Antiochus Wins The Battle of Raphia

In 217 BC, Antiochus III and Ptolemy IV Philopator fought the Battle of Raphia, also known as the Battle of Gaza. Antiochus nearly won this battle, winning the cavalry duel but losing the infantry fight.

the night before the battle, Theodotus the Aetolian, formerly an officer of Ptolemy, sneaked inside the Ptolemaic camp and reached what he presumed to be the King's tent but Ptolemy was absent and so failed to assassinate him.

What if...

Theodotus assassinated Ptolemy?
Antiochus won the battle?
 
In 217 BC, Antiochus III and Ptolemy IV Philopator fought the Battle of Raphia, also known as the Battle of Gaza. Antiochus nearly won this battle, winning the cavalry duel but losing the infantry fight.

the night before the battle, Theodotus the Aetolian, formerly an officer of Ptolemy, sneaked inside the Ptolemaic camp and reached what he presumed to be the King's tent but Ptolemy was absent and so failed to assassinate him.

What if...

Theodotus assassinated Ptolemy?
Antiochus won the battle?

Antiochus retrieved the situation a few years later at Panium, so Raphia was not as great a victory as it was trumpeted by the Ptolemies. But, in the larger scheme of things, it would have likely made no difference. The Seleucids would still have been crushed by Rome sooner or later.
 
I was currently writing up the wiki article in Romanian about the battle, and also wanted to fix some things in the english one*, while also thinking up a TL about this.

I think Antiochus wanted to take over all of Egypt, and thought he could do so by killing Ptolemy. That's why he had Theodotus sneak in and try to assasinate him, and maybe that's why he kept pursuing the ptolemaic left wing, where Ptolemy had been (and who, unbeknownst to Antiochus, managed to slip away and join his central phalanx).

So, what do you guys think, should I make a TL about Antiochus ?

* - regarding this, what do you guys think about this:

(Antiochus') losses in killed alone had amounted to nearly ten thousand footmen and more than three hundred horsemen, while more than four thousand had been taken prisoners. Three of his elephants perished in the battle and two died of their wounds. Ptolemy had lost about fifteen hundred foot and seven hundred horse, killed; sixteen of his elephants were killed and most of them captured.

to me, this clearly means Ptolemy had most of his (left flank) elephants captured, not that he had captured most of Antiochus' Syrian elephants, as the wiki article stupidly states.
 
Antiochus retrieved the situation a few years later at Panium, so Raphia was not as great a victory as it was trumpeted by the Ptolemies. But, in the larger scheme of things, it would have likely made no difference. The Seleucids would still have been crushed by Rome sooner or later.

POD over a century before fall and no difference... you sure? Besides Seleucids weren't crushed by Romans but by Parthians and their own squabling.
 
POD over a century before fall and no difference... you sure? Besides Seleucids weren't crushed by Romans but by Parthians and their own squabling.


It's not like the Romans didn't have anything to do with their fall...

Anyway, I think you're right and a Raphia POD can lead to the state surviving.
 
POD over a century before fall and no difference... you sure? Besides Seleucids weren't crushed by Romans but by Parthians and their own squabling.

The Seleucids went into a tailspin after the battle of Magnesia, and lost all their influence outside Syria. The huge reparations forced on them ruined their treasury and it was the reason why the Parthians and later, Jews, began to score victories against them routinely. The only reason they survived until Pompey era was because both Rome and Parthia found them a useful buffer state that was weak and did not impinge on their own interests. The key problem you need to solve is that the Seleucid army is in dire need of reform. Without the hardcore Macedonian infantry, and with them distrusting natives and relying only on Greek settlers for the core of their heavy infantry, the Seleucid army is poorly matched against the Romans, and simply does not have either the quality or quantity of the heavy infantry of the Romans. Against the other kingdoms with similarly weak infantry (like the Ptolemies and the Pontic Kingdom, who both had their imitation Macedonian pikemen), and the politically weak successor state of Macedonia, this army was adequate. But not against the Romans, with their superb legions. But Antiochus is too late to change that, apart from the personal mental make up of Antiochus makes it less likely that he will make any concessions to the non-Greek population of his kingdom.

What you really need to change is the structure of the Seleucid army. But by the time of Antiochus, the Romans and the Seleucids impinged on so many of each other's interests that a clash is coming before the Seleucid army has been reformed. The natural affinity of both the Romans and the Seleucids would be to clash over Greece (both claimed influence over that territory), and this clash is going to happen sooner or later. This is precisely what happened IOTL - Antiochus and the Romans clashed over a Green question, and the Seleucids were ruined. What you really need to do to have a Seleucid state of some consequence survive is for the Seleucids to either conquer Macedonia and establish themselves strongly in that territory, giving them a first rate infantry to rely on (too late for Antiochus to accomplish) or else, give the Seleucids time to draft and train native heavy infantry (which requires changing the structure of the Seleucid state, and consequently, takes time, even if Antiochus were willing to do so).

