Apollo without the Moon

Another question/idea/concept is that the Air Force drags it's feet enough on modifications to the Titan that NASA might just choose to use the Saturn 1 to launch Gemini instead. Which is a HUGE 'waste' of the booster but damn would it be impressive! And then be pretty easy to 'add' a longer duration space outpost element early on.
I've thought about that as a way to justify not only getting something resembling Big G but get it ahead of schedule. As if you've got that much booster, it really is a shame to waste two-thirds of its throw-weight. Easy enough to fatten-up the service module to take advantage of some of that six or so tons of spare payload capacity available and it's something that can be done (relatively) quickly. The lessons learned from Gemini start getting thrown into a blender when the Gemini spacecraft can afford the luxury of an airlock, for example.

The "Apollo" capsule WILL actually likely be a capsule all other factors being the same but there's a chance you'd get the M1 shape instead which could be made reusable (in a broad sense) and there might even be more incentive for Dynasoar TTL. All in all though it's likely TTL's Saturn/Apollo would have similar flight operations and schedule as per R7Soyuz OTL at the very least.
I think in a non-Moonshot TL, the GE Apollo concept is my favorite alternative to play around with. No reason it can't fly from the mid-Sixties until today if you're so inclined and the myriad lessons learned from operating it can easily be used to justify work on a spaceplane.
 
The problem is you are not getting all this orbital stuff (new rockets, new space craft, space stations orbit transfer vehicals etc) on the 1950s budget. And without the space race you are not getting a bigger budget.
 
The problem is you are not getting all this orbital stuff (new rockets, new space craft, space stations orbit transfer vehicals etc) on the 1950s budget. And without the space race you are not getting a bigger budget.
A Space Race is probably unavoidable, given the nature of the Cold War at the time and the Soviet inclination to pursue propaganda victories. As even if you butterfly away Sputnik, sooner or later they'd do something that gave the appearance they were technologically superior to the United States in space and, once that happens, the game is afoot. The Space Race as we know it is a far more contingent thing and so it's quite possible for alternative paths to be taken. The Moonshot by itself was a fairly low-probability event, requiring a fairly convoluted causality chain to enter the conversation (the U.S. being beaten twice by the Soviets for space-related firsts and the Kennedy Administration's own desperation for a win against the Communists after the Bay of Pigs) and even more chance combination of circumstances to sustain itself to completion (the martyring and canonization of Saint JFK plus LBJ's desire for a Marshall Plan for the South).
 
The problem is you are not getting all this orbital stuff (new rockets, new space craft, space stations orbit transfer vehicals etc) on the 1950s budget. And without the space race you are not getting a bigger budget.
That isn't necessarily a bad thing. The mind set stays closer to NACA - basic research and experimental design for private industry to draw on. It's already been noted that reusable rockets are likely to come sooner (in some form) simply because they can't afford to go throwing away expensive hardware like there's no tomorrow. No blank checks for a national priority mission.
 
That isn't necessarily a bad thing. The mind set stays closer to NACA - basic research and experimental design for private industry to draw on. It's already been noted that reusable rockets are likely to come sooner (in some form) simply because they can't afford to go throwing away expensive hardware like there's no tomorrow. No blank checks for a national priority mission.
And yet IRL reusable rockets didn't become very popular until fairly recently, even for countries that weren't doing national priority missions (I mean, aside from national defense missions). Ariane in particular is a strong counterexample, because between the 1980s and the 2010s it was probably the most commercially successful rocket--yet it was never intended to be reused, nor was reuse apparently ever really seriously studied. It's hard to argue that ESA or EADS were doing a "national priority mission" at that point. Limited budgets cut both ways, because while on the one hand they create incentives to save money, sometimes those incentives are perverse because they incentivize not spending on things that would save money in the long run since it would cost too much now. Essentially the "Vines boot" theory applied to capital goods. Another example of this would be the idea of liquid flyback boosters of some kind for Space Shuttle, which were studied over and over again from the 1960s to the 1990s, but never got implemented even though they were projected to reduce per-mission cost. Why? Because the cost of developing them in the first place was deemed to be too high.

