April 1942 Alternate Indian Ocean
- Thread starter Zheng He
- Start date
- Status
Admiral Beez
Banned
Zheng, please don't let all these tangents distract you from continuing this fantastic timeline.
It's not a tangent, there is a reason I am doing this, you'll see...
Derek Pullem
Donor
Is there a chance that Dowding could be assigned to RAAF - builds on his experience of the defense of UK air space given recent bombing raids in Northern Australia. Alternatively (possibly as well as) have him assigned to oversee Australian aircraft procurement (as he did briefly for the UK).
1-31 August 1942, Eastern India and Burma – The summer of 1942 saw significant changes in the Allied command and force structures in the Bengal region of India and the areas of western Burma still held by the Allies in preparation for operations in the dry season of 1942 and 1943.
The first move saw the retirement of Lord Linlinthgow as Governor General and Viceroy of India and he was replaced by Wavell (newly promoted to Field Marshal). Wavell was in turn replaced as Commander-in-Chief India by General Sir Claude Auchinleck who was fired on 9 August as Commander-in-Chief Middle East by Churchill for a lack of offensive spirit despite considerable success in stopping the Afrika Korps during the summer of 1942. Auchinleck had previously served as Commander-in-Chief India and despite his anger with both Churchill and Field Marshall Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, he agreed to return to India and arrived on 28 August.
Another shuffle saw Lieutenant General George Giffard, Commander-in-Chief West Africa brought to India to take over the Eastern Army in India in place of the recently retired Lieutenant General Charles Broad. Giffard was replaced in West Africa by Lieutenant General Noel Irwin who had been commanding IV Corps in India and Burma. Initially, Irwin was slated to replace Broad but his abrasive personality concerned Wavell. Wavell also wanted Giffard in India due to his reputation as a master administrator and logistician who had single handedly led the development of key Allied lines of communication through West Africa along with training and equipping two West African infantry divisions for independent operations in rough terrain. Irwin’s ego was salved with a promotion to General (permanent promotion to Lieutenant General) and by telling him that his presence in Africa was desired due to the large French presence in Africa since Irwin had served in France with distinction in both wars and even held the Croix de guerre. The superlative Lieutenant General William Slim remained in command of XV Corps in the Arakan while Lieutenant General Geoffrey Scoones took over IV Corps along the India-Burma frontier in Manipur.
Wavell and all of the members of his leadership team recognized that significant offensive operations in Burma were not possible until the supporting infrastructure could be improved and their forces could be properly trained and equipped for warfare in Burma. Slim in particular felt the units were too reliant on road based transport and too large for effective command and control (he successfully advocated for a two-brigade light division structure). Confidence was also a major issue. Only Slim’s leadership had prevented the retreat from Burma the previous spring from turning into a route and while the successful defense of Akyab had helped puncture a growing myth of Japanese invincibility, Slim more than anyone else understood the fragile state of his troops’ belief in themselves.
The basic plan once the weather cleared was for IV Corps, based primarily around the 17th and 23rd Indian Divisions to focus on building roads, railroads, and facilities in Manipur, particularly near Imphal. IV Corps would also conduct limited offensive operations in the direction of the Chindwin River. The primary goal of any offensive operations by IV Corps would be primarily about building the troops’ confidence and developing tactics as opposed to seizing significant slices of territory.
The primary responsibility for the Allies’ planned offensive in Burma for the dry months of 1942 and 1943 would fall to Slim’s XV Corps. Slim planned an advance down to the coast of Burma combined with amphibious landings to capture Cheduba and Ramree Islands 100 miles to the southeast of Akyab. Capturing these islands would provide the Allies with defensible coastal strong points where they could build airfields within fighter range of Rangoon as well as access to a natural deep water harbor at Kyaukpyu. Slim’s XV Corps was organized into three divisions – 14th Indian (47th and 55th Indian Brigades), 11th East African (21st East African Brigade and 123rd Indian Brigade), and 1st Arakan Division (88th Indian Brigade and 1st Burmese Brigade).
