Any good German 1916 strategies?

CaliGuy

Banned
Should Italy get hammered enough and leave the war would France/Uk actually care?
Yes, they would; after all, no Italy = more CP troops for use against Britain & France on the Western Front, no?

Good question, Petain wanted to pull out immediately, the French government, afraid of a vote of no confidence said he had to stay regardless of cost. I think they'd force the military to stay and die until parliament toppled the government and allowed a withdrawal. I have no idea what that point would be though. USW was never contemplated under Falkenhayn due to the civilian government's opposition; that only changed once H-L took over and did their 'soft' dictatorship that forced the civilian government to comply to their demands. The Kaiser was effectively a political non-entity at that point. Shortages were bearable in 1916 all things considered, they only became serious in the winter of 1916-17 because of the insane production plan H-L devised that effectively collapsed a bunch of sectors of the German economy, which 1917-18 were spent recovering from. Falkenhayn saw the Verdun attrition as the solution to the strategic dilemma he faced: bleed the French so badly that the Brits launch their offensive prematurely before their conscript army was prepared to fight, bleed them on strong defenses on the Somme, then negotiate an end to the war on the backs of the destroyed combat power of the Entente (he also assumed Russia was more beaten than it was...but then Brusilov's success was a function of Conrad and his generals' massive incompetence).
So, Petain was willing to allow Germany to occupy eastern Lorraine?

Also, it's interesting that H & L first screwed over sectors of the German economy and then brought the U.S. into the war; indeed, those two resulted in little but trouble for Germany after Tannenberg, no?
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Now if only the Austrians hadn't launched the Italian offensive and had actually built up proper defenses in Galicia, they could have checked Brusilov and saved the Germans 350k casualties when they intervened to prop up the Austrians. That probably would have required better coordination and Conrad to fall down some stairs.
If the Brusilov Offensive would have failed in this scenario, would the Central Powers have been able to launch another large-scale offensive into Russia along the scale of Gorlice-Tarnow (especially if Verdun would have went better for the Central Powers)?
 

Deleted member 1487

So, Petain was willing to allow Germany to occupy eastern Lorraine?
No, he was willing to allow them to occupy the East Bank of the Meuse, as he knew he could hold the West Bank even if the East fell.

Also, it's interesting that H & L first screwed over sectors of the German economy and then brought the U.S. into the war; indeed, those two resulted in little but trouble for Germany after Tannenberg, no?
Yeah, they were about the worst thing that could have happened to Germany. Ironically even Ludendorff later was smart enough to realize Hitler was a nutter that shouldn't be allowed near power, despite paving the ideological way for him and being a proto-version of him:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_Ludendorff
By the time Hitler came to power, Ludendorff was no longer sympathetic to him. The Nazis distanced themselves from Ludendorff because of his eccentric conspiracy theories.[67] In January 1933, on the occasion of Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor by President Hindenburg, Ludendorff allegedly sent the following telegram: "I solemnly prophesy that this accursed man will cast our Reich into the abyss and bring our nation to inconceivable misery. Future generations will damn you in your grave for what you have done."[68] Other historians consider this text to be a forgery.[69] In an attempt to regain Ludendorff’s favor, Hitler arrived unannounced at Ludendorff’s home on his 70th birthday in 1935 to promote him to field marshal. Infuriated, Ludendorff allegedly rebuffed Hitler by telling him: "An officer is named General Field-Marshal on the battlefield! Not at a birthday tea-party in the midst of peace".[70] He wrote two further books on military themes, demonstrating that he still could think coherently about war despite his warped prejudices.[71]

If the Brusilov Offensive would have failed in this scenario, would the Central Powers have been able to launch another large-scale offensive into Russia along the scale of Gorlice-Tarnow (especially if Verdun would have went better for the Central Powers)?
Who said it would fail in this scenario? That would require a separate POD than Verdun going as planned.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
No, he was willing to allow them to occupy the East Bank of the Meuse, as he knew he could hold the West Bank even if the East fell.

