At Shiloh (6-7 Apr '62), Gen. AS Johnston was killed & Gen. PGT Beauregard assumed command of the retreat. On 17 Jun, Beauregard having gone on leave without permission, Pres. Davis replaced him with Gen. B Bragg, who moved his men 770 miles by railroad from Tupelo MS to Chattanooga TN, arriving on 23 Jul. At the end of Jul he met with Maj. Gen. E Kirby-Smith in Chattanooga to decide strategy. Kirby-Smith was not under his command, reporting directly to Richmond, so despite the difference in their ranks their decisions had to be taken jointly. On 21 Aug Bragg crossed the Tennessee R & invaded Kentucky, but on 23 Oct he withdrew thru the Cumberland Gap. On 28 Nov 1863, after another year of indecisive battles & losses, Bragg resigned his command, & 2 days later his resignation was accepted by Pres. Davis.
What if the Confederate gov't had been more decisive, & had used the winter of 1862-63 to devise a strategy for winning the war, to reorganize the command structure, & to replace ineffective Confederate generals?
The Confederacy in 1861-62 was deeply unfortunate in its choice of senior generals. S Cooper was a desk general who would never see field service. By Apr 1862 AS Johnston was dead. Beauregard was insubordinate as well as ineffective, having called off a final night assault on Grant's lines at Shiloh that might have ended the battle with a Confederate victory, & having abandoned the vital rail nexus of Corinth, MS without a fight; & Bragg's appointment would also prove to have been a mistake.
In mid-Oct Sec'y. of War Geo. Randolph* meets with Gen. Cooper, the senior Confederate general on active duty, serving as Adjutant General of the Army, to discuss Bragg's failure to press his advantage at Perryville, his retreat, & his evident intention to evacuate Kentucky entirely. Their discussion ranges over other, related topics, & they conclude that while Pres. Davis is unlikely to listen to their advice, they are duty-bound to offer it. In order to add some weight to their concerns they bring them to the attention of VP AH Stephens, & on 30 Oct 1862, 1 week after Bragg withdraws thru the Cumberland Gap, Pres. Davis reluctantly complies with a request for the 3 of them to meet with him to discuss "the progress of the war".
(* Appointed in Mar 1862, Randolph was known for insisting on strengthening the Confederacy in the S & the W. He became increasingly frustrated with Davis' Virginia-centric approach to the war, & he was dissatisfied with Davis' habit of micromanaging subordinates. Increasingly overcome by the impossible duties of his job, his tuberculosis returned in Sep, his health grew more fragile, & he would resign on 15 Nov 1862. He was noted for the tact with which he usually handled Davis; but this meeting, & the frustration it reflects, amounts to a last-ditch attempt on his part to get Davis' attention before resigning. In the end, he felt that the only way to get Davis to listen was by abandoning tact.)
At their late morning meeting in Davis' office on the 2d floor of the Confederate Executive Mansion, the Brockenbrough house, Stephens, Randolph, & Cooper remind the president that in addition to his failed invasion of Kentucky Bragg can arguably be blamed for the devastating loss of New Orleans, having persuaded Davis to transfer troops away from the Gulf Coast; he is also suffering from rheumatism, dyspepsia, nerves, & severe migraine headaches; & he's losing the trust of his subordinates. Bragg has got to go. On top of that, the Army of Mississippi at Vicksburg is about to come under serious pressure from the Union, being their next logical strategic objective in the W. Someone competent will have to be appointed to that command. Furthermore, Maj. Gen. TC Hindman, in command of the Trans-Mississippi Theatre, has built & organized an effective army, but in doing so he's alienated the people of his dept., who are urgently calling for his replacement. Stephens, Randolph, & Cooper unite in insisting that these issues are best dealt with as part of a coordinated overall strategy for winning the war rather than individually.
Visibly controlling his anger, Pres. Davis thanks his advisors for their suggestions before, over their protests, he dismisses them.