Something similar is likely to be the case here. Saturn I may well be tested for reuse, but there's a good chance that NASA or the Air Force or both look at the actual costs of implementing reuse--modifying the production stages, acquiring necessary hardware and equipment (e.g., ships to recover the stages with), refurbishment facilities, and so on--and decide that they can't really afford to do it even if it would reduce launch costs. Instead, they'll muddle on with single-use rockets. Same with Europe, Japan, etc. Eventually someone will probably break out of this paradigm and actually do a reusable rocket that works, but that might not be for a long time, and even then they might go down a number of blind alleys (SSTO, extreme hydrolox usage, upper-stage first like the Shuttle, etc.) first.
 
I've thought about that as a way to justify not only getting something resembling Big G but get it ahead of schedule. As if you've got that much booster, it really is a shame to waste two-thirds of its throw-weight. Easy enough to fatten-up the service module to take advantage of some of that six or so tons of spare payload capacity available and it's something that can be done (relatively) quickly. The lessons learned from Gemini start getting thrown into a blender when the Gemini spacecraft can afford the luxury of an airlock, for example.

I'd love that outcome, but I'd point out that you still have "Apollo" in the wings and (just like OTL) as the "program of record" it's likely going to be the main focus. Still I think a Big-G outcome would be fun to make happen :)

I think in a non-Moonshot TL, the GE Apollo concept is my favorite alternative to play around with. No reason it can't fly from the mid-Sixties until today if you're so inclined and the myriad lessons learned from operating it can easily be used to justify work on a spaceplane.

Obviously since the Soyuz is still going :)

I'm partial to the 410 but then again it was going to try to insert a controllable return vehicle which to me is always a plus.

The problem is you are not getting all this orbital stuff (new rockets, new space craft, space stations orbit transfer vehicals etc) on the 1950s budget. And without the space race you are not getting a bigger budget.

As said there'd still be a "race" just not the need for an overwhelming response we got. But you're correct there would likely be FAR less budget than we got OTL but that's not really a bad thing given it lead to NASA being almost constitutionally and definitely organizationally unable to operate under a reduced budget and support framework. Some sectors of NASA didn't believe that such support and budget were going to last BECAUSE they were used to budget fluctuations and hot and cold support. Specifically the older NACA elements and Marshall (specifically WvB and team) were used to operating on a shoestring and were quite able to function on such budgets by being innovative.

I think that the budget and support would be a bit more steady as it was going in that direction early on. (The new NASA management was after all the old NACA management for the most part) It would likely have been less than 1% of the Federal budget at maximum and likely about half that 'steadily' as time went on as it would likely have less need or planning for larger projects and infrastructure. (As an example I suspect the Saturn 1 launch pads and operations would have remained a lot smaller and more concentrated. I doubt Houston is as big a deal in such a timeline and more operations are concentrated in Florida)

That isn't necessarily a bad thing. The mind set stays closer to NACA - basic research and experimental design for private industry to draw on. It's already been noted that reusable rockets are likely to come sooner (in some form) simply because they can't afford to go throwing away expensive hardware like there's no tomorrow. No blank checks for a national priority mission.

Eh, I'll get more into this in my reply to Workable Goblin but... :)

One possible 'path' is that NASA could be politically forced to use legacy military systems instead of developing their own. I mentioned that Saturn was pretty much literally on the pad by the possible POD but Saturn had been hampered by Air Force politicking since the mid-50s so it's not inconceivable (and actually likely but NASA has a few tricks available to them) that would continue enough to have an effect.

I've talked about there being a possible timeline in a situation like this where the Air Force gets enough support to build something like the SLS: 1960 system and that could easily be 'mandated' (as a cost saving measure) for ALL US launches. (After all that's essentially how the Shuttle was sold) With less money to go around the private industry has more incentive to get more cut-throat and lets face it no matter how the "Space Race" turns out THE main factor is always going to be military preparedness and use so missiles essentially. (Which brings up the possibility of a totally Titan based space program :) )

There still IS a "blank check" national priority it's just NOT the 'civilian' side of the house :)

Randy
 
And yet IRL reusable rockets didn't become very popular until fairly recently, even for countries that weren't doing national priority missions (I mean, aside from national defense missions). Ariane in particular is a strong counterexample, because between the 1980s and the 2010s it was probably the most commercially successful rocket--yet it was never intended to be reused, nor was reuse apparently ever really seriously studied. It's hard to argue that ESA or EADS were doing a "national priority mission" at that point. Limited budgets cut both ways, because while on the one hand they create incentives to save money, sometimes those incentives are perverse because they incentivize not spending on things that would save money in the long run since it would cost too much now. Essentially the "Vines boot" theory applied to capital goods. Another example of this would be the idea of liquid flyback boosters of some kind for Space Shuttle, which were studied over and over again from the 1960s to the 1990s, but never got implemented even though they were projected to reduce per-mission cost. Why? Because the cost of developing them in the first place was deemed to be too high.

