Anglo-American Wars of the 19th Century

[TFSmith121]

Reydan - Thanks for the Hansard link; I've found some of the

As a Brit who watches a lot of these timelines get written but rarely comments on them I'd like to make a few constructive points.

Firstly, a link: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/
AH.com is very good at sourcing stats and army lists and orders of battle for timelines but often handwaves the motivation of the combatants. Hansard is a record of everything said in Parliament from 1803 onwards. You can search it by words, TRENT for example, and see how British politicians at the time felt.

Secondly, some related points:

1. Whilst I don't think a US-UK rivalry in the 19th and early 20th century is impossible by any means, you've got to think about the changing governments in both countries. Whilst grudges do develop they also dissolve very quickly on the international arena as the demands of a changing world affect changing Governments. Any good timeline can't simply rely on a "well they've hated each other since x" argument but needs to keep such a rivalry alive and kicking.

2. Britain was heavily invested in the US in this period, leading to substantial business lobbies on both sides of the Atlantic that would not be in favour of the disruption of war. If your plan is to butterfly these then you need to be aware of the serious knock-ons this will have. Particularly for American manufacturing.

3. Be aware of Britain's European focus. Remember that, OTL, British foreign policy was always more closely focused on the balance of power in Europe. The USA will never be their sole point of attention and a good timeline would need to cover events in Europe as well.

4. I've seen a lot of timelines get stuck on the idea that Britain would do well on the coast of the USA but would have limited success inland. I'm sure this would be a realistic assessment, but sometimes these threads seem to imply that Britain has no war aims at all beyond attacking seaboard cities in the vague hope America gives up. British military and political officials were well prepared in terms of planning - I'm not saying these plans would succeed but a good timeline would need to acknowledge they were there.

5. Finally, you need to think about why Britain would stay in the conflict. With an ocean between them and the most powerful fleet in the world, what is to stop Britain taking its ball and going home? Canada? As posters have pointed out, Britain never assumed it could hold onto Canada in a serious war with the USA so is unlikely to through everything into saving this colonial territory.

Reydan - Thanks for the Hansard link; I've found some of the relevant debates elsewhere, but the searchable link is very useful. Entertainingly enough, using it and the "most relevant" filter, the first three it yielded were:

• In 1863, a Seymour asks how dispatches got from the UK to the British forces at Vancouver (Island, so Maitland et al); a Paget responds they went to Panama (presumably across the Isthmus by the PRR) and then north to the British commanders by "American steamer."
• In 1882, a Stanley asks if the government can justify the seizure of passengers off a neutral mail steamer at Alexandria, absent a declaration of war or blockade, in contrast to the Palmerston reaction to the Trent incident; the answer is, well, those were Egyptian troops (in support of the khedive, and thus allied with the British against Urabi), and not British, so the government didn't care, apparently.
• In February of 1862, a petition from residents of Manchester is presented by (yet another) Stanley requesting a inquiry into the law respecting the Right of Search, and expressing the opinion that the seizure of Mason and Slidell (from the Trent) was, far from being an outrage, actually justified by the law of nations, and that British protests over Trent amounted to Britain abandoning the right of search;

Interesting stuff.

1. Good points; there is something to be said for the realities that unlike in the US, there's not going to be any Reconstruction in the aftermath of an Anglo-American conflict in the 1860s; the liklihood of various bloody shirts being waved in domestic politics is significant.

2. True; one of the interesting elements of this are the American entrepreneurs (Maxim at one extreme; Selfridge at the other) who made their way to Britain in the late Ninteeenth Century. Ripples across both nation's economies.

3. Very true, and a point that has been made in BROS. Britons are Europeans, after all, as much as some might wish to deny it.

4. True; according to Bourne, Britain's war plans amounted to a two front offensive into the US, overland from Lower Canada into northern NY and from New Brunswick/Nova Scotia by sea into Maine. These fronts are separated by some 700 miles, and given the realities of how Britain prosecuted (as an example) the Crimean campaign, which is roughly comparable to the invasion of Maine, and the 1880-81 operations in South Africa, it's a fair question how well these plans would be executed by the British military of the period.

5. Definitely true. Britain did not mobilize for a continental war on the scale of the American Civil War until 1914, arguably, and the entirety of BNA was, as stated multiple times by British politicians at various levels, was not a major revenue producer for the British economy.

Again, thanks for the searchable link. Very helpful.

Best,

 

[EnglishCanuck]

As a Brit who watches a lot of these timelines get written but rarely comments on them I'd like to make a few constructive points.

Firstly, a link: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/
AH.com is very good at sourcing stats and army lists and orders of battle for timelines but often handwaves the motivation of the combatants. Hansard is a record of everything said in Parliament from 1803 onwards. You can search it by words, TRENT for example, and see how British politicians at the time felt.

Secondly, some related points:

1. Whilst I don't think a US-UK rivalry in the 19th and early 20th century is impossible by any means, you've got to think about the changing governments in both countries. Whilst grudges do develop they also dissolve very quickly on the international arena as the demands of a changing world affect changing Governments. Any good timeline can't simply rely on a "well they've hated each other since x" argument but needs to keep such a rivalry alive and kicking.