Davis is described by his contemporaries as "overbearing, over-controlling, & overly meddlesome". Postwar historians say that he was preoccupied with detail, unable to delegate responsibility, was unable to get along with people who disagreed with him, & neglected civil matters in favor of the military. A West Point graduate, war veteran, & fmr US Sec'y. of War, he considered his own military qualifications & his knowledge of the skills & personalities of the senior members of the officer's corps to be far superior to those of anyone else (with the possible exception, later in the war, of Gen. Lee); & he had great difficulty listening to advice-- especially military advice-- from anyone. In practice, however, he was a vacillating commander in chief, often unable to make up his mind; he utterly failed either to devise or impose a strategy on the war, pretty much allowing each theatre commander to devise his own strategy; he made several extremely poor appointments for senior military commands, & even after the officers appointed to those positions proved themselves unsuitable Davis often exhibited an extreme reluctance either to fire anyone, or to stick to his principles on the rare occasions when he did. Even Beauregard, fired for cause, was later restored to duty.
Dismissed, Gen. Cooper stands up to leave. VP Stephens remains seated. Cooper ignores & Stephens watches as Sec'y. of War Randolph protests the president's refusal to listen to them. Saying, "I will hear no more about this;" Pres. Davis gets to his feet and walks out of his office, followed by Randolph, who is still speaking. As he starts down the stairs, in response to something Randolph has said, Davis turns his head to make a bitter reply, and his foot misses the next step. Davis tumbles all the way to the foot of the stairs, where he lays oozing blood from a head injury.
By mid-afternoon the president's doctors say that Davis is suffering from numerous bruises, contusions, and a few broken bones, the most serious of which are a broken cervical vertebra & a depressed fracture of the skull. He is in a light coma, the prognosis of him waking up is uncertain, & even if & when he does awaken he'll never walk again. In that event a lengthy period of convalescence will be needed, during which & possibly even afterward he'll be unable to exercise the duties of his office.
An hour later AH Stephens* is sworn in as President of the Confederate States of America, & early that same evening he convenes a meeting of his cabinet, which had already gathered. It is decided to convene a special meeting of the military high command in 10 days' time, to include Sec'y. Randolph & Gen. Cooper as well as Sec'y. of the Navy Stephen Mallory & Gens. Lee & Johnston, the other 2 highest-ranking officers in the Army.
(* By 1862 Stephens had already begun expressing open opposition to the Davis administration, eventually including conscription, impressment, suspension of habeus corpus, various fiscal policies, & his military strategy. Pro-Union, he was also an early advocate of delaying the beginning of the war to allow the South to get ready, later he was a strong advocate of peace, & he was-- as unlikely as this mat seem-- a close personal friend of Pres. Lincoln.)
During these days Stephens considers appointing long-time friend RH Toombs as his VP, but he's advised against having a president & a VP both from Georgia. The same objection applies to Howell Cobb, a prominent leader of the secession movement who'd been considered by the Montgomery Convention for the post of president, so his choice settles on S Carolina Congressman RH Rhett, another prominent secession leader of the secession movement who'd been considered for president. Informed that Randolph will soon resign as Sec'y. of War, Stephens decides to appoint Cobb-- now a veteran brig. gen. with the Army of N. Virginia, recently reassigned as a district commander in Florida-- to that position; while creating the cabinet-level position of Executive Chief of Staff specifically for his friend Toombs. JP Benjamin remains Sec'y. of State, C Memminger as Sec'y. of the Treasury, TH Watts as Atty. Gen., S Mallory as Sec'y. of the Navy, & JH Reagan as Postmaster Gen. Stephens also uses this time to summon Gen. Lee, who has his confidence, to Richmond for private consultations.
On 9 Nov Davis still has not regained consciousness & the invitees convene, including Randolph, who has been persuaded to attend as pretty much his last official act, with Cobb present as an observer. Stephens announces his decision to reorganize the command structure of the Confederate Army. Gen. Cooper will assume the new post of Chief of Staff. Gen. Bragg will be relieved of command & will take over Cooper's old position as Adjutant General. Beauregard will not be restored to duty, despite the fact that his allies in the Confederate Congress are lobbying for precisely that*. Subject to these decisions, Stephens opens the floor for further discussion.