Something similar is likely to be the case here. Saturn I may well be tested for reuse, but there's a good chance that NASA or the Air Force or both look at the actual costs of implementing reuse--modifying the production stages, acquiring necessary hardware and equipment (e.g., ships to recover the stages with), refurbishment facilities, and so on--and decide that they can't really afford to do it even if it would reduce launch costs. Instead, they'll muddle on with single-use rockets. Same with Europe, Japan, etc. Eventually someone will probably break out of this paradigm and actually do a reusable rocket that works, but that might not be for a long time, and even then they might go down a number of blind alleys (SSTO, extreme hydrolox usage, upper-stage first like the Shuttle, etc.) first.

Oh 'reusable' rockets were VERY popular in real life in OTL :) Heck even the military was looking at things like trying to recover and reuse the Titan stages. (Apparently surprised almost everyone how often something not designed to be recovered had to be damaged even more before the damn thing sank :) )

On the other hand for a certain launch rate it had and has been shown to be vastly more economical to actually throw away your boosters every flight than to reuse them. Of course the 'tipping' point is rather flexible depending on your assumptions as we all well know :)

Saturn 1 WAS designed to be recovered but as you note the cost of doing so was seen by DARPA (the initial sponsor) as not being cost effective over the number of flights planned which was initially very few. Once NASA takes over and the "race" begins to ramp up the option actually looks better, especially if you look to a higher flight rate which was quite common at the time. (Part of the issue with letting people who actually 'fans' of a thing actually run your programs is they have some preconceived ideas and bias' that they bring to the table with them :) )

On the Gripping hand as you say they might call it a wash due to the needed initial cost for the infrastructure and capability for getting to recovery and reuse so there's that also. Marshall (and DARPA actually) had done a lot of the preliminary work on what was needed for recovery and reuse of Saturn by the time it first flew and in the case of the US specifically they had enough already existing infrastructure and capability that they considered that initial cost pretty much affordable in terms of implementation. But at the same time mission and other factors were changing too as Saturn transitioned to full NASA operations and with a new administration incoming it was a question of where "policy" would go.

My 'hope' of course is that WvB and company would push harder for recovery at the very least and that had both practical and operational grounds early on as the telemetry and testing issues were a lot easier if you recovered the booster for examination after flight and they felt (and could show) that doing so would not engender a huge operational or cost impact. (More than DARPA was willing to pay but possibly affordable under the NASA umbrella, but a HUGE amount depended on NASA pulling off something to pull the US even with the Soviets in the Space Race. OTL they flubbed that one by being "too" cautious but in a different timeline....) One of the things is that once that ball is rolling (as we've somewhat seen OTL currently but as we'll all note it's NOT a sudden "paradigm shift" as reusability advocates always said it would be so there's room for error :) ) it will tend to spread outwards and in and of itself affect the aforementioned "policy" over time.

Europe might just see a need to 'one-up' the Americans and Soviets if given the opening after all and while I feel it wouldn't be that much of an effect on the USSR's program (they were after all facing different circumstances and operational issues) it could easily be a short-term "win" in the "Space Race" for the US on some level.

My internal jury is still out on this one and I have notes and ideas either way, but I'm pretty confident that at least in the US there would be an early push for recovery and reuse if only for the people involved in things on our side. They literally KNEW how thing needed to proceed and had been effectively arguing for it since the late 40s with a surprising amount of success with the typically fickel American public. Given a couple of short term 'wins' unlike OTL and the support could probably be there to get it done at least for one system by the mid-60s.

Randy
 
The issue is that develouping reusable is very very expensive on a much smaller (the OTL) 1960s space budget and may not even be practical with electronics and tech from the 50s 60s and 70s.
 
I'd love that outcome, but I'd point out that you still have "Apollo" in the wings and (just like OTL) as the "program of record" it's likely going to be the main focus. Still I think a Big-G outcome would be fun to make happen :)
With that sort of setup, though, though, you could have a Gemini capsule plus a 13'-15'-diameter CSM flying with people aboard it by 1965. Which gives you most of the functionality of Apollo years ahead of schedule, at a time when beating the Soviets is paramount. (Including three souls in orbit, if you're willing to do a bit of redesign and cram them in like sardines.) Even if NASA is uninterested in it because of Apollo, a two-year acceleration of things might entice the political branches to make NASA accept it. And given the story of the development of the Apollo spacecraft, NASA surely won't be interested in anything other than it.

