Anzio landing works

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Deleted member 1487

What if Operation Shingle had enough landing craft made available to land double the divisions of OTL, enough to secure the bridgehead and attack out of it ASAP, which enables them to cut off the German 10th army? Let's say this delays D-Day into July due to the need to keep naval vessels in the Mediterranean longer, but prevents the Germans from withdrawing from the trap and as a result opens up the Italian Front. Does this end WW2 by the end of the year? Supposedly some of the German commanders were convinced the Allies could have cracked open the front and it would have been fatal for the German war effort and ended the war months early. Were they right and if so would it have meant something different for the post-war with an end by December 1944?
 
How many Allied men/formations would be necessary to accomplish this entrapment?

How much amphib lift and supply lift would be needed to accomplish this?
 
Landing craft wasn't the issue. You need to replace General Lucas. His refusal to move from the beachhead killed any chance of trapping the Germans. The quote from Churchill is priceless "I had hoped we were hurling a wildcat into the shore, but all we got was a stranded whale".

Maybe Lucas can crash into Mark Clark and get rid of two duds at once.

I agree though that a speedy collapse of the Italian front would have left the Germans in an untenable position. Would the Western Allies have held back to let the Russians "liberate" the areas of Eastern Europe they had conceded to them?
 

Deleted member 1487

How many Allied men/formations would be necessary to accomplish this entrapment?

How much amphib lift and supply lift would be needed to accomplish this?
I actually am not clear on that. About 2 divisions were landed on the first day and met virtually no opposition and apparently wasted a lot of time securing the bridgehead before the Germans could respond, which gave them time to react and hem in the landing zone. I'm thinking 4 divisions, double the historic landing force, should be enough to both secure the beachhead and push out. Apparently the Italian resistance offered to guide the landing forces to the Alban Hills, but the offer was refused. Having more forces capable of acting quickly might well have let them capture a lot of inland territory and cut off rail supply via Rome to the front. That would also open up Rome to being taken relatively quickly if there were a large number of follow forces in the following days while the Germans get put on their back foot. So if they could land 4 divisions per 20 hour period I think that would be enough to unhinge the German line and rapidly take Rome before German defenses were ready and troops could withdraw from the front to avoid capture. Also the Germans apparently also ended their 24 hour watch of the landing zone the day before the landings, so moving in 2 corps per 20 hour period would then give them sufficiently rapid build up to counter German reactive moves.
 
Landing craft wasn't the issue. You need to replace General Lucas. His refusal to move from the beachhead killed any chance of trapping the Germans. ..

Patton pronouned the VI Corps had been ordered on a "suicide mission". A few days before the landing Patton visited Lucas HQ & looked over the Allied force and the estimates of German forces in Italy & probable German reserves. His final evaluation of the effort was that the Allied force was entirely inadaquate for the task. This was much the same as Clarks evaluation in December when he recommended to his boss Alexander the operation be dropped.

Previous to being ordered to SHAEF & leaving the post of SACMED Eisenhower had looked at the redeployment schedules for Allied ground forces & amphibious lift judging that he could not see any decisive amphibious ops possible in Italy or the Med with remaining forces from November.
 

Deleted member 1487

Patton pronouned the VI Corps had been ordered on a "suicide mission". A few days before the landing Patton visited Lucas HQ & looked over the Allied force and the estimates of German forces in Italy & probable German reserves. His final evaluation of the effort was that the Allied force was entirely inadaquate for the task. This was much the same as Clarks evaluation in December when he recommended to his boss Alexander the operation be dropped.

Previous to being ordered to SHAEF & leaving the post of SACMED Eisenhower had looked at the redeployment schedules for Allied ground forces & amphibious lift judging that he could not see any decisive amphibious ops possible in Italy or the Med with remaining forces from November.
Then what is the counterfactual in terms of a dropped Operation Shingle? What could they have done differently instead? Seems like without the pressure at Anzio there would be more forces either for Italy to hold the line or to redeploy to Normandy.
 
LW had gathered the meager forces left for Operation Steinbock and transferred some to counter this? they probably all get sent?
 

