Another "should never have entered service" thread- Ships

Late ones--yes. not worth it

The later ironclads weren't worth the steel..but the statement of all being "shouldn't have been built" seemed a bit extreme.
 
The later ironclads weren't worth the steel..but the statement of all being "shouldn't have been built" seemed a bit extreme.


NHBL,

The original statement didn't say "all". I know because I'm the one who wrote it. I may not have mentioned Polyphemus by name in my first post, but I did describe her and I did mention Katahdin by name.

Ming777 did mention "all ironclads" and, after a fashion, he's correct. With the introduction of steam, ramming was a dangerous tactic for both "rammer" and "ramee" alike. Look at the ACW, the last war in which any amount of ramming took place.

While Merrimac's ramming of USS Cumberland did sink that vessel, it came very near to sinking Merrimac too. Albemarle was nearly lost in the same manner, as was USS Sassacus when she rammed Albemarle. Manassas' ramming attempts on Farragut's squadron as it passed Forts Jackson and St. Philip were pathetic. At Mobile, Tennessee II found herself being rammed instead of ramming and, despite being nearly immobile, rammed ineffectually at that. The two "ram fleets" that engaged off Memphis in 1862 weren't warships at all, let alone ironclads. Given the small number of guns available for those ships, ramming was seen as a viable tactic by their civilian commanders. While the rams had some effect against each other, the Union ironclads present weren't threatened at all.

As I wrote earlier, the many ramming attacks that took place at Lissa had more to do with Italian incompetence than successful tactics on the Austrian's part. In the best ram attack of the battle, the Austrian ship was substantially aided in striking the Italian when the latter's captain tried to cross his opponent's bows which was the absolute worst maneuver he could have attempted. Of the two ships sunk at Lissa, one ship can be said to have been sunk by ramming. The other caught fire and exploded.

Ramming had always been dangerous, the introduction of steam and the larger vessels involved simply made it much more so. Any ship specifically designed to ram after the introduction of steam should not have been built.


Bill
 
Can I nominate the '30s Narwhal & Nautilus? Too big & clumsy to be commerce raiders, too underarmed to be anything much else.

The Narwhal-class wasn't really intended for commerce raiding, but, rather as 'submarine cruisers,' intended to act primarily as long-range scouts in direct support of the fleet (by using the ballast tanks as extra fuel tanks, they had a range of 25,000 miles), while at the time of their design in the late 1920s, commerce raiding by submarines was considered to be effectively banned by international law requiring submarines to abide by the 'cruiser rules.' (Although the 2 6"/53 deck guns would have been useful in dispatching a merchant ship stopped and deemed subject to destruction under those rules.) The great size was considered necessary to produce a boat of the necessary speed, habitability and range given the bad state of US diesel technology until the mid-1930's. Furthermore, their 6 tubes (4 forward, 2 aft) and 24 torpedos was the heaviest torpedo armament mounted on a US sub until the Salmon/Sargo classes of the late 1930s.

The class was essentially an experiment to try to find the ideal submarine for a Pacific war, operating against Japan or scouting for the expected Central Pacific offensive of Plan Orange from bases in Hawaii or the continental US, but once in service was found to be too large and complex for the operations expected, would take too long to build in a mobilization context, and were let down by unreliable engines. Attempts to correct these shortcomings through a smaller sub with most of the capabilities led to the WW2 'fleet boats' (Porpoise through Tench classes, but despite their shortcomings, Narwhal and Nautilus actually had a slightly above average combat record in the war, sinking 14-15 ships between them, while distinguishing themselves on a number of special operations (i.e. the Makin Island raid, deploying UDT teams to scout and clear obstacles from invasion beaches, and supplying guerillas and coastwatchers while evacuating refugees from Japanese-occupied territory,) and Nautilus's unsuccessful attack on Kirishima at Midway helped Enterprise's dive-bombers find the Japanese carriers (they followed a destroyer returning to the formation after dropping depth charges to drive Nautilus away.)
 

