Historically, Israel leadership was divided about support for the UN (and by extension, for the US) in 1950. Israeli diplomatically supported the UN Security Council's decision to intervene, but that was it, given the country was only two years removed from the 1948 war, and the IDF was quite limited in its capabilities; however, despite the opinion of leaders on the left of the governing coalition that Israel should pursue Swiss-style neutrality in the Cold War, other members of the Cabinet - including PM David Ben Gurion - were in favor of Israel committing troops.
After internal debate, and pressure from the US and elsewhere, the Israelis agreed to provide economic aid to the government of the Republic of Korea, but that's as far as Israeli overt involvement went. Ben Gurion won a resolution of support of the UN support in the Parliament of 68-20. Ben-Gurion then proposed to the cabinet that Israel send troops; after further debate, the Cabinet unanimously opposed the proposal, which led to a comment from Ben Gurion that "
even the majority has the right to be mistaken.”
So that's the history; here's the PoD - two years earlier, Col. David "Mickey" Marcus (USMA, Class of 1924), and veteran of the US Army in WW2, who then volunteered for the Haganah and was named the first general officer in what became the Israeli forces, is NOT killed in a friendly fire incident in June, 1948. So in
this reality, Marcus helps set up the IDF as a somewhat more professional and Western-oriented force in 1948-50, and is still serving in 1950 as a military advisor to Ben Gurion - who, historically, called Marcus "the best man we had."
Marcus reinforces Ben Gurion's instinct that for the IDF to participate in Korea under UN Command will only be a positive for Israel's foreign relations with the West, and despite being almost 50, offers to take a volunteer battalion of IDF soldiers, equipped to US Army standards, to Korea. He points out that for Israel to do so, at a time when the Arab states are all claiming neutrality, will only make the contrast obvious. He also points out this an opportunity for the next generation of IDF officers and men to gain experience in conventional operations. The Cabinet, after some debate, agrees, and the unit is offered to the US. The Truman administration agrees, Marcus recruits a picked battalion, presumably drawing heavily upon men with experience in the Allied forces during WW2, and the Israeli Battalion (like those offered by Belgium, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, the Netherlands, the Philippines, and Thailand) arrives in Korea in 1950-51, and is attached as an "extra" infantry battalion to one of the US divisions in 8th Army, and shares its experience over the next three years.
See:
https://in.bgu.ac.il/bgi/israelis/DocLib/Pages/2015/She.pdf
and
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23739770.2010.11446616?journalCode=rifa20
and
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/mickey-marcus
So, the questions - it's a stretch given the realities of Israeli internal politics in 1950, but any thoughts on the chances? On the future of Israeli-Western and Israeli-US relations in the 1950s and 1960s? (We all know what happened after '67).
Here's another one - does an Israeli commitment to the UN lead to (for example) a similar commitment from one or more of the frontline Arab states? If so, are Egypt and/or Jordan the most likely?
If so, does this lead to a
less hostile Southwest Asia? Is the US willing to ease the British and French out of the region, butterflying Suez in 1956?
If they above occurs, does the region become as much a cockpit of the Cold War as it did historically, and is the '67 war butterflied?
Further thoughts?