Any chance of Stalin and Hitler joining forces in WWII

NoMommsen

Donor
Operation Pike is not the only option here. A much more realistic is where the Anglo-French successfully intervene in the Winter War in 1940. (The British and French forces that fought in Norway were originally going to be an expeditionary force to fight the soviets in Finland). Then again, this scenario would probably lead to Operation Pike occurring anyway.
As far as I understood its development the anglo-french ... intervention in the winter war was right from the beginning NOT to help the Finns but hinder Germany.

That was just an excuse to occupy Narvik ... and on its way to the finnish border the swedish iron ore fields.
Most likely they would have slowed it that way, that they would have ... recommended the Finns to bow to Stalin anyway. - and then stay in Narvik and Sweden.
 
You mean ground operations in general? Because I could see Stalin offering to send (it's questionable whether Hitler would accept it, but I doubt it) Red Air Force and naval formations to support the Germans against the British. Iran and Turkey (see below) are the only two potential places.

interesting idea, the Soviets had hundreds of Tupolev TB-3 bombers that Germans could have used as transports or modified with more advanced BMW engines (it used copy of early design) they could have supplemented FW-200 Condors in maritime role?

the KM wanted to make greater use of Northern Sea Route, and they had discussed some type of repair base (or IIRC a repair ship) in Far East.

Stalin did demand exclusive rights and control over the Bosphorous, which would have basically turned Turkey into a Soviet protectorate, as part of his price for any entry into the Axis and after the war OTL he tried to pressure the Turks on the straits as well as some disputed territory near Armenia... so he clearly had some designs on the Turks. Whether he would be willing to push it as far as an invasion is uncertain, but possible.

maybe some "accidental" bombing from Dodecanese and/or Syria (with Germany serving as their attack dog) and the Soviets gain at least their minimal demand of Imperial Russia border? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_territorial_claims_against_Turkey

(if they had resolved to continue collaboration with Soviets)
 
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One of the very numerous threads that require Hitler not to be Hitler.

Simply not going to happen under Hitler. Now, if Hitler dies after the M-R pact, but before Barbarossa, it might be possible.
 
France made a troop guarantee to Finland. Sweden said no. Perhaps an accidental Soviet bombing on Swedish territory (happened to the Hungarians so not impossible) leads to Sweden allowing French access. Soviets fire at French. Pike happens. Soviet Union declares war on Brits and French.

And for all of those people who say "USSR and Britain will make peace quicker than you can type out a sentence with the word "Satan" in it," the question is, why? Britain didn't back down to Germany, why would they back down to the USSR if they already started hostilities? After all, Britain declared war on the Germans, they started hostilities and never showed signs of wanting to cease.

So, in this scenario, we probably get the Soviets and Germans as co-belligerants. As for propaganda praising the USSR and speaking of Anglo-French savagery, it would take a real 1984-esque shift of thinking to change the enemy from Oceania to Eurasia.
 
And for all of those people who say "USSR and Britain will make peace quicker than you can type out a sentence with the word "Satan" in it," the question is, why? Britain didn't back down to Germany, why would they back down to the USSR if they already started hostilities?

Britain didn't back down to Germany after Germany repeatedly breached agreement after agreement it had made with Britain, proving itself totally untrustworthy. Britain did not not (haha, double negatives!) back down to Germany after blundering into a war against it on the behalf of a country Britain gave no formal guarantees too and had no treaty with. Or blundered into a war with Germany because they launched a unprovoked air strike against some of it's oil fields. And, in more cold pragmatic terms, Germany in 1941 posed a substantially greater existential threat to the British home isles that the Soviets did not. Making peace with the powerful enemy who doesn't pose a direct threat to you in order to focus on the one who does is only logical.

Of course, such a white peace would only come about if Hitler initiates Barbarossa. Which, while still quite probable, is not necessarily a given in a situation where the USSR and Britain end up at war.
 
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You still have not demonstrated Britain would have gave up. The fact they supported sending men to Finland shows that the Anglo-French alliance were consigned to fighting both the Germans and the Russians.

