An IDF Battalion in the UN Command, Korean War?

Thanks for the post. Fair points, although there is another option, for Israel or Egypt, in terms of doing more than they did historically, if not to the extent of combat ground troops: aviation, maritime, or medical support.
  • South Africa provided a fighter squadron, initially with P-51s and then F-86s, that was attached to a US fighter wing.
  • Italy (NATO member), India (neutral), Norway (NATO member), Sweden (neutral), and Denmark (NATO member) all sent medical units; the Danes sent the hospital ship Jutlandia and the Indians actually sent an airborne (parachute-qualified) medical company, whose service included a combat jump by a dozen Indian Army medics attached to the US 187th Parachute Infantry Regiment.
Given the realities of US interest in walking a narrower path in the region in the 1950s than in the 1960s and afterward, I can see a possible path forward. God knows the results wouldn't have been any worse for the typical resident of Southwest Asia than what occurred historically.

The thing is you are using examples of states that were all basically pro-Western (NATO countries and even Sweden) and/or strongly anti-communist (South Africa).

The example of India could serve as a model..... But you would still need to clear the hurdle of how any Arab state is going to explain to protesters in the streets (and possibly its own military units) why military medical doctors are potentially saving the lives of Israeli soldiers in Korea.

Honestly it would be more interesting to see how the IDF battalion might have performed and the repercussions thereof than in trying to see how one can shoehorn in an Arab battalion to fight in Korea alongside an Israeli battalion given that its about as possible as India and Pakistan both joining the effort with combat battalions (and note Pakistan sent no forces, not even medical units unless I'm mistaken but didn't suffer from lack of opportunities to get US support) and for broadly similar reasons.

It's simply not in any Arab state's self interest to attempt to curry US favour and aid at the expense of being seen to be on the same side as Israel (ie. Public Enemy No. 1 after the events of 1947-1949). They can already attempt to gain support in other ways that don't risk the domestic shitstorm that this method would plus there is a strong presumption that these states were dying to get US aid at any price when that's just not how it worked.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
The thing is you are using examples of states that were all basically pro-Western (NATO countries and even Sweden) and/or strongly anti-communist (South Africa).

The example of India could serve as a model..... But you would still need to clear the hurdle of how any Arab state is going to explain to protesters in the streets (and possibly its own military units) why military medical doctors are potentially saving the lives of Israeli soldiers in Korea.

Honestly it would be more interesting to see how the IDF battalion might have performed and the repercussions thereof than in trying to see how one can shoehorn in an Arab battalion to fight in Korea alongside an Israeli battalion given that its about as possible as India and Pakistan both joining the effort with combat battalions (and note Pakistan sent no forces, not even medical units unless I'm mistaken but didn't suffer from lack of opportunities to get US support) and for broadly similar reasons.

It's simply not in any Arab state's self interest to attempt to curry US favour and aid at the expense of being seen to be on the same side as Israel (ie. Public Enemy No. 1 after the events of 1947-1949). They can already attempt to gain support in other ways that don't risk the domestic shitstorm that this method would plus there is a strong presumption that these states were dying to get US aid at any price when that's just not how it worked.

Well, if an Egyptian Army field ambulance goes to Korea, presumably they could be attached to the Turkish Brigade (itself attached, generally, to the US 25th Division) in a spirit of pan-Islamic amity, while the IDF battalion is attached to one of the other US divisions (1st Cavalry, 2nd, 3rd, 7th, and 24th infantry divisions, or the 1st Marine Division).

As far as how an IDF battalion would have performed, it would be a scratch but presumably volunteer force, with a reasonable cadre of senior officers and ncos with experience in the forces from WW II recruited in Palestine (3 infantry battalions and supporting elements saw service in Italy in 1944-45, after all), as well as others who had served in one or another army in WW II and emigrated to Palestine/Israel afterward, and men with experience in the '48 war and afterwards. If Marcus went as the battalion commander, given his US Army experience, the IDF battalion would actually have better knowledge of US doctrine and practices than any other of the smaller UN contingents; I expect he'd be the only West Pointer among the Allied battalion cos, for example.
 
Well, if an Egyptian Army field ambulance goes to Korea, presumably they could be attached to the Turkish Brigade (itself attached, generally, to the US 25th Division) in a spirit of pan-Islamic amity, while the IDF battalion is attached to one of the other US divisions (1st Cavalry, 2nd, 3rd, 7th, and 24th infantry divisions, or the 1st Marine Division).


And then how do the Egyptian authorities explain (to their (agitated and voting) population) what happens if an Israeli solider finds himself on stretcher in front of an Egyptian doctor?

