• Does anybody has an idea what this new attempt of an amendment looked like/contained ?
  • Would it have been possible for the Asquith goverment to pass the Home Rule Bill without an amendment due to the Parliament Act of 1911 ?
  • Would it have been possible for the Asquith goverment to pass the Home Rule Bill with an amendment of its "own like" without the consent of the House of Lords by the same Parliament Act ? (Given the support of Labour and the Irish Parliamentary Party ion the Commons)
I believe this was the attempt to sidestep Ulster resistance by excluding the four counties with absolute Protestant majorities -Antrim, Armagh, Londonderry and Down, as per Agar-Robartes proposal.
  • Technically possible yes, but they were attempting to avert the Great Ulster Rebellion of 1914.
  • Without getting too much into the mechanics, essentially yes. The King really didn't want a civil war in Ireland/Ulster (which is why there was a Buckingham Palace Conference. House of Lords Conservative leadership would have had the option of raising technicalities and having a couple of hundred new Liberal peers created to make sure the measure passed or of nodding the measure through and historically would have gone for the latter option. Better being frustrated than being neutered!
 

NoMommsen

Donor
THX for contribution @ShortsBelfast :)

So Asquith would have been able to pass the Home Rule Bill with an amendment of ... "his" taste (still with a lot of conferring with esp. the IPP, the King and some others). He had made the announcement of an amendment, so I don't think he could pass it - and implement it without. That he did IOTL was IMO the "fruit" of his bargaining with the Torys to suspend it immediatly after pass.
(Have to look for this Agar-Robartes proposal ...)

What do you mean with the "Great Ulter Rebellion of 1914" ?
The "attempt" to threat with civil-war with these weapon smuggling affairs ?
 
Read up the 1912 Ulster Exclusion Crisis, Solemn League and Covenant et al. Ulster Protestants didn't want to be a minority in a Home Rule Ireland and had imported large quantities of German rifles and machine guns to make the point forcibly. Prepared to fight the British Army to stay British! Majority of population of island of Ireland wanted Home Rule but opposition geographically concentrated in one quarter of the island. Recipe for secession and consequent war. Unwillingness of Nationalists and Unionists to compromise or meet each other halfway. So, if the 1911 Bill had been reintroduced without amendment and passed, you would have had exactly that. The Great Ulster Rebellion of 1914.
 
Not sure if a fresh Bill would have to be introduced, but Asquith would have had the King firmly and unequivocally behind him and the leaders of the Conservative party being pointedly asked by the King if they were really willing to start a Civil War over the issue. Conservatives were using Ulster as a stalking horse to oppose Irish Home Rule generally. At that point it would have been obvious they had lost. People like Walter Long, Baldwin, Austen Chamberlain would have advocated compromise at that point and, no doubt, there would have been a couple of peers with lands in the Four Counties deserting the hardline Tory position because their homes would be safe under this proposal. And the Lords when it came down to it didn't want to welcome 400 new Liberal peers. The only people who were really keen to start a shooting war over it were the Ulstermen and the far right of the Tory party.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Not a fresh, completly new bill, which would have been Home Rule Bill No. 4, but the 3rd, introduced 1912, having passed the commons in may.
Only one with another amendment (still "possible technically" with how the british not-a-constitution [in the sense as constitution is understood by "continentals"] works ?)

Whatever compromise might have been "pressed upon" the Unionists, as they most likely would argue would need to be implemented.
But ... the Curragh incident showed, that he cannot rely on the army for that purpose.
 
Question 8 Gladstone treaties of 1870 remake

NoMommsen

Donor
I started this thread not ro necro thread myself. Therefore I would like to transfer the question of this thread hither also, as it begins to take part in my attempt on an ATL here.

