Another Confederate victory scenario (Pt. #1)

At Shiloh (6-7 Apr '62), Gen. AS Johnston was killed & Gen. PGT Beauregard assumed command of the retreat. On 17 Jun, Beauregard having gone on leave without permission, Pres. Davis replaced him with Gen. B Bragg, who moved his men 770 miles by railroad from Tupelo MS to Chattanooga TN, arriving on 23 Jul. At the end of Jul he met with Maj. Gen. E Kirby-Smith in Chattanooga to decide strategy. Kirby-Smith was not under his command, reporting directly to Richmond, so despite the difference in their ranks their decisions had to be taken jointly. On 21 Aug Bragg crossed the Tennessee R & invaded Kentucky, but on 23 Oct he withdrew thru the Cumberland Gap. On 28 Nov 1863, after another year of indecisive battles & losses, Bragg resigned his command, & 2 days later his resignation was accepted by Pres. Davis.
What if the Confederate gov't had been more decisive, & had used the winter of 1862-63 to devise a strategy for winning the war, to reorganize the command structure, & to replace ineffective Confederate generals?
The Confederacy in 1861-62 was deeply unfortunate in its choice of senior generals. S Cooper was a desk general who would never see field service. By Apr 1862 AS Johnston was dead. Beauregard was insubordinate as well as ineffective, having called off a final night assault on Grant's lines at Shiloh that might have ended the battle with a Confederate victory, & having abandoned the vital rail nexus of Corinth, MS without a fight; & Bragg's appointment would also prove to have been a mistake.
In mid-Oct Sec'y. of War Geo. Randolph* meets with Gen. Cooper, the senior Confederate general on active duty, serving as Adjutant General of the Army, to discuss Bragg's failure to press his advantage at Perryville, his retreat, & his evident intention to evacuate Kentucky entirely. Their discussion ranges over other, related topics, & they conclude that while Pres. Davis is unlikely to listen to their advice, they are duty-bound to offer it. In order to add some weight to their concerns they bring them to the attention of VP AH Stephens, & on 30 Oct 1862, 1 week after Bragg withdraws thru the Cumberland Gap, Pres. Davis reluctantly complies with a request for the 3 of them to meet with him to discuss "the progress of the war".
(* Appointed in Mar 1862, Randolph was known for insisting on strengthening the Confederacy in the S & the W. He became increasingly frustrated with Davis' Virginia-centric approach to the war, & he was dissatisfied with Davis' habit of micromanaging subordinates. Increasingly overcome by the impossible duties of his job, his tuberculosis returned in Sep, his health grew more fragile, & he would resign on 15 Nov 1862. He was noted for the tact with which he usually handled Davis; but this meeting, & the frustration it reflects, amounts to a last-ditch attempt on his part to get Davis' attention before resigning. In the end, he felt that the only way to get Davis to listen was by abandoning tact.)
At their late morning meeting in Davis' office on the 2d floor of the Confederate Executive Mansion, the Brockenbrough house, Stephens, Randolph, & Cooper remind the president that in addition to his failed invasion of Kentucky Bragg can arguably be blamed for the devastating loss of New Orleans, having persuaded Davis to transfer troops away from the Gulf Coast; he is also suffering from rheumatism, dyspepsia, nerves, & severe migraine headaches; & he's losing the trust of his subordinates. Bragg has got to go. On top of that, the Army of Mississippi at Vicksburg is about to come under serious pressure from the Union, being their next logical strategic objective in the W. Someone competent will have to be appointed to that command. Furthermore, Maj. Gen. TC Hindman, in command of the Trans-Mississippi Theatre, has built & organized an effective army, but in doing so he's alienated the people of his dept., who are urgently calling for his replacement. Stephens, Randolph, & Cooper unite in insisting that these issues are best dealt with as part of a coordinated overall strategy for winning the war rather than individually.
Visibly controlling his anger, Pres. Davis thanks his advisors for their suggestions before, over their protests, he dismisses them.
Davis is described by his contemporaries as "overbearing, over-controlling, & overly meddlesome". Postwar historians say that he was preoccupied with detail, unable to delegate responsibility, was unable to get along with people who disagreed with him, & neglected civil matters in favor of the military. A West Point graduate, war veteran, & fmr US Sec'y. of War, he considered his own military qualifications & his knowledge of the skills & personalities of the senior members of the officer's corps to be far superior to those of anyone else (with the possible exception, later in the war, of Gen. Lee); & he had great difficulty listening to advice-- especially military advice-- from anyone. In practice, however, he was a vacillating commander in chief, often unable to make up his mind; he utterly failed either to devise or impose a strategy on the war, pretty much allowing each theatre commander to devise his own strategy; he made several extremely poor appointments for senior military commands, & even after the officers appointed to those positions proved themselves unsuitable Davis often exhibited an extreme reluctance either to fire anyone, or to stick to his principles on the rare occasions when he did. Even Beauregard, fired for cause, was later restored to duty.
Dismissed, Gen. Cooper stands up to leave. VP Stephens remains seated. Cooper ignores & Stephens watches as Sec'y. of War Randolph protests the president's refusal to listen to them. Saying, "I will hear no more about this;" Pres. Davis gets to his feet and walks out of his office, followed by Randolph, who is still speaking. As he starts down the stairs, in response to something Randolph has said, Davis turns his head to make a bitter reply, and his foot misses the next step. Davis tumbles all the way to the foot of the stairs, where he lays oozing blood from a head injury.
By mid-afternoon the president's doctors say that Davis is suffering from numerous bruises, contusions, and a few broken bones, the most serious of which are a broken cervical vertebra & a depressed fracture of the skull. He is in a light coma, the prognosis of him waking up is uncertain, & even if & when he does awaken he'll never walk again. In that event a lengthy period of convalescence will be needed, during which & possibly even afterward he'll be unable to exercise the duties of his office.
An hour later AH Stephens* is sworn in as President of the Confederate States of America, & early that same evening he convenes a meeting of his cabinet, which had already gathered. It is decided to convene a special meeting of the military high command in 10 days' time, to include Sec'y. Randolph & Gen. Cooper as well as Sec'y. of the Navy Stephen Mallory & Gens. Lee & Johnston, the other 2 highest-ranking officers in the Army.
(* By 1862 Stephens had already begun expressing open opposition to the Davis administration, eventually including conscription, impressment, suspension of habeus corpus, various fiscal policies, & his military strategy. Pro-Union, he was also an early advocate of delaying the beginning of the war to allow the South to get ready, later he was a strong advocate of peace, & he was-- as unlikely as this mat seem-- a close personal friend of Pres. Lincoln.)