More importantly, given that even the Wafd Party was losing popular support because it wasn't nationalistic enough towards the British in the 1930s (a factor I'm sure in their abrogation of the 1936 Treaty in 1951 - a move hinted at from November 1950 and likely aimed at winning back the nationalist base they were losing (and which was temporarily successful, but they unleashed more than they could handle and ended up directing nationalist focus to the total removal of the British from the Suez Canal Zone)) and given this:

The Egyptian monarchy was seen as both corrupt and pro-British, with its lavish lifestyle that seemed provocative to the free officers movement who lived in poverty. Its policies completed the image of the Egyptian government being a puppet-figure in the hands of the British government. Promoting the feeling of corruption of several Egyptian institutions such as the police, the palace and even the political parties by the free officers. Despite allegations of anti-British sentiment, a CIA document dated 23 July 1952 stated that the dissatisfaction within the army over corruption in high command began in 1948 after the discovery of an arms scandal during the Palestine conflict.[2] The loss of the 1948 war with Israel led to the free officers' blame of the King and their promotion of that feeling among the Egyptian people.[2] Tensions between the military and the monarchy resulted in the removal and arrest of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces Haidar Pasha, Chief of Staff Harid Pasha and other high-ranking officers.[2] However, scandal subsided over time and the King was able to eventually reappoint Haidar and Harid to their old positions.[2]

It's difficult to see who in the Egyptian government would think of sending any Egyptian military personnel (whether a doctor, nurse or even just a few orderlies) to Korea in the knowledge that an IDF battalion is already there and a large British force is there too. That move alone would likely be well used as electoral fodder by the time the 1955 elections were due.

One needs to recall too that Free Officers Movement was established in 1949.

There's also this (Egypt from Independence to Revolution, 1919-1952 by Selma Botman) (which at this point is discussing Egyptian issues with the continuing British military presence (which also resulted in a violent incident on February 21, 1946 when British troops fired on demonstrators after the demonstrators attacked British armoured cars that were passing through the area of the demonstrations (which until then had been peaceful)) and the Egyptian desire for a British withdrawal from Sudan):

.....Al-Nuqrashi returned to the prime minstry. He took Egypt's case before the Security Council of United Nations in 1947 to appease nationalist feelings in the country and defend Egypt's interests. His voice was barely heard, and the coucil recommended a resumption of negotiations, to the extreme disappoint of all political groups in Eygpt. This type of ineffectual performance made it increasingly clear that the traditional parties were incapable of solving the national question.

Nationalist pride was further bruised by Egypt's performance in the Palestine War of 1948. The population became even more alienated from Egypt's political leadership as a result of the "munitions scandal" in which defective military equipment left over from World War II had been purchased by the palace, high military officials and some politicians and supplied to Egyptians troops fighting in Palestine. The unscrupulous behaviour of supposedly respectable government officials and the embarassing weakness of the Egyptian army precipitated the formation of the Free Officers movement by young, low-ranking military officers who felt themselves betrayed by their superior officers and political leaders...

Egyptian attempts to pressure/battle the British to give up the Suez Canal continued right through 1951 and 1952 and peaked in January 1952. On January 19, Egyptian commandos struck the Tel al-Kabir (the largest British garrison) and a 12 hour battle ensued leaving 50-60 Egyptian commandos dead. On January 25, the British attacked a police station in Ismailiyya (a centre of anti-British activity) and the result was 50 dead Egyptians.


Given the domestic situation you are essentially suggesting that:

1. A King who has just emerged from the scandal of the failure of Egyptian forces in Palestine and who is regularly seen as being pro-British and possibly a British stooge would be okay with an Egyptian field ambulance being sent to a conflict on the same side as the British and Israeli soldiers

2. That a nationalist party that had just been returned to government in the 1950 elections (before Korea) on the back of nationalist resentment over the loss in Palestine, the continued stonewalling of the British in Suez and Sudan and which was agitating against the British in Suez would agree to send an Egyptian field ambulance to a conflict on the same side as the British and Israeli soldiers.

3. That following on the Munitions Scandal and loss in Palestine that precipitated the formation of the movement that wished to overthrow the King and root out corruption, that the Egyptian government would be able to send a field ambulance to Korea in 1950.


The outcome of such a move is likely outright Revolution and the withdrawal of the field ambulance. So the Free Officers Movement get their ranks swollen by the move, and probably get a figure like Muhammad Naguib to help with a coup in 1950 rather than 1952.

On the other hand the domestic situation and problems with both the British and the Israelis likely means that no Egyptian government in 1950 would be sending any Egyptian forces (even janitors) to Korea in 1950.



As far as how an IDF battalion would have performed, it would be a scratch but presumably volunteer force, with a reasonable cadre of senior officers and ncos with experience in the forces from WW II recruited in Palestine (3 infantry battalions and supporting elements saw service in Italy in 1944-45, after all), as well as others who had served in one or another army in WW II and emigrated to Palestine/Israel afterward, and men with experience in the '48 war and afterwards. If Marcus went as the battalion commander, given his US Army experience, the IDF battalion would actually have better knowledge of US doctrine and practices than any other of the smaller UN contingents; I expect he'd be the only West Pointer among the Allied battalion cos, for example.