The eastern bank of the Meuse only near Verdun or all of the way down the Meuse? :

http://www.socopse.se/images/18.3d9ff17111f6fef70e9800055634/1350483884256/Mause-map.gif

Mause-map.gif


Yeah, they were about the worst thing that could have happened to Germany. Ironically even Ludendorff later was smart enough to realize Hitler was a nutter that shouldn't be allowed near power, despite paving the ideological way for him and being a proto-version of him:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_Ludendorff

Who said it would fail in this scenario? That would require a separate POD than Verdun going as planned.
Yeah, it's certainly interesting how H & L set into motion a series of events that screwed both Germany and Russia over.

Also, do you know what exactly caused Ludendorff to eventually turn on Hitler?
 

Deleted member 1487

And what of the small trifling matter (almost embarrassed to mention it really) of the Nore Command stopping them from getting to the Channel and preventing them from beating the Bejesus out of anyone?

No need to be embarrassed, its not something that gets much attention on this site. By 1916 the Nore command was an administrative rather than a combat command, other commands were created during the war that took on the Nore commands combat responsibilities. These commands iotl were unable to stop the transit of the destroyer half flotilla in early 1916, its reinforcement and subsequent withdrawal of II flotilla in mid 1916 and the deployment and rotation of 2 destroyer flotilla in late 1916 through to mid 1917.

These destroyers changed the naval balance in the channel and actually contested RN control of these waters with various degrees of succes. However the RN did reinforce the Dover patrol from the Harwich force, which was reinforced from the Grand Fleet which in turn was limited in its radius of action due to a shortage of destroyers. Diffuse effects for sure, but given the lateness and half arsed nature of the deployment its not surprising that larger and more tangible effects weren't achieved.
 
I'd still guess that Russia would make the best target, as in 1917. They may break down even earlier. Italy should be #2, Greece #3. But then, almost anything seems better than the "bloodmill" of Verdun.
 
Also, do you know what exactly caused Ludendorff to eventually turn on Hitler?

I read somewhere that Ludendorffs ideological beliefs were too extreme even for Hitler. Where Hitler saw war as a means to an end, Ludendorff saw war a an everyday part of life and the highest expression of a nations
'will to live' and therefore politics should be subservient to the needs of the military. He argued that when a nation was at war, everything should be secondary to the military, while a nation at peace should be doing all it could to prepare for the next war. Such views were apparently too insane for Hitler and he pensioned Ludendorff of when he got the chance.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Would seconde @Max Sinister

The proposal of @Riain (getting the Flandern coast) has quite some merit, but IMO it would result in something as bloody and as futile as all the offenses were in the west : lots of dead soldiers without a significant gain.

But ... the germans could have done their own 'brusilov'-offensive from let's say march/april (at last) onwards. Also in the south, as there is still undecided Romaia around (nobody knew at this point how baaad their military performance eventually was).
It could come like this :
  • a propped up "Süd-Armee", k.u.k 2. and 7. Armies start actions to regain the Bukowina, maybe starting from Czernowitz-region, drawing in, whatever forces the russians have at that moment available (and been made availabe by to reluctant commanders like Russki on other sections of the CP-russian front.
  • followed perhaps by a diversional action in Lithunia
  • with the main effort starting around april/may between Lutzk and Brody, aiming first at Rovno and Dubno with the further (strategical ?) reaching aim of Shitomir/Vinnitsa to then proceed (at some point) down on both banks of the Dnjestr with the far reaching aim of Odessa (?) (such 'far-reacing' aims would IMO be right to the tast of Hötzendorf)
  • any counter/relief.offensive maybe in the north would most likely lead in something similar as the Lake Naroch Offensive, maybe not fully as catastrophic but ... near of.
Keep in mind : this is NOT the thoroughly entrenched western front (entrenched to a degree, yes, but in most regions far from what it was in the west)
this is maneuver-warfare ther germans to this point bested the Entente power, esp. the russians on almost every occasion.