Your presumption is that once France falls, Britain's internal calculus changes. However, you arbitrarily decide Britain merely makes piece with their enemy to pile on Germany (which is your dream scenario in every thread.) Of course, this makes no sense being that Britain was just bombing Russia. To suddenly stop and make overtures for an alliance as soon as France falls connotes major weakness, not that of a multi-continental Empire which just a few weeks before it can contain both Germany and Russia, no problem.

If Britain is that weak where they must suddenly disengage, then why even continue fighting at all? Why not make peace with both the Germans and the Russians? And, are the Russians going to stop for absolutely no concessions? IOTL, they had eyes on British territories in the middle east and central asia. Britain engaging Russia in a warm war provides the cassus belli for Stalin to achieve his territorial designs which he attempted to achieve IOTL in the Axis pact negotiations.

The more likely scenario is if France falls, the war looks incredibly hopeless and Britain will simply make peace with both Germany and Russia. IOTL, Italy thought Britain would simply quit after the France debacle. Mussolini was not a maniac, though he judged wrong. Add the fact that Russia is at war with both Germany and Russia, it is almost assured Britain makes peace.


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Ironically, in the events above, the likely result is that the Germans go full retard and invade Russia. And, as soon as that happens, it is possible the Britain rejoins the war to help Russia. However, I do not even think this is very likely as IOTL the Brits and Americans expected Russia to lose. This means that Britain only re-starts the war if they think the US is going to be involved, which might not happen because Britain is out and with peace between 40-41, the Dutch will be selling oil to the Japanese precluding the need to invade them thus butterflying away Pearl Harbor.

So, Britain likely sits out even as Russia probably avoids defeat at the gates of Moscow (though IOTL British lend lease might have been the grain of rice that tipped the scales in Russia's favor in repulsing AGC.) This means Russia cannot successfully decimate AGC and the result is without enough promise to win the war they only get minimal assistance from Britain and America. By 1943, Russia simply runs out of men and food to keep fighting.

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In short, French in Finland and British bombers over Baku loses the war for Britain and likely ends up in the Soviets being beaten by the Germans in continental Europe.
 
You still have not demonstrated Britain would have gave up.

Who said anything about giving up? I'm saying that once Hitler attacks the Soviets, the two will do the sensible thing and make peace to fight Hitler.

Your presumption is that once France falls, Britain's internal calculus changes.

Uh... no? It changes once, if, Germany attacks the Soviet Union. Otherwise, as I explicitly said, Britain probably won't make peace.

The more likely scenario is if France falls, the war looks incredibly hopeless and Britain will simply make peace with both Germany and Russia.

The more likely scenario is really they bunker down and fight while counting on the Americans to come help. It's what they did when the war looked incredibly hopeless IOTL.

IOTL, Italy thought Britain would simply quit after the France debacle. Mussolini was not a maniac, though he judged wrong. Add the fact that Russia is at war with both Germany and Russia, it is almost assured Britain makes peace.

Now you're the one claiming that Britain would give-up without demonstrating it. That OTL Mussolini thought that the British would give up is hardly demonstrative given that, ya know, Mussolini was wrong.

(though IOTL British lend lease might have been the grain of rice that tipped the scales in Russia's favor in repulsing AGC.)

Almost no current military historian thinks British lend-lease made a substantive difference in repulsing AGC from Moscow. The first British equipment didn't even show up in the region until the end of November, well after the German assault had over-extended itself and was rapidly losing steam. The scales were already tipping in Russia's favor by then...
 
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And for all of those people who say "USSR and Britain will make peace quicker than you can type out a sentence with the word "Satan" in it," the question is, why?

Because the mere threat of the Allies joining on the Finnish side is what made Stalin to cut the Winter War short IOTL. Remember that by March the Red Army was winning, and Stalin's USSR still made a very sub-standard, well-nigh humiliating deal with Finland to end the war. It is Stalin who would not want to end in a war against the Anglo-French when he fears that Hitler will stab him in the back in the near future. That might well realize his old nightmare scenario of the imperialist capitalists ganging up on the USSR in a shooting war.