In short :
- Germany refrains from entering Belgium (and Luxemburg at this point)
- Germany try the 'last minute turn" eastwards
- Germany states its non-intention to attack and unwillingness to fight France at all, if not attacked by itself
- Germany guarantees the neutrality and inviolability of Belgium (at last), as long as not compromised by ... someone else

To "prove" its peace-loving (in the west) Germany offers/proposes/asks for a remake at least about its content of the "Gladstone treaties" of August 1870, which can be found here (Appendix B and C).
(In short : if any of the possible belligerents [France and Prussia/Germany] violate Belgium, Britain will team up with the other against the [first] violator)
This is communicated to London as well as Brussels, confidentially also to Paris, on diplomatic channels at late evening/night of 1st August to 2nd August and therefore "present" the morning of 2nd August.

What do you think will be the reaction of :
  • Sir Edward Grey
  • Sir Herbert Asquith
  • the british cabinet as a whole
  • the belgian goverment
  • as well as its further recuperations on british policy
Pls note, that this will also appear in the monday morning papers at last, if not already in the sunday papers (Wolffs Telegraphische Bureau will bring it at night already [it was the "official/unofficial" news agency of the german goverment], Lichnowsky might try to "activate some contacts" he might have within the London press).
 

NoMommsen

Donor
@Glenn239
To avoid our last embroilment into timings of who said what exactly and mixing of TTL with OTL, ... just assume Grey is really the :

french bootlicking
... Grey wanted Britain in unity with French objectives, whatever these may be. Grey wanted, at any cost, to avoid giving any assurance of neutrality to Germany under any condition.
...
As first answer above, Grey wanted Britain and France in lockstep. If France wanted to avoid war and negotiate, Grey would oblige. If France wanted war with Germany, Grey would oblige.
...
treacherous liar
... The morning conversation on the phone and by Tyrell was in reference to the offer later made in no.419. But key details were omitted earlier in the day to make it appear better than it actually was.
...
You see the bait and switch that Grey pulled on Lichnowsky – the two offers are one and the same offer, except for the ‘guaranteed’ neutrality part – in that key detail Grey lied to Lichnowsky over the phone and then told the truth in the face to face meeting.

...
you depicted him.

He still needed and knew that he needed the support of the cabinet (at that point between 1/2 to 2/3 against intervention) and the party to convince the parliament, the King and the public, cabinet and parliament to get Britain as a whole behind intervention for France.
OTL on 2nd August he had to threaten the cabinet with his resignment, if France wouldn't be given british support. All he got then was a - more or less clear - statement of the cabinet, that a belgian violation would state a casus belli, though the cabinet was still discussing how extended such a violation would have to be to actually be such a casus belli. And the rather clear statement, that the sending of the BEF was NOT in the ropes at that point of time.

How could Grey still reach his goal of almost unconditional surren....support for France given the situation, that on sunday morning at the cabinet meeting at last he and Asquith (Lichnowsky catched Asquith at his breakfast before a meeting with Grey before the days cabinet meeting) knew about the mentioned above communications of the germans ? Probably by rumor and/or press several other cabinet members as well ?
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Hmm, nobody really picking up ... anyway :
No "new" question in the propper sense, but kinda follow up on "Question 2 other use of Armygroup Kummer"

Done a wee bit :p of research on the Serbian campaign in August 1914, including the railways of A-H and their capacities and the railways-deployment plans (some charts/maps linked).
I came to the conclusion, that it would be well possible to deploy the "Kummer"-troops at Sabac and Klenac and west of it (intended to "fill some holes" after 2.Army has gone to Galicia") from the 16th/17th August onwards, probably the 100.LSt Brig. from Vienna as the first, followed closely by the 95.LSt.Division from Prague and the 106.LSt.Division from Krakow as the last.

For the front situation on 19th August, the day k.u.k.).Division broke down in the battle of the Jadar/Cer I would like to refer to this map. From my readings so far its outcome was a quite close to very close draw.

My idea now is, that the arrival of at least 100.LSt.Brig. and (parts of) 95.LSt.Div. in the vicinity of Dobric-Lipolist (see map) on 18th/19th August could have decisevly changed changed the outcome of the austrian August offensive and serbian counteroffensive.
IOTL k.u.k.21.Divi. was kinda "split", though both parts had rather the same objective : driving serbian 2.Army back from the Cer-range, western part against Combined Div., eastern part against Combined and Cavalry Div. with the additional objective making contact to the "Sabac-group" of k.u.k.IV.Corps and 29.Div..