(* Beauregard returns a few months later to Louisiana, where he persuades Gov. Moore to appoint him a brig. gen. of volunteers. By the end of the war he's worked his way back up to the rank of maj. gen.)
Although offered his choice of other assignments, Gen. Lee prefers to remain in command of the more than 50,000-man Army of N Virginia. A consensus is reached to roll Maj. Gen. E Kirby-Smith's 10,000-man Army of E Tennessee into the 30,000-man Army of Tennessee at Chattanooga. It is further decided for this enlarged Army of Tennessee to cooperate under a single theatre command with the fewer than 40,000-man Army of Mississippi based at Vicksburg, & to place Gen. Johnston in overall command of this theatre with great operational & tactical latitude granted to his subordinate army commanders. (Since Beauregard never relieves Maj. Gen. JC Pemberton of command of the Dept. of S Carolina & Georgia, Pemberton doesn't get promoted & he's never sent to command the Army of Mississippi at Vicksburg.)
Pursuant to his previous private discussions with Pres. Stephens, Gen. Lee now offers Lt. Gen. J Longstreet, promoted 9 Oct, to command the Army of Mississippi at Vicksburg; & Lt. Gen. TJ Jackson, promoted Sep '62, to command the Army of Tennessee at Chattanooga. Gen. Johnston isn't happy at getting 2 of Lee's subordinates as commanders of his 2 field armies, but Johnston has no commanders of his own with the seniority & proven track records of Longstreet & Jackson, who are now really too senior to remain in the Army of N Virginia anyway, so that other commands must be found for them. Randolph & Gen. Cooper concur in this reccommendation, & when Pres. Stephens also agrees Johnston has little choice but to accept. In recognition of his brilliant victory at Richmond KY in Aug, it is then decided to send west the army commander who is displaced by merging his Army of E Tennessee with the Army of Tennessee, Maj. Gen. E Kirby-Smith, to assume command of the 11,000-man Army of the West at Van Buren, AR (instead of the well-meaning but incompetent Maj. Gen. TH Holmes).
It was known to the Confederate gov't in Nov 1862 that the Union was about to embark upon a major thrust against Vicksburg. That this thrust would involve the extensive use of river gunboats was also obvious, as shown in the Battles of New Orleans & Memphis. Sec'y. Mallory informs the conference that the Confederacy has no effective answer to these gunboats. The plan therefore devised is for Longstreet to stand on the defensive at Vicksburg, maintaining his rail lines of communication & supply with points E; while Lee conducts a mobile & active defense in the N Virginia Theatre. JH Morgan is promoted to brig. gen. & assigned with a reinforced brigade of cavalry to Longstreet's command, which is also heavily reinforced with artillery & ammunition. J Wheeler's cavalry remains under command of the Army of Tennessee, & recently promoted Brig. Gen. NB Forrest is assigned to use his veteran cavalry brigade to maintain communications between the Armies of Tennessee & Mississippi.* In assuming command of the Army of Tennessee, which will be engaged in offensive ops, Gen. Lee will also permit Gen. Jackson to bring with him the 19 rgts & 5 batteries of artillery of his old division in II Corps, amounting to a reinforcement of some 10,000 to 12,000 men. The Confederate gov't will also not transfer Maj. Gen. CL Stevenson's 7500-man division from Jackson's command to the Army of Mississippi (historically ordered by Pres. Davis on 16 Dec), so the effective strength of the Army of Tennessee will be nearly 60,000 men.
(* In this scenario Forrest's veteran troopers aren't reassigned in Dec 1862, forcing him to start over with green recruits, so his brigade retains its effectiveness into 1863.)
The Confederate spring offensive of 1863 will consist of 2 offensive ops that are intended to draw off Union forces from the Vicksburg campaign.
It is planned for Maj. Gen. E Kirby-Smith to cross the Boston Mtns. in the spring & advance against Springfield, MO; but before Kirby-Smith can begin his campaign, his plans are pre-empted in early Dec 1862 by the southward advance of Brig. Gen. J Blunt in command of 5200 men of the Union Army of the Frontier.