So even if Stalin would go as far as to declare war on the British and the French, methinks he would go about that war in a pretty lacklustre way, constantly looking for ways to get out of it. Not committing much resources against them, as a German attack against the Rodina is the bigger threat. In terms of the "Finnish front", a continuing Winter War would see Finland fold or be occupied before early May 1940, and only a minimal number of Allied troops would have made it to Finland by that time, with the OTL schedules. After the Red Army takes Helsinki, the coastal areas and is observed by the Swedish across Tornio River, the front here goes quiet. Sweden is not going to have an open war against the USSR if it can help it in any way (the soldiers might want it but the politicians would be having none of it) and Stalin very likely will not commit troops to conquer Sweden through Lapland or in an amphibious operation - the hassle with Finland and all the wartime losses and the costs of occupation would have been enough to hurt the 1940 Red Army. Besides, the northern Baltic Sea is the natural border to protect Leningrad. Next up, the Baltic states.
 
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Almost no current military historian thinks British lend-lease made a substantive difference in repulsing AGC from Moscow. The first British equipment didn't even show up in the region until the end of November, well after the German assault had over-extended itself and was rapidly losing steam. The scales were already tipping in Russia's favor by then...
I am speaking of the counteroffensive where the majority of mobile elements were British equipment.
 
I am speaking of the counteroffensive where the majority of mobile elements were British equipment.

The majority of the mobile elements in the Soviet counter-offensive was cavalry, armed mainly with Soviet small arms and crew served weapons. The Red Army's armored formations were had been so devastated by the previous fighting, that even with lend-lease they were relegated to a supporting role in the subsequent fighting, as was the still shattered VVS.The bulk of the effort in mauling AGC was done by the Red Army's infantry, cavalry, and artillery.

Furthermore, even if we narrow the category, it is still incorrect to say that a majority of Soviet armor was made up of British equipment. ~30-40% is not a majority, although it is a significant minority.
 
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Hitler's endgame also runs contrary to forging an alliance with either the British or the Soviets in another way: in a war between Britain and Russia, Germany would be caught in the middle regardless of whose side they were on.

you mentioned Iran and Turkey as only countries Soviets MIGHT involve themselves in? you don't think their invasion of Iran would place them de facto in Axis for duration?

of course my scenario is no strange alliance with Japan so perhaps the Soviets would also feel secure enough to go for Manchuria and have parallel war pretty much as Germany and Japan did?
 
Problem is Hitlers endgame. An alliance therefore would be just a prelude to conflict. Stalin also knew that , he was just trying to gain time for the Red Army to be rebuilt.

I doubt Stalin seriously considered MK as other than propaganda intended to shake off Versailles.
 
Because the mere threat of the Allies joining on the Finnish side is what made Stalin to cut the Winter War short IOTL. Remember that by March the Red Army was winning, and Stalin's USSR still made a very sub-standard, well-nigh humiliating deal with Finland to end the war.

Stalin did the same thing in 1944 though, when he could have taken all of Finland but made peace instead.
 
Stalin did the same thing in 1944 though, when he could have taken all of Finland but made peace instead.

That was also predicated on external reasons, foremost the first priority of sending those troops that would have been needed to subdue and occupy Finland against the Germans in the late summer of 1944. Finland had just stopped the Red Army cold, like it did in the early part of the Winter War, even if the Red Army of 1944 was a whole different beast than its 1940 iteration. And in 1944 Stalin also had to take into account the opinion of the British and that of the Americans, who seemed to see Finland in a different light as other German allies - as had became evident in discussions at Teheran, say. In late summer 1944, like in March 1940, conquering and annexing Finland in the end was (or at least seemed) potentially a lot more trouble than it was worth to Stalin. Which was very lucky for Finland, but that is neither here nor there.

On both occasions, Stalin made a logical decision based on the facts at hand as well as his limited information about the condition of the Finnish military. In both 1940 and 1944 the Finnish army was in truth very tired and on its last legs (and I mean where it mattered, ie. the Karelian isthmus and surroundings), mere weeks from the collapse of the front if the Red Army kept pressing, but happily for the Finns Stalin did not know that.
 
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