ITTL now 21.Div. could concentrate only on taking/retaking Heights 706 northeast of Tekeris together with northern part of k.u.k.9.Div. (as this was the latters IOTL objective also). Meanwhile, what's already there from Armygroup Kummer (not all but possibly most parts of 100.LSt.Brig., about 1/2 of 95.LSt.Div. [worth at least another Brigade] and some parts of 106.LSt.Div., altogether about an overstrengh Brigade at least) advances between Varna and Desic against serbian Cavalry Div. and parts of Timok I.Div.(at that moment mainly engaded against austrian k.u.k.XIII.Corps) already under pressure from k.u.k.29.Div..

IMO the break-down of the southern wing of k.u.k.9.Div. in the Jadar-valley on the 19th August would still occur, but not on the Cer-range, where the northern part held out OTL also. Combined Div. would be mauled, with Tekeris taken Morava I.Division would be cut off as well and also (mainly) mauled, though parts might made it through to Timok I.Div. at Badanja-Jarebice.
Also the "relief"-offense aginst serbian 1.Army (ordered IOTL 19th August) would go much better with Cavalry Div. (was attached to serbian 1.Army on 19th August by Putnik) under much more pressure from its western flank with now also 106.LSt.Div. comming in rising numbers.
Though this offensive would have to stop 23rd to 24th August latest, as k.u.k.IV.Corps was scheduled to go to Galicia from 30th August onwards and not "freed" for further usage for Potiorek by Conrad(as OTL).

However, this would NOT have brought an overall-victory (right now), but with a line hold by austrian forces from the Dobrava to Rumska and (perhaps) including Tekeris (or at least) on its outskirts/surrounding heights), furthe west the Cer-range in possesion as well as the bridges at Ljesnica ... dunno if holding east of the Drina at least south of Loznica to Zvornik would also be in the ropes ... holding all of the Macva ... the starting position for the second round from 6th to 9th Septembre would look to me v e r y promising for the austrians.


Feasable ? Possible ? Probable ? ASB ?
Your opinions ?
 
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NoMommsen

Donor
Believe it or not : I am still "working on this :biggrin:

First something, that could be seen as a follow-up to this post.

I finally found a notion about the early russian mining activities in Bruce Mannings part on Russia in "War Planning 1914" by Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig (all dates are georgian calender)
- 28.07.1914 mining of the "approaches to its primary" bases
- 31.07.1914 mine laying of the "belts for the "central position" in the Gulf of Finland" (what I would locate at the island of Gogland and east of it)
- 02.08.1914 "additional 200 mines are sown to cover the "flank position" between Sveaborg and the Skerries
I further assume the dates mentioned meant the commencing of the mining.

The first the germans knew of for certain by reports of attachees and sailors.
The second was assumed by them as a certaincy.
The last the germans assumed from reports of merchants received on 31.07. and 01.08..

I still don't know with some level of accuracy, when the russians started to mine :
- Irben Street to close off the Gulf of Riga
- Mouth of the Gulf of Finland between Sveaborg and Reval
- Approach to the mouth of the Gulf of Finland between Hanko and Dagö-island

The last the germans started to mine (south of Hanko towards Odensholm-island) from 10.-14.08.1914.

If someone has an additional/better source :
I would be happy to be guided there.
 
Question 9 Big Bang Baltic Beginning

NoMommsen

Donor
That I was/am looking for such infos has a reason.
This is still around a possible/ly happening) ATL with Kaiser Bill staying with his last moment switch of OTL towards an East-All-Out and staying with his cancellation of the invasion/incursion of Belgium, Luxemburg and France no DoW from Germany against France ITTL).