Bonus points though, if ITTL the M-410 is chosen for Apollo and a panicking Martin fleshes out a Titan LDC-launched M-410 to be launched on the same timeline as the Saturn I Proto-Big G. As no matter what happens, we get a cool launcher and payload combo.

I'm partial to the 410 but then again it was going to try to insert a controllable return vehicle which to me is always a plus.
I'm partial to 410 too, but there's no reason you can't also add some manner of maneuvering system to the Apollo D-2. (An Apollo D-2 dangling from a Rogallo wing would be adorably ridiculous.) It just requires running the Apollo design program in any other manner than as one for picking who's best to build Max Faget's dream Moonship.

I've talked about there being a possible timeline in a situation like this where the Air Force gets enough support to build something like the SLS: 1960 system and that could easily be 'mandated' (as a cost saving measure) for ALL US launches. (After all that's essentially how the Shuttle was sold) With less money to go around the private industry has more incentive to get more cut-throat and lets face it no matter how the "Space Race" turns out THE main factor is always going to be military preparedness and use so missiles essentially. (Which brings up the possibility of a totally Titan based space program :) )
I love the OG SLS. And I also love the idea of the 15'-diameter Titans getting the love they deserve, as would happen in a totally Titan-based space program. But they're not worth it if the price of admission is mandating the SLS's use for governmental launches. As such a mandate would be a pox upon everyone involved. (Also, not uncoincidentally, like the Shuttle ended up being.)

The issue is that develouping reusable is very very expensive on a much smaller (the OTL) 1960s space budget and may not even be practical with electronics and tech from the 50s 60s and 70s.
It's important to be stressed that the sort of reusability being discussed here is radically different from what is being attempted today. You are probably correct regarding budget and the more grandiose reusability concepts, a la some iterations of the Collier's Ferry Rocket where all three stages were piloted and intended to flyback to Earth and make a controlled horizontal landing. But the reusability that actually got closest to flying, the sort von Braun was anticipating for the Saturn I and Robert Truax was daydreaming about, was much simpler involving parachute-splashdowns of spent first-stages and towing them back to port for inspection and refurbishment.

That being said, you could probably do something like ULA's SMART-style helo recovery in the late Sixties if you had the right set of technological developments and incentives to investigate the idea.
 
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I have some questions I'd like to pose about space programs.

1) Is there any difference, budget wise, in a space program that is just doing missions/flights, and one that is going to be trying to build Earth orbit satellites?
2) What about a space program that is trying to build bigger, badder, manned satellites (space stations).

I'm just trying to get a general feel for the costs for the three types of programs. My uneducated guess is that small, unmanned, spy and communications satellites are going to be the least expensive of the three programs, followed by the manned missions/flights programs, and finally the manned space station program is going to cost more?
 
Were any actually built? No? Then they weren't. The idea of them was popular enough, but when it came time to bend metal everyone found some excuse not to actually do it.

Were any built and flown? Yes? Then they were :)
The X-15 being the main example with the X-20 and the Lifting Body Program not far behind it, so the ability and willingness to work on them were actually there. We've discussed the first couple of Saturn 1's, but even Mercury and Gemini were looked at for being reused, (Mercury was rightly considered too limited both as as program and a spacecraft and Gemini was always really an 'interim' system but both the company and some in NASA had high hopes :)) and Apollo was initially aimed at testing reusability but that was dropped early on, again due to the Lunar rush. (Picked back up for AAP and found to be workable if not economically questionable due to the projected flight rate)

The 'rush' for the Moon that OTL's Apollo Moon program was under caused a LOT of work to be set-aside and/or discarded and yet they still kept trying to include recovery and reuse but there was simply no "time" for side tracks.

The issue is that develouping reusable is very very expensive on a much smaller (the OTL) 1960s space budget and may not even be practical with electronics and tech from the 50s 60s and 70s.

Your up-front costs are greater but there was a large amount of examples that your longer term costs would be less. The tech proved to be durable enough the main sticking point was the 'how' given the needed developments in various areas for various concepts.

