Anybody buy the "Edwardian appeasement" argument

This was Niall Ferguson's argument in "the Pity of War." He argued, contrary to traditional emphasis on increasing German naval and economic might, that Germany aligned with the Entente because Russia and France were actually MORE dangerous to the far-flung British Empire than Germany was.

Note he also makes an argument that Britain would have been better off staying out of WWI. I know that's very controversial, so try to keep it separate in your mind from the question of Edwardian appeasement.
 
To the first, I don't buy it, as the British approached Germany in 1895 asking for an alliance. Something the Germans turned down.

As for the second, I would agree. Britain would have been better staying out of the war......
 
I generally agree on all fronts on Neill's views. German weakness prompted British involvement with the entente, why not? The Russian's threatened to invade Afghanistan and Tibet and challenge British control of India, France controlled a fair portion of Africa and there were confusions over Sth East Asia. Also not to mention both are natural enemies of the UK. It would be easier to tackle a weak foe and remain a dominant player in a war than to take two superpowers on a truly global front and risk everything. Germany was the easy way out to ensure British domination.
 
Not really no.

What could Russia do? While it could certainly exert greater pressure in Central Asia with the aim to destabalising British interests there this is unlikely to work. The use of force will prove counter productive and Britain can offer most of the area's rulers more so than the Russians. At best Russia could fight the Japanese and possibly force them back but even this is doubtful. Russia's fleet is hardly a major concern and they will be severely limited in any action they can take in Europe.

France is far more of a potential threat.. but in reality without a major ship building campaign it is not. Can the French Navy challenge the British in the Channel? Not really.
Could the French close the Suez canal and support uprisings within the empire? Ofcourse they could try and perhaps have some measure of success, but at the cost of losing their merchant marine, most probably their holdings in the far east and quite possibly an ecstatic German Army sweeping towards Paris.

On the other hand Germany wasn't a major threat untill they began to amass a fleet out of all proportion for guarding the sea lanes to a few profitless peices of Africa and the Far East. You have to be building it in mind for the future and the British empire is the most obvious target for alteration.

Its a bit like saying who is more worrying to the US now, China or Europe. If Europe actually got united and properly armed with the aim of taking on the US it would probably pose a greater threat, but such isn't likely. In the case of China its probably alot less likely than certain Americans think, but its more likely than Europe.
 
PJ Norris said:
I generally agree on all fronts on Neill's views. German weakness prompted British involvement with the entente, why not? The Russian's threatened to invade Afghanistan and Tibet and challenge British control of India, France controlled a fair portion of Africa and there were confusions over Sth East Asia. Also not to mention both are natural enemies of the UK. It would be easier to tackle a weak foe and remain a dominant player in a war than to take two superpowers on a truly global front and risk everything. Germany was the easy way out to ensure British domination.

I'd disagree on all fronts. Any strategic thinker worth their salt recognized that Russia was worthless unless it could mass an insane number of men. Even then, it was hardly worth anything but tying down troops or beating up on third rate Austro-Hungarians.

France was better, but her fleet was miniscule compared to Britain's and her industrial capacity far short of it. Thus, Britain could commit everything, win, and still be able to replace all of her losses, while France would be stuck. The only strategic threat on the European continent to British interests was Germany.

Germany had the men, the industry, the equipment, the training, and the will to dominate Europe. As it was, it took Britain, France, Russia, and the USA to defeat Germany. After 4 years. I find it impossible to believe that Britain did not recognize the threat to her interests that Germany posed, and instead allied with a clearly weaker Russia and France......
 
raharris1973 said:
This was Niall Ferguson's argument in "the Pity of War." He argued, contrary to traditional emphasis on increasing German naval and economic might, that Germany aligned with the Entente because Russia and France were actually MORE dangerous to the far-flung British Empire than Germany was.

Note he also makes an argument that Britain would have been better off staying out of WWI. I know that's very controversial, so try to keep it separate in your mind from the question of Edwardian appeasement.

Don't you mean 'Britain aligned with the Entente'?

I think he is absolutely right about the first. France and Russia are more dangerous than Germany to the British Empire.

His second point is a little weak. Britain itself may have ended up better off, but what sort of power will it face on a European continent dominated either by the Franco-Russian Entente or Germany?
 
You are underestimating Russia. Gradually extending her power into Central Asia, she was close to being a real threat to India. Without India, Britain is just a third-rate power. But in general I agree with you - Russia was a threat to Britain's imperial status, but Germany was a threat to Britain's independent existence.

Bulgaroktonos said:
I'd disagree on all fronts. Any strategic thinker worth their salt recognized that Russia was worthless unless it could mass an insane number of men. Even then, it was hardly worth anything but tying down troops or beating up on third rate Austro-Hungarians.

