Anzio: The pit of mistakes and lost opportunities

The landing crafts were manufactured, but King "snatched" more than his share of it all.

But I also subscribe to the notion that the Allieds could land wherever they wanted. They did not even need to employ overwhelming forces for gaining the result: Germany plugging holes all over the place.

Kesselring was the one who convinced Hitler that defending Italy was a good idea. Hitller was a bit hesitant to begin with. But also saw that delaying the Allieds in Italy would be better than having them to knock on France earlier (which was nto possible but Hitler did not know that).

If Hitler had not listened to Kesselring, then the front line would have been North of Rome.

It would have generated the 20+ divisions for Russia.

Ukraine would have been the logical place to use them.

Would it have changed the war dramatically? maybe not, in terms of the final outcome, but maybe in how the map would have looked like.

Ivan
 
What's really getting lost, here, is the ultimate stupidity of the Italian campaign in the first place. The waste of Allied manpower & shipping that would otherwise have been available for attacking France in '43 led proximately to lengthening the war at least 6mo.
 
What's really getting lost, here, is the ultimate stupidity of the Italian campaign in the first place. The waste of Allied manpower & shipping that would otherwise have been available for attacking France in '43 led proximately to lengthening the war at least 6mo.

Well, the Italian campaign did serve a few purposes. First it was a logical extension of North African campaign. Second it knocked Italy out of war. Third it has served as a training polygon for Allied forces to test and experiment. Fourth it draw away plenty of German forces, both directly and indirectly. Fifth it enabled the Allies to make multiple diverse threats that further exasperated German situation. Sixth, I don't think the invasion in 1943 was possible. Luftwaffe was very much alive and kicking, Germans still had substantial mobile reserve and the Allies lacked both knowledge and experience necessary to successfully execute such operation.
 
By spring 1943 the Red Army was invincible operationally and strategically; it had the doctrine, equipment, and material to effect the complete collapse of the German army. It's ability to conduct complex deception and force regroupment makes any added German forces useless. As Cook said, 20 infantry divisions will barely make a ripple.
 

Cook

Banned
Kesselring was the one who convinced Hitler that defending Italy was a good idea.

Kesselring convinced Hitler that the south of Itlay should be defended, prior to that Rommel's plan was to abandon the south and make a stand north of Rome.

It would have generated the 20+ divisions for Russia.
The Germans seldom had more than 20 divisions in Italy, and if they were to abandon the peninsular, they’d still have to form a line in front of Austria; abandoning the peninsular is not going to free up 20 divisions.

Anyone looking for a WTF ASB! Moment in the Italian campaign will appreciate the following:

Kesselring’s subordinate was SS General Karl Wolff, who had command of all SS and security forces in German occupied Italy, including the fascist forces in the Salo Republic. In this role he countermanded a number of Kesselring’s orders to execute civilian hostages (obviously not all), rescued the art treasures from the monastery of Monte Casino when fighting approached it, prevented an attempt to kidnap the Pope and negotiated to surrender German forces in Italy to the allies without Kesselring’s knowledge.
 
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I really don't think 1943 was the year of the Soviet forces. 1943 was still very much touch-and-go I thin.

Kursk settled a lot, but Kursk could also have gone another way (especially if it had just gone away!).

Yes, not all 20 divisions could have been pulled out.

However, insofar as COSSAK had only planned for an invasion of France for 1943 of 3 divisions, and Marshall not having made up his mind what to do after the landing (Brooke: and then what? do we go South, East or North? or do we just sit down for a game of baccarac)

1943 was not feasible.

Yours,
 
However, insofar as COSSAK had only planned for an invasion of France for 1943 of 3 divisions,

COSSAC (CHIEF OF STAFF TO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER) prepared several plans. those plans were made following the guidance or directive to use only forces at hand in the UK. That directive was based on the January 1943 decision to focus operations on Italy or the Med. It followed and ran in accordance with other decisions such as altering Operation BOLERO to allow more cargo ships to support the Italian/Mediterranian theatre.

Had the decision been taken for operations in NW Europe been made then the plans would have reflected a entirely different array of ground and air forces than what BG Morgans group were directed to plan around. That is to say there was absolutely nothing set in stone as to what plans could be made. and neither were the forces available in the UK. This was all dependant on the decisions for stratigic focus & thus where the cargo shipping was allocated.

The landing crafts were manufactured, but King "snatched" more than his share of it all.

Yes the Pacifc threatre 'cost' the Allied European operations, tho the reasons go far beyond Adm King. It can be argued the decision to execute MacArthurs Operation CARTWHEEL, and approving his subsequent operations towards the Phillipines, all from early 1943 did more damage to Allied options than Kings efforts at getting the central Pacific offensive underway. The USN offensive did not start until latter 1943, and the costs were understood and budgeted. Macs CARTWHEEL operation and subsequent campaigns across northern New Guinea/South Pacific cost cargo shipping and amphibious capability from January 1943 that had not been allowed for during stratigic planning sessions in 1942.
 
I really don't think 1943 was the year of the Soviet forces. 1943 was still very much touch-and-go I thin.

Kursk settled a lot, but Kursk could also have gone another way (especially if it had just gone away!).

The Red Army from August to December 1943 cleared all land east of the Dnieper, easily defeated Germany's strongest mobile and infantry forces in the East, breached the Dnieper on a broad front from Gomel to Dnepropetrovsk, and repelled all German counterattack attempts. Suffice to say in 1943 it achieved total victory on a broad front and set the stage for it's 44 campaign.

