Another path for Weimar

I did take a brief glanze at the thread this is based on.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=15985&highlight=Weimar+Republic+Survives

While I only read a couple of pages I wanted to address a question raised in the first few pages. How to deal with the Nazi party.

Every one was in agreement that the Treaty of Versaillies had to go since it robbed germany of one of its richest provences and imposed undue additional hardship and shame on an already staggering economy. The Polish invasion of Russia Shocked the SDP government sufficently to initiate limited rearamament....to atleast offer a reasonable chance of stopping a similar Polish attack on Germany.

But the Military recognised that limited defense against Polish attach was insufficent, they had to not only be able to win a two front war against France and Poland , but be able to mount preemptive war against these threats with a 'reasonable chance of fighting a larger European war'. This was all set out in Defense minister Groeners 'Tasks for the Wehrmacht'. Groener even established pre-emptive war 'if the risks could be calculated'.

His successor Schleicher established a unified command and cemented the concept of the 'Risk Wehrmacht' to first establish a defense , followed by a 'offensive Wehrmacht'. When Hitler got into power it had already been accepted that if Treaty of Versaillies had to go and territory of France and Poland had to be returned, it would have to be done by force. Any attack on these countries implied a wider European war including with the UK. At that point it doesn't really matter who is incharge of Germany , they have set course for war at the end of the 1930s begining of the 1940s.

The Nazi party in the 1920s was treated as a fringe party...what 'Monty Python' gang would refer to as 'The Extremely silly Party". In the 1920s several trends came together to give them disproportionate influence. Firstly was the raise of patriotic revisionist literature and movies trying to dispell the guilt of the German aggressor in WW-I. This schooled an entire generation of Germans in a distorted revisionist view of history. This played really well in the Bourgousies and ruling class ,who help to perpetuate the myths. By the end of the 1920s the german population was being steeled for the inevitablity of another war , atleast a European War.By the end of the 1930s they saw war as inevitable.

What realy got the Nazi in power was 'the great depression' and its additional strain on German middle class and Bourgeousis. When they saw their livelyhoods threated they became increasingly desperate and Hitlers simplistic 'fast food' solutions to problems seemed like music to their ears. Remove or minimize 'the great depression' and you remove the mechanism that shifted the Nazis from Political extremist directly into power.

Any strong colliation of the increasingly militant right wing parties would have carried the day and by virtue of nessesity have crystalized into a right wing dictatorship. Once the reigns of dictatorship are inplace Schachts concept of credit for armaments would have been exploited to establish the 'Risk Wehrmacht', which was always planed to be transformed into the 'Offensive Wehrmacht at the end of the 1930s. This credit concept was already in play in the early 1930s.

While the rapid economic recovery might not have been as quick as under Hitler regime, no depression or less depression effects , would have mean't less recovery was needed. The forced centralised power that Groener enabled, would have lead directly to mass production of armaments that infact Blomberg had called for in 1933/34. The end result would have been a smaller Wehrmacht than Hitlers Wehrmacht , but infinatly more effective through unified command and better armaments. Certainly once war began massive output of select armaments would have been imposed from the start, so armaments out put would have reached 1944 levels by 1941. What made the historic Wehrmacht unbeatable in the first few years of the war, was the military doctrine and military leadership already in place. All they needed was the tools to complete the task.
 
Last edited:

oberdada

Gone Fishin'
Glen said:
I was under the impression at the time this was written that Thalmann wasn't following orders from Moscow vis a vie cooperating with other leftist parties to keep the right out of power.

No.

That is what they taught in East German schools, though ...

Thälmann always considered the Socialdemocrats (Socialfashists as he calles him) the main enemy ...

KPD and NSDAP even organized a strike together in 1932
 

Glen

Moderator
Wendell said:
The fate of Gallicia would be wholly Soviet here IMO. Is a Polish SSR to be formed?

In its early years, the NSDAP might have gotten along, and even supported a Socialist (provided it was nationalistic enough) government. To make this eaier, keep Hitler in prison, or have him commit suicide. This means that the Leftward faction of that party is dominant.