2. Britain was heavily invested in the US in this period, leading to substantial business lobbies on both sides of the Atlantic that would not be in favour of the disruption of war. If your plan is to butterfly these then you need to be aware of the serious knock-ons this will have. Particularly for American manufacturing.

3. Be aware of Britain's European focus. Remember that, OTL, British foreign policy was always more closely focused on the balance of power in Europe. The USA will never be their sole point of attention and a good timeline would need to cover events in Europe as well.

4. I've seen a lot of timelines get stuck on the idea that Britain would do well on the coast of the USA but would have limited success inland. I'm sure this would be a realistic assessment, but sometimes these threads seem to imply that Britain has no war aims at all beyond attacking seaboard cities in the vague hope America gives up. British military and political officials were well prepared in terms of planning - I'm not saying these plans would succeed but a good timeline would need to acknowledge they were there.

5. Finally, you need to think about why Britain would stay in the conflict. With an ocean between them and the most powerful fleet in the world, what is to stop Britain taking its ball and going home? Canada? As posters have pointed out, Britain never assumed it could hold onto Canada in a serious war with the USA so is unlikely to through everything into saving this colonial territory.

Very good points.

On 1. It's of course what allowed for the policy of one administration to be changed around so people could never be sure of how exactly a government on either side of the pond would react to a certain incident. That and since there is an ocean separating them each side could develop certain misconceptions about the other side.

The papers of course, never helped

But the idea that a British victory at any point from 1812 to 1899 earns them the eternal hatred of America has always been a bit weird to me. By that logic everyone in the English speaking world should hate Germans since in the last century we've gone to war with them twice. Yet of course geopolitical realities tend to temper our views.

2. Economics would be interesting, I mean look at the historical examples of 1775-1783 and 1812-1815, two very bitter conflicts yet neither side turned its back on the other. Trade flourished between the wars and Britain really bankrolled American industrialization because it was a safe investment. We really would have to assume IMO that each side would continue to trade with each other for economic reasons, it simply makes sense to do so.

Money talks louder than nationalism more often than not.

3. I think perhaps the reason most people tend to focus on a Trent War idea is that its probably the one time where European interests for the British Empire were relatively stable, and the one power they regarded as their major competitor was already wrapped up in various misguided adventures of their own.

The great thing is that we basically already know everything going on in Europe at the time, and the ones which take place in any conceivable Trent War time frame (1861-65) are ones which historically Britain could do (or did) nothing about. Really the only time Britain could have conceivably concentrated a great percentage of its resources in North America.

4. Most of the relevant literature (Bourne, Stacey, Hitsman, Fuller) can only give us a best guess of what the British were planning. Largely though they seemed to be depending on a defensive stance in Canada (since they believed that even if they lost it they could get it back at the peace table) and thrusts at the coasts where they could concentrate their forces. Arguably their most enthusiastic scheme was in attacking Portland to seize the Atlantic terminus of the Grant Trunk Railroad. To the planners it made sense since it could be attacked overland from New Brunswick and from the sea by the RN.

My own TL acknowledges this and I've laid out their thinking, but I think like all war plans it will be subject to change once it actually comes into contact with the enemy.

5. For the Trent War specifically, the whole issue was over national honor. To use my own TL as an example again, adding to the fact that the British government was already paranoid about Seward's loud and public annexationist attitude meant that they had to consider the US a threat.

The seizure of the commissioners under the British flag was, by and large, an insult to national honor (and illegal under the Maritime Laws, which amusingly the British government only acknowledged when it got used against them ) and coupled with their paranoia regarding Seward meant they were already expecting trouble.

Even then it was only further provocation which would have lead to a shooting war I think, which is why in my TL Captain Williams (who in OTL was absurdly confrontational with armed US Marines!!! ) ends up dead, the St. Albans raid happens early, and the USS Dacotah and the HMS Terror open fire on one another.

Basically the war takes place over national prestige and the fact that Britain wasn't going to give up an inch of territory without a fight.

 

[TFSmith121]

The point worth considering is that in the only

The point worth considering is that in the only case where the British army and navy actually made an effort to deploy significant forces to BNA in this period because of a war scare, the winter of 1861-62, British war plans were to embark on a "defensive" war against the United States by invading US territory on multiple fronts as the opening act of any such war.

As stated:

"On the strongest recommendations of naval and military experts he (Lt. Gen. Williams, British c-in-c in the Province of Canada) was ordered to attack Rouse's Point (upstate New York, Lake Champlain) immediately upon the outbreak of war with a view to blocking the Americans' most likely route of advance.1

1 (HRH The Duke of) Cambridge (in other words, the British Army commander in chief) to Williams, private, 14 Dec. 1861, Cambridge papers; as in

British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862; Author(s): Kenneth Bourne; Source: The English Historical Review, Vol. 76, No. 301 (Oct., 1961), pp. 600-632

and:

