Another Pearl Harbor thread

CalBear said:
the DD would all be able to get out, assuming that their boilers weren't in pieces being repaired.
AFAIK, even Cassin & Downes, in dock, were fit to sail in an emergency. If the choice was "finish the work" or "lose the ship"...:eek:

Also, the handful of subs could conceivably sortie against Nagumo. And there were 3-4 boats at sea in the vicinity. (Yes, I know, the Mk 14 sucked.:rolleyes: At least the Mk 6 problems were less likely to bite them; they were designed for use against heavies.)
CalBear said:
The Irony is, of course, that the base HAD this amount of warning time if it had begun to react to USS Condor's sub sighting.
A good three hours...:rolleyes: Who was the idiotic duty officer? I read someplace he was asleep.:eek:
Just to quickly address a couple common misconceptions that have come up here.

The U.S. was not under a set of ROE that flatly required that they wait until the enemy fire the first shot. This is best illustrated by the Ward's prosecuting the 03:45 sub sighting to a kill. There were also the well known engagements between KM subs and U.S. destroyers in the Atlantic.

While there were many sailors on liberty, most were aboard ship (cheaper to sleep on the ship than in a hotel, unless you got lucky :p). This is most easily shown by the fact that USS Arizona, with a overall complement of ~1,800 had 1,500 men aboard when the attack started (1,177 of them being killed), including the ship's Captain and Rear Admiral Kidd, Commander Battleship Division.

There were plenty of men aboard to fight the ships. They might have been hung over as all hell, but they were there.
Agree on all points.

I'd add, you don't even need all the crew back: just the gunners & the support people. (And in a pinch, you can shanghai cooks or stewards or black gang.) You do need at least one boiler lit to provide power to magazine lifts & turret drives & such, but as I understand it, the heavies & cruisers did that anyhow just for housekeeping; probably stoking one boiler high enough for it could be done, while you light a couple more. In the cans, I think they used diesel generators; I also think the boilers would start faster from cold.
 
The submarines would have to cross the 200 miles first to get near the Kido Butai, which is in case of the most modern USN fleet submarines still a ten hour journey, from the base itself, assuming the IJN would be so polite to lurk around all the time, waiting for the submarines to arive. (Average Fleet submarine top speed of the surfaced modern Cachelot and P- classes was around the 20 knots, under perfect conditions, meaning: a smooth sea and no wind.)

The would indicate the fastest way of getting to the Kido Butai would take at least 10 whole hours, also assuming the USN knew where to look for first. More likely the left over long ranged aircraft would start searching first, followed soon by attack aircraft, if still available. The submarines would always be send and always get there far too late to make much of an impression and even if succesful in an attack on a IJN ship, the questionable quality of their torpedoes would likely compromise their effort. Also important to know was that the Commander in Chief of the Kido Butai was a cautious commander, not willing to take too many risks, so he would very likely leave the scene as soon as the first two strikes had been recovered.
 
HMS Warspite said:
The submarines would have to cross the 200 miles first to get near the Kido Butai, which is in case of the most modern USN fleet submarines still a ten hour journey
Yeah, I should've thought of that...:eek: In my defense, tho, there were boats already at sea, & IIRC (without looking through Blair again), at least one inbound from Midway. Not good chances for intercept, I know, but...
HMS Warspite said:
also assuming the USN knew where to look
There was a DF bearing; Halsey got sent on a reciprocal, fortunately, away from Nagumo.:eek: A fleet boat inbound from the north might be detailed to look in the other direction, with some (albeit small) chance of spotting the Kido Butai.
HMS Warspite said:
the questionable quality of their torpedoes would likely compromise their effort.
Probable, yes. Impossible for a lucky shot? No. Why should it all go Japan's way?;)
 
AFAIK, even Cassin & Downes, in dock, were fit to sail in an emergency. If the choice was "finish the work" or "lose the ship"...:eek:

Also, the handful of subs could conceivably sortie against Nagumo. And there were 3-4 boats at sea in the vicinity. (Yes, I know, the Mk 14 sucked.:rolleyes: At least the Mk 6 problems were less likely to bite them; they were designed for use against heavies.)

.