So - no. Antiochus III is too late to change anything much of consequence.
 
The Seleucids went into a tailspin after the battle of Magnesia, and lost all their influence outside Syria. The huge reparations forced on them ruined their treasury and it was the reason why the Parthians and later, Jews, began to score victories against them routinely. The only reason they survived until Pompey era was because both Rome and Parthia found them a useful buffer state that was weak and did not impinge on their own interests. The key problem you need to solve is that the Seleucid army is in dire need of reform. Without the hardcore Macedonian infantry, and with them distrusting natives and relying only on Greek settlers for the core of their heavy infantry, the Seleucid army is poorly matched against the Romans, and simply does not have either the quality or quantity of the heavy infantry of the Romans. Against the other kingdoms with similarly weak infantry (like the Ptolemies and the Pontic Kingdom, who both had their imitation Macedonian pikemen), and the politically weak successor state of Macedonia, this army was adequate. But not against the Romans, with their superb legions. But Antiochus is too late to change that, apart from the personal mental make up of Antiochus makes it less likely that he will make any concessions to the non-Greek population of his kingdom.

What you really need to change is the structure of the Seleucid army. But by the time of Antiochus, the Romans and the Seleucids impinged on so many of each other's interests that a clash is coming before the Seleucid army has been reformed. The natural affinity of both the Romans and the Seleucids would be to clash over Greece (both claimed influence over that territory), and this clash is going to happen sooner or later. This is precisely what happened IOTL - Antiochus and the Romans clashed over a Green question, and the Seleucids were ruined. What you really need to do to have a Seleucid state of some consequence survive is for the Seleucids to either conquer Macedonia and establish themselves strongly in that territory, giving them a first rate infantry to rely on (too late for Antiochus to accomplish) or else, give the Seleucids time to draft and train native heavy infantry (which requires changing the structure of the Seleucid state, and consequently, takes time, even if Antiochus were willing to do so).

So - no. Antiochus III is too late to change anything much of consequence.

Why does having a kleros in Syria or Mesopotamia make you a worse phalangite than having it next to the tombs of Macedonian kings near Pella ?

Macedonia was getting seriously depopulated since a whole lot of people went east in search of fame, fortune and power (and often got it).

Also, regarding Seleucid heavy infantry, they were beggining to introduce units of heavy infantry which observers would later mistake for troops armed in Roman fashion. Not that the phalanx was bad. If used correctly, it could and did beat roman manipular formations.
 
Why does having a kleros in Syria or Mesopotamia make you a worse phalangite than having it next to the tombs of Macedonian kings near Pella ?

Macedonia was getting seriously depopulated since a whole lot of people went east in search of fame, fortune and power (and often got it).

Also, regarding Seleucid heavy infantry, they were beggining to introduce units of heavy infantry which observers would later mistake for troops armed in Roman fashion. Not that the phalanx was bad. If used correctly, it could and did beat roman manipular formations.

The phalanx was not bad at all. But the Seleucids relied on the Greek-Macedonian settlers for it (whose numbers were never large), and not the natives. This puts them at a serious quantitative disadvantage against the Romans, who can arm much of their country, if need be. The number of heavy infantry the Seleucids can raise is very much smaller than the capacity of the Romans, and in Greece (which is where the clash is going to occur), heavy infantry is vital.
 
The Seleucids went into a tailspin after the battle of Magnesia, and lost all their influence outside Syria. The huge reparations forced on them ruined their treasury and it was the reason why the Parthians and later, Jews, began to score victories against them routinely. The only reason they survived until Pompey era was because both Rome and Parthia found them a useful buffer state that was weak and did not impinge on their own interests. The key problem you need to solve is that the Seleucid army is in dire need of reform. Without the hardcore Macedonian infantry, and with them distrusting natives and relying only on Greek settlers for the core of their heavy infantry, the Seleucid army is poorly matched against the Romans, and simply does not have either the quality or quantity of the heavy infantry of the Romans. Against the other kingdoms with similarly weak infantry (like the Ptolemies and the Pontic Kingdom, who both had their imitation Macedonian pikemen), and the politically weak successor state of Macedonia, this army was adequate. But not against the Romans, with their superb legions. But Antiochus is too late to change that, apart from the personal mental make up of Antiochus makes it less likely that he will make any concessions to the non-Greek population of his kingdom.

What you really need to change is the structure of the Seleucid army. But by the time of Antiochus, the Romans and the Seleucids impinged on so many of each other's interests that a clash is coming before the Seleucid army has been reformed. The natural affinity of both the Romans and the Seleucids would be to clash over Greece (both claimed influence over that territory), and this clash is going to happen sooner or later. This is precisely what happened IOTL - Antiochus and the Romans clashed over a Green question, and the Seleucids were ruined. What you really need to do to have a Seleucid state of some consequence survive is for the Seleucids to either conquer Macedonia and establish themselves strongly in that territory, giving them a first rate infantry to rely on (too late for Antiochus to accomplish) or else, give the Seleucids time to draft and train native heavy infantry (which requires changing the structure of the Seleucid state, and consequently, takes time, even if Antiochus were willing to do so).

