all of the training and lectures they had received on Ceylon and from the 49th Fighter Group at Darwin with one returning pilot from No. 452 Squadron commenting, “The Yanks weren’t kidding, those bloody Jap fighters will send you home talking to yourself.”

Word had also been sent to Fremantle to get No. 457 Squadron’s Spitfires up to Darwin as fast as possible. Among other lessons, the raid had hammered home the need for Darwin to be covered by three full fighter squadrons. The Beaufighter pilots of No. 31 Squadron were also told that they had air defense duty along with their attack and long-range escort missions. Everyone agreed that if the single engine fighter squadrons could tie down the Japanese escorts, the big twin engine fighters could be deadly against Japanese bombers and that further refinement of interception tactics and procedures involving No. 31 Squadron was essential.
 
The comment about how an Oscar can send you home talking to yourself is an OTL comment from Lieutenant Sammy Pierce, a seven kill ace in P-40s and P-38s with the 49th Fighter Group.
 
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