There were ONE submarine near Hawaii on December 7, the Thresher, and that was 60 miles southwest of Oahu. Place it 60 miles north of Oahu and the submarine could spot the attack
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
The submarines would have to cross the 200 miles first to get near the Kido Butai, which is in case of the most modern USN fleet submarines still a ten hour journey, from the base itself, assuming the IJN would be so polite to lurk around all the time, waiting for the submarines to arive. (Average Fleet submarine top speed of the surfaced modern Cachelot and P- classes was around the 20 knots, under perfect conditions, meaning: a smooth sea and no wind.)

The would indicate the fastest way of getting to the Kido Butai would take at least 10 whole hours, also assuming the USN knew where to look for first. More likely the left over long ranged aircraft would start searching first, followed soon by attack aircraft, if still available. The submarines would always be send and always get there far too late to make much of an impression and even if succesful in an attack on a IJN ship, the questionable quality of their torpedoes would likely compromise their effort. Also important to know was that the Commander in Chief of the Kido Butai was a cautious commander, not willing to take too many risks, so he would very likely leave the scene as soon as the first two strikes had been recovered.

A better hope would be to stumble over the replenishment fleet, unlikely as it is, it was limited to around 10 knots. Still, assuming the ten hour window, which is extremely unlikely as you note, that would put the subs on Nagumo's force when they were recovering the 2nd wave at around 1300 local time (assuming timing the same is IOTL). That would be just about the most vulnerable time for the fleet, with the carriers on steady course with no zig-zag and partly fueled and armed aircraft both on deck and also in the hangers.
 
A better hope would be to stumble over the replenishment fleet, unlikely as it is, it was limited to around 10 knots. Still, assuming the ten hour window, which is extremely unlikely as you note, that would put the subs on Nagumo's force when they were recovering the 2nd wave at around 1300 local time (assuming timing the same is IOTL). That would be just about the most vulnerable time for the fleet, with the carriers on steady course with no zig-zag and partly fueled and armed aircraft both on deck and also in the hangers.


If one or more subs could be that extremely lucky to get in range (and also spot their targets, given the poor whether at the time, combined with lack of other means of detection by USN subs at the time, other than visual) the Kido Butai might be in trouble indeed, although this options still does not explain how on earth the submarines might strike gold in the remote vastness of the Northern Pacific. Finding a needle in a haystack might be easier.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
If one or more subs could be that extremely lucky to get in range (and also spot their targets, given the poor whether at the time, combined with lack of other means of detection by USN subs at the time, other than visual) the Kido Butai might be in trouble indeed, although this options still does not explain how on earth the submarines might strike gold in the remote vastness of the Northern Pacific. Finding a needle in a haystack might be easier.

More like finding a particular eedle in a haystack made of needles.

Actually the best chance might be to pick off one or two of the I-Boats the Japanese had waiting in case the fleet sortied.
 
mattep74 said:
There were ONE submarine near Hawaii on December 7, the Thresher, and that was 60 miles southwest of Oahu. Place it 60 miles north of Oahu and the submarine could spot the attack
You're right, it was Bill Anderson's Thresher. You're wrong about where she was, tho: Blair puts her 50nm northwest of Pearl (about where I expected), en route back from Midway. (He also lists Tambor & Triton off Midway & Narwhal & Dolphin off Wake.)
HMS Warspite said:
how on earth the submarines might strike gold in the remote vastness of the Northern Pacific. Finding a needle in a haystack might be easier.
The odds aren't good, I'll grant. Was there no chance of DF guidance & the direction of the retreating strike a/c giving a hint?

I'll also grant, even if the Kido Butai could be detected, for a prewar skipper to be aggressive enough & lucky enough to gain firing position is pretty improbable.
CalBear said:
best chance might be to pick off one or two of the I-Boats
That looks like the most likely score, if one's to be made.
 
Last edited:
I agree on taking the IJN submarines first, just because they were there in the range to be attacked. These Japanese submarines were the easiest targets on the short term, being just outside the base of Pearl Harbor and around the Hawaii islands. Surviving USN and USAAF aircraft could at least do something against them. (as in the OTL by the way.)
 
Top