During these days Stephens considers appointing long-time friend RH Toombs as his VP, but he's advised against having a president & a VP both from Georgia. The same objection applies to Howell Cobb, a prominent leader of the secession movement who'd been considered by the Montgomery Convention for the post of president, so his choice settles on S Carolina Congressman RH Rhett, another prominent secession leader of the secession movement who'd been considered for president. Informed that Randolph will soon resign as Sec'y. of War, Stephens decides to appoint Cobb-- now a veteran brig. gen. with the Army of N. Virginia, recently reassigned as a district commander in Florida-- to that position; while creating the cabinet-level position of Executive Chief of Staff specifically for his friend Toombs. JP Benjamin remains Sec'y. of State, C Memminger as Sec'y. of the Treasury, TH Watts as Atty. Gen., S Mallory as Sec'y. of the Navy, & JH Reagan as Postmaster Gen. Stephens also uses this time to summon Gen. Lee, who has his confidence, to Richmond for private consultations.
On 9 Nov Davis still has not regained consciousness & the invitees convene, including Randolph, who has been persuaded to attend as pretty much his last official act, with Cobb present as an observer. Stephens announces his decision to reorganize the command structure of the Confederate Army. Gen. Cooper will assume the new post of Chief of Staff. Gen. Bragg will be relieved of command & will take over Cooper's old position as Adjutant General. Beauregard will not be restored to duty, despite the fact that his allies in the Confederate Congress are lobbying for precisely that*. Subject to these decisions, Stephens opens the floor for further discussion.
(* Beauregard returns a few months later to Louisiana, where he persuades Gov. Moore to appoint him a brig. gen. of volunteers. By the end of the war he's worked his way back up to the rank of maj. gen.)
Although offered his choice of other assignments, Gen. Lee prefers to remain in command of the more than 50,000-man Army of N Virginia. A consensus is reached to roll Maj. Gen. E Kirby-Smith's 10,000-man Army of E Tennessee into the 30,000-man Army of Tennessee at Chattanooga. It is further decided for this enlarged Army of Tennessee to cooperate under a single theatre command with the fewer than 40,000-man Army of Mississippi based at Vicksburg, & to place Gen. Johnston in overall command of this theatre with great operational & tactical latitude granted to his subordinate army commanders. (Since Beauregard never relieves Maj. Gen. JC Pemberton of command of the Dept. of S Carolina & Georgia, Pemberton doesn't get promoted & he's never sent to command the Army of Mississippi at Vicksburg.)
Pursuant to his previous private discussions with Pres. Stephens, Gen. Lee now offers Lt. Gen. J Longstreet, promoted 9 Oct, to command the Army of Mississippi at Vicksburg; & Lt. Gen. TJ Jackson, promoted Sep '62, to command the Army of Tennessee at Chattanooga. Gen. Johnston isn't happy at getting 2 of Lee's subordinates as commanders of his 2 field armies, but Johnston has no commanders of his own with the seniority & proven track records of Longstreet & Jackson, who are now really too senior to remain in the Army of N Virginia anyway, so that other commands must be found for them. Randolph & Gen. Cooper concur in this reccommendation, & when Pres. Stephens also agrees Johnston has little choice but to accept. In recognition of his brilliant victory at Richmond KY in Aug, it is then decided to send west the army commander who is displaced by merging his Army of E Tennessee with the Army of Tennessee, Maj. Gen. E Kirby-Smith, to assume command of the 11,000-man Army of the West at Van Buren, AR (instead of the well-meaning but incompetent Maj. Gen. TH Holmes).
It was known to the Confederate gov't in Nov 1862 that the Union was about to embark upon a major thrust against Vicksburg. That this thrust would involve the extensive use of river gunboats was also obvious, as shown in the Battles of New Orleans & Memphis. Sec'y. Mallory informs the conference that the Confederacy has no effective answer to these gunboats. The plan therefore devised is for Longstreet to stand on the defensive at Vicksburg, maintaining his rail lines of communication & supply with points E; while Lee conducts a mobile & active defense in the N Virginia Theatre. JH Morgan is promoted to brig. gen. & assigned with a reinforced brigade of cavalry to Longstreet's command, which is also heavily reinforced with artillery & ammunition. J Wheeler's cavalry remains under command of the Army of Tennessee, & recently promoted Brig. Gen. NB Forrest is assigned to use his veteran cavalry brigade to maintain communications between the Armies of Tennessee & Mississippi.* In assuming command of the Army of Tennessee, which will be engaged in offensive ops, Gen. Lee will also permit Gen. Jackson to bring with him the 19 rgts & 5 batteries of artillery of his old division in II Corps, amounting to a reinforcement of some 10,000 to 12,000 men. The Confederate gov't will also not transfer Maj. Gen. CL Stevenson's 7500-man division from Jackson's command to the Army of Mississippi (historically ordered by Pres. Davis on 16 Dec), so the effective strength of the Army of Tennessee will be nearly 60,000 men.
(* In this scenario Forrest's veteran troopers aren't reassigned in Dec 1862, forcing him to start over with green recruits, so his brigade retains its effectiveness into 1863.)
The Confederate spring offensive of 1863 will consist of 2 offensive ops that are intended to draw off Union forces from the Vicksburg campaign.
It is planned for Maj. Gen. E Kirby-Smith to cross the Boston Mtns. in the spring & advance against Springfield, MO; but before Kirby-Smith can begin his campaign, his plans are pre-empted in early Dec 1862 by the southward advance of Brig. Gen. J Blunt in command of 5200 men of the Union Army of the Frontier.
This is just about the time that Kirby-Smith is arriving at Van Buren to assume command. Maj. Gen. TC Hindman has done a good job of reganizing the army & preparing it for offensive ops, so only a few minor changes need to be made. Instead of assigning Brig. Gen. TJ Churchill to defend his right flank at Arkansas Post-- a complete waste of Churchill's considerable talents-- Kirby-Smith sends Hindman to command Arkansas Post & employs Churchill in the offensive. 3000 men from Arkansas Post are transferred to Van Buren to take part in the offensive, along with other reinforcements increasing the strength of the Confederate army from 11,000 to nearly 16,000 men. [1st Div. Brig. Gen. JS Roane (3100 men), 2d Div. Brig. Gen. FA Shoup (3200 men), 3d Div. Brig. Gen. DM Frost (3900 men), 4th Div Brig. Gen. TJ Churchill (3000 men), & 5th Div (cavalry) Brig. Gen. JS Marmaduke (2800 men)]. The troops from Arkansas Post will arrive last, so they'll serve as a fresh reserve. The plan used by Kirby-Smith is similar to the one historically used by Hindman & earlier on the same ground by Van Dorn, except that instead of having his cavalry conduct diversionary attacks from the S while enveloping the Union L flank & carrying out the main attack from the E with his infantry, Kirby-Smith realizes that tying up his cavalry with a diversion from the S would make it unavailable for scouting purposes. He therefore uses Brig. Gen. Frost's poorly equipped & poorly disciplined Missouri infantry to attack from the S, while sending Marmaduke's cavalry ahead with the mission of swinging around behind the Union army & attacking from the N while the main army attacks from the E. Marmaduke is therefore in position to recognize early that Union Gen. Herron (4000 men) is rapidly approaching out of Springfield to reinforce Union Gen. Blunt (5200 men), & Marmaduke can interdict that approach. Marmaduke's 2800 cavalry harass & slow down the approach from the N of Herron's 4000 men, while Kirby-Smith's remaining 7000 men (less the 3000 from Arkansas Post)-- instead of being forced onto the defensive at Prairie Grove & facing a united Union army, as happened to Hindman-- assault & destroy Blunt's 5200 in conjunction with Frost's 3900. Then Kirby-Smith turns on Herron (this time including the 3000 from Arkansas Post) & inflicts another crushing defeat in detail.