"...That this gloomy picture-of the extreme unlikelihood of the British being able to establish their minimum needs in Canada once war had broken out-was at least implicit in the experts' views is borne out by the apparently unanimous support in the army for one rather desperate scheme-an expedition against Maine. A combined operation, mounted from Nova Scotia, to capture Portland and occupy the greater part of Maine might, it was thought, draw off large numbers of American soldiers who would otherwise be available for an attack on Canada and cut the most likely line of attack via Lake Champlain. Still more important it would also solve the problem of Canada's exterior communications for it would both cover the vulnerable roads through New Brunswick and in the Grand Trunk Railway provide a direct communication with Quebec and Montreal. The military experts-Burgoyne, Seaton and Macdougall-all pressed the scheme and on 3 December (1861, British Secretary of War) Lewis suggested to Palmerston that they give provisional orders to under-take it' provided that the force at Halifax, military and naval, should render such a step safe and prudent '. He certainly also raised the question in Cabinet, the appointment to its command was considered and, as late as 26 December, (planners were) drawing up a list of the troops it would need.1

1. Lewis to Palmerston, private, 3 Dec., Broadlands papers; Lewis's memoranda of Dec. 3, and de Grey's memorandum of 26 Dec.,as in

British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862; Author(s): Kenneth Bourne; Source: The English Historical Review, Vol. 76, No. 301 (Oct., 1961), pp. 600-632

The interesting thing is, of course, to contrast these rather haphazard plans (but again, these are what the best minds on London could come up with at the time) with the similar British operations in the Black Sea in 1855-56 (which led to a years-long campaign by what amounted to the entire deployable element of the British army, which was only forced to a conclusion thanks to the addition of the French, Turkish, and Sardinian expeditionary forces) and, of course, the British failure at an overland offensive campaign in South Africa in 1880-81.

Now, one can presume the British would be smart enough not to stage the equivalent of Colley's forlorn hope in South Africa two decades earlier, or to avoid the stalemate of the Crimean six years later (again, without the equivalent of the French, Turkish, and Sardinian expeditionary forces), but given the historical examples of Bomarsund, Petropavlovsk, Sveaborg, Taganrog, and the 2nd and 3rd Taku Forts (all examples of British-led amphibious operations either failing utterly or requiring British and/or Allies contributions that simply would not be availalbe in a 1861-?? Anglo-American conflict), or, in a later period, the equally haphazard and generally failing attempts at early offensives in South Africa in 1899, Tanga in 1914, and the Dardanelles and/or Kut Al Amara in 1915.

The foundational reality in an putative Anglo-American conflict in 1862 scenario is the US had begun its mobilization in April, 1861; any remotely realistic British and BNA mobilization that actually tracks with history as it was experienced doesn't kick off until December, 1861/January, 1862, which is, of course, a difference of at least 8-9 months.

As anyone who's actually been in uniform and gone through basic and advanced training (individual or formation-level) knows, that is a huge asset for the United States in any conflict in this period, and makes the correlation of forces in theater obvious.

Best,

 

[Saphroneth]

The idea that Britain never believed it could hold Canada in a serious war against the US seems at odds with the fact that it did.

Of course, at various times they may have believed that they couldn't hold Canada - but thats not necessarily the reality, especially if their assumptions had been based off the worst case (that the US had secretly prepared for war and heavily mobilized, for example).

It's also worth noting that "hold Canada" is a tricky phrase - the British couldn't hold all of it, perhaps, but holding Quebec and Montreal is easier (Montreal fortress is an island!) and Halifax is basically invulnerable because it's a major fortification hundreds of land miles from any US centre of power and so British reinforcements are likely to arrive before US troops do!

 

[EnglishCanuck]

The idea that Britain never believed it could hold Canada in a serious war against the US seems at odds with the fact that it did.

Of course, at various times they may have believed that they couldn't hold Canada - but thats not necessarily the reality, especially if their assumptions had been based off the worst case (that the US had secretly prepared for war and heavily mobilized, for example).

Well the British only firmly came to believe they could not hold Canada in a conventional war after 1865 (due to the size of the armies the Union could muster, and the belief that the colonists could fend for themselves) and even then in 1861-62 during the historical crisis they believed they had a chance.

I tend to agree with them, though my qualifier is that post 1890 the chances of holding Canada are nil, there's nothing distracting the US and all the post-Civil War issues have been dealt with.

Before then though, it's a pretty even chance.

It's also worth noting that "hold Canada" is a tricky phrase - the British couldn't hold all of it, perhaps, but holding Quebec and Montreal is easier (Montreal fortress is an island!) and Halifax is basically invulnerable because it's a major fortification hundreds of land miles from any US centre of power and so British reinforcements are likely to arrive before US troops do!

Small note, Montreal had no indigenous defences (save those on St. Helens Island) and would have depended on a force on the south side of the river to hold off an army with siege guns, or a series of entrenchments and a tête de pont on the river at the bridge. Difficult but not impossible.

The idea that the US could threaten Halifax any time before the High Seas Fleet became the issue for the Royal Navy is (all things being equal to OTL) rather dubious of course.

 

[TFSmith121]

Only if one willfully confuses the political geography of

The idea that Britain never believed it could hold Canada in a serious war against the US seems at odds with the fact that it did. Of course, at various times they may have believed that they couldn't hold Canada - but thats not necessarily the reality, especially if their assumptions had been based off the worst case (that the US had secretly prepared for war and heavily mobilized, for example). It's also worth noting that "hold Canada" is a tricky phrase - the British couldn't hold all of it, perhaps, but holding Quebec and Montreal is easier (Montreal fortress is an island!) and Halifax is basically invulnerable because it's a major fortification hundreds of land miles from any US centre of power and so British reinforcements are likely to arrive before US troops do!