Sorry, didn't mean to ignore you.

Well, this would be a different take on a 'Nazi' Germany, though it would REALLY be a National Socialist Germany, ya?
 

Glen

Moderator
esl said:
I did take a brief glanze at the thread this is based on.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=15985&highlight=Weimar+Republic+Survives

While I only read a couple of pages I wanted to address a question raised in the first few pages. How to deal with the Nazi party.

Every one was in agreement that the Treaty of Versaillies had to go since it robbed germany of one of its richest provences and imposed undue additional hardship and shame on an already staggering economy. The Polish invasion of Russia Shocked the SDP government sufficently to initiate limited rearamament....to atleast offer a reasonable chance of stopping a similar Polish attack on Germany.

But the Military recognised that limited defense against Polish attach was insufficent, they had to not only be able to win a two front war against France and Poland , but be able to mount preemptive war against these threats with a 'reasonable chance of fighting a larger European war'. This was all set out in Defense minister Groeners 'Tasks for the Wehrmacht'. Groener even established pre-emptive war 'if the risks could be calculated'.

His successor Schleicher established a unified command and cemented the concept of the 'Risk Wehrmacht' to first establish a defense , followed by a 'offensive Wehrmacht'. When Hitler got into power it had already been accepted that if Treaty of Versaillies had to go and territory of France and Poland had to be returned, it would have to be done by force. Any attack on these countries implied a wider European war including with the UK. At that point it doesn't really matter who is incharge of Germany , they have set course for war at the end of the 1930s begining of the 1940s.

The Nazi party in the 1920s was treated as a fringe party...what 'Monty Python' gang would refer to as 'The Extremely silly Party". In the 1920s several trends came together to give them disproportionate influence. Firstly was the raise of patriotic revisionist literature and movies trying to dispell the guilt of the German aggressor in WW-I. This schooled an entire generation of Germans in a distorted revisionist view of history. This played really well in the Bourgousies and ruling class ,who help to perpetuate the myths. By the end of the 1920s the german population was being steeled for the inevitablity of another war , atleast a European War.By the end of the 1930s they saw war as inevitable.

What realy got the Nazi in power was 'the great depression' and its additional strain on German middle class and Bourgeousis. When they saw their livelyhoods threated they became increasingly desperate and Hitlers simplistic 'fast food' solutions to problems seemed like music to their ears. Remove or minimize 'the great depression' and you remove the mechanism that shifted the Nazis from Political extremist directly into power.

Any strong colliation of the increasingly militant right wing parties would have carried the day and by virtue of nessesity have crystalized into a right wing dictatorship. Once the reigns of dictatorship are inplace Schachts concept of credit for armaments would have been exploited to establish the 'Risk Wehrmacht', which was always planed to be transformed into the 'Offensive Wehrmacht at the end of the 1930s. This credit concept was already in play in the early 1930s.

While the rapid economic recovery might not have been as quick as under Hitler regime, no depression or less depression effects , would have mean't less recovery was needed. The forced centralised power that Groener enabled, would have lead directly to mass production of armaments that infact Blomberg had called for in 1933/34. The end result would have been a smaller Wehrmacht than Hitlers Wehrmacht , but infinatly more effective through unified command and better armaments. Certainly once war began massive output of select armaments would have been imposed from the start, so armaments out put would have reached 1944 levels by 1941. What made the historic Wehrmacht unbeatable in the first few years of the war, was the military doctrine and military leadership already in place. All they needed was the tools to complete the task.

Nice discussion, but I missed where you said how to deal with the Nazis.

BTW, I suggest for anyone interested in Weimar World (the result of the AH Challenge that you linked to) that you start by reading the LAST pages of the thread, which includes maps and a fairly detailed 100 years of history for the Weimar Repubic (yes, I said 100, we take the timeline to 2019).
 
Glen said:
Nice discussion, but I missed where you said how to deal with the Nazis.