Fully reusable, manned fly-back was of course the "preferred" method (ala METEOR or METEOR Jr) but also the most technically difficult and likely expensive method. (All the stuff they didn't know they didn't know and all that :) ) Next was von Braun's "Ferry Rocket" with a manned fly-back final stage but all the other stages recovered by ballistic flight and landing at sea by parachute and retrorocket. Recovering the booster and second stage were seen as pretty straight forward and you could hold off on development of a fully reusable upper stage and use simpler capsules till the tech was ready. And there are variants in between if the will is there, it just takes some good arguments and support. Maybe :)

Of course there are going to be those who oppose such and we know that below a certain flight rate recovery and reuse doesn't make real sense but once again keep in mind early work was really mover focused on recovery to help development. Any reuse might just be a bonus and get a foot in the door

Randy
 
Were any built and flown? Yes? Then they were :)
The X-15 is not even remotely in the same space as what we're talking about, and you know it. And of course the X-20 didn't fly, which was my point, and neither did proposals for reusable Gemini or Apollo. No reusable vehicles actually flew until the Shuttle, and that was hardly a great endorsement of the concept in the end.
 
I have some questions I'd like to pose about space programs.

1) Is there any difference, budget wise, in a space program that is just doing missions/flights, and one that is going to be trying to build Earth orbit satellites?
2) What about a space program that is trying to build bigger, badder, manned satellites (space stations).

I'm just trying to get a general feel for the costs for the three types of programs. My uneducated guess is that small, unmanned, spy and communications satellites are going to be the least expensive of the three programs, followed by the manned missions/flights programs, and finally the manned space station program is going to cost more?

It's probably going to be somewhat complex and convoluted to figure out since it doesn't break down as easily as that. Learning the hard way, as you go, it going to call for lots and lots of false starts and blind alleys all of which will drive up the cost. And then there's the priority, the openness (visibility) and factors of who's actually paying the bills to consider.

Consider OTL the satellite and space probe race started before NASA was fully organized and had multiple military divisions spending a lot of time, effort and money on various totally separate programs all competing over budget and resources that didn't end up shaking out into a more coherent effort till the mid-60s. Even so the DoD budget for early satellites (recon and communications) fairly exploded but since most of it was hidden it never really 'looked' as big as the NASA budget for the same.

Then when you add manned spaceflight in the cost goes up significantly and of course to put up any really usable space station you need a bigger and more expensive booster to support that. And through it all priorities will shift affecting budgets and public/political support along the way.

At the most basic level you're correct because the Space Station program is going to require a big booster to put up the Space Station (or bits thereof) and the supplies and people to make it work. But in the second case you needed something for the "manned" space program to do anyway OTHER than just orbit the Earth so it is both a logical and inevitable move to go to a space station program. With no clear Lunar goal that's going to be the next step anyway.

And something to keep in mind was at the time (late 50s, early 60s) the thinking was that with a space station a lot of your basic mission tasks now changed to include that space station. Part of the "space station" program was a manned or unmanned orbital tug which would take satellites to and from various orbits for maintenance and repair. So satellite design may change significantly. Space Probes would no longer launch directly to the target but to the space station for checkout and if needed repair before they headed off into deep space. Again this changes your design and mission parameters. Would this work? At the time they didn't know, (and a bit telling we're still not sure of the answer today :) ) and the only way to find out was to try it and see.

Your Space Station program IS going to be the biggest and most expensive part of your space program for sure, but with that keep in mind that also makes it more likely that those paying for it will want to find more uses and missions for that money.

Randy
 
How much did Nedelin affect the Soviet space program, though? It was a Yangel ICBM. We *thought* it was space related for decades, but it wasn't.

As for Apollo succeeding because it was quick, absolutely, and going off the Vinland analogy, here's another: electrons jumping orbits. Only possible because of the uncertainty principle (delta t times delta e is a constant). The amount of time has to be really short for an electron to be able to have enough energy to go to a different energy level.

Apollo was an inordinate amount of capability because we threw a lot of money at it before we realized we didn't want to do it anymore :)
 
I have some questions I'd like to pose about space programs.

1) Is there any difference, budget wise, in a space program that is just doing missions/flights, and one that is going to be trying to build Earth orbit satellites?
2) What about a space program that is trying to build bigger, badder, manned satellites (space stations).

I'm just trying to get a general feel for the costs for the three types of programs. My uneducated guess is that small, unmanned, spy and communications satellites are going to be the least expensive of the three programs, followed by the manned missions/flights programs, and finally the manned space station program is going to cost more?

Satellites are cheap, especially if you use decommissioned ICBMs (viz. Orbital Vehicle).