The remaining Union troops in Springfield are inadequate to hold the city, which falls in Jan-- about the same time that Gen. Hindman is surrendering to overwhelming odds at Arkansas Post. With his lines of supply & communications now threatened, Kirby-Smith is forced to stand on the defensive at Springfield & to detach troops to conduct screening ops between Little Rock & Arkansas Post. Ultimately, in the summer of 1863, he will be forced back out of Missouri by overwhelmingly superior Union forces that are drawn, at least in part, from reserves & reinforcements that otherwise would have been allocated to Grant's Vicksburg campaign. If Grant remains focused on Vicksburg then Kirby-Smith can maintain himself almost indefinitely in C Arkansas. If not-- if Grant diverts substantial forces against him-- then Kirby-Smith will be forced down into SW Arkansas or even N Louisiana. This, however, will require a direct order, since Grant was determined to capture Vicksburg as the next step in conducting campaigns farther E. Thus Kirby-Smith is allowed to maintain himself in C Arkansas, harassing the rear of Grant's far superior forces at Vicksburg.
The 2d Confederate offensive op planned for the spring of 1863 is by the Army of Tennessee under Lt. Gen. TJ Jackson, reinforced to a strength of nearly 60,000 men, making it by far the strongest army in the Confederacy. But before Jackson can get ready, as with Kirby-Smith, his plans are pre-empted by the winter advance of Gen. Rosecrans' Union Army of the Cumberland, 41,400 strong. As Bragg did historically, Jackson launches a strong surprise attack against Rosecrans' right flank at the Battle of Stones River; but instead of Bragg's mere 35,000 men Jackson now has nearly 60,000, including his own old crack division from N Virginia, & he also calls in Brig. Gen. Forrest's cavalry brigade from the W. Where Bragg won the initial engagement & forced the Union forces into a strong defensive position which he then failed to break, with overwhelming superiority of numbers backed by the cavalry of both Wheeler & Forrest Jackson does significantly better-- smashing & overrunning the Union defenses. This exposes first Nashville & then E Kentucky as far N as Louisville to major Confederate invasions, incidentally greatly increasing the success of subsequent Confederate recruiting efforts & enlarging each of the 3 Confederate armies E of the Mississippi. E Tennessee & then E Kentucky are secured from Union counter-ops, making Lee's position in Virginia much more secure & enabling him to embark on the Gettysburg campaign with reinforcements transferred from Jackson, & correspondingly greater chances of success. Forrest is restored to his mission of conducting aggressive raids into W Tennessee & W Kentucky while maintaining communications between the two western armies.
Although Gen. Kirby-Smith wouldn't have the strength or the strategic position to maintain himself in SW Missouri, Gen. Jackson would have the strength, the strategic position, & the military skills to maintain himself almost indefinitely in E Tennessee & E Kentucky. With his back to the mountains, covered in part by Lee, & his right flank anchored by the upper Ohio R, he can concentrate most of his forces against Union attacks from the W while threatening S Ohio & SE Indiana with Wheeler's & Forrest's cavalry. This will lead to the transfer of at least some gunboats & reinforcements to the upper Ohio R from Grant's Vicksburg campaign, which will slow Grant's progress although it may not materially derail the campaign itself.
Unlike Gen. Pemberton, who allowed himself to be tricked out of Vicksburg & into fighting in the open, where he had neither the strategic position nor the military skills to win; Gen. Longstreet-- even without the reinforcement of Maj. Gen. Stevenson's 7500-man division-- will be a much more credible opponent. He may disregard Gen. Johnston's order to march out of Vicksburg, or if he obeys it then the results of the Battles of Champion's Hill & Big Black River might be very different. Even if he loses both battles, as Pemberton did, merely by not losing them as badly, & by not suffering the extreme losses incurred by Pemberton, Longstreet will be able to withdraw in good order back into the fortress of Vicksburg, where he'll be able to maintain himself at least thru the end of 1863. It was Pemberton's heavy losses at Champion's Hill & Big Black River that caused the loss of Vicksburg, & not any failure in the defense of Vicksburg itself; & it may have been overconfidence inspired by the presence of those extra 7500 men that led-- at least in part-- to those results.
This proposal takes as its key proposition that the Confederate loss of the war wasn't primarily due to a lack of manpower or resources. While those disadvantages were important, they were compensated by the fact that the Confederacy didn't have to win-- merely to prevent the Union from winning. In failing to achieve that objective, the personal failures of 3 men were critical-- Jefferson Davis, for failing to devise & impose strategy; Bragg, for his repeated failures in Kentucky & Tennessee; & Pemberton, for losing Vicksburg.
What this proposal fails to do is to undertake a detailed analysis of what the Union response would have been to a stronger defense of Vicksburg, coupled with the loss of E Kentucky. An effective response could derail the path to Confederate victory outlined in this paper, but such ops would take time. The loss of E Kentucky alone would set back the Union timetable by a year or so, & in light of rising anti-war sentiment in the North it's doubtful if the Union had that much time to spare.
Absent Bragg's decisive defeat at Chattanooga in late Nov 1863, even if Vicksburg does fall more or less on schedule, & even if Gettysburg still results in a Union victory, the Lincoln re-election campaign won't receive a timely reinvigoration by Sherman's capture of Atlanta in Sep 1864, his opposition will be strengthened by the lack of positive war news, Lincoln will consequently lose the election to Gen. McClellan (as he was widely expected to, including by Lincoln himself, before news arrived of the fall of Atlanta), & McClellan, despite his own statements to the contrary, will come under immense pressure from his own party immediately after his election-- before he's even inaugurated-- to offer to end the war on terms of Southern independence (as he was universally expected to, including by Lincoln himself).
Not by winning the war, but merely by hanging on by a thread & not losing it, the Confederacy achieves its independence.
 