France was better, but her fleet was miniscule compared to Britain's and her industrial capacity far short of it. Thus, Britain could commit everything, win, and still be able to replace all of her losses, while France would be stuck. The only strategic threat on the European continent to British interests was Germany.

Germany had the men, the industry, the equipment, the training, and the will to dominate Europe. As it was, it took Britain, France, Russia, and the USA to defeat Germany. After 4 years. I find it impossible to believe that Britain did not recognize the threat to her interests that Germany posed, and instead allied with a clearly weaker Russia and France......
 
Abdul Hadi Pasha said:
You are underestimating Russia. Gradually extending her power into Central Asia, she was close to being a real threat to India. Without India, Britain is just a third-rate power. But in general I agree with you - Russia was a threat to Britain's imperial status, but Germany was a threat to Britain's independent existence.

Certainly something of a threat, but barring massive militarization projects, Russian soldiers were not going to be able to wage a war across Afghanistan and into India. The logistical capabilities are just not there for Russia. Not even for the USSR......

Though I suppose you are right, I probably am underestimating Russia. I love the poor sods. So much potential, yet so little done about it.....
 
You are underestimating Russia. Gradually extending her power into Central Asia, she was close to being a real threat to India. Without India, Britain is just a third-rate power. But in general I agree with you - Russia was a threat to Britain's imperial status, but Germany was a threat to Britain's independent existence.

Germany,by no means could have successfully invaded the British Isles, not in this forum anyway. I think you're forgetting about the british navy. But yes, few people take into account how scared the British were of the Russians. Germany was, very much, it's unwillingness to take part in the Boxer Rebellion because of Russian involvement is a testimony to this. Russia was a real threat, not at sea, but because it had the will and strength (supposedly) to take all of Asia (!).

France was better, but her fleet was miniscule compared to Britain's and her industrial capacity far short of it. Thus, Britain could commit everything, win, and still be able to replace all of her losses, while France would be stuck. The only strategic threat on the European continent to British interests was Germany.

Not so. If it was a direct, real threat why did Britain not fully commit itself to the Entente? I think people have to take a better look at this thing. Firstly the British didn't expect the Germans to win a war on two fronts, against two superpowers, with a crap financial base. Austro-Hungary was unthoughtof and for good reason.

Germany had the men, the industry, the equipment, the training, and the will to dominate Europe. As it was, it took Britain, France, Russia, and the USA to defeat Germany. After 4 years. I find it impossible to believe that Britain did not recognize the threat to her interests that Germany posed, and instead allied with a clearly weaker Russia and France......

It did not however have the financial base, paying for the naval and arms build up alone almost busted the German Empire and things proved worst under the pressures of the war. I think the duration of the war was more due to the weapons and techniques of the war than anything else and besides everyone believed short, lightening wars modelled on 1870-71 was the norm then. And France and Russia are NOT weak, as much as pro-Anglo history books would like you to believe. Yes Russia was weak at the time of the alliances but was modernizing and strengthening at a spectacular rate. Have no war until 1917 and you could find a Russia that could have crushed Germany without trying.

To emphasize my points:

- The German Navy was weak, only germanophobes in London and pro-entente politicians talked about a German threat from the sea.

-the British believed they were a third rate power because they were spread out and strained (even though they weren't they just believed that) and that only a 'thin red line' sat on the empire's borders where a conflict with France or Russia was more likely than Germany.

-the French however had major disputes with the British almost yearly over who held what in Africa. Egypt is a prime example.

-The Brits actually got on rather well with the Germans, the proposed alliance in 1895 in Tokyo (I think) and negotiations between the two nations over swapping colonies, docks and train routes (and influence over Columbia) was actually going really well. Only when the Brits discovered German weakness they killed the idea and Germany was seen as a troublesome but merely overlarge, belligerent, central European country not neighboring Britain, surrounded on all sides with a weak empire. Britain was more afraid of those nations that already HAVE empires.
 
All the evidence points to German alienation of British public opinion from the time Willie II came to the throne. When a country like Britain is threatened by a naval arms race it reacts strongly and negatively towards the threat. When it is then threatened diplomatically by the same country and is served up bombastic lectures on their lost destiny by the same source it is likely they will turn away from ideas of aligning themselves with that threat. This is precisely what Germany under Willie II did.

Prior to the decision to build a navy to rival the Royal Navy, popular fiction in Britain always portrayed France as the principal enemy that threatened British independence. After the decision it was always Germany who was the enemy.