Space stations are very expensive. The ISS is the most expensive single project ever produced by humanity. Manned Orbiting Laboratory never got off the ground. Skylab was only possible because we'd blown so much on Apollo hardware -- it was a program of leftovers.
 
The X-15 is not even remotely in the same space as what we're talking about, and you know it. And of course the X-20 didn't fly, which was my point, and neither did proposals for reusable Gemini or Apollo. No reusable vehicles actually flew until the Shuttle, and that was hardly a great endorsement of the concept in the end.

The X-15 was seen a step towards orbital flight and it's rather telling that the easiest and more relevant data that it could have provided for reusability studies was not fully collated and studied till the late 90s and early 2000s BECAUSE it was shut down due to budget conflicts with the Lunar program. (A LOT of data and information that the X-15 gathered could be directly applied to such things as fly-back booster research and development)

Similarly by the time the USAF fully realized that the X-20 as a strictly military project was not going to be funded and finally turned to NASA for support NASA was no longer in a position to do so having fully committed to the Lunar landing program and had no funding or support to commit. So since there was no clear military (or other) mission for DynaSoar it was canceled. NASA was in fact interested but had nothing to spare for the program.

And again the pressures on Gemini and Apollo due to the Lunar goal more than anything else contributed to the stunted and delayed reusability studies as well as the lack of space station studies till AAP came around, on-orbit maintenance till the Shuttle era and so forth. Things that were very much in the forefront of consideration BEFORE the Lunar goal was announced.

I'm not saying that it's inevitable but a LOT of very solid work was started and planned to be expanded before (and shortly after) the Lunar Goal was announced. And it's not unlikely the would have continued without the side-track of going to the Moon RIGHT NOW. :)

Randy
 
How much did Nedelin affect the Soviet space program, though? It was a Yangel ICBM. We *thought* it was space related for decades, but it wasn't.

Keep in mind the whole Soviet "space" effort was a side effect of the military ICBM and satellite program and was under the authority of and control of the military for the most part. Korolev had to 'prove' the R7 was operationally ready as an ICBM before he got permission to use it to 'test' a satellite launch. Nedelin had an effect on the pace of the whole program initially and began to put doubts in the leaderships mind over the use of storable propellants for operational use. It made Korolev more adamant about NOT using storable propellants and Glushko more defensive about using them causing an even greater split between the two. I had a lot of down-stream effects.

As for Apollo succeeding because it was quick, absolutely, and going off the Vinland analogy, here's another: electrons jumping orbits. Only possible because of the uncertainty principle (delta t times delta e is a constant). The amount of time has to be really short for an electron to be able to have enough energy to go to a different energy level.

Apollo was an inordinate amount of capability because we threw a lot of money at it before we realized we didn't want to do it anymore :)

Apollo was designed and built around a single mission and wasn't much good for anything else. The hardware had a lot of possible utility once different development work could have been done on the whole system but as it was it was very limited to pretty much going to the Moon. Anything outside of that mission and it required modifications and development work which was a lot more money and resources.

The other problem was the "mission" itself which allowed no side-tracks, little to no development outside it self and was always going to be the main focus for everything from budget to engineering time. This was apparent to the public and politicians as well so that once we HAD reached the Moon the inevitable questions of other things that the budget and resources could be going to were asked. And the answers given were wholly unsatisfactory.

The Apollo system still had a lot of potential but by that point to most people the "Space Race" was over and other problems and priorities could and did come to the fore. The Soviets said they had never been 'racing' to the Moon and it looked like that was true, so the US looked like they "won" the race against themselves and we fell back to Earth orbit for the next 50 years. Here I blame the Soviets/Russians because it they had tried at ALL to go to the Moon even decades after the US then at least there would have been some form of 'competition' but they didn't and so we've not gone back.

Randy
 
With that sort of setup, though, though, you could have a Gemini capsule plus a 13'-15'-diameter CSM flying with people aboard it by 1965. Which gives you most of the functionality of Apollo years ahead of schedule, at a time when beating the Soviets is paramount. (Including three souls in orbit, if you're willing to do a bit of redesign and cram them in like sardines.) Even if NASA is uninterested in it because of Apollo, a two-year acceleration of things might entice the political branches to make NASA accept it. And given the story of the development of the Apollo spacecraft, NASA surely won't be interested in anything other than it.