And I'm playing with the thought, that - beside "simply tturn our whole army to the East" - Willy might also ²demand" something ... spectacular against the russians by his navy. Such proposals should - by job description, lesser the "lived" reality of the HSF - come from the Admirality Staff. Given the "mood" Kaiser Bill was in, when Moltke opposed his orders I could imagine, that Tirpitz might have been inclined to pass on the blame of the non-existence of such plans to the non-present Chief of the Admiraity Staff Hugo von Pohl. ... what also might have "bought" some time for the Kaiser to "come back to reason" (what for the sake of an ATL he won't).

Since his appointment as Chief of the Admiraity staff in April 1913 Hugo von Pohl tried on several occasions to at least initiate a discussion about possible offensive operations in the Baltic Sea against Russia BIG style ... or at least bigger style than just to hold on and "fake" a strengh the Baltic Sea parts of the HSF simply did not have after the "Tirpitzian" plans. The last time he tried this was on 25th July 1914, only to be with this initiative once more almost completly ignored. There seems to haven't even been a written answer to his memoranda about this.

And now on 1st/2nd/3rd August Hugo von Pohl has to patch together some "spectacular" plans of operation in the Baltic Sea.These are my thoughts what could or might be his thoughts :

Despite Nicolai von Essen being the Chief of the russian Baltic Fleet, given the "material" at hand in early August (4 pre-dreadnoughts, one of at Kronstadt docked for repairs; some armored and protected cruisers; some large T-Boats/destroyers, some T-Boats; only few subs; few dedicated, old and slow minelayers), an early open-water battle was rather improbable.

That would leave as an "offensive action" only bombarding russian harbours and bases. This would have to happen rather quickly, as the russians are thought (correctly) to wage an extensive mine-warfare.
- Kronstadt would be even to the boldest an obvious suicide mission
- Reval/Tallin/Peter and Paul Fortress complex is at least a year from completion without facilities for more than some T-Boats
- Riga is known emptied from naval forces (beside a few older T-Boats)
- Libau and Windau : see Riga​
That in essence leaves only one target worth of considering : Sveaborg/Helsingfors or Helsinki as it's named today.

And here is his (well, ... mine) plan of operations :
Baltic Big Bang Beginning

1st Minesweeping Division (15 older T-Boats, half class 1885, half class 1892 converted) (maybe also 2nd ? or parts of it ?) start clearing/searching a path west and north of Dagö towards Sveaborg, being escorted by some "Small Cruisers" (Magdeburg, Augsburg, maybe also Danzig and/or Stuttgart, being in the first days part of "Reconnaissance Group" before with further ships becomming recommissiond distributed to the Reconnaissance Groups 2 and 3).

These sail from Memel (yes, big and "deep" enough to harbour the Small Cruisers as well as the T-Boats), which will be made a forward depot for ammo, coal, fuel for the wholeof the operation at least. BTW : eventual ... "one-time-usage" of the minesweeping T-Boats to speed up operations will be ... anticipated and prepared for (orders for the already planned "True Mine-Hunters are already on the way as IOTL).

Some "way behind (maybe from waiting position/roadstead at Pillau) the larger ships of the Reconnaissance Group (Moltke, Seydlitz, von der Tann, Blücher might be made Prince Heinrichs Flaggship as he requested on 2nd August IOTL) "cover" the minesweeping operation (the "usage" of the fast elements of the fleet were part of v-Pohls "proposals" IOTL).

Even further behind maybe at Danzig ... or ... at the eastcoast/northern tip pf Gotland ? ... near Färosund ... ? 1st Battlesquadron is at waiting position for ... whatever objective may become active.