BTW, I suggest for anyone interested in Weimar World (the result of the AH Challenge that you linked to) that you start by reading the LAST pages of the thread, which includes maps and a fairly detailed 100 years of history for the Weimar Repubic (yes, I said 100, we take the timeline to 2019).


Yeah I did get carried away didn't I.:eek: What I was examining was the conditions that allowed the Nazis to move from extreme in 1928 to power in 1933. The effects of the Great depression was the spark that catapulted them into power. At least 1/4 of the German vote was undecided and clearly alot of other support was 'weak' and mobile...and awaited a catalyst to spark a swing vote. In modern terms they were not voting for Hitler , they were voting against the SDP. Every one dispised the SDP, which showed how immature the voters were....IE they didn't blame the 'Depression' for the effects they blamed the party in power.

In that kind of volitale election exposing the Nazis for the extremist they might have been enough for the flow of votes to go to another right wing party. KDP [had they realised 'Mein Kampf' goals] could have helped by painting Hitler and his foreign policy goals as far worse than the others. That way the vote would not have swung so far to the right.

Hitlers study of American TV commercials and UK WW-I propganda techniques mean't he understood mass psychology in a way that few others of the day appreciated. Removing him would have taken alot out of the nazi sails.
 

Glen

Moderator
esl said:
Yeah I did get carried away didn't I.:eek: What I was examining was the conditions that allowed the Nazis to move from extreme in 1928 to power in 1933. The effects of the Great depression was the spark that catapulted them into power. At least 1/4 of the German vote was undecided and clearly alot of other support was 'weak' and mobile...and awaited a catalyst to spark a swing vote. In modern terms they were not voting for Hitler , they were voting against the SDP. Every one dispised the SDP, which showed how immature the voters were....IE they didn't blame the 'Depression' for the effects they blamed the party in power.

In that kind of volitale election exposing the Nazis for the extremist they might have been enough for the flow of votes to go to another right wing party. KDP [had they realised 'Mein Kampf' goals] could have helped by painting Hitler and his foreign policy goals as far worse than the others. That way the vote would not have swung so far to the right.

Hitlers study of American TV commercials and UK WW-I propganda techniques mean't he understood mass psychology in a way that few others of the day appreciated. Removing him would have taken alot out of the nazi sails.

Well, that's basically what we did.

In 1920 Hitler gets outed as a Reichswehr spy and kicked from the party. He returns to Austria and slowly starts to build a following there instead. His faction of the Heimwehr will eventually spark a civil war in Austria when Dulfuss tries for the Patriotic Front.

Meanwhile, in Germany things are going slightly better throughout the 1920s so they are a bit more stable when the depression hits. Also, Ebert survives and is in office when the depression hits. Further, in the DVNP Goerleder arises as a darkhorse candidate for the leadership of the DVNP. In 1933 Ebert is defeated in the run-off by war hero compromise candidate and recent Reichswehr chief of staff Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck (who without a Kapp Puetsch, the original POD of the timeline, has remained in the Army up until this point). Ebert steps down peacefully, and a right-center coalition rules Germany for the next 10 or so years. They are a bit authoritarian, but they are in fact still democratic.
 
Glen said:
Well, that's basically what we did.

In 1920 Hitler gets outed as a Reichswehr spy and kicked from the party. He returns to Austria and slowly starts to build a following there instead. His faction of the Heimwehr will eventually spark a civil war in Austria when Dulfuss tries for the Patriotic Front.

Meanwhile, in Germany things are going slightly better throughout the 1920s so they are a bit more stable when the depression hits. Also, Ebert survives and is in office when the depression hits. Further, in the DVNP Goerleder arises as a darkhorse candidate for the leadership of the DVNP. In 1933 Ebert is defeated in the run-off by war hero compromise candidate and recent Reichswehr chief of staff Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck (who without a Kapp Puetsch, the original POD of the timeline, has remained in the Army up until this point). Ebert steps down peacefully, and a right-center coalition rules Germany for the next 10 or so years. They are a bit authoritarian, but they are in fact still democratic.