CalBear

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??? I don't get the connexion between Alaska a (wierd) super cruiser and two Iowa class battleships?
Even with the incredible industrial output of the U.S. during WW II, there WERE limits on the resources available, with steel being a serious supply bottleneck. Steel used for the Alaskas wasn't available for other ships, including BB65 & 66. Alaska also occuppied a slipway that would have otherwise been available for either a Iowa or even the oft lamented, although very unnecessary, Montana.

There is also the simple fact that the CB was about as useless a type as the USN operated in the 20th Century and was a ship seeking a mission from the day it was proposed.
 
There is also the simple fact that the CB was about as useless a type as the USN operated in the 20th Century and was a ship seeking a mission from the day it was proposed.


CalBear,

Exactly and neatly put.

Alaska[/b] and her sisters were ships built on rumors about the construction of IJN "pocket battleships". Those rumors were even shakier than most rumors because Japan had no plans to build that type of ship whatsoever.

Many unnecessary, ill-designed, and just plain awful ships get built in this manner. I've already brought up the RN's hideously expensive Powerful-class cruisers from the 1890s. They were built in order to counter the rumored capabilities of a large Imperial Russian cruiser which, as it turned out, was actually obsolete before it was launched.


Bill
 

CalBear

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CalBear,

Exactly and neatly put.

Alaska[/b] and her sisters were ships built on rumors about the construction of IJN "pocket battleships". Those rumors were even shakier than most rumors because Japan had no plans to build that type of ship whatsoever.

Many unnecessary, ill-designed, and just plain awful ships get built in this manner. I've already brought up the RN's hideously expensive Powerful-class cruisers from the 1890s. They were built in order to counter the rumored capabilities of a large Imperial Russian cruiser which, as it turned out, was actually obsolete before it was launched.


Bill


And even worse was that they were TOO big and too valuable to send out without a proper ASW escort of at least a couple DD. That made them more or less Iowas but with 12" guns replacing the 16" and with the additional difference of being 2-3 knots slower.

Such a deal!:rolleyes:
 
And even worse was that they were TOO big and too valuable to send out without a proper ASW escort of at least a couple DD. That made them more or less Iowas but with 12" guns replacing the 16" and with the additional difference of being 2-3 knots slower.

Such a deal!:rolleyes:
And was not their turning radius worse?
 
Alaska[/b] and her sisters were ships built on rumors about the construction of IJN "pocket battleships". Those rumors were even shakier than most rumors because Japan had no plans to build that type of ship whatsoever.


No pocket battleships, but large cruisers / cruiser killers...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Design_B-65_cruiser

But getting back to cruiser business, was it really necessary to construct all those different RN / USN cruiser and destroyer classes during 1930`s and 1940's? True, the technology was improving and overall the Allies won the war, but was there never really a situation in which, for example, 8" cruisers were definitely needed over 6" cruisers (given that 6" had technological capability to used also for AA role)? Considering that new ship classes are always very expensive, was constructing Iowas instead of, say, additional series of BB-57 -class ships useful at all?

In different time, USN managed 1970-2000's practically by constructing four ship classes (Spruance, Ticonderoga, Arleigh Burke, Perry) of which three first mentioned share a definite ancestry (Kidds were a fluke). I just wonder, with hindsight, if there would have been theoretically a way to manage WW II era navy with perhaps four different surface combatant ship classes (Escort hodgepodge, DD, CL, BB)? Certainly in area of armaments the USN showed the way by using just a single medium DP gun instead of cacophony of RN, for example...
 

CalBear

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No pocket battleships, but large cruisers / cruiser killers...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Design_B-65_cruiser

But getting back to cruiser business, was it really necessary to construct all those different RN / USN cruiser and destroyer classes during 1930`s and 1940's? True, the technology was improving and overall the Allies won the war, but was there never really a situation in which, for example, 8" cruisers were definitely needed over 6" cruisers (given that 6" had technological capability to used also for AA role)? Considering that new ship classes are always very expensive, was constructing Iowas instead of, say, additional series of BB-57 -class ships useful at all?