Only if one willfully confuses the political geography of British North America as it was in 1862 with that of the Dominion of Canada after confederation in 1867.

The Province of Canada (i.e., the Canada West and Canada East districts, or historical Upper Canada and Lower Canada, or - in other words - present-day southeastern Ontario and southern Quebec) was indefensible in the winter of 1862 against the forces the US could deploy into the theater overland by rail.

Given the historical short of war situation and any remotely realistic outbreak of war, Upper Canada, including Montreal (which, as EC points out, was no more a fortress than any other city without any sort of fixed defenses, and digging earthworks in the middle of an Ontario/Quebec winter might not be the simplest task) to the northeast and anything to the west all the way to the Manitoba District - which also would have been taken easily by US forces operating overland from Minnesota and Wisconsin - would have been under US control by the time of the spring thaw, while, given the available forces, Lower Canada would certainly have followed by the winter of 1863, IF the British were insane enough to embark on their preferred strategy of a multi-front war that included an invasion of Maine.

Given the historical example of the timeframe it took the French, British, Turks, and Sardinians to force the Russians to withdraw from Sevastopol in 1855, any such British invasion of Maine would have (also) become a stalemate, and given the absolutely ludicrous assesment by the British of the political and social realities of Maine in 1862 - much less the utter stupidity of trying to seize a railroad line some 170 miles long through extremely rough country and crossed than 30 bridges and viaducts by landing at one end and trying to roll it up ... and hoping, presumably, the trains would still be running by the time one got ashore, just makes the utter vapidity of the British planning cited by Bourne plain to anyone who has ever considered the geographic and topographic realities... or looked at a map.

As an example, this was the Britons' assessment of the sort of reception they would receive in Maine in 1862:

"...If it were really necessary to occupy Maine both (RN North American squadron commander V. Adm.) Milne and (Admiralty war planner RN Capt.) Washington believed that, rather than risk an attack, they should wait and see whether, as Milne put it, 'that state was inclined to change masters '.4 This was a reference to a further argument which many of the military experts, recalling 1812, had used to advocate the scheme:

The interests of Maine & Canada are identical. A strong party is believed to exist in Maine in favor of annexation to Canada; and no sympathy is there felt for the war which now desolates the U. States. It is more than probable that a conciliatory policy adopted towards Maine would, if it failed to secure its absolute co-operation, indispose it to use any vigorous efforts against us. The patriotism of the Americans dwells peculiarly in their pockets; & the pockets of the good citizens of Maine would benefit largely by the expenditure and trade we should create in making Portland our base & their territory our line of communication with Canada.5

But such confident arguments, dubious though they really were, merely played into the hands of cautious men like Washington:

' Possibly a very strict blockade, without an attack, might induce the people of Maine to consider whether it would not be for their interest to declare themselves independent of the United States, and so profit by all the advantages that would be derived from railway communication with Canada and the Lakes '.1

4 Washington, 'List of the Chief Ports of the Federal Coast, etc.'; Milne to Grey, private, 17 Jan. 1862, Milne papers I07/2. 5 Macdougall in his paper of 3 Dec. 1861.
1 Washington, ' List of the Chief Ports of the Federal Coast, etc.'

as in

British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862; Author(s): Kenneth Bourne; Source: The English Historical Review, Vol. 76, No. 301 (Oct., 1961), pp. 600-632

Again, it would be difficult to have an understanding of political realities in Maine in 1861-62 further from reality unless one was literally on drugs - and yet this sort of material is what passed for British war planning, apparently.


It's the sort of war planning by large scale map and from thousands of miles away, with utter and complete ignorance of the facts on the ground, one would expect from a chateau general in 1914-18 or even worse, the sort of wishful thinking that led to such debacles as the Dardanelles in 1915-16, Mesopotamia in 1915-16, Norway in 1940, Greece in 1941, Malaya in 1941, the Arakan in 1942-43, and the Dodecanese in 1943.

And, of course, Bourne was an English historian; doubtful he overstated the inanity of it all, but there you go...

It certainly makes for interesting reading, particularly in comparison to the quite clear-eyed assesment of the strategic issues, historically, by everyone in the Lincoln Administration from the commander-in-chief on down.

Best,

 

[galveston bay]

As a Brit who watches a lot of these timelines get written but rarely comments on them I'd like to make a few constructive points.

Firstly, a link: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/
AH.com is very good at sourcing stats and army lists and orders of battle for timelines but often handwaves the motivation of the combatants. Hansard is a record of everything said in Parliament from 1803 onwards. You can search it by words, TRENT for example, and see how British politicians at the time felt.

Secondly, some related points:

1. Whilst I don't think a US-UK rivalry in the 19th and early 20th century is impossible by any means, you've got to think about the changing governments in both countries. Whilst grudges do develop they also dissolve very quickly on the international arena as the demands of a changing world affect changing Governments. Any good timeline can't simply rely on a "well they've hated each other since x" argument but needs to keep such a rivalry alive and kicking.

2. Britain was heavily invested in the US in this period, leading to substantial business lobbies on both sides of the Atlantic that would not be in favour of the disruption of war. If your plan is to butterfly these then you need to be aware of the serious knock-ons this will have. Particularly for American manufacturing.

