Apart from Axis victory, could World War 2 have gone any worse?

K, and?


Except they didn't? They didn't even try to. In 1944 they sent the Soviet a couple thousand broad gauge locomotives rather than try to entirely recreate the Soviet rail system in Siberia, plus the US+UK+USSR combined built less locomotives than Germany did during the war and focused on other things like AFVs. Regauging was the easiest issue, the hard stuff was all the other things that go with rebuilding the entire system:
https://www.hgwdavie.com/blog/2018/...y-operations-in-the-russo-german-war-19411945

And?

This commenced in October 1941, though some goods had been moved prior to this under the "cash and carry" agreement. The route was affected by the start of hostilities between Japan and the US in December 1941, but was not interrupted as Japan and the Soviet Union maintained a strict neutrality towards each other for the duration of the conflict, changing only in August 1945.

Due to this neutrality the goods could be moved only in Soviet-flagged ships, and, as they were inspected by the Japanese, could not include war materials. The route was therefore used to transport foods, raw materials and non-military goods such as lorries and other road vehicles, railway locomotives and rolling stock. It was also the most practical route for goods and materials produced in the US western states. During the conflict the Pacific Route saw a steady stream of goods moved from the west coast of the United States and overall accounted for some 50% of all Lend-lease goods to the Soviet Union. The route closed in September 1945 with the end of the conflict and the cessation of the Lend-Lease scheme.

The Pacific Route was augmented by the Alaska-Siberia Air Route (ALSIB), which was used to fly combat aircraft and airborne goods from North America to Siberia and beyond. This route was also immune from Japanese interference, as it was undertaken by Soviet pilots based in western Alaska. ALSIB was used for delivery of nearly 8,000 aircraft, air cargo and passengers from 7 October 1942 to the end of hostilities.

Pacific Route cargo to Vladivostok was transported exclusively aboard independently routed Soviet ships. Twenty-seven United States cargo ships built about 1919 were transferred to the Soviet Far Eastern State Shipping Company (FESCO) as Lend-Lease in 1942. Older Soviet ships excluded from the JW convoys of faster Liberty ships to minimize travel time through the dangerous Barents Sea were suitable for the Pacific route, and were later augmented by Liberty ships supplied to the Soviet Union.

The operations of the Pacific Route were organized by Leonid Belakhov, Deputy Commissar and Chief Political Officer of the Soviet Merchant Fleet (MorFlot). Goods were moved from US west coast ports (principally Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, and Columbia River ports) and moved via the Great circle route across the Pacific, skirting the Aleutians and the Kuriles. From there they passed via the Perouse strait to Vladivostok. When the Perouse strait was frozen, Soviet ships traveled south of Kyushu and entered the Sea of Japan through the Tsushima Strait to reach Vladivostok. Cargoes including military goods avoided Japanese inspection during the summer months by partially unloading in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky to reduce their draught to cross the shallow Amur River estuary and enter the Sea of Japan via the Strait of Tartary. The total distance was 6,000 miles and took 18–20 days From Vladivostok nearly 400,000 railway car loads of goods were transhipped via the Trans-Siberian Railway to the industrial heart of the Soviet Union, a further 5,000 miles.

A branch of the Pacific Route began carrying goods through the Bering Strait to the Soviet Arctic coast in June, 1942. From July through September convoys of shallow draught ships and icebreakers assembled in Providence Bay, Siberia to sail north through the Bering Strait and west along the Northern Sea Route. Total westbound tonnage through the Bering Strait was 452,393 in comparison to 8,243,397 tons through Vladivostok. Part of this northern tonnage was fuel for the Alaska-Siberia Air Route airfields described below. Provisions for the airfields were transferred to river vessels and barges on the estuaries of large Siberian rivers.

http://english.ruvr.ru/2007/12/19/168522.html
http://columbia.washingtonhistory.org/m ... 06-a2.aspx

http://www.kscnet.ru/ivs/bibl/paperno/for_65_engl.htm

Part of that effort was the ALCAN Highway and it was also the reason for the hard fought Aleutians Campaign. The Japanese made a big mistake when they did not make a stronger stand there. A lot of what massacred them in Manchuria was shipped from Seattle and Portland and went that way.
 