Which might affect Israeli doctrine after Korea as well.....
 
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Dave Shoup

Banned
More importantly, given that even the Wafd Party was losing popular support because it wasn't nationalistic enough towards the British in the 1930s (a factor I'm sure in their abrogation of the 1936 Treaty in 1951 - a move hinted at from November 1950 and likely aimed at winning back the nationalist base they were losing (and which was temporarily successful, but they unleashed more than they could handle and ended up directing nationalist focus to the total removal of the British from the Suez Canal Zone)) ... It's difficult to see who in the Egyptian government would think of sending any Egyptian military personnel (whether a doctor, nurse or even just a few orderlies) to Korea in the knowledge that an IDF battalion is already there and a large British force is there too. That move alone would likely be well used as electoral fodder by the time the 1955 elections were due.

Which might affect Israeli doctrine after Korea as well.....

All fair enough. Guess it will have to be left to Turks ... although given their experience with the Soviets in 1945-46, maybe the Iranians can be induced to "compete" with the Israelis?

As far as the Israelis go, they're still going to have to depend on an expansible reserves-based army with national service and a small professional cadre, and an ever-increasingly capable air force. Diplomatically, with a closer relationship with the US from 1950 onwards, maybe they chose to pass on the Anglo-French illusion in 1956? That would have been a good move.
 
All fair enough. Guess it will have to be left to Turks ... although given their experience with the Soviets in 1945-46, maybe the Iranians can be induced to "compete" with the Israelis?

That may be a stronger possibility! Iran (like India and Yugoslavia) opposed the Palestinian partition out of fears that it would cause generations of violence and preferred a single federal Jewish-Arab state instead. However it maintained friendly relations with Israel after its establishment and was the second Muslim country after Turkey to recognize Israel in March 1950. Iranian relations with Turkey were fairly good and like Ethiopia, Iran could look back on the late 1940s as a time when American pressure helped to reduce both Soviet and British influence in the country. The recent Soviet attempts to peel off bits of northern Iran would also be quite fresh and Iran would clearly have an interest in countering a communist threat. So at that point in 1950 it wouldn't have any particular issues with sending perhaps at least a medical unit that would serve in Korea alongside an IDF battalion and British forces (they may not like the British, but they aren't engaged in periodic fire-fights with British forces like the Egyptians were from 1946-1956).

In fact it would be interesting to determine why Iran didn't send any personnel historically to Korea.


As far as the Israelis go, they're still going to have to depend on an expansible reserves-based army with national service and a small professional cadre, and an ever-increasingly capable air force. Diplomatically, with a closer relationship with the US from 1950 onwards, maybe they chose to pass on the Anglo-French illusion in 1956? That would have been a good move.

Passing on the Anglo-French plans might well have been a better move indeed. This seems to be a point where it could go either way since Israeli forces would have been fighting and possibly interacting with US, British and French forces so links would likely have deepened with all 3. However the question then arises what the British and French will do regarding Egypt as tensions had been simmering since the late 1940s.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
That may be a stronger possibility! Iran (like India and Yugoslavia) opposed the Palestinian partition out of fears that it would cause generations of violence and preferred a single federal Jewish-Arab state instead. However it maintained friendly relations with Israel after its establishment and was the second Muslim country after Turkey to recognize Israel in March 1950. Iranian relations with Turkey were fairly good and like Ethiopia, Iran could look back on the late 1940s as a time when American pressure helped to reduce both Soviet and British influence in the country. The recent Soviet attempts to peel off bits of northern Iran would also be quite fresh and Iran would clearly have an interest in countering a communist threat. So at that point in 1950 it wouldn't have any particular issues with sending perhaps at least a medical unit that would serve in Korea alongside an IDF battalion and British forces (they may not like the British, but they aren't engaged in periodic fire-fights with British forces like the Egyptians were from 1946-1956).

In fact it would be interesting to determine why Iran didn't send any personnel historically to Korea.

Passing on the Anglo-French plans might well have been a better move indeed. This seems to be a point where it could go either way since Israeli forces would have been fighting and possibly interacting with US, British and French forces so links would likely have deepened with all 3. However the question then arises what the British and French will do regarding Egypt as tensions had been simmering since the late 1940s.

Regarding Iran, dunno; looked at the US State Department historian's site, but nothing obvious came up in a search. The postwar US Military Mission to Iran began in 1947, and the US and Iran signed a mutual assistance pact in 1951, to the tune of about $16 million in aid in 1949-52, so presumably there were already some military ties. Given H.A. Razmara's career as a professional officer, educated in the West, perhaps he'd have advocated for an Iranian volunteer medical unit under UN Command.

If the US opposes any Anglo-French adventurism and the Israelis don't line up with them either, seems unlikely even Eden and Mollet would have foolish enough to go forward with it.
 
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