The 1st Arakan Division was a newly established formation comprised of one of the less well trained Indian brigades and another brigade formed from surviving troops from Burma Corps. Its responsibility was garrison duty and defense of the Arakan northwest of Akyab. The 11th East African Division was also a newly established formation responsible for the defense of Akyab and the surrounding areas. The veteran 21st East African Brigade was due to return from rest and retraining on Ceylon and Slim planned to build a division around it. The Indian brigade was temporarily assigned to the division until additional brigades could be brought in from Africa. Slim fully expected the Japanese to make another try at capturing Akyab and he wanted the East African troops dug in and ready to repel the enemy. In fact, his operation depended on the Japanese attacking him first as he planned to strike to the south after the enemy’s attention was fixed on Akyab. The 14th Indian Division had the task of advancing down the coast to Ramree Island to join up with the amphibious assault elements. Slim was also told to expect the well trained 6th British Infantry Brigade (2nd Infantry Division) in early November 1942 and Slim planned to employ that unit as a corps reserve formation. All of Slim’s divisions were built around the light two brigade construct and depended on mountain artillery and jeep and mule based transport.
Of course, the success of this operation depended on the arrival of additional troops and shipping for the amphibious assault of Cheduba and Ramree Islands. With operations on Madagascar winding down, Wavell had been promised the amphibious trained 29th Infantry Brigade, No. 5 Royal Marine Commando, and an additional company of amphibious trained East African troops along with sufficient transport and assault shipping. The forces were due to depart from Diego Suarez in early September. The amphibious operations would also depend on an as yet undetermined level of support from the Eastern Fleet. The Indian Navy and its growing force of sloops, corvettes, and minesweepers had been doing a fine job of handling the patrol and escort responsibilities in the Bay of Bengal but it lacked the offensive punch to support an opposed landing and defend a beachhead against enemy air and naval attacks.
In addition to preparing his troops for operations in the upcoming dry season, Slim had also spent the summer getting a handle on a growing crisis in the Arakan. During the headlong retreat in the spring of 1942, a number of British commanders tried to institute a scorched earth policy in the expectation the whole area was about to fall to the Japanese. Colonial and army officials also confiscated coastal and riverine fishing boats and transport barges along with road transports (animal and vehicle) in order to prevent them from falling into the enemy’s hands. Slim put a stop to scorched earth tactics and he ordered confiscated boats, vehicles, and animals returned to their owners or if not possible, the owners were well compensated for their loss. Additionally, during the summer Slim put the troops from his 1st Arakan Division to work assisting with food storage and distribution. Slim realized that he could not support an offensive from a base where the civilian population was restless and starving and he had Wavell’s backing for all of these activities, as both men were concerned that the loss of Burma and its food production capacity could lead to even worse conditions than Bengal had experienced during the minor famine of 1940 and 1941.
Air defense infrastructure was improving but was still crude. During the monsoon months, superhuman efforts had seen the construction of several new airfields in the Arakan, Manipur, and Assam although overall the airfield construction program was behind schedule, although new radar sites and communications stations were proliferating throughout the region.
Both the quality and quantity of aircraft were increasing as well. Including units still training on Ceylon, No. 224 Group now possessed 11 fighter squadrons – eight equipped with Hurricanes (five with the cannon equipped Hurricane IICs), two with P-36 Mohawks, and No. 25 Squadron of the RAAF equipped with modified Brewster Buffaloes. No. 25 Squadron was specifically designated as a bomber escort squadron since its otherwise maligned Buffaloes were the longest legged Allied fighters in theater. For bomber and attack squadrons, No. 221 Group possessed three squadrons of Blenheim IVs, two squadrons of Lysanders, and one squadron of Hudsons. Additionally, No. 62 Squadron and its Hudsons were due to rotate back up to Burma from Port C by mid-September and No. 215 Squadron’s Wellingtons were scheduled to return to Burma from Ceylon. No. 221 Group was also standing up a second Wellington squadron (No. 99) and its first squadron of Vultee Vengeance dive bombers (No. 82). Both of these units were due to reach operational status by late September or early October. Additionally, when No. 11 Squadron re-deployed to Ceylon from Port C, there were plans in place to rotate crews from No. 221 Group’s Blenheim squadrons to Ceylon to train them in skip bombing tactics.