That’s why I put that the Japanese couldn’t take the islands. The fact that the carriers were gone at Midway makes everything up for grabs. Hawaii doesn’t fall but it does need to be cleared of Japanese. They would of had complete air cover which does shift the balance of power and the question was worse case not what was going to happen but rather outside the box etc

How does a regiment of SNLF (all the Japanese had at the time) tackle a Marine regiment again? I've looked at this in considerable detail and I concluded that even if Spruance ran for it to save his flattops (which he would, for those were his orders; so the carriers would survive), the Japanese landing attempt would have been a bloodbath for the Japanese as in a virtual massacre. Think Tarawa, only fifty times worse with the Japanese playing the role of the landing force.
 

Deleted member 1487

And?



Part of that effort was the ALCAN Highway and it was also the reason for the hard fought Aleutians Campaign. The Japanese made a big mistake when they did not make a stronger stand there. A lot of what massacred them in Manchuria was shipped from Seattle and Portland and went that way.
https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...ve-gone-any-worse.459380/page-3#post-18180611
https://history.army.mil/books/70-7_09.htm
These routes of delivery were long, roundabout, and difficult. With the Germans in control of most of western Europe and of French North Africa, the Mediterranean and the Baltic were closed to Allied cargo vessels. This left three main alternative routes for the transport of supplies from the United States to the Soviet Union. The first ran across the Atlantic and around the coast of Norway to Soviet Arctic and White Sea ports, principally Murmansk and Archangel, the second across the Pacific to Vladivostok and over the Trans-Siberian Railway to European Russia, the third around the coast of Africa to the Persian Gulf and thence across Iran to the Soviet border. (See Map III, inside back cover.) Each of these routes had its definite limitations. The northern route around Norway was the shortest but it also was the most vulnerable to attack by German submarines and land-based aircraft. Moreover, winter cold and ice frequently blocked Soviet harbors and rendered sailing conditions for Allied merchantmen scarcely tolerable even without the German threat. The route to Vladivostok ran directly past the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. Ships flying American or British flags could not proceed through waters controlled by the Japanese once Japan had gone to war against Britain and the United States. And even in Soviet flag shipping, a very scarce commodity in 1941-42, the United States did not dare risk supplies and equipment definitely identifiable as for military end use. Moreover, the rail line from Vladivostok to European Russia had initially a very limited capacity. The southern route via the Persian Gulf was the only one relatively free of the threat of enemy interference, but in 1941 it possessed an insignificant capacity. Iranian ports were undeveloped and the Iranian State Railway running north to the USSR was rated in October 1941 as capable of transporting but 6,000 tons of Soviet aid supplies monthly, hardly the equivalent of a single shipload.
 

nbcman

Donor
That’s why I put that the Japanese couldn’t take the islands. The fact that the carriers were gone at Midway makes everything up for grabs. Hawaii doesn’t fall but it does need to be cleared of Japanese. They would of had complete air cover which does shift the balance of power and the question was worse case not what was going to happen but rather outside the box etc
Not really. The IJN CVs with aircrews weakened significantly after even a successful Midway couldn’t really operate close to the Hawaii Islands in mid-1942 due to the strength of the aircraft based there.
 
In the late summer of 1944 France falls into a civil war, the Allied advance is stopped because moving supplies across France had become impossible.
 

These routes of delivery were long, roundabout, and difficult. With the Germans in control of most of western Europe and of French North Africa, the Mediterranean and the Baltic were closed to Allied cargo vessels. This left three main alternative routes for the transport of supplies from the United States to the Soviet Union. The first ran across the Atlantic and around the coast of Norway to Soviet Arctic and White Sea ports, principally Murmansk and Archangel, the second across the Pacific to Vladivostok and over the Trans-Siberian Railway to European Russia, the third around the coast of Africa to the Persian Gulf and thence across Iran to the Soviet border. (See Map III, inside back cover.) Each of these routes had its definite limitations. The northern route around Norway was the shortest but it also was the most vulnerable to attack by German submarines and land-based aircraft. Moreover, winter cold and ice frequently blocked Soviet harbors and rendered sailing conditions for Allied merchantmen scarcely tolerable even without the German threat. The route to Vladivostok ran directly past the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. Ships flying American or British flags could not proceed through waters controlled by the Japanese once Japan had gone to war against Britain and the United States. And even in Soviet flag shipping, a very scarce commodity in 1941-42, the United States did not dare risk supplies and equipment definitely identifiable as for military end use. Moreover, the rail line from Vladivostok to European Russia had initially a very limited capacity. The southern route via the Persian Gulf was the only one relatively free of the threat of enemy interference, but in 1941 it possessed an insignificant capacity. Iranian ports were undeveloped and the Iranian State Railway running north to the USSR was rated in October 1941 as capable of transporting but 6,000 tons of Soviet aid supplies monthly, hardly the equivalent of a single shipload.

