An new trafalgar? Jutland 1916

Dont know if this has been asked before but two questions.

How could the RN have of won a decisive victory at Jutland, and what would the action have been like?

What would the long term consequences have been?

My own thoughts on the latter include much more assets being avaiable for convoy defence and a less sucessful u- boat campaign allied with a tighter blockade leading to an earlier allied victory.

Just noticed the typo in the title but do not know how to change it
 
Dont know if this has been asked before but two questions.

How could the RN have of won a decisive victory at Jutland, and what would the action have been like?

What would the long term consequences have been?

My own thoughts on the latter include much more assets being avaiable for convoy defence and a less sucessful u- boat campaign allied with a tighter blockade leading to an earlier allied victory.

Just noticed the typo in the title but do not know how to change it

Have the RN shells fuzing work properly. Enough extra damage and sinkings would occur, the RN might follow up the retreating HSF more aggressively, and sink even more.
Also have the turret safety precautions improved (less RN losses).
The action wouldnt be that different, just with more German battleships sunk. But probably enough to render the HSF useless for the rest of the war
 
The British had problems with their shells and cordite and they had known about it for a few years. They improve that alone will improve the odds in their favor.

Regarding the turret safety precautions, the Royal Navy actually had better proceedures than the High Seas Fleet. However, the Battlecruiser force, under Beatty, placed a lot of importance and trained for high rates of fire. One way, unfortunately, one gets and sustains a high rate of fire is being careless on the amount of ready charges in the turret itself and removing anti-flash doors within the barbette.
 
A major consideration for the Royal Navy in WWI is that they had much more to lose than to gain through aggressive action.

A German High Seas Fleet in its pre-Jutland state is a threat which must be contained, but one which can be effectively contained.

An HSF in its historical post-Jutland state (mauled and bottled up in harbor) is a relatively minor nuisance.

But if the HSF manages to damage the Grand Fleet enough to acheive partity or better, Germany can then force another engagement in which they have a chance to destroy the Grand Fleet, leaving Britain open to blockade or invasion.

Churchill once said that Jellicoe was "the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon," but nothing Jellicoe could do as commander of the Grand Fleet could win the war. This points heavily towards the strategy Jellicoe actually pursued -- giving the HSF a bloody nose when it attempted coastal raids and the like to encourage it to remain passively in port, but never put the Grand Fleet at risk if there's any way to avoid it.
 
The the GF had smashed the HSF at Jutland what's stopping Britain running convoys straight to St Petersburg, it could be the direct link that Russia needed to hold on a bit longer. Also the RN could go on the offensive and de-mine the waters off Germany etc to draw off resources from the western front. It'd be all good.
 

Redbeard

Banned
Read the very next sentence! Britian did go on the offensive off the channel coast in the latter half of the war, clearing the mines and supressing the shore batteries.

Sure, but going into the Baltic would be quite another matter. The main problem would be taking Copenhagen, which was surrounded by strong and modern fortifications guarding the city and the minefields in the Oeresund. Even with only a small part of their fleet intact the Germans can relatively easy keep Copenhagen supplied and reinforced from behind the minefields.

A decisive victory at Jutland does indeed risk the Royal Navy demanding to end the war with a daring operation into the Baltic. But I fear Dardanelles would be kindergarten compared to this.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 
Read the very next sentence! Britian did go on the offensive off the channel coast in the latter half of the war, clearing the mines and supressing the shore batteries.

Getting into the Baltic would not be a good idea; shore batteries, confined, shallow water, mines, roving destroyer and MTB patrols, perhaps a few U-Boats in deeper water: and how would a convoy - requiring capital ships as a part of its escort to deal with cruisers - retain formation and surprise>

A good way to lose big ships very pointlessly. When one could just go to Archangel instead.
 
Better intelligence information better communication within the Grand Fleet and to some extend luck. Jellicoe was unaware that the High Seas fleet had managed to escape round him whilst distant gunfire was thought to be a night attack by German destroyers.

Jellicoe played on the side of caution expecting to rengasge the enemy in the morning. The battleships would have easily outgunned their German counterparts and the High Seas fleet would have been severly depleted.