I don't have time to read all 78 pages unless you could URL me to some highlights. In 1928 the Reichwehr is forced to contemplate its future re Polish invasion. Defense minister Groener [probably their best prewar], writes up 'the tasks for the Wehrmacht' that becomes the blueprint for the rearmament drive that sucessive ministry's use. How does this play out in this ALT [alternative time line]? Blomberg's first step when he moved into defense ministry was to establish centralised control and impliment strick control on what armaments each service branch gets to fill doctrine roles. Hitler completely failed to enable Blombergs authority and instead negotiated with each branch seperately with out any real understanding of the economic limits to unrestrained rearmament. As Deist puts it...

“The navy followed the same course as the Luftwaffe and insisted on independently carrying out its own measures. As chief of the navy command, Raeder sought and established contact with Hitler from the beginning in the interest of his own rearmament plans. At the end of June 1934 he bypassed Blomberg and obtained Hitler’s approval for important changes in the planning of ship construction. The net result of these developments was that Blomberg’s attempt as commander in chief of the Wehrmacht to organize and define the build up and expansion of the armed forces within the framework of his own authority failed as early as the autumn of 1934.”

“Blomberg’s difficult relation to Goering , who was far more powerful politically , is not in itself an adequate explanation of this failure. Next to the consolidation of the regime at home, rearmament was given absolute priority within the framework of Hitler’s policies, consequently , intervention on his part to achieve a coordinated rearmament of the Wehrmacht would certainly have been conceivable. But he did not intervene-quite the contrary…We can only observe that in this most important area for conduct of future wars, the Wehrmacht idea suffered its first and , in the final analysis, decisive defeat”

Deist etal ; “Germany and the Second World War”, pp 512.


Its difficult to establish how much difference this would have made, by most accounts it should have made a hugh difference. Constanlty Allied estimates on German war production doubled the actual figures since they were assuming an overhauled economy which didn't happen until 1943/44.

How does your ATL address this , since the planned rearmament was light years away from what historically happened in scale and mission?
 

Glen

Moderator
esl said:
I don't have time to read all 78 pages unless you could URL me to some highlights. In 1928 the Reichwehr is forced to contemplate its future re Polish invasion. Defense minister Groener [probably their best prewar], writes up 'the tasks for the Wehrmacht' that becomes the blueprint for the rearmament drive that sucessive ministry's use. How does this play out in this ALT [alternative time line]? Blomberg's first step when he moved into defense ministry was to establish centralised control and impliment strick control on what armaments each service branch gets to fill doctrine roles. Hitler completely failed to enable Blombergs authority and instead negotiated with each branch seperately with out any real understanding of the economic limits to unrestrained rearmament. As Deist puts it...

Its difficult to establish how much difference this would have made, by most accounts it should have made a hugh difference. Constanlty Allied estimates on German war production doubled the actual figures since they were assuming an overhauled economy which didn't happen until 1943/44.

How does your ATL address this , since the planned rearmament was light years away from what historically happened in scale and mission?

Smaller rearmament probably along the lines you suggest, though the point is never clearly made (feel free to write some of the economic/structuring events, just don't change anything that has already happened).

Don't need to read all howevermany pages there are, just go from the most recent backwards until you hit the actual latest draft of the timeline. Shouldn't be too far back.
 
Glen said:
Sorry, didn't mean to ignore you.

Well, this would be a different take on a 'Nazi' Germany, though it would REALLY be a National Socialist Germany, ya?
Indeed. I think it is plausible for TTL. The party would carry more "legitimacy" for its whole name: National Socialist German Worker's Party.
 

Glen

Moderator
Wendell said:
Indeed. I think it is plausible for TTL. The party would carry more "legitimacy" for its whole name: National Socialist German Worker's Party.

Well, it wouldn't be This timeline but perhaps another viable one.
 

Glen

Moderator
This one is probably worth developing more. A three way cold war could develop between Communist/Socialists, Fascists, and Capitalist Democracies.
 
Top