'The Great Game' was a real threat to the stability of British India and its empire in both the Near and Far East. Russia offended British liberal sensibilities and threatened its Empire. They became allies almost by default because France and Russia were already allies when the Entente was formed.

With Bismarck as chancellor British and German interests almost always coincided. Germany was interested in keeping Russia contained as was Britain. Germany was interested in curbing French dominance over the continent as was Britain. Germany was interested in ensuring stability and a continuation of the staus quo in Europe as was Britain. The equilibriuum was disturbed by Germany's decision to challange British naval superiority.
 
I actually tend to agree with Ferguson about British motivations.

Britain did have a period of a couple of years where they were really worried about German naval buildup, but by 1910 or so it was pretty obvious that Germany would never be able to match British naval strenght, even in the North Sea alone, unless British leaders had their brains sucked out by Alien Space Bats and decided to just stop building new ships entirely for a few years while Germany kept building.

With an inferior navy even in home waters, Germany wasnt a great threat to British security as long as the British stayed ahead of them in naval construction, which they could readily afford to do because they didnt have to finance a huge national army.

The Germans were certainly not a serious threat to the British overseas, either. Sure, they had grabbed some land in Africa and the Pacific, that the British might have wanted for themselves, but overall the German overseas empire was dwarfed in size and power by the British.

The Russians and the French, on the other hand, were serious threats to British imperial power. Russia didnt need a powerful navy to threaten British positions in Asia - they could do that by land. They had a Trans-Siberian railroad and they were strengthening their industrial base and rail network, even though they were still backwards in development compared to other European countries. The poor military performance against Japan in 1905 showed great weaknesses, but the British had to assume that the Russians would recover from this and continue to get stronger in the long run.

The French couldnt match Britain in naval power, but their imperial territories in Africa were so large that they could cause still be a threat to British power even if Britain could cut them off from France. Besides, the French could concentrate most of their naval force in the Mediterranean and make it tougher for the British to cut their communications with Algeria.

Individually, Britain was probably strong enough to win a colonial war with either Russia or France individually. The alliance between Russia and France, however, meant that there was a good chance that if Britain got into a war with one of them, they would be at war with both.

So, Britain had a lot to gain by reaching agreements with both France and Russia which cooled down colonial tensions. If the price of that was being seen as unfriendly by the Germans, it was a price that most British leaders were willing to pay.
 
It shouldn't be forgotten that Russia is still committed to acquiring a warm water port, most likely Constantinople or even unlikely Persia. Either one presents a serious threat to an unaligned Britain. Constantinople and the Straits were eventually signed over to the Russians once the Ottoman Empire had left Britain's sphere of influence. There were border (more colliding or overlapping spheres of influence) problems between Britain and Russia regarding Persia in mid-1914 which would have lead to serious talks between the two if the war hadn't broken out.

Also it should be recognized that the naval arms race between Britain and Germany is just a continuation of the old Anglo-Franco naval arms race just with a different foe (as mentioned above). The Germans needed a fleet in order to counterbalance the likely hostile naval forces of France and Russia. The German fleet is legislatively set in size and type of warship, so the British always knew how large it was ever going to be at any one time. The Germans had fallen behind schedule with their warship construction by 1914.
 
It's undeniably true that British colonial disputes with France and Russia were far more serious than those with Germany, and that most British politicians believed that a war with the Dual Alliance would be an extremely hazardous proposition. This led to the ententes of 1905 and 1907 but these were merely a resolution of conflicts between the involved powers, they acquired a specifically anti-German character only because there was also a real fear of German power in Edwardian Britain. This fear was manifested in the press and popular perception of a German economic challenge, in the fear of the German naval buildup which which reached its height in 1909 and the increasing Germanophobia of the FO's permanent officials, who were motivated by basically balance of power concerns.

Fergusson's error is in assessing Britain as an imperials power, which she was and in which capacity she was far more threatened by France and Russia than by Germany. But he ignores the fact that Britain was also a European power and in that context she was far more threatened by the German fleet and the prospect of German domination of continental Europe than by the Dual alliance.

Moreover, the imperial clashes with France and Russia were over concrete issues (colonial borders, spheres of influence etc.) that could be negotitaed away in a rational fashion. But how could the growth of German industry and population, her ambition to possess a world-class fleet and ambition to become a true world power be resolved by diplomacy?
 
The inferioriy of the French Navy apropos the RN is also rather misleading, for the French had long-since decided that they would have to avoid direct contact and instead attack British commerce.

With a large Empire allowing worldwide coaling and a large cruiser fleet - most designed as long-range raiders - this would have been a tricky proposition: imagine the German Pacific Squadron of 1914 ten times stonger and with overseas bases from which they could still operated.