Objectives of the whole action :
  • clear a path towards Sveaborg/Hesingfors/Helsinki for the battlesquadron/major ships
    • thereby "lure" russian forces into an open-water-battle
  • bombardement (from a distance ? german naval 30,5 cm range 15-20 km, more than what was installed at Sveaborg at this pount in time) of the fortress complex, harbour facilities, mining facilities (mine stocks as as well as eventually present ships) and eventual present ships (the pre-dreadnoughts)
    • thereby "lure" russian forces into an open-water-battle
  • return the fleet back to Pillau/Königsberg and Danzig for eventual repairs
    • thereby "lure" russian forces into an open-water-battle
essentially : do as much damage to the russian forces as possible for the duration of the operation


Possible "strategic value" of this operation (but this is less what I would like to see discussed) :
  • First : satisfying the Kaisers demand for some spectacular action of the fleet without too much of risking valuables (this would probably be the main drive, with the others more or less thin "covers" for this one")
  • Second : considerably hindering the russian navy to conduct actions byx detroying there easy available resources (ships, stocks and facilities of Helsingfors)
  • Third : considerably hindering the russian navy to intercept further german actions on the baltic coasts, thereby "freeing" the heavy covering forces for whatever might become now necessary in the western(northsea theatre
  • Forth : enabling the navy to conduct further actions to ensure blockade of the Gulf of Finland (landings/occupations of Libau, Windau, perhaps even Hanko now, that there aren't any russian naval forces to intercept supply convois/ships toward the named harbours).


Now I would like to ask your opinion, as I render myself unfortunatly under- and uneducated on naval matters. :
Is this Big Bang Baltic Beginning possible as described with sailing of first elemts from Memel between 7th to 10th August ? Earlier ? Later ?

But also, what you think such an operation would/might play out ?
Will they get into 15-20 km range to shell Helsingfors ?
Will von Essen try to intercept them earlier on ? And if so : at what point with what forces ?
 
Believe it or not : I am still "working on this :biggrin:

First something, that could be seen as a follow-up to this post.

I finally found a notion about the early russian mining activities in Bruce Mannings part on Russia in "War Planning 1914" by Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig (all dates are georgian calender)
- 28.07.1914 mining of the "approaches to its primary" bases
- 31.07.1914 mine laying of the "belts for the "central position" in the Gulf of Finland" (what I would locate at the island of Gogland and east of it)
- 02.08.1914 "additional 200 mines are sown to cover the "flank position" between Sveaborg and the Skerries
I further assume the dates mentioned meant the commencing of the mining.

The first the germans knew of for certain by reports of attachees and sailors.
The second was assumed by them as a certaincy.
The last the germans assumed from reports of merchants received on 31.07. and 01.08..

I still don't know with some level of accuracy, when the russians started to mine :
- Irben Street to close off the Gulf of Riga
- Mouth of the Gulf of Finland between Sveaborg and Reval
- Approach to the mouth of the Gulf of Finland between Hanko and Dagö-island

The last the germans started to mine (south of Hanko towards Odensholm-island) from 10.-14.08.1914.

If someone has an additional/better source :
I would be happy to be guided there.

Using the minelayers Amur, Jenisei, Ladoga and Narova, the Russians laid 2119 mines on the morning of July 31st (7 a.m. to 11.20 a.m., very fast work) in the central position between Porkkala and Tallinn (somewhat west of the direct line between Helsinki and Tallinn). The mines were placed in eight lines 46-86 meters from each other and set to the depth of 4,9 meters below the surface. During August, 1031 additional mines were laid in the same area, in eight different small operations.

The ships going against Helsinki/Sveaborg like you are envisioning would have to go through this mine barrage.
 
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NoMommsen

Donor
@DrakonFin
THX a lot :) for this info.

... just a wee nitpick-question on dates : July 31st ... gregorian or julian calendar (+ 13 days for gregorian in 1914) ?
 
@DrakonFin
THX a lot :) for this info.

... just a wee nitpick-question on dates : July 31st ... gregorian or julian calendar (+ 13 days for gregorian in 1914) ?

Gregorian. The mining operation took place at the same time as Russia started mobilizing.

EDIT: @NoMommsen, according to my sources, that apart from the 290 mines laid in the sea area outside Hanko, the Russians started the main effort to mine the area between the Archipelago Sea, Hanko and Hiidenmaa/Hiiumaa in spring-summer 1915. The same goes for the Irbe Strait, it was a main focus for mining in the summer of 1915 when 2179 mines were laid in 27 separate smaller barrages.