Another Confederate victory scenario (Pt. #2)

Immediately following his election as the 17th President of the United States, GB McClellan comes under intense pressure from peace elements in Congress, from among the governors, the newspapers, & from influence groups in the Democratic Party to bring an end to "Mr. Lincoln's war". Shortly afterward he receives a request for safeconduct from the Confederate president-elect for an unofficial peace delegation. By mid-Jan, realizing that ending the war-- even on terms of Southern independence-- will be hailed as great statesmanship by a majority of the Northern newspapers & the people who read them, he receives the Confederate peace delegation & informal negotiations begin. (Since neither McClellan nor his Confederate counterpart have yet been inaugurated they have no authority to conduct such negotiations, which is why they're informal.)
The War for Southern Independence ends with an armistice announced by Pres. McClellan as his 1st official act on Inauguration Day, 4 Mar 1865, & confirmed by a treaty ratified on 9 Apr 1865 that recognizes the independence of the Southern Confederacy. The boundaries of the Confederacy include Virginia (less W Virginia), all of Tennessee, Arkansas, & Indian Terr., & points S.
Kentucky presents a problem, as E Kentucky-- under Confederate occupation-- is heavily populated by Union sympathizers, while the reverse is true in W Kentucky, which is under Union occupation. A solution is found in conducting a county-by-county plebiscite in both Kentucky & Missouri, which has long been under Union occupation although roughly half the population supports the Confederacy. For the most part E Kentucky votes to remain in the Union while W Kentucky votes to join the Confederacy, while W & S Missouri vote to join the Confederacy & the rest of the State joins the Union. In Kentucky the Union & Confederate armies exchange occupation zones.
The W boundary of the Confederacy is formed by the Rio Grande, passing thru C New Mexico Terr., the northern limits of which are further defined by the Cimmaron & Purgatoire Rs. These boundaries are controversial mainly in Kentucky, Missouri, & Kansas, Kansas ending up virtually severed from the rest of the Union; but they're accepted as one of the prices of ending the war. All of the other W territories remain in the Union.
Another major problem the treaty negotiators encounter is the status of New Orleans, captured by Union forces in Apr 1862. Cities like Norfolk & Mobile are returned to Confederate sovereignty with no difficulty, but the Union is reluctant to give up such an important port as New Orleans that they've won by conquest, possession of which is essential to their midwestern trade; while public opinion won't allow the Confederacy to end the war with New Orleans still in Union hands. A solution is found in declaring New Orleans to be a free port under joint Union-Confederate sovereignty, governed by a civil commission with 2 members apiece appointed by the Union & Confederate gov'ts & 1 elected by the people of New Orleans, this election subject to approval by a three-quarters majority of the other commissioners. The peace treaty also provides for the immediate resumption of full diplomatic relations, establishes the neutrality of the Mississippi River as a trade route, & declares New Orleans to be a free port for goods being shipped from the North. These provisions prove to be extremely unpopular in Louisiana, which threatens to secede from the Confederacy if they're carried out; but the Southern inability to dislodge Union troops by force compels Louisiana to acquiesce. New Orleans begins to prosper as never before.
McClellan & his VP, GH Pendleton, are re-elected in 1868 to a 2d term, & in 1872 he's succeeded by fmr Pennsylvania governor Andrew Curtin. In these different postwar circumstances Curtin hasn't switched to the Democratic Party, so he runs as a Republican with WH Seward (fmr Sec'y. of State in the Lincoln cabinet) as his candidate for VP. When Seward dies a month before the election it succeeds in tipping a close race in Curtin's favor; & even after his inauguration-- preceded by the example of James Tyler, who succeeded to the presidency & governed without a VP-- he appoints no successor VP. Curtin serves 2 consecutive terms thru 1880, in his 2d election campaign (1876) with fmr Ohio governor Rutherford B Hayes as his running mate.
Worn down by the rigors of fighting a war he opposed, forced to impose conscription, which he had also opposed; & oppressed by the opposition of several prominent Confederate governors, many members of the Confederate Congress, & the failures of his multiple peace initiatives, AH Stephens decides not to run for re-election. In a hard-fought campaign his VP, RH Rhett, is narrowly defeated for the Confederate presidency by Davis' old arch-enemy PGT Beauregard, whose self-promotion & charisma finally earn him the reward they deserve. Knowing well how to shade the truth, Beauregard proves to be a far better president than he ever was a general, he gains (undeserved) much of the credit for ending the war, & he goes down in history as a great statesman. His VP is fmr S Carolina governor ML Bonham, who served as a general under Beauregard's command in the 1st Manassas campaign. In 1868 they're both re-elected to a 2d term, & in 1872 they're succeeded by fmr Virginia governor Wm. Smith & JP Benjamin (fmr Atty. Gen., acting Sec'y. of War, & Sec'y of State in the Davis & Stephens cabinets). Smith & Benjamin serve 2 terms thru 1880; & whatever the politics of the Beauregard/Bonham administration, both Smith & Benjamin are at least willing to contemplate alternatives to slavery.
During the McClellan & Beauregard administrations (1864-72) the Union-Confederate border is militarized, although not very heavily. The US flag is redesigned to show many fewer stars. By the end of the Curtin & Smith administrations (1872-80) the border is virtually demilitarized.
With the issue of secession having been decided by the war in its favor, 1st New England in the 1870s (over trade issues) & 2d the fmr Northwest Terr. in the 1880s (over ineffective federal negotiation of navigation issues on the St. Lawrence R) threaten to secede from the Union. Both threats are successfully dealt with short of either secession or war, but the imperial nature of the US federal gov't is fatally weakened.
On the other hand, victory in the war greatly enhances & strengthens the centralization of the Confederate gov't, which paradoxically was established only to ensure the rights of sovereign States.
Early in 1866 negotiations begin between the Confederate & Union gov'ts over the future of the Navajo people, interned since 1864 at Bosque Redondo in E New Mexico Terr., although their homeland was in Arizona Terr. By 1866 it is becoming evident that for many reasons the Bosque Redondo experiment is a failure, & the Confederacy wants to relocate the Navajos back to Arizona Terr.; but in light of their differing policies regarding Mexico the Union refuses to consider it. Another solution must be found.