Deleted member 1487

LW had gathered the meager forces left for Operation Steinbock and transferred some to counter this? they probably all get sent?
Doubtful, Hitler called off Eisenhammer to make way for Steinbock, he was obsessed with forestalling the invasion of France. If the Allies are even more successful in Italy, he'd probably want to ensure that he did everything possible to distract from any landing in France while Italy is dealt with.
 
At 06:00 22 Jan Kesselring ordered (with Hitlers permission) Op RICHARD executed. This was the contingency plan for countering a Allied landing on the Italian coast. Forces ordered to respond to this op were eleven divisions including armored, armored inf, para, and regular infantry. Sunday evening Kesselring reported to Hitler he had sufficient forces surrounding the beach head to contain the four Allied divisions landed. He was fifty percent off on VI Corps strength. Two reinforced divisions had been landed & the landing craft were just starting to land the next series of two more infantry divisions and reinforcing battalions.

On D+3. Tuesday, VI Corps counted 56,000 men including service units by nightfall, & a small artillery ammunition reserve. Kesselring had a similar number of combat troops in contact & a total of 70,000 just combat soldiers within a days march. Mackensens 14th Army drew supply & service units from depots in nearby Frascati & other Rome suburbs. VI Corps was drawing from first the docks of Naples, & further from the warehouses & ships anchored in Algerian ports. Reserves in the German 10th and 14th Armies, uncommitted to and battle front were still substantial.
 
Then what is the counterfactual in terms of a dropped Operation Shingle? What could they have done differently instead? Seems like without the pressure at Anzio there would be more forces either for Italy to hold the line or to redeploy to Normandy.

Tough one. Some options to examine:

A limited Op SHINGLE designed from the start as a diversion to draw off German reserves. This need not be near Rome. Multiple targets presented along the Italian coast.

Double down on Deception ops, including commando raids. Those were immensely sucessful in pinning German forces in useless locations.

Earlier and broader attacks along the Gustav Line. The 1943 & early 44 attacks failed in part because they were limited to relatively narrow sectors. A broader attack, as was done in the spring might have results. I dont see this as a game changer stratigically, but it ups the attrition of German ground forces.

Execute Op ANVIL in January. This probablly has no better initial results than Op SHINGLE but it gets the Allies a lodgement in South France eight months earlier than Op DRAGOON. I've gamed it out multiple times & by spring this S France enclave is a much bigger headache for the defense than the Anzio lodgement.
 

Deleted member 1487

At 06:00 22 Jan Kesselring ordered (with Hitlers permission) Op RICHARD executed. This was the contingency plan for countering a Allied landing on the Italian coast. Forces ordered to respond to this op were eleven divisions including armored, armored inf, para, and regular infantry. Sunday evening Kesselring reported to Hitler he had sufficient forces surrounding the beach head to contain the four Allied divisions landed. He was fifty percent off on VI Corps strength. Two reinforced divisions had been landed & the landing craft were just starting to land the next series of two more infantry divisions and reinforcing battalions.
It seems that he thought by the end of the day he could have 20k men in the area of the landing, while by midnight the Allies landed about 36k IOTL. Bump that up to 70k and they'd have a decisive advantage on the first day long before the Germans could get to their D+3 numbers.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Anzio#Initial_landings
At 5 a.m. he initiated Operation "Richard" and ordered the Kampfgruppe of 4th Parachute Division and the Hermann Göring Panzer Division to defend the roads leading from Anzio to the Alban Hills via Campoleone and Cisterna whilst his plans expected some 20,000 defending troops to have arrived by the end of the first day.