The long term consequences? Forcing entry to the Baltic was unlikely as U-boats and mines are effective weapons for a weak naval power. There would have been an earlier resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare and possibly earlier entry of the United States. Remember victory at Traflagar merely staved off any invasion. The war went on for 9 years.
 
This may get support.....

Their Finest Hour Volume 2 (Winston Churchill)

I have always been fascinated by amphibious warfare, and the idea of using tanks to run ashore from specially- constructed landing craft on beaches where they were not expected had long been in my mind. Ten days before I joined Mr. Lloyd George’s Government as Minister of Munitions on July 17, 1917, I had prepared without expert assistance, a scheme for the capture of the two Frisian islands of Borkum and Sylt. The object was to secure an overseas base for flotillas and cruisers and for such air forces as were available in those days, in order to force the naval fighting, in which we had a great numerical superiority, and establishing close blockade relieve the pressure of the U-boat war, then at its height, against our Atlantic supply-line and the movement of the American armies to France. Mr Lloyd George was impressed with the plan, and had it specially printed for the Admiralty and the War Cabinet.

It contained the following paragraph, 22C, which has never yet seen the light of day.

The landing of the troops upon the island (of Borkum or Sylt) under cover of the guns of the Fleet (should be) aided by gas and smoke from torpedo-proof transports by means of bullet-proof lighters. Approximately one hundred should be provided for landing a division. In addition a number – say fifty- tank landing lighters should be provided, each carrying a tank or tanks (and) fitted for wire cutting in its bow. By means of a drawbridge of shelving bow (the tanks) would land under (their) own power, and prevent the infantry from being held up by wire when attacking the gorges of the forts and batteries. This is a new feature, and removes one of the very great previous difficulties, namely, the rapid landing of (our) field artillery to cut wire.

And further, paragraph 27:

There is always the danger of the enemy getting wind of our intentions and reinforcing his garrison with good troops beforehand, at any rate so far at Borkum, about which he must always be very sensitive, is concerned. On the other hand, the landing could be affected under the shields of lighters, proof against machine gun bullets, and too numerous to be seriously affected by heavy gunfire (i.e. the fire of heavy guns); and tanks employed in even larger numbers than are here suggested, especially the quick moving tank and lighter varieties, would operate in an area where no preparations could have been made to receive them. These may be thought new and important favourable considerations.

In this paper also I had an alternative plan for making an artificial island in the shallow waters of the Horn Reef (to the northward).

Para 30. One of the methods suggested for investigation is as follows: A number of flat bottomed barges of caissons, made not of steel but of concrete, should be prepared in the Humber, at Harwich, and in the Wash, the Medway, and in Thames. These structures would be adapted to the depths in which they were to be sunk, according to a general plan. They would float when empty of water, and thus could be towed across to the site of the artificial island. On arrival at the boys marking the island seacocks would be opened and they would settle down on the bottom. They would subsequently be gradually filled with sand, as opportunity served, by suction dredgers. These structures would range in size from 50’ x 40’ x 20’ to 120’ x 80’ x 40’. By this means a torpedo and weatherproof harbour, like an atoll, would be created in the open sea, with regular pens for the destroyers and submarines and alighting platforms for aeroplanes.

This project, if feasible, is capable of great elaboration, and it might be applied in various places. Concrete vessels can perhaps be made to carry a complete heavy gun turret, and these, on the admission of water to their outer chambers, would sit on the sea floor, like the Solent Forts, at the desired points. Other sinkable structures could be made to contain stores rooms, oil tanks or living chambers. It is not possible, without an expert enquiry, to do ore here than indicate the possibilities, which embrace nothing less than the creation, transportation in pieces, assemblement and posing of an artificial island and destroyer base.
 
I don't think that Britain would try to land in the Baltic, just that with the HSF out of the way they could force through convoys to Russia via what would be the shortest and most convenient route. This could be part of a general naval offensive against Germany proper, de-mining of no go areas, shelling the coast and forcing passages that had been closed since the start of the war.