At the end of the Civil War, with the Confederacy in possession of Texas, the weakened Union is not initially in a position to offer much help to the Juarista rebels of Mexico. This dramatically slows their progress towards forcing the Emperor Maximilian out of Mexico City. Instead of Feb 1867, it's early Jun before he fortifies himself in Queretaro. Since the Confederacy has won the Civil War, Maximilian hasn't established refugee colonies in Mexico for displaced Confederate veterans; but by the spring of 1866 informally organized Texas Ranger cavalry units begin crossing the border. Since the Juarista rebels are in possession of much of N Mexico, the Ranger units skirmish mainly with these Juaristas. About the time that Queretaro comes under siege these informal, para-civilian Texas Ranger units are joined by elements of the Texas State Militia. Texas policy in this regard has been influenced by a vague desire for territorial acquisitions at the expense of an old enemy, a fatally weakened Mexico; but political & military realities lead Texas to conclude a military assistance agreement with the imperial gov't. By the end of 1867 Juarista retaliatory raids into Texas lead the Confederacy itself, motivated largely by military adventurism & jingoistic considerations, into an effort to secure its S border by propping up the tottering imperial regime, while the Union sends shipments of arms & ammunition to the Juaristas by sea. By mid-1868 Maximilian is back on his throne in Mexico City, having lost some of his liberal ideals, & he is now employing substantial numbers of Confederate mercenary cavalry to hunt down the poorly armed Juaristas. Maximilian accepts the existence of an undefined "special relationship" with the CSA, using his good offices with the gov'ts of Europe to improve Confederate relations in those quarters. The Navajos are also ceded huge land grants S of Union-held Arizona Terr., between El Paso & Agua Prieta, which remain under Mexican sovereignty.
(In the circumstances of a Mexican civil war the Confederacy can do what it never could have done otherwise, which is to invade & not conquer-- but tip the scales in favor of the otherwise losing side. This effort is led by civilian adventurers who happen to be hardened veterans of the late War for Southern Independence, who are more than capable of spearheading this process, & who enjoy the political connections to draw first the Texas State gov't, & later the gov't of the Confederacy into their support. Among other things, the Confederacy benefits by the Imperial Mexican gov't hiring on a more or less permanent basis a small corps of Confederate mercenary cavalry to help police the country. This enables the Confederacy to maintain & employ a larger army than would otherwise be the case.)
In 1868, when Carlos Manuel de Cespedes ignites a rebellion against Spain that historically became known as the 10 Years' War, the Confederacy recognizes the de Cespedes gov't while the Union does not. In late 1869 the Confederacy sends military assistance to the Cuban rebellion in the form of a corps of Civil War veterans, while the Union stands neutral. In a strikingly novel move, about 10-20% of this corps is comprised of black Confederate soldiers, which makes a profound impression on the predominantly black Cubans. By mid-1871 the war is over, Spain withdraws, & Cuba becomes a sovereign nation. Like Mexico, the new Cuban gov't recognizes an undefined "special relationship" with the CSA.
(Once again, in the circumstances of a Cuban civil war the Confederacy can do what it never could have done otherwise, which is to invade & not conquer-- but tip the scales in favor of the otherwise winning side. In the historical timeline, while de Cespedes didn't win the decisive victory described in this scenario, he did force a treaty granting greater autonomy to Cuba. Once again, the Confederacy signs a treaty with Cuba allowing it to station-- & Cuba to pay for-- a reinforced division of troops there with substantial artillery to help defend the territorial integrity of Cuba. However, in light of the slave revolts in Haiti earlier in the century & the unhappy French experience in trying to govern that neighhboring island, the Confederacy wants no part of it or the rest of the Greater Antilles, which are too distant-- although if the British were to withdraw then the Bahamas & Bermuda would be tempting. Unlike the war in Mexico, these efforts in Cuba are conducted as a deliberate Confederate policy to protect the S Confederate borders & to acquire land for the resettlement program-- see below.)
Absent the string of Union victories thru 1863 & into 1864, the Confederate Congress never enacts its authorization for the gov't to raise 300,000 black Confederate troops, so Pres. Davis never makes his speech-- "As between the loss of independence & the loss of slavery, we assume that every patriot will freely give up the latter-- give up the negro slave rather than be a slave himself..." However, an examination of period newspapers, Union battlefield reports, published eyewitness accounts, prisoner of war records from Camp Douglas, Camp Morton, Point Lookout, & elsewhere; pension records, & other sources reveals the presence of an estimated ~60,000 armed black troops, both slave & free, serving & fighting in the Confederate armies, many of them as early as 1861. This is thoroughly attested in the writings of Frederick Douglass, Horace Greeley, Union Gen. H Halleck, Confederate Gen. NB Forrest, & many others. In June 1861 Tennessee became the first Southern State to legislate the use of black soldiers. In contrast to the North, where blacks served in segregated units, the vast majority of black Confederates were integrated in predominantly white units. Confederate Gen. NB Forrest in fact had between 40 & 75 blacks, both free & slave, riding with him from 1862 thru the end of the war. Afterward Forrest said of these men, "...these boys stayed with me...& better Confederates did not live." (In contrast to the ~60,000 under arms, an estimated ~180,000 blacks served in logistical support roles in Virginia alone.)
It is hard to imagine the reintegration of ~60,000 armed black veterans into a slave economy. Moreover, the shared experiences of war & the establishment of cameraderie between white & black soldiers, as well as the civic gratitude of Confederate cities (like Richmond, Petersburg, & Lynchburg) where blacks volunteered en masse to defend their cities against Northern aggression, would ease the way towards emancipation & the eventual outlawing of slavery. This process would be further advanced by the anti-slavery attitudes of Southern heroes like Rob't E. Lee. 5 years prior to the war, in 1856, Lee wrote in a letter to his wife, "...
slavery as an institution, is a moral & political evil in any Country. It is useless to expatiate on its disadvantages." In testimony before Congress in 1866 he said, "Everyone with whom I associate expresses kind feelings towards the freedmen. They wish to see them get on in the world, & particularly to take up some occupation for a living..." On 1 May 1870 he said, "So far from engaging in a war to perpetuate slavery, I am rejoiced that slavery is abolished. I believe it will be greatly for the interest of the South. So fully am I satisfied of this that I would have cheerfully lost all that I have lost by the war, & have suffered all that I have suffered to have this object attained."