This is just about the time that Kirby-Smith is arriving at Van Buren to assume command. Maj. Gen. TC Hindman has done a good job of reganizing the army & preparing it for offensive ops, so only a few minor changes need to be made. Instead of assigning Brig. Gen. TJ Churchill to defend his right flank at Arkansas Post-- a complete waste of Churchill's considerable talents-- Kirby-Smith sends Hindman to command Arkansas Post & employs Churchill in the offensive. 3000 men from Arkansas Post are transferred to Van Buren to take part in the offensive, along with other reinforcements increasing the strength of the Confederate army from 11,000 to nearly 16,000 men. [1st Div. Brig. Gen. JS Roane (3100 men), 2d Div. Brig. Gen. FA Shoup (3200 men), 3d Div. Brig. Gen. DM Frost (3900 men), 4th Div Brig. Gen. TJ Churchill (3000 men), & 5th Div (cavalry) Brig. Gen. JS Marmaduke (2800 men)]. The troops from Arkansas Post will arrive last, so they'll serve as a fresh reserve. The plan used by Kirby-Smith is similar to the one historically used by Hindman & earlier on the same ground by Van Dorn, except that instead of having his cavalry conduct diversionary attacks from the S while enveloping the Union L flank & carrying out the main attack from the E with his infantry, Kirby-Smith realizes that tying up his cavalry with a diversion from the S would make it unavailable for scouting purposes. He therefore uses Brig. Gen. Frost's poorly equipped & poorly disciplined Missouri infantry to attack from the S, while sending Marmaduke's cavalry ahead with the mission of swinging around behind the Union army & attacking from the N while the main army attacks from the E. Marmaduke is therefore in position to recognize early that Union Gen. Herron (4000 men) is rapidly approaching out of Springfield to reinforce Union Gen. Blunt (5200 men), & Marmaduke can interdict that approach. Marmaduke's 2800 cavalry harass & slow down the approach from the N of Herron's 4000 men, while Kirby-Smith's remaining 7000 men (less the 3000 from Arkansas Post)-- instead of being forced onto the defensive at Prairie Grove & facing a united Union army, as happened to Hindman-- assault & destroy Blunt's 5200 in conjunction with Frost's 3900. Then Kirby-Smith turns on Herron (this time including the 3000 from Arkansas Post) & inflicts another crushing defeat in detail.
The remaining Union troops in Springfield are inadequate to hold the city, which falls in Jan-- about the same time that Gen. Hindman is surrendering to overwhelming odds at Arkansas Post. With his lines of supply & communications now threatened, Kirby-Smith is forced to stand on the defensive at Springfield & to detach troops to conduct screening ops between Little Rock & Arkansas Post. Ultimately, in the summer of 1863, he will be forced back out of Missouri by overwhelmingly superior Union forces that are drawn, at least in part, from reserves & reinforcements that otherwise would have been allocated to Grant's Vicksburg campaign. If Grant remains focused on Vicksburg then Kirby-Smith can maintain himself almost indefinitely in C Arkansas. If not-- if Grant diverts substantial forces against him-- then Kirby-Smith will be forced down into SW Arkansas or even N Louisiana. This, however, will require a direct order, since Grant was determined to capture Vicksburg as the next step in conducting campaigns farther E. Thus Kirby-Smith is allowed to maintain himself in C Arkansas, harassing the rear of Grant's far superior forces at Vicksburg.