Meanwhile in the west : same procedure as every year, Miss Sophie
The Entente would stage a number of offensives, repelled as bloody the year before, may it be in Flandern, north or south of Verdun, at the Isonzo or even at the macedonian front without any significant gain, maybe a shifting the front a couple of kilometers to the east (or north, if from Macedonia), but nothing substantial.

However, what could be substantial :
  • the russians withdraw further forces from the Caucasus, making the ottomans life much easier there (advancing to Trabzon ? or even Erzurum ?, maybe a push from persian Azerbaidjan ?)
  • Romania, stll/again offered Bessarabia, would most likely now join the CP, opening another front against Russia, to fight on Romanias forces were somewhat better prepared to fight on, instead the carpathian mountains (though stll far from CP or russian standards) and which was much shorter
In such a scenario I can imagine the CP being in Odessa and Kiev (here at least short of) in septembre/octobre 1916, maybe even in Minsk and Riga as consequences of some counter- and counter-counterattacks, but these might follow shortly in some autumn offensives.
If at this point there is still a Tsar ... ? Whoever is in charge, without a - more or less - proven ability of success (Brusilov-offensive IOTL), I doubt, that they will or can sustain the war. Russia will seek at least an armistice or will be rolled over, just a year earlier.

Results octobre/novembre 1916 :
- Nothing new in the west (perhaps a some more entente troops, due to only 'lesser' blood-mills instead of Verdun IOTL, but also germans)
- Russia essentially knocked out of the war
- german troops start to transfer to the west for the "Kaiserschlacht" to start in spring 1917 (instead 1918), better prepared
- Caucasus almost open to the ottomans
- less harsh 'turnip'-winter (much of Ukraine to exploit, as well as Romania)
- lesser incentive for unrestricted Sub-warfare
 
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NoMommsen

Donor
I read somewhere that Ludendorffs ideological beliefs were too extreme even for Hitler. Where Hitler saw war as a means to an end, Ludendorff saw war a an everyday part of life and the highest expression of a nations
'will to live' and therefore politics should be subservient to the needs of the military. He argued that when a nation was at war, everything should be secondary to the military, while a nation at peace should be doing all it could to prepare for the next war. Such views were apparently too insane for Hitler and he pensioned Ludendorff of when he got the chance.
It was the more and more sectarian, spiritistc behavior and intellectual foundation (if you can speak of such at all) of Ludendorff, heavily influenced by his wife.

The arguementation you cite is Colmar von der Goltz ("Nation in Arms").

However, Hitler and his lot were armsdeep in militarisation of almost every aspect of life, idolizing the "trench community" of 194-1918.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
I'd still guess that Russia would make the best target, as in 1917. They may break down even earlier. Italy should be #2, Greece #3. But then, almost anything seems better than the "bloodmill" of Verdun.

That's because the Germans did Verdun wrong. Their original inception of the attack was not really to capture Verdun but to maximize French casualties while minimizing their own, basically by presenting a threat to Verdun to draw as many French divisions into the salient as possible and blow them to pieces with their massive weight of artillery. But the Germans then got it in their heads that they could capture the town easily and got involved in the meat grinder we all know about. Had they remain tied to the original conception of the Verdun offensive, they would have been much better off.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
... But the Germans then got it in their heads that they could capture the town easily ...
Some of them, esp. of 5th army (Crownprince and Schmidt v.Knobelsdorf specifically).
But part of it might also have been Falkenhayn non-communication (or at least insufficient) of his plans to the other higher commanders.

What leads to the question : What if Verdun had been started to actually capture it (or most of the fortresses and bastions) ? ... with a 'proper' preparation in starting it on the eartern bank of the Meuse to get/harass the forts there ? ... maybe together with an additional 'push' from the south (St.Mihel salient) ?
 
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They broke throough the eastern Alps, I assume they could try through the western ones as well, but it's unlikely. Yhey woul have transferred the bulk of the AH army in the West to force yet another decisive attritional battle on the French before the Americans could intervene massively.
Lets say the Germans/Austrians push to the PO, destroy a couple of armies in the process, put Milan under fire, capture Venice, and an armistice is declared at the current front lines. Allied forces are to leave Austria as part of the armistice and Italians have to evacuate Albania.