Black Confederate veterans are emancipated by act of the Confederate Congress in 1867, & each certified veteran is awarded 40 acres of land & a mule, although not the right to vote. In 1869 emancipation is extended to any black who can be shown to have labored for 90 days or longer on fortifications, logistics, or other non-combatant works to advance the cause of Confederate victory, although non-combatants are not initially given the 40 acres or the mule. These 2 laws so reduce the number of slaves in the South that many plantations are forced to hire free laborers, almost all of them black, to work alongside their dwindling number of slaves. As the habit & the advantages of paying free black laborers become entrenched, the disadvantages of the disapproval of major trading partners like Britain, France, & the United States become evident, & fmr Confederate Sec'y. of State (now VP) Benjamin is able to express these disadvantages to the Confederate Congress, Congress in 1879 enacts a 10-year program of gradual compensated emancipation which falters somewhat in the execution, requiring a 5-year extension. By 1894, a mere 29 years after the end of the war, slavery is no longer legal in the South. (Full civil rights, however, are withheld for another 50-100 years, which is a record not too different than in the historical timeline.)
In 1868, with the establishment of the special relationship with Mexico, the Confederacy begins awarding Mexican land grants along the Rio Grande to its emancipated blacks.* Beginning in 1871, with the establishment of the special relationship with Cuba, this practice is extended to that island. The practice of awarding land grants is extended to black veterans of the Mexican & Cuban campaigns, while similar land grants in the Southern States begin to be awarded to white veterans as well. Beginning in 1879, with the enactment of gradual compensated emancipation & extending well into the 20th Century, blacks who choose either to return to Africa or to emigrate to either Mexico, Cuba, or elsewhere are paid a bounty. In addition to the cash bounty, those choosing to resettle in either Mexico or Cuba can still receive the 40 acres of land & a mule that were originally offered merely as pensions to black Confederate veterans.
(* Mexico is willing to accept black, & to a lesser extent Navajo settlers, mainly to take over land expropriated from the Juarista rebels, to acquire new settlers who won't be inclined to rebel, to improve relations with the Confederacy by creating a buffer zone of land grants under Mexican sovereignty, but held by Confederate sympathizers, between the 2 nations; & therefore to increase its tax base. The imperial gov't is persuaded to accept Navajo resettlement mainly because the Navajo are among the most advanced, industrious, & peaceful of all the Indian tribes; & the resettlement program for both races works. The situation in Cuba is very different, since Cuba has a larger population with less land; but the argument here is that Confederate blacks are industrious, peaceful, will integrate well with Cuban blacks, won't be inclined to revolt, & therefore will represent a stabilizing influence on the island while increasing its tax base. The argument about integrating well turns out to be the opposite of the truth, but otherwise the experiment is at least somewhat successful.)
Between 1865 & 1871 the recent experience of war, followed by divergent policies regarding Mexico & Cuba, lead to tensions between the Union & the Confederacy. After 1871, however, the scars & animosities of the war begin to heal faster. The Southern need for goods manufactured in the North, coupled with Northern requirements for Southern cotton, tobacco, rice, & other agricultural products ensures the rapid resumption of trade. Many Southern students either resume or begin their studies in Northern colleges. Absent the Yankee occupation of much of the South & absent Reconstruction, the South preserves little institutional animosity towards the North. Most of the postwar hatred is 1-sided, on the part of Northern abolitionists against the Southern institution of slavery; but as slavery gradually ends even this issue fades. By 1894, to all intents & purposes, the issue is dead. Civil rights activism is still 60-70 years in the future, & its impetus & overall effects will be vastly reduced by the reduced population of blacks still living in the Confederacy. In contrast to the historical timeline, in this scenario civil rights problems are almost entirely confined to the North.
Absent the war-devastation of much of the South, absent Reconstruction, with the early & full resumption of trade & diplomatic relations, with the Mississippi & New Orleans established as a free-trade corridor, with special trade relationships with Mexico & Cuba, & with improved trade relations with Europe thru the good offices of the Emperor Maximilian, Southern cities begin their economic renaissance much earlier than historically. Absent the Reconstruction-sponsored reign of terror of fmr black slaves over their fmr white masters across much of the South, there is little or no Southern animosity towards the black freedmen, as well as towards Yankee carpetbaggers-- who in this timeline do not exist. In place of all this, Northern manufacturing industries intending to expand are drawn to the South, with its more favorable business tax incentives, less developed infrastructure, & lower wages. By c1900 manufacturing industry is well-established in all of the 10 largest Southern cities, & in many of the next-tier cities as well. With much-reduced reliance on large-scale agriculture, the South begins much earlier to derive much of its income from manufacturing.
(With a peace advocate like Stephens in the Confederate presidency things definitely don't have to turn out this way; but knowing himself to be a nonmilitary man Stephens is more likely to listen to advice, & his closest & best sources of advice in this scenario will be Gen. Lee & Lee's fmr subordinate general, Cobb, who will come to act as a conduit for Lee's advice to reach Stephens. If the peace treaty doesn't contain provisions for the neutrality of the Mississippi R & New Orleans to serve as a neutral port then it's doubtful that peace will happen at all, as a South without New Orleans is unthinkable, & the Midwest needed the Mississippi & New Orleans to ship their goods internationally. With the Mississippi R & New Orleans neutralized, though, prosperity takes root much more quickly thruout the South.)
Absent the issues of Cuban independence & the sinking of the Maine, the Spanish-American War is completely avoided. The 1st serious foreign policy test of both the Union & Confederate gov'ts comes in 1914, with the beginning of WW1.
 