All good points and all still facing the same uphill battle as any advanced Gemini idea did OTL :) Worse it's likely a constrained budget so the "Apollo" supporters are going to purely HATE having to support a Gemini vehicle at all, let alone more advanced versions. For all it's ability and good points Gemini had operational and utility issues that were frankly pretty bad and based on assumptions that ended up not being true, and in context without the 'focus' of the Lunar goal Gemini looks like proposing a dead-end, interim system that may not get much traction with only an orbital program planned. But that still leaves the "issue" with keeping up with the Soviets and the obvious need for something between Mercury and Apollo. (And the need to slip this by the budget office :) )

The take I plan on using is to extend the "Mercury Mk II" analogy (in my background it's actually the Mercury Mk III due to the Mercury Mk II being the extended use version of the Mercury capsule using the "unused" initial Mercury project capsules :) ) and pitch it as a "Mercury extension" project rather than a "new" program which might need a "new" name and therefore "new" budget. (The military were pretty much masters at this, but James Webb was no slouch in 'gaming' the system either :) )
So you'd have something pretty similar to OTL's Gemini in the Mercury Mk II with likely some tweaks given there's less pressure to 'get-to' Apollo at the moment. I can see this being the basis for modifications to allow three crew and more maneuverability but it'll be a struggle to get something like Big Gemini out of it On the other hand as you note it might be more a political decision than and engineering one.

(On the gripping hand, it would be wild to get to a point where as the USAF realizes they have no justification or utility for the X-20 program and it's facing the same dire cuts it did OTL in THIS case when they turn to NASA it may not be too little/to late and a joint NASA/USAF budget worked out to get it actually flying)

Bonus points though, if ITTL the M-410 is chosen for Apollo and a panicking Martin fleshes out a Titan LDC-launched M-410 to be launched on the same timeline as the Saturn I Proto-Big G. As no matter what happens, we get a cool launcher and payload combo.

I suspect that IF you have a NASA chose the M-410 Martin would at least offer an "alternative" LV infrastructure, after all the Titan III-etc made some good sense as the SLV-4 at the time. (My 'take' on this is if you have an 'alternate' job for Martin, say building the SLS LV's then they won't be as worried about keeping Titan going somehow. But if they have no such program going then for sure they and the Air Force are going to be pushing Titan variants for any and all missions just like OTL)

The Air Force would like the M-410's controllability and land-landing very much so a "Blue Apollo" could get their support.

I'm partial to 410 too, but there's no reason you can't also add some manner of maneuvering system to the Apollo D-2. (An Apollo D-2 dangling from a Rogallo wing would be adorably ridiculous.) It just requires running the Apollo design program in any other manner than as one for picking who's best to build Max Faget's dream Moonship.

Faget was a force of nature inside NASA as the time of Mercury/Gemini/Apollo because (as he pointed out) the simplest and fastest as well as the most effective vehicle to get people into and out of space was the blunt capsule. The main reason the Apollo D-2 scored so high is that it allowed a 'capsule' shape to also have a crew module for extended orbital or Lunar missions without compromising the capsules heat shield. The M-410 on the other hand used the M1 blunt lifting body/hypersonic lifting body as a crew compartment which 'naturally' had a open 'back' that could then be directly connected with the mission module. The downside of the Apollo D-2 design (as with the Soyuz) was that the escape rocket package had to be powerful enough to drag both the capsule and the mission module away whereas with the M-410 and capsule-only design it only had to be powerful enough to pull those single items away. (And why Martin included multiple other possible configurations including Faget's preferred capsule design) In the end the way that NAA worked closely with Faget to point-design their Apollo bid worked out since it was seen as the most straight forward and likely fastest to develop design. Again, take away the Lunar goal pressure and different possibilities open up.

In context the original Apollo designs was supposed to do a LOT of other work and not just go into orbit or around the Moon. Highly controlled reentry and hypersonic flight were initially program goals as was land-landing at a specific spot. The Mission Module was an initial requirement WITHOUT the need to rendezvous and dock with said module which the 'plain' capsule could not do unless there was a hatch in the heat-shield. (Later to be proven possible but not something NASA was wanting to experiment with initially even though several contractors suggested it, including Martin) This was all part of the reason that Apollo was seen as a "longer-term" (and longer to develop) vehicle and hence the need for something else between it and Mercury.