Balancing out the No. 224 Group and No. 221 Group were three Indian Air Force squadrons – No. 1 (Hurricane Is), No. 2 (Lysanders), and No. 7 (Fairey Battles) and 3 PRU with a mixed bag of specially equipped B-25s, Hurricane IIs, and Indian Blenheim Is. Transport duties fell to No. 31 Squadron equipped with DC-2s and DC-3s.
One leadership change that affected the Allied air forces in India and Burma was the arrival of Air Vice Marshal Quintin Brand to take over duties as Commander-in-Chief RAF India. Brand, a South African who had commanded No. 10 Group during the Battle of Britain had run afoul of too many in the chain of command due to this allegiance to Hugh Dowding and Keith Park and their conservative tactics. Wavell was replacing Air Vice Marshal Richard Peirse with Brand because he wanted a fighter pilot with experience in leading and coordinating air defense efforts due to concerns the enemy would begin a large-scale air offensive against the Arakan and even Calcutta as soon as the weather cleared. Peirse who had done and effective job of advocating for resources and building up the air force units in the area was sent to Karachi to manage to expanding Allied air depot and the air transport route that ran through there. In addition to a desire for an experienced fighter pilot in overall command of his air forces in the region, Wavell also made the change because he was concerned that Peirse could become an unwanted distraction. It was becomingly increasingly clear that he had a wandering eye and was not above pursuing the wives of his fellow officers.
Given the infrastructure limitations and the logistical challenges present in the India-Burma theater, Allied forces entered the end of the rainy season about as well as equipped and postured for offensive operations as they could reasonably be expected to be. Not surprisingly the Prime Minister was not impressed with Wavell’s conservatism calling it, “calling it very nice and useful nibbling.” However, events in the summer of 1942 including the fall of Tobruk, the possible starvation of Malta, Rommel’s drive into Egypt, and plans for the upcoming OPERATION TORCH distracted Churchill’s attention sufficiently that he was not able to demand a more ambitious agenda from Wavell.
The first move saw the retirement of Lord Linlinthgow as Governor General and Viceroy of India and he was replaced by Wavell (newly promoted to Field Marshal). Wavell was in turn replaced as Commander-in-Chief India by General Sir Claude Auchinleck who was fired on 9 August as Commander-in-Chief Middle East by Churchill for a lack of offensive spirit despite considerable success in stopping the Afrika Korps during the summer of 1942. Auchinleck had previously served as Commander-in-Chief India and despite his anger with both Churchill and Field Marshall Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, he agreed to return to India and arrived on 28 August.
Another shuffle saw Lieutenant General George Giffard, Commander-in-Chief West Africa brought to India to take over the Eastern Army in India in place of the recently retired Lieutenant General Charles Broad. Giffard was replaced in West Africa by Lieutenant General Noel Irwin who had been commanding IV Corps in India and Burma. Initially, Irwin was slated to replace Broad but his abrasive personality concerned Wavell. Wavell also wanted Giffard in India due to his reputation as a master administrator and logistician who had single handedly led the development of key Allied lines of communication through West Africa along with training and equipping two West African infantry divisions for independent operations in rough terrain. Irwin’s ego was salved with a promotion to General (permanent promotion to Lieutenant General) and by telling him that his presence in Africa was desired due to the large French presence in Africa since Irwin had served in France with distinction in both wars and even held the Croix de guerre. The superlative Lieutenant General William Slim remained in command of XV Corps in the Arakan while Lieutenant General Geoffrey Scoones took over IV Corps along the India-Burma frontier in Manipur.
Wavell and all of the members of his leadership team recognized that significant offensive operations in Burma were not possible until the supporting infrastructure could be improved and their forces could be properly trained and equipped for warfare in Burma. Slim in particular felt the units were too reliant on road based transport and too large for effective command and control (he successfully advocated for a two-brigade light division structure). Confidence was also a major issue. Only Slim’s leadership had prevented the retreat from Burma the previous spring from turning into a route and while the successful defense of Akyab had helped puncture a growing myth of Japanese invincibility, Slim more than anyone else understood the fragile state of his troops’ belief in themselves.