Another Confederate victory scenario (Pt #3)

With the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Serbia in 1914 the Austro-Hungarian gov't still issues an ultimatum to the gov't of Serbia which is ignored, Austria-Hungary still invades Serbia, Germany still invades Holland & Belgium, & Russia still invades Germany.
In 1915, finding that they have many issues in common, the Union & Confederate gov'ts begin high-level talks to coordinate their foreign policies relative to the war. In particular they are both very concerned about the security of their maritime trade from attacks by German submarines, & a treaty of naval cooperation is 1 of the 1st signed. However, the special relationship existing between Mexico & the Confederacy, the resettlement of large numbers of Confederate-sympathizing blacks in N Mexico*, & the fact that regaining Mexican territories lost in war against the US would now mean fighting against 2 foreign nations instead of only 1, means that Arthur Zimmermann never sends his telegram offering German assistance to Mexico if Mexico will go to war against the US. Absent the Zimmermann telegram, there is no galvanizing cause for war between the 2 American nations & Germany.
(* Angered at the loss of life at the hands of black Confederate soldiers at Manassas, on 13 Aug 1861 the New Bern Weekly Press editorialized: "The war has dispelled one delusion of the abolitionists. The Negroes regard them as enemies instead of friends. No insurrection has occurred in the South-- no important stampede of slaves has evinced their desire for freedom. On the contrary, they have jeered at & insulted our troops, have readily enlisted in the rebel army, & on Sunday, at Manassas, shot down our men with as much alacrity as if abolitionism had never existed." In light of news stories like this & the willingness of blacks, both slave & free, to volunteer for the Army, & for the defense of Southern cities, the attachment of Southern blacks to the Confederate cause can hardly be doubted. To believe otherwise is political correctness masquerading as history.)
Aside from the Zimmermann telegram, the other main cause of the US entry into WW1 was the sinking of 7 merchant ships between Jan & Apr 1917 by German submarines; but with N America divided into 2 nations 5 of those ships are now Union & 2 are Confederate. The provocations remain well below the threshhold of war for the remainder of 1917. Furthermore, the relative weakness of the Union & Confederate gov'ts, both diplomatically & militarily, makes it important for them to act together in order to achieve any serious effect on the course of the war; but coordinating their policies & their actions takes additional time.
Outcome #1-- In light of their relative weakness & the low level of provocations, neither the Union nor the Confederate gov't declares war.
Outcome #2-- The Confederate gov't doesn't declare war but, somewhat later than in the historical timeline because of the reduced level of provocations, the Union does. The Union would be able to get fewer troops to Europe before the Armistice, but their impact on the outcome would be somewhat less than in the historical timeline.
Outcome #3-- Because of delays imposed by coordinating their efforts, not until Jan 1918 do the Union & Confederate gov'ts concur in asking their respective Congresses for declarations of war (enacted in Feb), & not for another 2-3 months after that will both Congresses finish debating & passing their respective Selective Service Acts. Very few Union or Confederate troops would be able to get to Europe before the Armistice, & their impact would be negligible.
As in the historical timeline, in all 3 of the above scenarios Germany anticipates that its resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in Jan 1917 will bring about declarations of war by the Union gov't, the Confederates, or both. They therefore conduct aggressive offensives from 21 Mar thru 20 Jul 1918 to achieve gains before significant American troops can arrive. Absent American forces in all timelines, these German offensives achieve roughly their historical results. By Aug the German High Command realizes that the war can no longer be won, & with the failure of these last-ditch offensives the Union & Confederate gov'ts realize it too. Preparations for war in all 3 timelines wind down, no American troops get sent to Europe, & on 11 Nov Germany surrenders.
Even if Woodrow Wilson does manage to get elected President of the US, there will be no 14 Points. No League of Nations. Europe will negotiate an end to their war without American involvement, but the provisions of the Versailles Treaty will fall just as heavily on Germany, & will contribute just as much to a renewal of war a generation later.
The 1 positive outcome of WW1 for the Union & Confederate gov'ts in all 3 timelines is the establishment of intergovernmental working groups from the middle to the highest levels to coordinate the policies & actions of both gov'ts regarding international trade, international relations, & war. By the late 1930s these working groups include Canadian, Mexican, & Cuban observers. They coordinate the policies & actions of all 5 gov'ts thru 1941, during the run-up to WW2, & then comes the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
As in the historical timeline, the Japanese attack is occasioned by US sanctions against Japan for its role in China, & is not in any way directed against the Confederacy; so, when the Union declares war, the Confederacy initially stands neutral. As in the historical timeline, the Union declaration of war against Japan is quickly met by a declaration of war against the US from Germany. As 1942 draws on, however, it becomes evident that because of the close trade relationship heretofor established between the Union & the Confederacy, Confederate neutrality in a war in which the Union is involved is infeasible. Confederate ships passing between Confederate & Union ports are sunk by German U-boats. Belligerent nations that are at war with the Union have to curtail their trade & other relationships with the Confederacy because of the risk that any goods sold to the Confederacy will end up in Union hands. In practice this amounts to embargo. By mid-1942 the Confederacy therefore begins preparing for war, & a declaration of war comes late in the year.
The Confederacy has no large navy with which to participate in the Pacific campaign, but it does have a small but well-trained army. By the end of 1942 or early 1943 the Confederacy therefore begins sending troops to N Africa & Europe, leaving the Union to fight the Japanese. The belated arrival of Confederate troops in N Africa (Feb-May 1943 instead of Nov 1942) slows the progress of the British 8th Army offensive somewhat, since the Afrika Korps is no longer confronted with the spectre of American troops cutting off their retreat; but the overwhelming superiority of the British 8th Army ensures that the end results are roughly the same. By the time significant Confederate troops land in N Africa & reach Tunisia in mid-1943 (Apr-Jul?), the Afrika Korps is bottled up there. The campaigns in N Africa, Sicily, Italy, & S France are therefore borne primarily by Confederate forces; while the campaign in the Pacific, the D-Day invasion, & the offensive across N France & into Germany are borne mainly by the Union. The invasions of Sicily & Italy are delayed by a few months, but with major German reverses on the Russian Front the end results are roughly the same. D-Day & the rest of the events in the ETO occur more or less on schedule.
By the end of WW2 the Union & the Confederacy are as close allies as if the War for Southern Independence had never happened, much as the relationship between the US & Britain has evolved since the American Revolution. Tensions between the West & the USSR, however, are unaffected by the changes in this timeline, so with the formation of NATO, both the Union & the Confederacy are founding members.
 