Moreover, technology allowed for minefields, submarines, torpedo boats etc. to guard coastlines and prevent enemy capital ships coming too close.
 
The vigour of debate here says a lot about the significance of the issue.

What is clear is that from the 1890s the British do not wish to be isolated. Rapprochement with France and Russia is part of that process.

It is more accurate to suggest that the British do not wish to be aligned against anyone. Had there been no WW1 a deal with Germany is quite plausible - the British considered themselves to be in a process, not at a destination.

Britain's position means she has potential for conflict with just about everyone. I would say that the German Navy creates a certain urgency about the German threat, as well as Germany's vigour. However, the British were certainly keen not to have France and Russia as potential enemies - but it is not an either/or proposition.
 
Britain would have been better off without WW1 in the short term at least (a victorious Germany could turn on them eventually)

Russia was the big threat during the 19th century.
France was not a concern, anything it could do Britain could do better. They make the first ironclad warship, Britain makes one that could take on 10 of theirs at once. They weren't even very good on the industrial strength line of things.
The only real threats to Britain's industry were Germany and the USA. The USA was no problem, it was good friends with Britain, at the end of the 19th century it was in the empire in everything but name.
Germany though, it was new and powerful. It was a concern. Kaiser Bill being such a idiot and alienating Britain didn't help there either.

Britain ended up with Russia just due to mutual alliances with France, I don't think we set out to make friends with Russia over Germany.
Russia could threaten central asia though with superior British industry the NW frontier was far more secure then it had been in years gone.

eidt- The Germany/USA thing is like what someone mentioned above with China or the EU only even more so. The USA at the beginning of the 20th century is the EU now. Some people in Britain probally realised it was inevitable that it would take over as the dominant industrial power with its greater population and natural resources (well not that on Europe...) but we were friends, this rivalry would purely be in the buisness world and in the buisness world there is nothing to stop people from one country owning industry in the other.
Germany on the other hand was China, a new, serious threat, previously 2nd rate though now trying to become a top rate power.

I believe Britain would have been better off with Germany though. With Britain on in the peace negotiations Germany would not be annexing large chunks of France though it would be expanding into Poland. The main problem with Germany was their dumb wanting to make a empire abroad when they were a land based empre. Their interests were different to those of Britain.
 
Last edited:
balance of power stuff

Matt said: "This fear was manifested in the press and popular perception of a German economic challenge, in the fear of the German naval buildup which which reached its height in 1909 and the increasing Germanophobia of the FO's permanent officials, who were motivated by basically balance of power concerns.

Moreover, the imperial clashes with France and Russia were over concrete issues (colonial borders, spheres of influence etc.) that could be negotitaed away in a rational fashion. But how could the growth of German industry and population, her ambition to possess a world-class fleet and ambition to become a true world power be resolved by diplomacy?"

So a less tangible fear of German potential was more important to balance of power considerations than actual global friction with Russia and France? Were strategists of the time as aware of the industrial wellsprings of national at this time? The irony is that since 1871, all (except France) Britain's allies were the ones who had engaged in major wars of aggression, whereas the Central Powers basically had not. Yet the Entente was somehow the status quo coalition.
 
So, if the Germans had accepted British alliance offers in 1895

What would the long-term prospects have been?

The Germans would have had to lower their expectations from such an alliance. Basically, they would just need to accept it as a device to prevent potential British alignment with France (a la the Palmerston - Louis Napoleon era). It would help keep their supplies from overseas in war flowing, even if the British would do pathetically little to help Germany on land. The Germans would also have to realize that there's no way the British would explicitly endorse German domination as a result of victory against the Dual Alliance. Why's it worth it for Berlin in the end? Basically to prevent war, and failing that, to slow down British reaction time in turning against Germany if she started to do really well in a Dual Alliance war. I'd think that democratic politics would make it a little bit harder for Britain to do a quick 180 like she could back in the 18th century.

Okay then, so Germany accepts alliance with Britain in 1895. If Germans can be satisfied with it, will it last, or would Britain still ditch Germany out of Edwardian appeasement.
 
raharris1973 said:
What would the long-term prospects have been?

The Germans would have had to lower their expectations from such an alliance. Basically, they would just need to accept it as a device to prevent potential British alignment with France (a la the Palmerston - Louis Napoleon era). It would help keep their supplies from overseas in war flowing, even if the British would do pathetically little to help Germany on land. The Germans would also have to realize that there's no way the British would explicitly endorse German domination as a result of victory against the Dual Alliance. Why's it worth it for Berlin in the end? Basically to prevent war, and failing that, to slow down British reaction time in turning against Germany if she started to do really well in a Dual Alliance war. I'd think that democratic politics would make it a little bit harder for Britain to do a quick 180 like she could back in the 18th century.