The basic plan once the weather cleared was for IV Corps, based primarily around the 17th and 23rd Indian Divisions to focus on building roads, railroads, and facilities in Manipur, particularly near Imphal. IV Corps would also conduct limited offensive operations in the direction of the Chindwin River. The primary goal of any offensive operations by IV Corps would be primarily about building the troops’ confidence and developing tactics as opposed to seizing significant slices of territory.
The primary responsibility for the Allies’ planned offensive in Burma for the dry months of 1942 and 1943 would fall to Slim’s XV Corps. Slim planned an advance down to the coast of Burma combined with amphibious landings to capture Cheduba and Ramree Islands 100 miles to the southeast of Akyab. Capturing these islands would provide the Allies with defensible coastal strong points where they could build airfields within fighter range of Rangoon as well as access to a natural deep water harbor at Kyaukpyu. Slim’s XV Corps was organized into three divisions – 14th Indian (47th and 55th Indian Brigades), 11th East African (21st East African Brigade and 123rd Indian Brigade), and 1st Arakan Division (88th Indian Brigade and 1st Burmese Brigade).
The 1st Arakan Division was a newly established formation comprised of one of the less well trained Indian brigades and another brigade formed from surviving troops from Burma Corps. Its responsibility was garrison duty and defense of the Arakan northwest of Akyab. The 11th East African Division was also a newly established formation responsible for the defense of Akyab and the surrounding areas. The veteran 21st East African Brigade was due to return from rest and retraining on Ceylon and Slim planned to build a division around it. The Indian brigade was temporarily assigned to the division until additional brigades could be brought in from Africa. Slim fully expected the Japanese to make another try at capturing Akyab and he wanted the East African troops dug in and ready to repel the enemy. In fact, his operation depended on the Japanese attacking him first as he planned to strike to the south after the enemy’s attention was fixed on Akyab. The 14th Indian Division had the task of advancing down the coast to Ramree Island to join up with the amphibious assault elements. Slim was also told to expect the well trained 6th British Infantry Brigade (2nd Infantry Division) in early November 1942 and Slim planned to employ that unit as a corps reserve formation. All of Slim’s divisions were built around the light two brigade construct and depended on mountain artillery and jeep and mule based transport.
Of course, the success of this operation depended on the arrival of additional troops and shipping for the amphibious assault of Cheduba and Ramree Islands. With operations on Madagascar winding down, Wavell had been promised the amphibious trained 29th Infantry Brigade, No. 5 Royal Marine Commando, and an additional company of amphibious trained East African troops along with sufficient transport and assault shipping. The forces were due to depart from Diego Suarez in early September. The amphibious operations would also depend on an as yet undetermined level of support from the Eastern Fleet. The Indian Navy and its growing force of sloops, corvettes, and minesweepers had been doing a fine job of handling the patrol and escort responsibilities in the Bay of Bengal but it lacked the offensive punch to support an opposed landing and defend a beachhead against enemy air and naval attacks.
In addition to preparing his troops for operations in the upcoming dry season, Slim had also spent the summer getting a handle on a growing crisis in the Arakan. During the headlong retreat in the spring of 1942, a number of British commanders tried to institute a scorched earth policy in the expectation the whole area was about to fall to the Japanese. Colonial and army officials also confiscated coastal and riverine fishing boats and transport barges along with road transports (animal and vehicle) in order to prevent them from falling into the enemy’s hands. Slim put a stop to scorched earth tactics and he ordered confiscated boats, vehicles, and animals returned to their owners or if not possible, the owners were well compensated for their loss. Additionally, during the summer Slim put the troops from his 1st Arakan Division to work assisting with food storage and distribution. Slim realized that he could not support an offensive from a base where the civilian population was restless and starving and he had Wavell’s backing for all of these activities, as both men were concerned that the loss of Burma and its food production capacity could lead to even worse conditions than Bengal had experienced during the minor famine of 1940 and 1941.
Air defense infrastructure was improving but was still crude. During the monsoon months, superhuman efforts had seen the construction of several new airfields in the Arakan, Manipur, and Assam although overall the airfield construction program was behind schedule, although new radar sites and communications stations were proliferating throughout the region.