Cannot agree with your interpretation of it, since some of those Shermans that overran Rumania came via San Francisco and then made the whole 11,000 kilometer journey back to Manchuria to shoot up the Kwantung Army. 8 million of the 16 million tonnes of Lend Lease went by way of the Pacific Route, twice that of the either the Arctic or the Iranian routes. How does 2000 locomotives sound? OBVIOUS military use, right?

wiking said:

Except they didn't? They didn't even try to. In 1944 they sent the Soviet a couple thousand broad gauge locomotives rather than try to entirely recreate the Soviet rail system in Siberia, plus the US+UK+USSR combined built less locomotives than Germany did during the war and focused on other things like AFVs. Regauging was the easiest issue, the hard stuff was all the other things that go with rebuilding the entire system:
https://www.hgwdavie.com/blog/2018/...y-operations-in-the-russo-german-war-19411945

These words... and this source cited and can be interpreted a little differently. (^^^) YMMV.

1. UK is a little island. Not many segments that require shuttle cocking like the US and USSR.
2. US had locomotives out the wazoo.
3. The Russians had only four critical trunk systems and thus fewer critical segmentations to cover, with most of them out of LW bombing range, so for different reasons they needed fewer locomotive replacements also.
4. Russians had enough brains to not get their rolling stock bombed by Bomber Command, the 8th and the 15th Air Forces. If it is blown to confetti, it has to be replaced.
5. Y switches, RR control; gear, communications systems and so forth. Made In USA on a lot of it.
 
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4. Russians had enough brains to not get their rolling stock bombed by Bomber Command, the 8th and the 15th Air Forces. If it is blown to confetti, it has to be replaced.

Well, they did in 1941 lose about the same amount of locomotives and rolling stock they received from the Americans via lend-lease later, but afterwards were really good about not losing that sort of stuff, even when the Germans held the skies. None of the rail stuff was shipped until around the start of the Battle of Kursk, so it probably wasn’t until autumn 1943 that the locomotive portion of lend-lease had much impact.
 
Well, they did in 1941 lose about the same amount of locomotives and rolling stock they received from the Americans via lend-lease later, but afterwards were really good about not losing that sort of stuff, even when the Germans held the skies. None of the rail stuff was shipped until around the start of the Battle of Kursk, so it probably wasn’t until autumn 1943 that the locomotive portion of lend-lease had much impact.

When the Russians needed it for Bagration, to cross the RR desert the Germans left them in western Russia, it was there. Like success in most endeavors, it comes down to timing, does it not? Might have added 3 months logistics delays if the LL was not there.
 
When the Russians needed it for Bagration, to cross the RR desert the Germans left them in western Russia, it was there. Like success in most endeavors, it comes down to timing, does it not? Might have added 3 months logistics delays if the LL was not there.

I don’t know, the Russians got their rail lines across the the RR desert the Germans made in the retreat from Stalingrad well before any locomotive LL and again after chasing the Germans m across Eastern Ukraine at a time when the locomotive aspect of LL would only just be starting to be felt. The Soviets even probably artificially delayed their offensive across Poland in the winter of ‘44/‘45 so they could make additional gains in the Balkans. As the paper Wiking linked too noted, the Soviets in the 1930s were hauling freight tonnage on scales comparable to the Americans. So even before the war and Lend-Lease, the Soviet rail system was outperforming the German one (and competing with the American one) despite equipment differences. Not to say lend-lease didn’t immensely help the Soviet rail system, in particular the astonishing speed with which the Soviets converted the Polish rail system in the wake of the Vistula-Ofer Offensive can be heavily chalked up to lend-lease mechanizing the rail repair corps when combined with the efficient work of the NKPS, but how you use it also matters.
 