The German units in the immediate vicinity had in fact been dispatched to reinforce the Gustav Line only a few days earlier. All available reserves from the southern front or on their way to it were rushed toward Anzio and Nettuno; these included the 3rd Panzer Grenadier and 71st Infantry Divisions, and the bulk of the Luftwaffe's Hermann Göring Panzer Division. Kesselring initially considered that a successful defence could not be made if the Allies launched a major attack on January 23 or January 24. However, by the end of January 22, the lack of aggressive action convinced him that a defence could be made. Nevertheless, few additional defenders arrived on January 23 although the arrival on the evening of January 22 of Lieutenant General Alfred Schlemm and his 1st Parachute Corps headquarters brought greater organisation and purpose to the German defensive preparations. By January 24, however, the Germans had over 40,000 troops in prepared defensive positions.[18]

Three days after the landings, the beachhead was surrounded by a defence line consisting of three divisions: The 4th Parachute Division to the west, the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division to the center in front of Alban Hills, the Hermann Göring Panzer Division to the east.

Landing even 60k men on the first day would have been decisive assuming then that Lucas acted by taking the Alban Hills with his divisions. 4 vs. about 1 on D-day would have been more than enough, while by D+3 they could have had 8 divisions ashore and pressing on Rome with more strength than the Germans could contend with provided enough shipping was made available.

Execute Op ANVIL in January. This probablly has no better initial results than Op SHINGLE but it gets the Allies a lodgement in South France eight months earlier than Op DRAGOON. I've gamed it out multiple times & by spring this S France enclave is a much bigger headache for the defense than the Anzio lodgement.
Yes, but it also puts the Allied forces sent in a much more dangerous situation, as the Germans had a lot more reserves to use against them and no land based air cover nearby to help them. Seem remarkably dangerous to try in January.
 
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It seems that he thought by the end of the day he could have 20k men in the area of the landing, while by midnight the Allies landed about 36k IOTL. Bump that up to 70k and they'd have a decisive advantage on the first day long before the Germans could get to their D+3 numbers.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Anzio#Initial_landings


Landing even 60k men on the first day would have been decisive assuming then that Lucas acted by taking the Alban Hills with his divisions. 4 vs. about 1 on D-day would have been more than enough, while by D+3 they could have had 8 divisions ashore and pressing on Rome with more strength than the Germans could contend with provided enough shipping was made available.

This leaves out the considerable number of loose German units that were available for Op RICHARD, but not committed to the battle line. Kesselring had a large reserve, both in 10th Army reserves & in the 14th Army. His confidence at the end of Sunday caused him to keep a still substantial reserve near but uncommitted in the Rome - 10th Army region. One of the factors that confuses the issue around the German reserves is that battle groups of most of the 10th Army divisions, & later the 14th Army at Anzio were in the front lines, tho the bulk of many divisions were out of the battle zone to the rear. Thus formations that were technically 'in the line' were able to respond to movement orders fairly quickly Clark, Leese, & Patton seem to have understood this.

Note the accounting differences in the German & Allied records. The numbers for the men ashore with VI Corps include everyone, the service units as well as combat. Head counts for the corps 14th Army deployed around Anzio in January exclude the depot & LOC units servicing them as those were part of the army & army group overhead & not on the corps/division OB. Subtracting the service units active in the VI Corps beach head would provide a better comparitive head count. Another point is the VI Corps had a large portion of its supporting fire in the form of the naval gun fire ships. That is the corps artillery & other reinforcing combat support was thin on the ground in the opening days. The naval fire support made up for this at the beach head, but could not follow inland to the Alban Hills, Route 6, or other critical points inland.


Yes, but it also puts the Allied forces sent in a much more dangerous situation, as the Germans had a lot more reserves to use against them and no land based air cover nearby to help them. Seem remarkably dangerous to try in January.

In January 1944 the US and French air forces had 1000+ aircraft permanently based on Corsica alone & a considerable surge capacity on both Corsica & Sardinia. This was when SHAEF still had Op ANVIL on the table & was actively preparing for it. The entire heavy bomber fleet of the 15th AF is in easy range of south France & medium bombers based in south Sicily used the Corsican/Sardinian bases as refuel & service stops. Note that January 1944 is the month of the Big Week over Germany, which severely damaged the German interceptor forces, and after the air groups in northern Italy had been stripped of interceptors to reinforce Germany.
 