Okay then, so Germany accepts alliance with Britain in 1895. If Germans can be satisfied with it, will it last, or would Britain still ditch Germany out of Edwardian appeasement.

I disagree with the whole concept that Britain viewed France or Russia as tremendous strategic threats to the Empire and therefore allied with them. At Fashoda, it was the French who backed down, not Britain. This signals that the French recognize their incapability of defeating Britain in an imperial match up. Russia is successfully contained in the Baltic for the foreseeable future, especially with increased German influence in Constantinople. Nor is India in danger.

No general in the world would believe that the Russian army would be able to march across the Stans, into the Hindu Kush against hostile natives, march across it, and then fight a war in some deserts and more mountains across huge supply lines against disciplined soldiers. The sheer idea is ridiculous......

If Britain and Germany allied in 1895, it is difficult to say what would happen. I think there would still be a war, despite the Dual Alliance's total superiority in all fields. I think Britain would require that France and Russia be treated humanely, and that France lose a good portion of her overseas Empire to Germany. This keeps the balance of power in Europe and gives Germany what she wants.....
 
Bulgaroktonos said:
I disagree with the whole concept that Britain viewed France or Russia as tremendous strategic threats to the Empire and therefore allied with them. At Fashoda, it was the French who backed down, not Britain. This signals that the French recognize their incapability of defeating Britain in an imperial match up. Russia is successfully contained in the Baltic for the foreseeable future, especially with increased German influence in Constantinople. Nor is India in danger.

No general in the world would believe that the Russian army would be able to march across the Stans, into the Hindu Kush against hostile natives, march across it, and then fight a war in some deserts and more mountains across huge supply lines against disciplined soldiers. The sheer idea is ridiculous......

If Britain and Germany allied in 1895, it is difficult to say what would happen. I think there would still be a war, despite the Dual Alliance's total superiority in all fields. I think Britain would require that France and Russia be treated humanely, and that France lose a good portion of her overseas Empire to Germany. This keeps the balance of power in Europe and gives Germany what she wants.....

The French backed down at Fashoda because they had a small expeditionary force that found itself outnumbered by 10 to 1. The overall balance between the military strengths of the British and French empires as a whole was nowhere near as lopsided.

As for the Russians being able to threaten the British position in India, many British military and political leaders spent most of the nineteenth century worrying about precisely that. Their worries were greatly exaggerated during the 19th century, but as the 20th century began and Russia began to industrialize more and build more rail lines, it was not at all out of the question for them to extend a rail network into Central Asia that could potentially move and supply a considerable military force. They would still have to get across Afghanistan, but the Afghans werent always on the best of terms with the British, so it was not impossible that many of them would join the Russians against the British rather than fighting them.

As for naval strength, Russia didnt need it to threaten Britains imperial position in Asia. Railroads were changing the strategic balance - once it was easier for the British to move troops to India or Constantinople or even China by ship than it was for the Russians to march thousands of miles over land, but with railroads the equation was reversed - large numbers of troops could move faster by rail than by water.

France couldnt challenge Britains fleet directly, but again, they didnt have to. France could concentrate part of its navy in the Mediterranean to keep communication open with Algeria, and send the rest as commerce raiding detachments in various parts of the world. As F. Nelson wrote below, think of something like the German Pacific squadron in 1914 except 10 times bigger and with a number of bases to operate out of. The British would eventually hunt them down, but it would take time and a lot of merchant shipping plus a few unlucky detachments of smaller RN ships would be sunk in the meantime.

Against either France or Russia alone, Britain was still strong enough to prevail in a colonial war. Since they were military allies, though, a war with one probably meant a war with both. Even if Britain had an outright alliance with Germany, Germany was unlikely to start a massive war on the continent against Russia and France just to support Britains colonial territories. In the sphere of colonial warfare, they couldnt help the British all that much.

The threat to Britain from an expanded German navy looked ominous at first, but then they realized that the Germans couldnt outbuild them because the huge German army still took up the bulk of the military budget. As long as Britain kept construction going on new battleships and battle cruisers, they would always have superiority over the Germans. Furthermore, if they settled their colonial differences with the French and Russians, they could reduce their naval strength in most parts of the Empire, pulling more of their best ships into home waters to keep watch on the Germans.

So, I think that the British realized that they had more to fear from having France and Russia as enemies than the Germans. They also had more to gain from being friendly to the French and Russians then they did from being friendly to the Germans.
 
Top