But the main impact would be fostering that one thing that dragged WW1 out, hope, hope that something would happen that would buttress a country's fortunes. If the British forced a convoy through to Russia in the wake of a crushing victory at Jutland the Russians would be given a huge moral boost in fighting the war, a feeling that they had allies that were helping rather than being stuck out in the east, beyond help.
 
Wasn't the key issue with Jutland the commanders not using their targeters properly?
I remember reading that they were too old school and obsessed with rate of fire to the extent that they totally ignored the rather good modern targeting tech most of the fleet had.
 
Corelli Barnett spells out the GF deficiencies in 'The Swordbearers'. The GF cruisers and battlecruisers didn't keep Jellicoe well informed of what they were seeing and doing, the exception to the rule being the cruiser commander Goodenough (apt name). Their bracket method of finding the range at the beginning of the engagement wasn't as methodical or as fast as the German ladder method, so it was the Germans who regularly got the first hits in an engagement.
 
I think a major POD could have of been the 4 QE battleships which were attached to the battlecruiser force actualy being with the battlecruisers in the initial engagement with Hipper if this had of happened there is a large chance that Hippers ships would have been overwhelmed with the addition of 32 x 15in guns in very well protected battleships, that plus better signalling. The question is of course would the HSF have attempted to come to the rescue or would they have of run?

The moral effect of a clear victory on the British would have of been immense, destroyers that, screened the fleet would have been available for convoy duty etc. Long term maybe post war the navy is better placed to resist cuts in expenditure.
 
IMHO if the Grand Fleet had adopted a divisional approach rather than one staggeringly long battleline it could have got in close enough and often enough to wipe the Germans out. You can see how the two/three detached divisions did this, and with the whole force able to do it, then a general battle would have been joined

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
I don't think that Britain would try to land in the Baltic, just that with the HSF out of the way they could force through convoys to Russia via what would be the shortest and most convenient route. This could be part of a general naval offensive against Germany proper, de-mining of no go areas, shelling the coast and forcing passages that had been closed since the start of the war.

But the main impact would be fostering that one thing that dragged WW1 out, hope, hope that something would happen that would buttress a country's fortunes. If the British forced a convoy through to Russia in the wake of a crushing victory at Jutland the Russians would be given a huge moral boost in fighting the war, a feeling that they had allies that were helping rather than being stuck out in the east, beyond help.

The interesting thing would be the reaction of Denmark and Sweden to such an operation. In OTL they were both pro-German neutrals. If the British try running convoys through the Baltic, there could easily be the sort of accident (Danish/Swedish ship attacked by mistake) that could bring one or both into the war.

Cheers,
Nigel.
 
It isn't well known but Jutland was an ambush which came close to success.

The High Seas Fleet had absolutely no intention of engaging the Grand Fleet on even terms, knowing the British would win such an engagement.

The reason the High Seas Fleet emerged for Jutland was because they thought that they had managed to lure out a portion of the Royal Navy small enough to defeat yet large enough to be worth sending the fleet against.

Having broken German codes the British knew this well and tried to lure the Germans in...

Unfortunately the High Seas Fleet realized the entire British Grand Fleet was approaching too soon and immediately turned away.


So all you need to give the British a crushing victory is to delay German realization of what's really going on until the Germans can't disengage. Of course, losses will likely be heavy on the British side as all those Germans ships won't die easily.


Also, as Maniakes points out, a British disaster may end the war in defeat for London but a British triumph will have no such effect.

It's also interesting to consider whether the Royal Navy might regret such a victory as resources might then be diverted from the battle fleet relaxing in port the rest of the war to the British Army still fighting.
 
IMHO if the Grand Fleet had adopted a divisional approach rather than one staggeringly long battleline it could have got in close enough and often enough to wipe the Germans out. You can see how the two/three detached divisions did this, and with the whole force able to do it, then a general battle would have been joined

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

IIRC that is the way the Germans went as a result of their Jutland experience, their invasion of Moon and Orel Islands used a number of balanced divisions each with capital ships, cruisers and destroyers. But I think they needed to fall short at Jutland to do this. I don't know if the RN went this way after Jutland.
 
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