The 2d Confederate offensive op planned for the spring of 1863 is by the Army of Tennessee under Lt. Gen. TJ Jackson, reinforced to a strength of nearly 60,000 men, making it by far the strongest army in the Confederacy. But before Jackson can get ready, as with Kirby-Smith, his plans are pre-empted by the winter advance of Gen. Rosecrans' Union Army of the Cumberland, 41,400 strong. As Bragg did historically, Jackson launches a strong surprise attack against Rosecrans' right flank at the Battle of Stones River; but instead of Bragg's mere 35,000 men Jackson now has nearly 60,000, including his own old crack division from N Virginia, & he also calls in Brig. Gen. Forrest's cavalry brigade from the W. Where Bragg won the initial engagement & forced the Union forces into a strong defensive position which he then failed to break, with overwhelming superiority of numbers backed by the cavalry of both Wheeler & Forrest Jackson does significantly better-- smashing & overrunning the Union defenses. This exposes first Nashville & then E Kentucky as far N as Louisville to major Confederate invasions, incidentally greatly increasing the success of subsequent Confederate recruiting efforts & enlarging each of the 3 Confederate armies E of the Mississippi. E Tennessee & then E Kentucky are secured from Union counter-ops, making Lee's position in Virginia much more secure & enabling him to embark on the Gettysburg campaign with reinforcements transferred from Jackson, & correspondingly greater chances of success. Forrest is restored to his mission of conducting aggressive raids into W Tennessee & W Kentucky while maintaining communications between the two western armies.
Although Gen. Kirby-Smith wouldn't have the strength or the strategic position to maintain himself in SW Missouri, Gen. Jackson would have the strength, the strategic position, & the military skills to maintain himself almost indefinitely in E Tennessee & E Kentucky. With his back to the mountains, covered in part by Lee, & his right flank anchored by the upper Ohio R, he can concentrate most of his forces against Union attacks from the W while threatening S Ohio & SE Indiana with Wheeler's & Forrest's cavalry. This will lead to the transfer of at least some gunboats & reinforcements to the upper Ohio R from Grant's Vicksburg campaign, which will slow Grant's progress although it may not materially derail the campaign itself.
Unlike Gen. Pemberton, who allowed himself to be tricked out of Vicksburg & into fighting in the open, where he had neither the strategic position nor the military skills to win; Gen. Longstreet-- even without the reinforcement of Maj. Gen. Stevenson's 7500-man division-- will be a much more credible opponent. He may disregard Gen. Johnston's order to march out of Vicksburg, or if he obeys it then the results of the Battles of Champion's Hill & Big Black River might be very different. Even if he loses both battles, as Pemberton did, merely by not losing them as badly, & by not suffering the extreme losses incurred by Pemberton, Longstreet will be able to withdraw in good order back into the fortress of Vicksburg, where he'll be able to maintain himself at least thru the end of 1863. It was Pemberton's heavy losses at Champion's Hill & Big Black River that caused the loss of Vicksburg, & not any failure in the defense of Vicksburg itself; & it may have been overconfidence inspired by the presence of those extra 7500 men that led-- at least in part-- to those results.
This proposal takes as its key proposition that the Confederate loss of the war wasn't primarily due to a lack of manpower or resources. While those disadvantages were important, they were compensated by the fact that the Confederacy didn't have to win-- merely to prevent the Union from winning. In failing to achieve that objective, the personal failures of 3 men were critical-- Jefferson Davis, for failing to devise & impose strategy; Bragg, for his repeated failures in Kentucky & Tennessee; & Pemberton, for losing Vicksburg.
What this proposal fails to do is to undertake a detailed analysis of what the Union response would have been to a stronger defense of Vicksburg, coupled with the loss of E Kentucky. An effective response could derail the path to Confederate victory outlined in this paper, but such ops would take time. The loss of E Kentucky alone would set back the Union timetable by a year or so, & in light of rising anti-war sentiment in the North it's doubtful if the Union had that much time to spare.
Absent Bragg's decisive defeat at Chattanooga in late Nov 1863, even if Vicksburg does fall more or less on schedule, & even if Gettysburg still results in a Union victory, the Lincoln re-election campaign won't receive a timely reinvigoration by Sherman's capture of Atlanta in Sep 1864, his opposition will be strengthened by the lack of positive war news, Lincoln will consequently lose the election to Gen. McClellan (as he was widely expected to, including by Lincoln himself, before news arrived of the fall of Atlanta), & McClellan, despite his own statements to the contrary, will come under immense pressure from his own party immediately after his election-- before he's even inaugurated-- to offer to end the war on terms of Southern independence (as he was universally expected to, including by Lincoln himself).
Not by winning the war, but merely by hanging on by a thread & not losing it, the Confederacy achieves its independence.