In different time, USN managed 1970-2000's practically by constructing four ship classes (Spruance, Ticonderoga, Arleigh Burke, Perry) of which three first mentioned share a definite ancestry (Kidds were a fluke). I just wonder, with hindsight, if there would have been theoretically a way to manage WW II era navy with perhaps four different surface combatant ship classes (Escort hodgepodge, DD, CL, BB)? Certainly in area of armaments the USN showed the way by using just a single medium DP gun instead of cacophony of RN, for example...


Actually, the Kidd design was what the USN wanted ALL the Spruances to be,a design optimized for both ASW AND Surface Warfare, the ship that the U.S. used throughout the last part of the Cold War started out as a Congressionally mandated economy measure (showing that sometimes ham handed meddling can work out from time to time).

The inter-war cruiser types were interesting, particularly in the way that they demonstrated the difference in the institutional thinking of the RN and USN. British cruisers tended to be less heavily gun armed (RN York Class 3x2 8", 4x1 4", USN New Orleans 3x3 8", 8x1 5"/25), with greater range and with torpedo tubes (RN light cruisers as late as the Dido class carried two triple mounts with 5x2 5.25" guns while the comparable USN Atlanta class carried 8x2 5"/38 and no torpedoes, but a number of 40mm AA guns) and fairly light to non-existent armor, while American designs tended toward lots of secondary battery DP guns (generally 4x2 5"/38 in "Treaty" light cruisers and 6x2 5/38 in the post Treaty ships), heavier armor, and no torpedoes. American light cruisers carried armor closer to battle cruisers in other fleets than to other light cruisers (inside of 22k yard a Brooklyn class CL was able (on paper) to handle plunging hits from the Scharnhort class 12" main battery.

In the case in the U.S. DD designs in the inter-war period they were very much a matter of evolution. If you look at the progression of USN DD designs starting with the Farraguts through to the Fletchers you can see the shaping of what was THE U.S. DD design of the war (with 175 built), and was arguably the most balanced DD design of the entire war (the later Sumner class pushed the design envelope a bit too far, with stress damage to the forward hull from the extra weight of the two twin 5" mounts very common, something that was mostly corrected in the very late war Gearing ships).

Once the war began, the U.S stayed pretty much pat, with the Fletcher & Sumner DD, Cleveland class CL, and Baltimore Class CA. The two biggest advantage of the CA design vs. the CL were in the throw weight of CA's 8" gun, which had the ability to penetrate the KM Scharnhorst BC/BB deck armor at ranges where the German ship's main battery would not do the same to the USN deck plating and in the additional capacity to carry medium/light AA (12 40mm on the CL vs. 48 on the CA). The 8" gun was also a more useful shore bombardment gun. The ability of the 152mm (6") to be a true DP gun was more in theory than in fact, at least before the rather disappointing Worcester class CL due to shell loading requirements, ammunition handling, and turret tracking speed.

Lastly, the Iowas were an entirely different warship than any that came before it, or was even planned to exist after it (the true successorto the South Dakotas would have been the Montanas with their 28 knot speed and balanced design). While not specifically designed to act as a carrier escort, it was able to do so. It was almost 8 mph faster than any battleship yet was better protected than any BB ever floated, effectively a battle cruiser without the battle cruiser's limitations. In short, it was a warship built with only a singe limitation allowed to interfere in its design, that it be Panamax (fit through the Canal locks). The naval world changed literally while they were on the slipways, but the changes actually benefited them more than any of their BB cousins since they fit very nicely into the CBG concept while still having the ability to reach 30 km inland with aimed fire (3 salvos from any of the "fast battleships" was equal to the bombs of an entire squadron of carrier bombers and the salvos were not limited by time of day or weather as long as someone could call the fall of shot, something that opponents learned across the Pacific in three different wars).
 
The Iowas... the greatest battleship ever made.
Only because the bloody Washington Treaty put paid to the G3s... If not for that the poms would have had a ship that matched the Iowas in everything except top speed (and even then beaten by only by 2 or 3 knots) in the 1920s!
 
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