Sorry about any difficulty in reading this, but when I transfer text from my word processor to the site my indents show up in edit mode, but they vanish when I post.
 
Although offered his choice of other assignments, Gen. Lee prefers to remain in command of the more than 50,000-man Army of N Virginia. A consensus is reached to roll Maj. Gen. E Kirby-Smith's 10,000-man Army of E Tennessee into the 30,000-man Army of Tennessee at Chattanooga. It is further decided for this enlarged Army of Tennessee to cooperate under a single theatre command with the fewer than 40,000-man Army of Mississippi based at Vicksburg, & to place Gen. Johnston in overall command of this theatre with great operational & tactical latitude granted to his subordinate army commanders. (Since Beauregard never relieves Maj. Gen. JC Pemberton of command of the Dept. of S Carolina & Georgia, Pemberton doesn't get promoted & he's never sent to command the Army of Mississippi at Vicksburg.)
General Joseph E. Johnston did not return to active duty from his wound at Seven Pines until the very end of December 1862 and therefore could not take command when you appoint him inTTL.
Pursuant to his previous private discussions with Pres. Stephens, Gen. Lee now offers Lt. Gen. J Longstreet, promoted 9 Oct, to command the Army of Mississippi at Vicksburg; & Lt. Gen. TJ Jackson, promoted Sep '62, to command the Army of Tennessee at Chattanooga. Gen. Johnston isn't happy at getting 2 of Lee's subordinates as commanders of his 2 field armies, but Johnston has no commanders of his own with the seniority & proven track records of Longstreet & Jackson, who are now really too senior to remain in the Army of N Virginia anyway, so that other commands must be found for them. Randolph & Gen. Cooper concur in this reccommendation, & when Pres. Stephens also agrees Johnston has little choice but to accept. In recognition of his brilliant victory at Richmond KY in Aug, it is then decided to send west the army commander who is displaced by merging his Army of E Tennessee with the Army of Tennessee, Maj. Gen. E Kirby-Smith, to assume command of the 11,000-man Army of the West at Van Buren, AR (instead of the well-meaning but incompetent Maj. Gen. TH Holmes).
Both Jackson and Longstreet were Joe Johnston's subordinates before they were Lee's and he rated them both as his most trusted and able subordinates by the time of Seven Pines. He would never object to getting them under his command and would be overjoyed to have them.

Lee, however, would object to losing them because he didn't have that many possible replacements at that time. Without Jackson and Longstreet he could all on Ewell, D.H. Hill or possibly A.P. Hill but each of them had their negative points - Ewell being unimmaginative, D.H. Hill being tactless and confrontational and A.P. Hill having indeterminate health that often made him unfit for duty.
 
In order for us to comment on it, we have to be able to read it.

After just skimming through the avalanche, I can see there are a lot of comments to be made. The idea that a POD in 1862 would result in the D-Day invasion of Normandy occurring "more or less on schedule", let alone the idea that an essentially unchanged WW1, WW2, USSR, and NATO show up, isn't going to sit very well around here.

My advice is to first cut your posts into smaller, more manageable chunks and then post the first one alone. For example, lay out your prologue of Jeff Davis falling down the stairs plus the CSA cabinet and policy changes which immediately result.

Next, allow time for people to comment on the changes you've effected - because there are going to be comments on and problems with some of your suggestions - before you post the second small part.

Once the comments on the first part slow, post the second part, allow time for comments, post the third part, and rinse, shampoo, and lather your way through the whole thing.

I'll caution you in advance that this time line is going to be shredded. Apart from the uncounted butterflies you've murdered in your not-so-alternate history, the US Civil War and both World Wars are "hot topics" here and the levels of expertise in each is mind boggling.

You may want to read a few successful time lines before posting you own.

Good luck!
 
I think the confederacy lost the war for the start.
if first mistake was shutting it ports to exports of cotton in a effort to get Britain and France join the war on their side.
This meant they had no money coming in to pay for importing weapons or other war material.
Britain and France were never going to join the confederacy in a war against the union as they depend too much on grain for American and would have faced large food shortage without union grain.

The lost of New Orleans and the union navy taking control of the Mississippi River along with the union blockade of the southern ports was what sealed the fate of the confederacy.

The lack of a large Confederate States Navy to keep the sea lanes open for import export and defended New Orleans and the Mississippi River starved the confederacy of the resources in need to survive.
 
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