Both the quality and quantity of aircraft were increasing as well. Including units still training on Ceylon, No. 224 Group now possessed 11 fighter squadrons – eight equipped with Hurricanes (five with the cannon equipped Hurricane IICs), two with P-36 Mohawks, and No. 25 Squadron of the RAAF equipped with modified Brewster Buffaloes. No. 25 Squadron was specifically designated as a bomber escort squadron since its otherwise maligned Buffaloes were the longest legged Allied fighters in theater. For bomber and attack squadrons, No. 221 Group possessed three squadrons of Blenheim IVs, two squadrons of Lysanders, and one squadron of Hudsons. Additionally, No. 62 Squadron and its Hudsons were due to rotate back up to Burma from Port C by mid-September and No. 215 Squadron’s Wellingtons were scheduled to return to Burma from Ceylon. No. 221 Group was also standing up a second Wellington squadron (No. 99) and its first squadron of Vultee Vengeance dive bombers (No. 82). Both of these units were due to reach operational status by late September or early October. Additionally, when No. 11 Squadron re-deployed to Ceylon from Port C, there were plans in place to rotate crews from No. 221 Group’s Blenheim squadrons to Ceylon to train them in skip bombing tactics.
Balancing out the No. 224 Group and No. 221 Group were three Indian Air Force squadrons – No. 1 (Hurricane Is), No. 2 (Lysanders), and No. 7 (Fairey Battles) and 3 PRU with a mixed bag of specially equipped B-25s, Hurricane IIs, and Indian Blenheim Is. Transport duties fell to No. 31 Squadron equipped with DC-2s and DC-3s.
One leadership change that affected the Allied air forces in India and Burma was the arrival of Air Vice Marshal Quintin Brand to take over duties as Commander-in-Chief RAF India. Brand, a South African who had commanded No. 10 Group during the Battle of Britain had run afoul of too many in the chain of command due to this allegiance to Hugh Dowding and Keith Park and their conservative tactics. Wavell was replacing Air Vice Marshal Richard Peirse with Brand because he wanted a fighter pilot with experience in leading and coordinating air defense efforts due to concerns the enemy would begin a large-scale air offensive against the Arakan and even Calcutta as soon as the weather cleared. Peirse who had done and effective job of advocating for resources and building up the air force units in the area was sent to Karachi to manage to expanding Allied air depot and the air transport route that ran through there. In addition to a desire for an experienced fighter pilot in overall command of his air forces in the region, Wavell also made the change because he was concerned that Peirse could become an unwanted distraction. It was becomingly increasingly clear that he had a wandering eye and was not above pursuing the wives of his fellow officers.
Given the infrastructure limitations and the logistical challenges present in the India-Burma theater, Allied forces entered the end of the rainy season about as well as equipped and postured for offensive operations as they could reasonably be expected to be. Not surprisingly the Prime Minister was not impressed with Wavell’s conservatism calling it, “calling it very nice and useful nibbling.” However, events in the summer of 1942 including the fall of Tobruk, the possible starvation of Malta, Rommel’s drive into Egypt, and plans for the upcoming OPERATION TORCH distracted Churchill’s attention sufficiently that he was not able to demand a more ambitious agenda from Wavell.
An interlude for Burma to get everyone (including myself) up to speed on what is going there with the rainy season coming to an end.
The most significant POD is Linlinthgow retiring a year early. This moves Wavell up a year early and gets Auchinleck in position a year early (he was in India and unemployed for a year OTL). Giffard did take over as commander Eastern Army in 1943 after Irwin was fired, ITTL Giffard he is requested early and Irwin is shuttled off to West Africa (a position he held after the war).
Slim and Scoones have their OTL corps commands although ITTL Slim will command in the Arakan for the offensive instead of getting pushed aside by Irwin.
Having IV Corps spend the dry season of 1942 and 1943 building infrastructure is straight OTL. The infrastructure and logistical demands of the theater limited operations more than anything else.