The 1914 effort IOTL concentrated on the Gulf of Finland, and in offensive mining operations in the southern Baltic Sea (c. 1650 mines laid in 13 separate operations).

(My sources here are Suomenlahti Pietarin suojana ("The Gulf of Finland protecting St. Petersburg"), a Finnish 2016 book on the Russian fortifications, etc, on the Gulf of Finland before and during WWI, edited by Ove Enqvist and Johanna Pakola, and Itämeri 1914-1921 ("The Baltic Sea 1914-1921"), a Finnish 2010 book on WWI in the Baltic by Mirko Harjula.)

According to Harjula, at the beginning of the war, von Essen had the following ships at his use in the relevant area, mainly based in Helsinki/Sveaborg (where von Essen had his HQ):

Pre-dreadnought battleships

Imperator Pavel I
Andrey Pervozvannyi
(docked for repairs)
Tsarevits
Slava


Cruisers

Newer:
Rurik
Admiral Makarov
Bayan
Pallada


Older:
Aurora
Bogatyr
Diana
Gromoboi
Oleg
Rossiya

The cruisers were divided to the 1st and 2nd cruiser divisions, and it is said that of these, Pallada, Aurora, Diana, Gromoboi and Rossiya made up the 1st division in Tallinn and Rurik, Admiral Makarov, Bayan, Bogatyr and Oleg the 2nd division in in Helsinki/Sveaborg.

Destroyers

Newer:
Novik

Older:
28 torpedo boats/torpedo destroyers (operating from Hanko and Hiidenmaa/Hiiumaa, says Harjula)

Eight submarines were based at Tallinn.


My two cents, for what it is worth: in August von Essen was ordered to defend the entrance to the Gulf of Finland and not to risk his bigger ships unnecessarily. After that the battleships and cruisers were mainly kept in the Gulf of Finland. This order was of course connected to his oft-mentioned, aborted "pre-emptive" operation against the Swedish fleet. I'd suggest that if the German attack against Helsinki/Sveaborg happens before the order about not risking the ships, von Essen might lead his battleships and cruisers out to the area between Hanko and Hiidenmaa/Hiiumaa to meet the enemy. This would be dependent on what information he has about the attacking force: if he knows/suspects that his forces are outnumbered/outclassed, then he would likely be more cautious.

But if the attack takes place after such an order to not risk the bigger ships has been received, I'd say that he'd take his ships out to the central Gulf of Finland and wait behind the minefields of the central position, using smaller ships (the "torpedo destroyers") to harass the enemy and to draw its main force into the minefield, and only engage the Germans with his bigger ships when they are actually closing in to Helsinki/Sveaborg.

Note that even with guns with 15-20 km range, the German ships would have to enter to within the Russian mine barrage to get close enough to Helsinki/Sveaborg.
 
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NoMommsen

Donor
@DrakonFin
If these are ... "just two cents", then I would appreciate them as some rare golden misprint from ancient times, now on auction worth in the thousands.
I'd suggest that if the German attack against Helsinki/Sveaborg happens before the order about not risking the ships, von Essen might lead his battleships and cruisers out to the area between Hanko and Hiidenmaa/Hiiumaa to meet the enemy.
I have to admitt, that this ... comes quite close of what I have in mind might/could happen.;):biggrin:
Note that even with guns with 15-20 km range, the German ships would have to enter to within the Russian mine barrage to get close enough to Helsinki/Sveaborg.
I am painfully aware of that and - unfortunatly for my "wet" dreams in the role of Hugo von Pohl - that as an author I have to know, that the Porkkala-Naissaar barrage would be in place, even if I manage to send my ships during the first 1 1/2 weeks of the war.

OTOH your informations might ... spare me some T-Boats turned minesweepers : they won't reach 4,9 meters deep with their bottoms ;), only with their sweeping equipment might/should do so.
 
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