No amount of static infantry divisions will change the situation.
 
Julian: Exactly my point!

After Kursk there was no more doubt about the outcome in the East.

If Kursk had never been fought it might have been different (or fought differently - difficult to see how, but let that be).

The German losses doomed any further actions. Those losses might not have been incurred.

A bit more on poor old Lucas:

From his own diary:

Lucas recalled (1 February) that Alexander had been:
".. jind enough but I am afraid he is not pleased. ... I have done my best... As I told Clark yesterday, I was sent on a desperate mission, one where the odds were greatly against success..."

Press conference, notes from Wynford Vaughan-Thomas:

"He sat in his chair, before the fire, and the light shone on his polished cavalry boots. He had the round face and the greying moustache of a kindly country solicitor. His voice was low snd hardly reached the outer circle of the waiting pressmen. They fired their quesions at him, above all Question No. 1, "what was our plan on landing and what happened to it now?" Well gentlemen, there was some suggestion that we should aim at getting to those hills - he turned to his G-2- What's the name of them, Joe? but the enemy was now strong... I'll tell you what. That German is a mighty tough fighter. Yes, mighty tough fighter.

With this type of press conference, could he evenhave been elected as the dog catcher somewhere?

Lucas also claimed that he believed the US forces to be better trained and having better officers than any of the British formations. On top of, he never ever visited Penney.

But even so: was it a suicide mission he was on? could it have succeeded in the time frame set for it?

Or

was the fronts (Anzio and Cassino) too close to be two fronts? and therefore just a part of the same front?

Ivan
 
Julian: Exactly my point!

After Kursk there was no more doubt about the outcome in the East.

If Kursk had never been fought it might have been different (or fought differently - difficult to see how, but let that be).

The German losses doomed any further actions. Those losses might not have been incurred.

A bit more on poor old Lucas:

From his own diary:

Lucas recalled (1 February) that Alexander had been:
".. jind enough but I am afraid he is not pleased. ... I have done my best... As I told Clark yesterday, I was sent on a desperate mission, one where the odds were greatly against success..."

Press conference, notes from Wynford Vaughan-Thomas:

"He sat in his chair, before the fire, and the light shone on his polished cavalry boots. He had the round face and the greying moustache of a kindly country solicitor. His voice was low snd hardly reached the outer circle of the waiting pressmen. They fired their quesions at him, above all Question No. 1, "what was our plan on landing and what happened to it now?" Well gentlemen, there was some suggestion that we should aim at getting to those hills - he turned to his G-2- What's the name of them, Joe? but the enemy was now strong... I'll tell you what. That German is a mighty tough fighter. Yes, mighty tough fighter.

With this type of press conference, could he evenhave been elected as the dog catcher somewhere?

Lucas also claimed that he believed the US forces to be better trained and having better officers than any of the British formations. On top of, he never ever visited Penney.

But even so: was it a suicide mission he was on? could it have succeeded in the time frame set for it?

Or

was the fronts (Anzio and Cassino) too close to be two fronts? and therefore just a part of the same front?

Ivan

If the Germans hadn't attacked at Kursk then the Soviets would have struck. They were already getting impatient that the Germans took so long and if it hadn't been for the information from the 'Lucy Spy Ring' telling them of the German timetable they wouldn't have waited.

No doubt the Germans would have inflicted heavy losses but by the Autumn they would have been falling back and by the end of '43 it wouldn't have been much different from OTL.

As for the Anzio thing. If the Allies landed further away then they would have been destroyed. As I've said before EVERY BOLD action by the Western Allied armies in WW2 met with defeat.

The decision not to abandon Southern Italy was made because of the relatively poor performance by Allied troops in Sicily. This convinced Kesselring that a defence of Italy south of Rome was feasible.
 
I don't agree with that. There were a few bold moves not ending in defeat.

You are probably right in saying that the German soldier, by and large, was more of a soldier than the Western Allieds citizen-soldier.

That said, they lost the war. Let's not forget that.

I am not sure any other landing except at Anzio would have been disaster.

Ivan
 
Julian: Exactly my point!

After Kursk there was no more doubt about the outcome in the East.

If Kursk had never been fought it might have been different (or fought differently - difficult to see how, but let that be).

The German losses doomed any further actions. Those losses might not have been incurred.

Germany's defeat at Kursk was a symptom of the Red Army's strength, not a reason for it. It had absolutely no chance to achieve victory. During the Kursk Defensive Operation the Red Army only committed 50-60% of it's available forces from the Steppe, Voronezh, and Central Fronts; additional German forces would merely be ground up and crushed, with the Soviets still possessing reserves for a counteroffensive.

Also, most of German's losses were incurred not during Operation Citadel, but the followup Soviet counteroffensives. The Orel Offensive, Operation Kutuzov, was by itself larger in forces involved and losses than 9th Army's attack on the north face of the Kursk Salient.

Kursk occurred because the STAVKA, brilliantly, chose to temporarily surrender the initiative in order to force Germany to prematurely commit itself to an offensive action which it could not win. From the beginning STAVKA planned to execute a staggered series of offensives from Azov to Smolensk in order to defeat the Heer.

Whether Kursk occurs differently doesn't matter at all; Germany's defeat in 1943 it totally ensured by the Soviet's offensive power.
 
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