OTL the 29th Brigade and No. 5 Commando were supposed to go to Burma for an amphibious assault on Akyab in conjunction with the 14th Indian Division's overland advance but the situation on Madagascar did not clear up in time for their re-deployment. ITTL since Madagascar was cleared of Vichy forces and stabilized by mid-August 1942 so they will be made available.
Since the Allies held Akyab ITTL, the coastal offensive will be aimed at the next relevant target - Ramree Island.
Most of the units I have listed are OTL with a few slight modifications and additions such as the availability of the Indian squadrons and the standing up of the 11th East African Division a few months early.
Slim's light division construct based around light transport is straight OTL. One of his main criticisms of the failed offensive in the Arakan in 1942 and 1943 was that the divisions had too many brigades attached making command and control impossible.
Peirse and his wandering eye did not get sent away until 1944 OTL (Jesse Auchinleck). ITL it happens a little earlier. I made up the part about Wavell wanting a fighter pilot to lead his air forces but that is not unrealistic given that Allied air forces in the area were fighter heavy.
The quote from Churchill is from the OTL.
The most significant POD is Linlinthgow retiring a year early. This moves Wavell up a year early and gets Auchinleck in position a year early (he was in India and unemployed for a year OTL). Giffard did take over as commander Eastern Army in 1943 after Irwin was fired, ITTL Giffard he is requested early and Irwin is shuttled off to West Africa (a position he held after the war).
Slim and Scoones have their OTL corps commands although ITTL Slim will command in the Arakan for the offensive instead of getting pushed aside by Irwin.
Having IV Corps spend the dry season of 1942 and 1943 building infrastructure is straight OTL. The infrastructure and logistical demands of the theater limited operations more than anything else.
OTL the 29th Brigade and No. 5 Commando were supposed to go to Burma for an amphibious assault on Akyab in conjunction with the 14th Indian Division's overland advance but the situation on Madagascar did not clear up in time for their re-deployment. ITTL since Madagascar was cleared of Vichy forces and stabilized by mid-August 1942 so they will be made available.
Since the Allies held Akyab ITTL, the coastal offensive will be aimed at the next relevant target - Ramree Island.
Most of the units I have listed are OTL with a few slight modifications and additions such as the availability of the Indian squadrons and the standing up of the 11th East African Division a few months early.
Slim's light division construct based around light transport is straight OTL. One of his main criticisms of the failed offensive in the Arakan in 1942 and 1943 was that the divisions had too many brigades attached making command and control impossible.
Peirse and his wandering eye did not get sent away until 1944 OTL (Jesse Auchinleck). ITL it happens a little earlier. I made up the part about Wavell wanting a fighter pilot to lead his air forces but that is not unrealistic given that Allied air forces in the area were fighter heavy.
The quote from Churchill is from the OTL.
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you may find the official despatch of interest
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/LondonGazette/38269.pdf
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/LondonGazette/38269.pdf
Would have thought that Malta is too important to divert Keith Park away from it. Malta is key to the effort to wreck Rommel's supplies being shipped to North Africa, and Churchill has invested a lot in keeping Malta fighting.
Was that about Wavell in North Africa and 'Battleaxe'?
No, that is what he said about Wavell's plans for Burma for the dry season of 42 and 43 - limited offensives IVO Imphal and an offensive down the coast to capture Akyab. Churchill favored an ambitious series of operations aimed at capturing Rangoon which were completely divorced from reality.
A couple of other notes:
It is likely that in this situation the Japanese will aim an offensive at Akyab, failing to capture it in May was the only failure of an otherwise brilliant campaign and it presents a real problem for them going forward.
Slim putting a stop to scorched earth tactics in the Arakan and returning confiscated fishing boats and transport to the locals will go a long way toward mitigating the effects of the Bengal Famine. It won't prevent it completely because the cyclone and tidal waves and the crop fungus will still happen but his efforts will certainly help.
The 1st Arakan Division is my creation. The 88th Indian Brigade was a second line formation and was used OTL the way it is being used ITTL. Given the successful hold of the Arakan I can see Slim assembling a second brigade for similar purposes to have a division to serve as a garrison and defensive formation.
It is likely that in this situation the Japanese will aim an offensive at Akyab, failing to capture it in May was the only failure of an otherwise brilliant campaign and it presents a real problem for them going forward.