3. Be aware of Britain's European focus. Remember that, OTL, British foreign policy was always more closely focused on the balance of power in Europe. The USA will never be their sole point of attention and a good timeline would need to cover events in Europe as well.

4. I've seen a lot of timelines get stuck on the idea that Britain would do well on the coast of the USA but would have limited success inland. I'm sure this would be a realistic assessment, but sometimes these threads seem to imply that Britain has no war aims at all beyond attacking seaboard cities in the vague hope America gives up. British military and political officials were well prepared in terms of planning - I'm not saying these plans would succeed but a good timeline would need to acknowledge they were there.

5. Finally, you need to think about why Britain would stay in the conflict. With an ocean between them and the most powerful fleet in the world, what is to stop Britain taking its ball and going home? Canada? As posters have pointed out, Britain never assumed it could hold onto Canada in a serious war with the USA so is unlikely to through everything into saving this colonial territory.

first, nice link... thank you

1. As the saying goes (from Palmerston no less), "nations do not have permanent friends or allies, they only have permanent interests" The reverse is certainly true as well, as the history of Anglo-French relations demonstrates clearly

2. Most definitely, a huge amount of British capital flowed into the US (and still does, the British remain to this day the biggest investor in the United States) and both nations benefited very much. Except possibly the British investors in cattle ranches in the 1880s Great Plains, that didn't work out so well (Blizzard of 1887)

3. Just as the most vital American interest is its neighbors so it goes for the British. As the Napoleonic Wars, the Wars against Bourbon France and the Wars against Hapsburg Spain can attest. Preventing anyone from dominating Europe was the central focus of English (and later British) foreign policy since Elizabeth I

4. Hence the whole point of this thread... what are the war aims for the various potential Anglo-American Wars and how would the opponents shape their strategies to accomplish those missions

5. The British demonstrated in two wars with the Americans that it knew when it was time to cut losses. I would expect continued realistic appraisal, although deciding when to call it a day may vary depending on war aims and the time period in question.

 

[TFSmith121]

Re number 5

5. The British demonstrated in two wars with the Americans that it knew when it was time to cut losses. I would expect continued realistic appraisal, although deciding when to call it a day may vary depending on war aims and the time period in question.

Re number 5, along with North and Germaine deciding (eventually) to acknowledge reality, so did Gladstone in 1881.

Conversely, even after he knocked Aberdeen out in 1855, Palmerston doubled down, even though the Turks (and the threat of the Austrians, absent a single British or French or Sardinian trooper) had already been enough to get the Russians to agree to withdraw from the Balkans.

Which says volumes about which of the top leaders, American or British, we're going to stumble into a shooting war.

God knows it wouldn't be the BNAers, since a) they had no foreign policy and b) they had no military.

Best,

 

[Reydan]

Reydan - Thanks for the Hansard link; I've found some of the relevant debates elsewhere, but the searchable link is very useful. Entertainingly enough, using it and the "most relevant" filter, the first three it yielded were:

Thanks. I think if you click on the names it tells you who the MPs are (although stupidly not party affiliation but you can work that out from Wikipedia). Useful for thinking about factions and positions in the UK

Very good points.

Basically the war takes place over national prestige and the fact that Britain wasn't going to give up an inch of territory without a fight.

Thank you. I must admit, I'm not trying to say don't write these timelines. I think if they are done well they can be really fun. But I rankle a little when so much research goes into lists of regiments and ships and things and not into thinking about political and public reaction. Too much of that already goes on in the post-1900 thread and I love the 19th century too much to let it happen here.

I think timelines like BROS and Wrapped in Flame are convincing and researched and that, really, is all you can ask of alternate history.

The idea that Britain never believed it could hold Canada in a serious war against the US seems at odds with the fact that it did.

Of course, at various times they may have believed that they couldn't hold Canada - but thats not necessarily the reality, especially if their assumptions had been based off the worst case (that the US had secretly prepared for war and heavily mobilized, for example).

It's also worth noting that "hold Canada" is a tricky phrase - the British couldn't hold all of it, perhaps, but holding Quebec and Montreal is easier (Montreal fortress is an island!) and Halifax is basically invulnerable because it's a major fortification hundreds of land miles from any US centre of power and so British reinforcements are likely to arrive before US troops do!

Other people have touched on this already, but I wasn't quite arguing that Britain was just ready to give up on Canada - just that in the period it increasingly became convinced that it would either have to fight an aggressive war to push the US back from the start OR delay, deflect, or ultimately look to bargain Canada back at the peace table.

Its important to remember that losing Canada, whilst not ideal for Britain, affects its metropole very little. It affects how Britain can project power in north America but not its will to fight on at home.

first, nice link... thank you

4. Hence the whole point of this thread... what are the war aims for the various potential Anglo-American Wars and how would the opponents shape their strategies to accomplish those missions

Welcome.

I agree. Although I find the idea of a US-UK war very unlikely in the period, it is worth thinking about aims and objectives on all sides.

What I note is that we never seem to talk about the Pacific in discussion, although it does pop up in timelines. What facility does the US have from the 1860s onwards for preventing British naval power being projected in the Pacific coastal areas? Surely the British would, from the 1880s onwards, look to hoover up Hawaii in such a conflict, either by invading and expelling the US or "propping up" the native monarchy and expelling the US business interests.