This would increase the German/Austrians ability to cause mayhem with submarines in the med, threaten use of Corfu as a base for the French fleet which might even allow Austrian surface raiders. Also likely to effect Greek neutrality. The Allies might even evacuate Salonika.

Austria would not have to deal with attrition on Italian front. Would probably send a handful of divisions to Alsace. If everything plays out the same everywhere else, by 1918 the Austrians and Bulgarians don't have active fronts.

No no, i meant would the Allies care about the Italian/Cp peace in the first place and not simply continue the war in Northern Italy together with the Italians themselves who are now stuck with a war they thought they left, in the end there would be no real change as the Italians cant get the others to stop fighting in Italy.
 
Good question, Petain wanted to pull out immediately, the French government, afraid of a vote of no confidence said he had to stay regardless of cost. I think they'd force the military to stay and die until parliament toppled the government and allowed a withdrawal. I have no idea what that point would be though. USW was never contemplated under Falkenhayn due to the civilian government's opposition; that only changed once H-L took over and did their 'soft' dictatorship that forced the civilian government to comply to their demands. The Kaiser was effectively a political non-entity at that point. Shortages were bearable in 1916 all things considered, they only became serious in the winter of 1916-17 because of the insane production plan H-L devised that effectively collapsed a bunch of sectors of the German economy, which 1917-18 were spent recovering from. Falkenhayn saw the Verdun attrition as the solution to the strategic dilemma he faced: bleed the French so badly that the Brits launch their offensive prematurely before their conscript army was prepared to fight, bleed them on strong defenses on the Somme, then negotiate an end to the war on the backs of the destroyed combat power of the Entente (he also assumed Russia was more beaten than it was...but then Brusilov's success was a function of Conrad and his generals' massive incompetence).

So lets say, there are increased French casualties at Verdun, increased British casualties at Somme, less German casualties at both.

If Austrians still do their own thing and Trentino offensive and Brusilov happen same as OTL, along with Romanian DOW. Does Falkenhayn get fired just the same?

If Falkenhayn gets fired just the same what has been achieved? I can see the Germans not doing their 1917 withdraw on the western front, perhaps the Allies chicken out of their own April 1917 western front offensive??
 
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No no, i meant would the Allies care about the Italian/Cp peace in the first place and not simply continue the war in Northern Italy together with the Italians themselves who are now stuck with a war they thought they left, in the end there would be no real change as the Italians cant get the others to stop fighting in Italy.

I am thinking the Germans would wan't to rig an easy armistice for the Italians to minimize the impact/drain on this front. Would be ok to not occupy large hungry cities like Milan, would be content with securing the Friuli plain for its agriculture, and securing the rest of Albania for its naval impact and effect on Greece. They would force the Italians to make sure French and British stay out.
 
WTH? Just checked Ludendorff's WP article which said that he believed in an elaborate conspiracy theory involving the Jews, Jesuites, Catholic church, Freemasons, Communists (the usual suspects so far)... and the Dalai Lama. Whom he thought was an agent of Stalin.
 

Deleted member 1487

WTH? Just checked Ludendorff's WP article which said that he believed in an elaborate conspiracy theory involving the Jews, Jesuites, Catholic church, Freemasons, Communists (the usual suspects so far)... and the Dalai Lama. Whom he thought was an agent of Stalin.
Yep, that guy effectively ran Germany for 2 years.
 
WTH? Just checked Ludendorff's WP article which said that he believed in an elaborate conspiracy theory involving the Jews, Jesuites, Catholic church, Freemasons, Communists (the usual suspects so far)... and the Dalai Lama. Whom he thought was an agent of Stalin.
Yep, that guy effectively ran Germany for 2 years.

Germany was 'blessed' with shit political systems in both World Wars, no wonder they lost.
 
... and that Anglo-America can never loose anyway. ...

I once read that despite their political and strategic superiority the western alliance couldn't defeat Germany until their tactical and operational skills got to within throwing distance of German superiority in these feilds. I thought that summed things up nicely.
 
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