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I don’t know, the Russians got their rail lines across the the RR desert the Germans made in the retreat from Stalingrad well before any locomotive LL and again after chasing the Germans m across Eastern Ukraine at a time when the locomotive aspect of LL would only just be starting to be felt. The Soviets even probably artificially delayed their offensive across Poland in the winter of ‘44/‘45 so they could make additional gains in the Balkans. As the paper Wiking linked too noted, the Soviets in the 1930s were hauling freight tonnage on scales comparable to the Americans. So even before the war and Lend-Lease, the Soviet rail system was outperforming the German one (and competing with the American one) despite equipment differences. Not to say lend-lease didn’t immensely help the Soviet rail system, in particular the astonishing speed with which the Soviets converted the Polish rail system in the wake of the Vistula-Ofer Offensive can be heavily chalked up to lend-lease mechanizing the rail repair corps when combined with the efficient work of the NKPS, but how you use it also matters.

They were desperately short of rolling stock, not just Locomotives (10-15% prewar levels), but also boxers and tanker cars, as well as flatcars. And as that article also notes they had to replace a lot of signal equipment, restore water tankage, rebuild locomotive depots, etc., the Germans tore up; that had to impact their opt tempo and goes a long way toward explaining their tactical march limit of about 350-400 kilometers stall out as they run out of supply, stop forward momentum and have to bring their dumps forward to the line where they stalled. One can just imagine what a mess it was to cross the Carpathian mountains?

Anyway, I see the Lend Lease kick in hard around the end of October 1943 and into winter 1943-1944, where the Russian shove west picks up momentum. YMMV.
 

Deleted member 1487

Cannot agree with your interpretation of it, since some of those Shermans that overran Rumania came via San Francisco and then made the whole 11,000 kilometer journey back to Manchuria to shoot up the Kwantung Army. 8 million of the 16 million tonnes of Lend Lease went by way of the Pacific Route, twice that of the either the Arctic or the Iranian routes. How does 2000 locomotives sound? OBVIOUS military use, right?
Do you have a source on that and numbers about how many Shermans that was? As I understand it military specific equipment like tanks did not come in through Vladivostok to avoid provoking the Japanese...that is until later when they stopped inspecting Soviet shipping through their waters.
Even if half of LL did come through the Pacific route throughout the war, the majority of that was from 1943-45 with a strong focus on 1945 when the US sent the Soviet millions of tons of various thing to supply the planned invasion of Manchuria. From May-September 1945 95%, 1.5 million tons in total, came into Vladivostok to support the invasion of Manchuria.

The locomotives were again late in the war, a little less than half of the total after November 1944. If anything they were to help replace what had been lost throughout the war.


These words... and this source cited and can be interpreted a little differently. (^^^) YMMV.

1. UK is a little island. Not many segments that require shuttle cocking like the US and USSR.
2. US had locomotives out the wazoo.
3. The Russians had only four critical trunk systems and thus fewer critical segmentations to cover, with most of them out of LW bombing range, so for different reasons they needed fewer locomotive replacements also.
Sure, but the point was that the Allies never attempted to do anything remotely like what you were suggesting during the war, that is rebuilding the entire Trans-Siberian RR to use American rolling stock or even to dramatically expand weight bearing capacity. No one was capable of doing anything like that without making vast sacrifices in other areas of their war effort.

4. Russians had enough brains to not get their rolling stock bombed by Bomber Command, the 8th and the 15th Air Forces. If it is blown to confetti, it has to be replaced.
Not sure what 'brains' had to do with that.

5. Y switches, RR control; gear, communications systems and so forth. Made In USA on a lot of it.
Ok, but nothing in the quantities to rebuild the entire TSRR from near scratch, especially without dramatically impacting output in other areas of the war effort.
 
Do you have a source on that and numbers about how many Shermans that was? As I understand it military specific equipment like tanks did not come in through Vladivostok to avoid provoking the Japanese...that is until later when they stopped inspecting Soviet shipping through their waters.

Here.
 

nbcman

Donor
I searched Vladivostok, Siber (as in siberia and trans-siberian railroad), rail and east, and found no references to the tanks coming in through Vladivostok.
I've never any references for sole military purpose vehicles being shipped via the Pacific route other than aircraft which were flown there. As far as I can find, it was food, raw materials, trucks and other multipurpose items that were shipped to the Soviets via the Pacific route.

Most likely those Shermans that were used in the Soviets advance into Romania in 1944 came through the Persian corridor in 1943 or early 1944.
 
Most likely those Shermans that were used in the Soviets advance into Romania in 1944 came through the Persian corridor in 1943 or early 1944.

Correct. though Shermans were sent by the Arctic route as well.