 

[edgeworthy]

Re number 5, along with North and Germaine deciding (eventually) to acknowledge reality, so did Gladstone in 1881.

Conversely, even after he knocked Aberdeen out in 1855, Palmerston doubled down, even though the Turks (and the threat of the Austrians, absent a single British or French or Sardinian trooper) were enough to get the Russians to agree to withdraw from the Balkans.

Which says volumes about which of the top leaders, American or British, we're going to stumble into a shooting war.

God knows it wouldn't be the BNAers, since a) they had no foreign policy and b) they had no military.

Best,

Ironically, the conclusion of Peter Tsouras' Britannia's Fist Trilogy, for all its flaws, is based on this.

Lincoln is about the only person who seems to be able to grasp the reality of the situation, especially in the face of Seward and Stanton's bluster, and grabs the opportunity for a negotiated settlement as soon as possible.
Which is something a lot of the reviewers seem to gripe about
(Not the Generals raised from the dead nor the sudden invention of powered flight)

 

[galveston bay]

I agree. Although I find the idea of a US-UK war very unlikely in the period, it is worth thinking about aims and objectives on all sides.

What I note is that we never seem to talk about the Pacific in discussion, although it does pop up in timelines. What facility does the US have from the 1860s onwards for preventing British naval power being projected in the Pacific coastal areas? Surely the British would, from the 1880s onwards, look to hoover up Hawaii in such a conflict, either by invading and expelling the US or "propping up" the native monarchy and expelling the US business interests.

the Pacific does get mentioned both in the two main ones on the board now, and it has shown up elsewhere (printed stuff, like in "Dixie Victorious" in the "Hell on Earth" chapter (first chapter) by Andrew Uffindell.

While the Pacific is important to both nations for both nations it is a very long way from their center of gravity in terms of naval deployments, soldiers, and civilian government. The most powerful man in terms of numbers of troops available, money available and productive population, resources and industry is the Governor of California in the 1860s during the Trent War period, with the British governments in modern day British Columbia and Australia having a lot of authority but not much to work with in any of those things.

Hawaii would definitely be in play though, with whoever got a sizeable naval presence there last holding it (although my guess some kind of co-dominion would be the end result as both sides have very important interests there--- the Whaling fleets of both nations being just one)

Other than that, I suspect at least on the North American coast while both would like to grab it all, the means seems unlikely.

In early time periods, 1820s - 1840s, its a bit different but California itself has little value at the time and is either Spanish or Mexican, and the main thing to fight about is who between the Hudson Bay Company and the American Fur Company gets to kill the most beaver, sea otters and seals and rip off the local Native Americans in the modern day Pacific Northwest. While there is some significant money there, in terms of people who aren't Native Americans there aren't enough to fill a large modern cruise ship before the migration to Oregon started in the 1840s

By the 1870s, the Transcontinental Railroad makes the American position unassailable on the North American West Coast, although projecting power offensively into British Canada or defending Alaska seems a difficult proposition at best. This is the period that the British would have the best chance of unilaterally seizing Hawaii if so desired and of course there is lots of British activity in Oceania. American activity at this point is purely trade and whaling, with some Americans starting pineapple plantations in Hawaii, and British companies (among others) 'mining' the guano islands in the Pacific (I suppose mining is the word for digging up layers and layers of bird feces for transportation elsewhere)

Both the British and Americans have shared interests in trade with Japan and China, and the Americans fought their own gunboat battles in Korea and elsewhere against uppity natives who thought they had the right to determine if foreigners could visit or not. (sarcasm intended)

In the Pacific there really is a lot of commonality of interests for the British and Americans. It is only on the North American shore that those interests might diverge

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Thank you. I must admit, I'm not trying to say don't write these timelines. I think if they are done well they can be really fun. But I rankle a little when so much research goes into lists of regiments and ships and things and not into thinking about political and public reaction. Too much of that already goes on in the post-1900 thread and I love the 19th century too much to let it happen here.

I agree, very few people actually look into the politics that would be taken up in any of the nations involved. For instance, how would the Democrats spin the foreign war angle? Would they blame Lincoln for bringing in foreign powers and try to oust him on the idea they would do a better job? Or would they think that the Civil War should be stopped to deal with the foreign war?

I mean in WiF I was legitimately surprised when reading about Canadian responses to the historic Trent affair. When the earnest mouth piece of the completely anti-establishment, radical party of Canada is endorsing militia service, you know there is a broad base of support for the government!

Mind you, I do tend to attribute that to the rally around the flag effect crisis tend to provoke.

I think timelines like BROS and Wrapped in Flame are convincing and researched and that, really, is all you can ask of alternate history.

One would hope

Its important to remember that losing Canada, whilst not ideal for Britain, affects its metropole very little. It affects how Britain can project power in north America but not its will to fight on at home.

Indeed, based on all I have read, the main thing about losing Canada would be (and this goes double for an arch imperialist/gunboat diplomat like Palmerston) a massive loss of face on the world stage. Especially to a nation they don't regard as a heavy weight.

That kind of humiliation would be unacceptable.