Deleted member 1487

This leaves out the considerable number of loose German units that were available for Op RICHARD, but not committed to the battle line. Kesselring had a large reserve, both in 10th Army reserves & in the 14th Army. His confidence at the end of Sunday caused him to keep a still substantial reserve near but uncommitted in the Rome - 10th Army region. One of the factors that confuses the issue around the German reserves is that battle groups of most of the 10th Army divisions, & later the 14th Army at Anzio were in the front lines, tho the bulk of many divisions were out of the battle zone to the rear. Thus formations that were technically 'in the line' were able to respond to movement orders fairly quickly Clark, Leese, & Patton seem to have understood this.

Note the accounting differences in the German & Allied records. The numbers for the men ashore with VI Corps include everyone, the service units as well as combat. Head counts for the corps 14th Army deployed around Anzio in January exclude the depot & LOC units servicing them as those were part of the army & army group overhead & not on the corps/division OB. Subtracting the service units active in the VI Corps beach head would provide a better comparitive head count. Another point is the VI Corps had a large portion of its supporting fire in the form of the naval gun fire ships. That is the corps artillery & other reinforcing combat support was thin on the ground in the opening days. The naval fire support made up for this at the beach head, but could not follow inland to the Alban Hills, Route 6, or other critical points inland.

There was a substantial Italian resistance, so if the Allies seize the Alban Hills south of Rome there will probably be a need for German units to secure the city and supply lines. Also odds-and-ends units aren't necessarily prepared to face an Allied division due to lack of appropriate support units. Kampfgruppe can get into action quickly, but their staying power, especially when outnumbered by Wallied division in 1944, aren't especially great. Giving them time to dig in on the high ground also did not help. And yes the support units didn't get offloaded quickly due to lack of shipping and the lack of need given the floating arsenal guarding their rear. Have enough shipping be available to get the necessary units to show and have them be aggressive seizing the high ground and they can be available.


In January 1944 the US and French air forces had 1000+ aircraft permanently based on Corsica alone & a considerable surge capacity on both Corsica & Sardinia. This was when SHAEF still had Op ANVIL on the table & was actively preparing for it. The entire heavy bomber fleet of the 15th AF is in easy range of south France & medium bombers based in south Sicily used the Corsican/Sardinian bases as refuel & service stops. Note that January 1944 is the month of the Big Week over Germany, which severely damaged the German interceptor forces, and after the air groups in northern Italy had been stripped of interceptors to reinforce Germany.
http://www.forgottenairfields.com/france/corsica/-uss-corsica-s1226.html
There were, but that took time to build up and Corsica was only liberated after substantial bombardment in September or so. January is not a lot of time to build up the necessary facilities to maintain combat operations at the necessary pace. According to this map air support for Dragoon was rendered from Central Italy, north of Rome:
dragoon_invasion_force.jpg


http://www.517prct.org/documents/airborne_invasion/airborne_invasion_history.htm
One proposed plan contemplating an immediate staging in Corsica was rejected because of lack of available Corsican airfields, and also because those fields available were located on the eastern side of the island, and their use would have necessitated a flight over 9000 foot mountain peaks.

Also Anzio did contribute lessons that helped Dragoon be a success:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Dragoon
The chief objectives of Operation Dragoon were the important French ports of Marseille and Toulon, which were considered essential to supply the growing Allied forces in France.[17] The Allied planners were cautious, taking heed of lessons learned from the Anzio and Normandy landings. They chose a location without high ground controlled by the Wehrmacht, conditions that had led to heavy casualties after the initial landings on one of the beaches at Normandy. The choice for the disembarkation site was an area on the Var coast east of Toulon. A preliminary air campaign was planned to isolate the battlefield and cut the Germans off from reinforcement by destroying several key bridges. A large airborne landing was also planned in the center of the landing zone to quickly seize the high ground overlooking the beaches. Parallel to the invasion, several commando units would take control of the islands off the coast.[18]
The airborne component and lessons for choosing the right beach landing zone would be missed without Normandy and Anzio. Plus the airborne would really not be able to be used given the problems with Corsica and lack of Central Italian air bases. No doubt some air support could be rendered, but not nearly the OTL August 1944 levels.
 
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