I love the OG SLS. And I also love the idea of the 15'-diameter Titans getting the love they deserve, as would happen in a totally Titan-based space program. But they're not worth it if the price of admission is mandating the SLS's use for governmental launches. As such a mandate would be a pox upon everyone involved. (Also, not uncoincidentally, like the Shuttle ended up being.)

Well it IS the Air Force from whom OTL's Apollo pulled a LOT of it's management and staff after all :) So in my notes I of course have the Air Force pulling a 'reverse Shuttle' on NASA and simply asking if they could possibly 'use' any of the following capability if it was available and then going to TPTB and saying "See? Even NASA says they'd exclusively use out system" ("Begun the SLS wars had" is the exact quote I plan to use since it's the Air Force "Space Launch System" versus the "Saturn Launch System" in context :) )

The thing is depending on the butterflies outside the space program the same budget problems that drove a 'concentration' effect to reduce the number of launch vehicle for the whole US effort may not be the same. Especially if you can avoid the over sized requirements and the ridiculously high launch rate assumptions.

One of the things a more 'orbital' centered space program is going to do is concentrate more on, well, orbital operations and the needs, requirements and operations thereon. One of the early assumptions for example was the need for a space station where parts and satellites would come to so they could be assembled where needed and checked out before launch into their 'regular' orbit. This later morphed into a place where satellites on-orbit could be brought back to and serviced and/or repaired before putting them back into orbit again. This idea bled over into work on the Shuttle so that it became a major 'driver' for the assumed flight rate but in reality that 'job' never really materialized and it was a very niche and "special" mission when it happened at all.

Of a similar nature OTL once the Lunar goal was set the interest and incentive for a lot of work towards commercial and practical orbital satellite work was shunted to the side and pushed more on actual commercial interests with less government input or support. In some ways this helped push industry but with more government support the rate of growth and expansion would likely have been bigger but it also might be more restricted with a higher dependence on government support.

It's important to be stressed that the sort of reusability being discussed here is radically different from what is being attempted today. You are probably correct regarding budget and the more grandiose reusability concepts, a la some iterations of the Collier's Ferry Rocket where all three stages were piloted and intended to flyback to Earth and make a controlled horizontal landing. But the reusability that actually got closest to flying, the sort von Braun was anticipating for the Saturn I and Robert Truax was daydreaming about, was much simpler involving parachute-splashdowns of spent first-stages and towing them back to port for inspection and refurbishment.

Actually the Ferry Rocket parachuted two stages into the ocean for recovery with the third stage being the fly-back and horizontally landing stage :) Not being nit-picky though as I was going to point out that it was the METEOR and METEOR Jr. from Goodyear that flew all three stages back to a horizontal landing and it was they who early on found that the costs of the METEOR LV were prohibitive enough to require (reluctantly) reduction to the METEOR Jr. and even then the cost-effectiveness of the such recovery for the two lower stages was questionable. (In fact the METEOR Jr. study bits I've seen "mention" in passing mounting the Mjr. third stage on a two stage "Atlas Derived" launch vehicle as a more 'cost-effective' alternative : ) And always keep in mind METEOR was NOT the "ferry" but the Space Station that was the end result)

The idea of 'reusability' at the time we're talking about was for the most part literally "aircraft" like with ultra-short turn around times and very rapid reuse. We've come back to that "assumption" today but in between the reality of the actual situation has been well studied and pretty well understood. The closer a booster stage is to actually being an 'aircraft' the more likely it can be treated as and used as one. The more 'rocket' (especially in mission) like it is the more difficult and slower the recovery and refurbishment process is going to be and it gets worse as you move 'upward' in stage and stage capability.

So many early assumptions, (and far to many modern ones that people should know better by this point) were both naïve and unrealistic but were based on far to simple 'extrapolations' of then current technology and progress, but less actual knowledge. Reality, research and experience can eventually get you pretty close to where you want to go if you put the time, effort and resources into the work.

That being said, you could probably do something like ULA's SMART-style helo recovery in the late Sixties if you had the right set of technological developments and incentives to investigate the idea.

Oh they did :) After all, NASA paid Hughes to study catching (and returning) the entire S-1C stage in mid-air after all :)

Randy
 
That being said, you could probably do something like ULA's SMART-style helo recovery in the late Sixties if you had the right set of technological developments and incentives to investigate the idea.
Oh they did :) After all, NASA paid Hughes to study catching (and returning) the entire S-1C stage in mid-air after all :)
How high & fast up did the booster engines of Atlas drop off, could they not be recovered in later Atlas-Centaur developments?
 
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