So - no. Antiochus III is too late to change anything much of consequence.


Didn't Hannibal almost convince Antiochus to land him in southern Italy with a small army?

This could make an interesting POD...
 
The phalanx was not bad at all. But the Seleucids relied on the Greek-Macedonian settlers for it (whose numbers were never large), and not the natives. This puts them at a serious quantitative disadvantage against the Romans, who can arm much of their country, if need be. The number of heavy infantry the Seleucids can raise is very much smaller than the capacity of the Romans, and in Greece (which is where the clash is going to occur), heavy infantry is vital.


In fact, the Seleucids did rely on non-greek troops quite a lot. Just two examples:

Raphia

non-greek
5000 light infantry Dahae, Carmani, and Cilicians
2000 bowmen - Agrianes and Persians
2000 Thracians
5000 Medes, Cissians, Cadusians, and Carmanians
10000 Arabs and neighboring peoples
500 Lydian javelin men
1000 Cardaces
Total = 25500

greek
10.000 silver shield phalangites
20.000 regular phalangites
5000 Greek mercenaries
2500 Cretans
6000 cavalry (some of these were probably non-greek though)
Total = 43.500

so 1.7 Greeks for every non-Greek

Magnezia

non-greek
3000 Celto-Greek infantry
2500 Celto-Greek cavalry
1000 cataphracts from Media ("consisting of Medes and men drawn from many tribes in that part of the world")
1200 Dahae horse archers
1500 Tralles as light infantry
2500 Mysian bowmen
2000 Capadocian heavy infantry
1500 Carians and Cilicians
4000 Pisidians, Pamphylians and Lydians
? - mixed force of Cyrtian slingers and Elymaean archers
? arabian camel archers
Total = 17400

greek
2500 Cretans
4000 cataphracts (but "with an admixture of Phrygians and Lydians")
? - tarantines
16.000 phalangites
Total = 22.500


unknown
2700 - miscellaneous force


So, at most, 1.3 Greeks for every non-Greek (although there were probably at least the same number judging by the totals given)


Thus, I would say that the Seleucids relied on native troops probably a little too much for their own good, as this huge diversity often made compex maneuvers difficult to coordinate
 
In fact, the Seleucids did rely on non-greek troops quite a lot. Just two examples:

Raphia

non-greek
5000 light infantry Dahae, Carmani, and Cilicians
2000 bowmen - Agrianes and Persians
2000 Thracians
5000 Medes, Cissians, Cadusians, and Carmanians
10000 Arabs and neighboring peoples
500 Lydian javelin men
1000 Cardaces
Total = 25500

greek
10.000 silver shield phalangites
20.000 regular phalangites
5000 Greek mercenaries
2500 Cretans
6000 cavalry (some of these were probably non-greek though)
Total = 43.500

so 1.7 Greeks for every non-Greek

Magnezia

non-greek
3000 Celto-Greek infantry
2500 Celto-Greek cavalry
1000 cataphracts from Media ("consisting of Medes and men drawn from many tribes in that part of the world")
1200 Dahae horse archers
1500 Tralles as light infantry
2500 Mysian bowmen
2000 Capadocian heavy infantry
1500 Carians and Cilicians
4000 Pisidians, Pamphylians and Lydians
? - mixed force of Cyrtian slingers and Elymaean archers
? arabian camel archers
Total = 17400

greek
2500 Cretans
4000 cataphracts (but "with an admixture of Phrygians and Lydians")
? - tarantines
16.000 phalangites
Total = 22.500


unknown
2700 - miscellaneous force


So, at most, 1.3 Greeks for every non-Greek (although there were probably at least the same number judging by the totals given)


Thus, I would say that the Seleucids relied on native troops probably a little too much for their own good, as this huge diversity often made compex maneuvers difficult to coordinate

You may observe that I clearly referred to the heavy infantry, which did the major part of the infantry fighting in the battles with the Romans, in my post. The lightly armed bowmen and slingers were, for the most part, used only in the initial part of the battle, or for other non-battlefield duties. From your own example, when it comes to heavy infantry there were at best, 35K Greeks and 8K non-Greeks (a ratio of 4.5:1) at Raphia and 16K Greeks and 5-6K non-Greeks (a ratio of nearly 3:1).

The bulk of the non-Greeks were mostly cavalry or light infantry. The light infantry had not a great deal of value in actual battle (the were skirmishers, scouts and foragers), and were not particularly trained.

For the cavalry, the Seleucids had to depend heavily on the Medes (which is one reason why the Medes were placated). When you consider the ratio of the Greeks to the non-Greeks in the population, you will realise just how reliant the Seleucids were on the Greeks for their warfare.

In contrast, the Ptolemies raised native phalangites routinely (because there were fewer Greeks in Egypt and they needed a heavy infantry).
 
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