Slim putting a stop to scorched earth tactics in the Arakan and returning confiscated fishing boats and transport to the locals will go a long way toward mitigating the effects of the Bengal Famine. It won't prevent it completely because the cyclone and tidal waves and the crop fungus will still happen but his efforts will certainly help.
The 1st Arakan Division is my creation. The 88th Indian Brigade was a second line formation and was used OTL the way it is being used ITTL. Given the successful hold of the Arakan I can see Slim assembling a second brigade for similar purposes to have a division to serve as a garrison and defensive formation.
Yeah, but they don't know that yet. The PEDESTAL and PODIUM convoys were overall successful but Rommel is still deep in Egypt and Montgomery and Alexander just took over their jobs.
In Churchill's defence, the Germans (and Japanese) had had a remarkable amount of success in battles up till that point in the OTL with operations which might have earned the qualifier 'divorced from reality' before they fought them and won anyway (Norway, Fall of France, Crete, Barbarossa, Rommel's counterattacks in Libya and capture of Tobruk, the Japanese (edit: seemingly) just about everywhere for the first few months of 1941 (including Singapore and Southeast Asia - although in this timeline on that last one the Japanese obviously haven't quite made a clean sweep of Burma)). I can imagine Churchill getting a bit impatient and frustrated and thinking 'If they can do it, then why on Earth can't we? We were doing it to the Italians in North Africa, after all, before the Germans arrived to spoil things...'
2300 Hours, 19 August 1942, Dili, Timor – The eight Australian commandoes had successfully penetrated Dili’s harbor. Most of the transports from the reinforcement convoy bringing the reconnaissance regiment of the 48th Infantry Division to Dili had departed. However, there were still several ships in port including two merchant ships damaged during the air raid undergoing repairs along with the transport Aber Maru, the minesweeper Kaiho Maru, an inter-island steamer, the destroyers Sazanamti and Inazuma, and the second line destroyers Sanae, and Kuratake. The commandoes managed to attach limpet mines to the damaged merchant ships, the steamer, the Aber Maru, and Kaiho Maru. At 0200 hours, the mines exploded and all five of the ships were sunk or heavily damaged. By 0500 hours all eight of the commandoes were back in their concealment location off the beach and after nightfall on 20 August they were paddling back to Artauro Island.
0800 Hours, 20 August 1942, Surabaya, Java – An irate Vice Admiral Takahashi had just been briefed on the results of OPERATION JAYWICK. The only consolation was that it could have been worse. If the Allied raiders had arrived four days earlier when most of the convoy was in port the results could have been disastrous. The remaining transports and escorts for the 48th Infantry Division were due to arrive in Surabaya from Tjilatjap that night and were scheduled to sail during the late morning and early afternoon hours of 23 August. As much as Takahsashi did not want to, he ordered the convoy’s destination changed from Dili to Koepang. The original plan was to disembark Dili because it was much closer to the portion of Timor where the Allied forces were still operating. However, the combination of the air raid four days earlier and the commando raid the previous night demonstrated that Dili was too exposed and it was therefore preferable to unload the troops and supplies in Koepang, almost 200 miles to the southwest. While this would delay the timetable for operations against the Allied troops making a nuisance of themselves in eastern Timor, it could not be avoided.
An additional result of OPERATION JAYWICK was the 48th Division’s reconnaissance regiment began aggressively pushing out from Dili to expand its perimeter. The local Japanese commanders believed the commandoes who penetrated the harbor had come across the island and it did not occur to anybody that they had come by sea. The increased patrols by the Japanese had already forced the monitoring team from Lancer Force watching the harbor and the airfield to beat a hasty retreat into the interior of the island.
An additional result of OPERATION JAYWICK was the 48th Division’s reconnaissance regiment began aggressively pushing out from Dili to expand its perimeter. The local Japanese commanders believed the commandoes who penetrated the harbor had come across the island and it did not occur to anybody that they had come by sea. The increased patrols by the Japanese had already forced the monitoring team from Lancer Force watching the harbor and the airfield to beat a hasty retreat into the interior of the island.
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