What I note is that we never seem to talk about the Pacific in discussion, although it does pop up in timelines. What facility does the US have from the 1860s onwards for preventing British naval power being projected in the Pacific coastal areas? Surely the British would, from the 1880s onwards, look to hoover up Hawaii in such a conflict, either by invading and expelling the US or "propping up" the native monarchy and expelling the US business interests.

the Pacific does get mentioned both in the two main ones on the board now, and it has shown up elsewhere (printed stuff, like in "Dixie Victorious" in the "Hell on Earth" chapter (first chapter) by Andrew Uffindell.

While the Pacific is important to both nations for both nations it is a very long way from their center of gravity in terms of naval deployments, soldiers, and civilian government. The most powerful man in terms of numbers of troops available, money available and productive population, resources and industry is the Governor of California in the 1860s during the Trent War period, with the British governments in modern day British Columbia and Australia having a lot of authority but not much to work with in any of those things.

Hawaii would definitely be in play though, with whoever got a sizeable naval presence there last holding it (although my guess some kind of co-dominion would be the end result as both sides have very important interests there--- the Whaling fleets of both nations being just one)

Indeed it doesn't come up a lot, (though many TLs to mention it) and in my opinion it has many fascinating long term consequences.

Hawaii for instance was, at the time, ruled by the very pro-British, anti-American king Kamehameha IV who was very interested in expanding British influence on the islands (to the point he began favoring the Anglican Church and made Queen Victoria his son's godmother) and presumably in any war the British would realize the strategic importance of the island both at the time, and in any later conflict. I imagine that the Hawaiian monarchy would take advantage of Kamehameha's overtures in the aftermath.

The US would also doubtless expand their facilities and Pacific Fleet at a much more rapid pace than OTL.

British companies (among others) 'mining' the guano islands in the Pacific (I suppose mining is the word for digging up layers and layers of bird feces for transportation elsewhere)

Plumbing seems like it would be an adequate word

 

[TFSmith121]

Thanks for the kind words...

Thanks. I think if you click on the names it tells you who the MPs are (although stupidly not party affiliation but you can work that out from Wikipedia). Useful for thinking about factions and positions in the UK

- snip -

.

Ironically, the conclusion of Peter Tsouras' Britannia's Fist Trilogy, for all its flaws, is based on this. Lincoln is about the only person who seems to be able to grasp the reality of the situation, especially in the face of Seward and Stanton's bluster, and grabs the opportunity for a negotiated settlement as soon as possible. Which is something a lot of the reviewers seem to gripe about (Not the Generals raised from the dead nor the sudden invention of powered flight)

Never read it; haven't read any of the published ones, because I didn't want to be accused of using someone's else's ideas.

Generals raised from the dead and powered flight in the 1860s?

Wow.

And I got a ration of grief for sticking a keg of powder and a primer on a steam launch's mast, stepped forward over the bow, and using some basic maskirovka to get close enough to wreck a ship's rudder.

Best,

 

[galveston bay]

Never read it; haven't read any of the published ones, because I didn't want to be accused of using someone's else's ideas.

Generals raised from the dead and powered flight in the 1860s?

Wow.

And I got a ration of grief for sticking a key of powder and a primer on a steam launch's mast, stepped forward over the bow.

Best,

that last bit (the grief you got over the likely vs the steam punk) did kind of mystify me to be frank

Generals raised from the dead was sloppy writing, and I stick with my general assertion that Tsouras has a bad tendency to rush his endings without thinking them through. The powered flight struck me as a play to the the steam punk fans.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

that last bit (the grief you got over the likely vs the steam punk) did kind of mystify me to be frank

Generals raised from the dead was sloppy writing, and I stick with my general assertion that Tsouras has a bad tendency to rush his endings without thinking them through. The powered flight struck me as a play to the the steam punk fans.

In fairness to Tsouras, most of his work starts out rather well, but I agree that he seems to get stuck on how to actually end his works and rushes the ending in a way that usually makes no bloody sense. I mean every campaign ending on the exact dad day? I get the allusions to the near simultaneous conclusions of Vicksburg and Gettysburg, but it really seems lazy to do the same with no adequate preamble.

 

[TFSmith121]

Especially given DuPont's demonstrated interest

that last bit (the grief you got over the likely vs the steam punk) did kind of mystify me to be frank

Generals raised from the dead was sloppy writing, and I stick with my general assertion that Tsouras has a bad tendency to rush his endings without thinking them through. The powered flight struck me as a play to the the steam punk fans.

Especially given DuPont's demonstrated interest in naval mines and submersibles while CO of the Philadelphia NY in 1861, before he went to Port Royal.

Can't speak to Tsouras, but suspect Wraithverge's criticisms - and some of the rest from what appear to be additional incarnations - were all coming from the same source and based on the reality of that individual's situation vis a vis this particular board.

Thanks for the kind words.

Best,

 

[galveston bay]

In fairness to Tsouras, most of his work starts out rather well, but I agree that he seems to get stuck on how to actually end his works and rushes the ending in a way that usually makes no bloody sense. I mean every campaign ending on the exact dad day? I get the allusions to the near simultaneous conclusions of Vicksburg and Gettysburg, but it really seems lazy to do the same with no adequate preamble.

since Tsouras has sold a pretty fair number of books on the subject he is worth discussing here....

As a writer he does indeed start an intriguing and interesting story (in my opinion of course) and I have read and own most of the books he has written or edited. There are some frankly half baked ideas in some of his anthologies that he is responsible for (and some that he wasn't). His own stories are clearly written for an American audience in that the good guys always win (and that extends from Disaster at D-Day to his most recent one on Stalingrad), and to achieve that ending he rushes everything after the climax. This leads to some serious loose ends and flat out poor story telling toward the end of the books he has written.