Something of note:

In summer military and strategic cargoes were not able to be transported across La Perouse Strait because the Japanese Navy and Coast Guard controlled the Strait. The vessels were partly unloaded in Petropavlovsk for reducing of their draught to let them transport the cargoes across shallow water of the Amur Estuary and the Tatary Strait towards Vladivostok.

OOPs. So military cargoes did cross the Pacific route after all.

And then there is this jewel... about the US keeping Russian war debts on the books long after the other LL nations had their debts written off.

The lend-lease debt was paid off with no regarding to the fact that almost half of the losses of the Soviet transport fleet was caused by the activity of the American submarines in the North Pacific.

Many of those "Russian ships" were Russian only by the paint on the funnel and the rag hanging from the sternpost. But it is also true that it is kind of "morally questionable" that the LL was not written off for Russia. They paid that debt off about 20,000,000 times over in blood.
 
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This isn't probable but Operation Valkyrie is more successful, leading to the assassination of Hitler and other high ranking Nazi officials. However, Germany soon falls into a civil war with the WAllies and the Soviets supporting different sides. This causes WWII to slide into WWIII with the WAllies, Kuomintang China, and Free Germany fighting the Soviet Union, Japan, Soviet Germany, and the CCP.
 
Is it credible for Vichy to actively join the Germans? Having U-boats operating from (frex) Vichy Dakar...:eek: (Tho maybe this avoids the Pacific War, with Japan given free access across FIC.)

If there's still a PacWar, Japan going across the Kokokda Track in Feb '42, before MO (or as stage 1 of *MO), could be bad. Beyond that, I can't think of anything (in PTO, anyhow). Maybe Nimitz not becoming CinCPac?
The lack of a nuclear option leads to an invasion of the Japanese home islands.
Balderdash. Japan was on the verge of starvation & revolution, Bomb or no damn Bomb.:rolleyes: You've forgotten the total trade blockade & firebombing cities up & down the length of Japan. Just a handful of PGMs (in development) could've cut the essential rail bridges/tunnels, separating Japan into non-supporting zones. And it's been said, the shock of Sov DoW did as much (or more) to lead to Japan's surrender.
Estimations of casualties for a Japanese invasion ranked from one million to four million dead US soldiers.
Those estimates are pure fiction. The official estimate, at the time, put the casualties comparable to Okinawa as a percentage of force deployed (250K KIA, 1M total, IIRC). Which is severe, to be sure, but not insane, given the objective. And that presupposes Japan is actually able to mount an Okinawa-style defense in depth, which is in doubt, under U.S. air.
I'd like to ask you (and others) if, firstly, this conjecture is within the bounds of realism, and secondly, whether getting c. 94% of the OTL L-L, in total during 1941-45, would have given the Red Army the logistics to roll back the Wehrmacht all the way to Germany in 44-46 - even while the Soviet people and nation would suffer a lot more than IOTL?
Roll back, no, IMO. The Red Army was able to hold, but most (all?) its motor transport was U.S. supplied. (I do agree with your assessment in general, however, allowing for my remarks below.)

More to the point, tho, is when the Iran route is upgraded. The Brits, Americans, & Sovs are neither blind nor stupid (tho frequently painted as such in ATLs...:rolleyes:). So, given loss of Murmansk, why doesn't anybody say, "Hey, we'll need to upgrade supply corridors elsewhere.", & improve the Iran route (if not Vladivostok, also).

Would that mean as little as improvements to Arkangel'sk rail? Maybe. I have to think more would, of necessity, be done. (That said, yes, want to doesn't mean can {if I can borrow somewhat from Robert B. Parker ;)}.)
The Americans loose the battle of Midway. The Japanese then begin to bomb Hawaii daily as they have distroyed all American carriers.
"All" the U.S. CVs weren't destroyed by any means. And continuing to put CVs right off HI is a bonanza for the Sub Force, not to mention an oil hog that makes the Tokyo Express look smart.:rolleyes: (Given how buggered Yamamoto's dispositions were, PBYs had spotted Nagumo before he launched, & Nagumo had no idea Fletcher was close, how exactly he wins is ASB.)
Hawaii is then invaded by the Japanese
Not a chance in hell. IJN proposed it; IJA, not notorious for grasping strategic reality or realizing it had bitten off more than it could chew, thought it was a crazy idea.:rolleyes: (How much crazier, because it was an IJN proposal, I'll leave for your imagination.;) )
 
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