His alternate Gettysburg, as well as his trilogy (Britannia's Fist) all suffer from that weakness.

There are specific criticisms I have seen made regarding some of his conclusions regarding American naval guns (the Dahlgren specifically) vs British armor and weapons. I note that none of those who have criticized on this board are naval engineers or even engineers. I tend to think he makes a good case regarding those weapons and he says he consulted experts to check his facts. So you either believe him and his conclusions or you don't.

Bottom line though, all in all, he writes stories that entertain me, and I like his work. Its certainly a step up from Conroy (the 1862 book) although note he certainly sold a lot of books too, and his stories are generally interesting enough for me to read through without getting annoyed, while Harrison and his trilogy I just cannot take seriously, as this is the same guy who wrote "Bill the Galactic Hero" and "The Stainless Steel Rat" series which are flat out satire.

As these are the folks who have successfully sold multiple titles and made lots of money doing it, they are worth discussing. After all, a writer wants to be read and making some cash along the way is indeed validation.

I will note that Conroy and Tsouras did provide at least some justification in their stories for the war to happen, and actually indicated what the war aims and strategies were for the various sides. Always important.

Armies don't perform very well without a mission and a mission requires a strategy and a strategy requires an objective. Making the Americans pay isn't much of an objective.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

since Tsouras has sold a pretty fair number of books on the subject he is worth discussing here....

As a writer he does indeed start an intriguing and interesting story (in my opinion of course) and I have read and own most of the books he has written or edited. There are some frankly half baked ideas in some of his anthologies that he is responsible for (and some that he wasn't). His own stories are clearly written for an American audience in that the good guys always win (and that extends from Disaster at D-Day to his most recent one on Stalingrad), and to achieve that ending he rushes everything after the climax. This leads to some serious loose ends and flat out poor story telling toward the end of the books he has written.

His alternate Gettysburg, as well as his trilogy (Britannia's Fist) all suffer from that weakness.

There are specific criticisms I have seen made regarding some of his conclusions regarding American naval guns (the Dahlgren specifically) vs British armor and weapons. I note that none of those who have criticized on this board are naval engineers or even engineers. I tend to think he makes a good case regarding those weapons and he says he consulted experts to check his facts. So you either believe him and his conclusions or you don't.

Bottom line though, all in all, he writes stories that entertain me, and I like his work. Its certainly a step up from Conroy (the 1862 book) although note he certainly sold a lot of books too, and his stories are generally interesting enough for me to read through without getting annoyed, while Harrison and his trilogy I just cannot take seriously, as this is the same guy who wrote "Bill the Galactic Hero" and "The Stainless Steel Rat" series which are flat out satire.

As these are the folks who have successfully sold multiple titles and made lots of money doing it, they are worth discussing. After all, a writer wants to be read and making some cash along the way is indeed validation.

I will note that Conroy and Tsouras did provide at least some justification in their stories for the war to happen, and actually indicated what the war aims and strategies were for the various sides. Always important.

Armies don't perform very well without a mission and a mission requires a strategy and a strategy requires an objective. Making the Americans pay isn't much of an objective.

I suppose my biggest problem with Tsouras work (having only read Britannia's Fist and Disaster at D-Day) is that much of the time there isn't enough logical explanation for why various plans happen or are developed (for instance in D-Day I felt the German's just seem to do well by authorial fiat while the Allies founder about for reasons which in context of 1944 are not adequately enough explained) and my biggest gripe with Fist was the half assed ending which seemed to be a cheap way to wrap it up quickly.

Aside from that though, much of the work was actually enjoyable in a wonky sort of way. I suppose I just expected a more effort put into ending the series which may be why I'm so down on him. Well that and bloody Captain Sharp who he bludgeons us with as being a super spy, cripes he's more aggravating than Merlin from David Weber's Safehold series

Probably my biggest problem with Conroy is the magical abilities of "Old Fuss and Feathers" who seems to be lazily inserted into the story despite his historic inablilty to even understand why corps sized formations are needed! That and Rebecca's jarringly lesbian friend who likes to talk about sex.

What is with him and really sleazy wooden sex scenes? Almost as bad as Turtledove's infamous Mark Twain sex scene

 

[stafford1069]

A valiant effort, sir!

I would suggest that before anyone starts down these paths, they make the effort to review the works published at the time under official cover that actually lay out what the various nations' strengths, organizations, and deployments looked like, rather than the typical vague handwaves. To start, some links on the British Army and Navy, and the Canadian Provincial Forces, in the 1860s:

Dear TFSmith121,

Thank you. I been looking for these for some time.


Thank you


Yours
Stafford1069

 

[TFSmith121]

You are quite welcome, but thank Google books

Dear TFSmith121, Thank you. I been looking for these for some time. Thank you. Yours Stafford1069

You are quite welcome, but thank Google books.

The US Official Records (Army and Navy, US and rebel) are here and searchable, thanks to Cornell:

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/m/moawar/

All of the above sources are what provide the baseline orders of battle for BROS; all of which is sourced and none of which is "made up," unlike some of the competition.

Best,