An IDF Battalion in the UN Command, Korean War?

Dave Shoup

Banned
Historically, Israel leadership was divided about support for the UN (and by extension, for the US) in 1950. Israeli diplomatically supported the UN Security Council's decision to intervene, but that was it, given the country was only two years removed from the 1948 war, and the IDF was quite limited in its capabilities; however, despite the opinion of leaders on the left of the governing coalition that Israel should pursue Swiss-style neutrality in the Cold War, other members of the Cabinet - including PM David Ben Gurion - were in favor of Israel committing troops.

After internal debate, and pressure from the US and elsewhere, the Israelis agreed to provide economic aid to the government of the Republic of Korea, but that's as far as Israeli overt involvement went. Ben Gurion won a resolution of support of the UN support in the Parliament of 68-20. Ben-Gurion then proposed to the cabinet that Israel send troops; after further debate, the Cabinet unanimously opposed the proposal, which led to a comment from Ben Gurion that "even the majority has the right to be mistaken.”

So that's the history; here's the PoD - two years earlier, Col. David "Mickey" Marcus (USMA, Class of 1924), and veteran of the US Army in WW2, who then volunteered for the Haganah and was named the first general officer in what became the Israeli forces, is NOT killed in a friendly fire incident in June, 1948. So in this reality, Marcus helps set up the IDF as a somewhat more professional and Western-oriented force in 1948-50, and is still serving in 1950 as a military advisor to Ben Gurion - who, historically, called Marcus "the best man we had."

Marcus reinforces Ben Gurion's instinct that for the IDF to participate in Korea under UN Command will only be a positive for Israel's foreign relations with the West, and despite being almost 50, offers to take a volunteer battalion of IDF soldiers, equipped to US Army standards, to Korea. He points out that for Israel to do so, at a time when the Arab states are all claiming neutrality, will only make the contrast obvious. He also points out this an opportunity for the next generation of IDF officers and men to gain experience in conventional operations. The Cabinet, after some debate, agrees, and the unit is offered to the US. The Truman administration agrees, Marcus recruits a picked battalion, presumably drawing heavily upon men with experience in the Allied forces during WW2, and the Israeli Battalion (like those offered by Belgium, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, the Netherlands, the Philippines, and Thailand) arrives in Korea in 1950-51, and is attached as an "extra" infantry battalion to one of the US divisions in 8th Army, and shares its experience over the next three years.

See:

https://in.bgu.ac.il/bgi/israelis/DocLib/Pages/2015/She.pdf

and

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23739770.2010.11446616?journalCode=rifa20

and
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/mickey-marcus

So, the questions - it's a stretch given the realities of Israeli internal politics in 1950, but any thoughts on the chances? On the future of Israeli-Western and Israeli-US relations in the 1950s and 1960s? (We all know what happened after '67).

Here's another one - does an Israeli commitment to the UN lead to (for example) a similar commitment from one or more of the frontline Arab states? If so, are Egypt and/or Jordan the most likely?

If so, does this lead to a less hostile Southwest Asia? Is the US willing to ease the British and French out of the region, butterflying Suez in 1956?

If they above occurs, does the region become as much a cockpit of the Cold War as it did historically, and is the '67 war butterflied?

Further thoughts?
 
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Well that would certainly be interesting. I would imagine that this volunteer battalion would form the core of a mountain warfare unit upon return and would likely see operations in Lebanon and Syria if war broke out in the north in the 1950s and 1960s.


Wouldn't an Israeli commitment mean it was less likely that an Arab state become committed?
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Well that would certainly be interesting. I would imagine that this volunteer battalion would form the core of a mountain warfare unit upon return and would likely see operations in Lebanon and Syria if war broke out in the north in the 1950s and 1960s. Wouldn't an Israeli commitment mean it was less likely that an Arab state become committed?

Agreed; presumably the Golani Brigade is well-represented in the IDF Battalion in Korea, and the veterans of the IDF Battalion from Korea are well-represented in the Golani Brigade afterwards.

My thought is if the Israelis make a commitment under UN auspices, one or more of the frontline Arab states - seeing the potential diplomatic payoff - is willing to "compete" ... think the Turks and Greeks, historically; the Greeks actually offered a brigade, as an equivalent to the Turkish Brigade, but the logistics were such the US asked for a battalion instead. Given that, one would think either an Egyptian volunteer battalion, or a Jordanian one - presumably drawing heavily on Arab Legion veterans - would be in the realm of possibility.

One could also probably "nudge" the Egyptians somewhat with the Ethiopian example, as well.
 
My thought is if the Israelis make a commitment under UN auspices, one or more of the frontline Arab states - seeing the potential diplomatic payoff - is willing to "compete" ... think the Turks and Greeks, historically; the Greeks actually offered a brigade, as an equivalent to the Turkish Brigade, but the logistics were such the US asked for a battalion instead. Given that, one would think either an Egyptian volunteer battalion, or a Jordanian one - presumably drawing heavily on Arab Legion veterans - would be in the realm of possibility.

One could also probably "nudge" the Egyptians somewhat with the Ethiopian example, as well.

The problem with the Greek/Turkish example is that Greece and Turkey were both clearly in the Western camp and though rivals, they last fought a war 28 years before. So basically there has been a new generation that has not lived the experience of a Greco-Turkish War, and indeed that current generation instead has lived through World War II and communist machinations against both Greece (Greek communists and the civil war) and Turkey (Soviet designs on Turkish territory).

Those factors are lacking with Israel and Egypt/Jordan since they last experienced a war just a year before. There is still a LOT of bad blood. And unlike Greece and Turkey none of those states have really every faced a concerted communist threat by this point (which I would imagine had been a very, very large factor in their neutrality). I would expect that Israel throwing in with the UN forces in Korea would likely see Israel becoming to be seen as very much a Western nation and the Arab states would be drawn closer to the Soviet Union. This would also likely sour relations between the USSR and Israel a few years earlier (and maybe drive Stalin's paranoia in his later years about Jewish Doctors even more). Upshot is that Egypt probably enters an arms deal with the USSR (via an Eastern European satellite like Czechoslovakia) even earlier than it did in 1955 (perhaps in 1953 or 1954 shortly after the 1952 Revolution in Egypt). This might lead to an earlier attempt by the USA and UK to win Egypt back with financial aid for the Aswan Dam (so maybe the Dam gets completed sooner) but end result might still be something like the Suez Crisis, only now Israel has very recent experience of having had some of its soldiers fighting alongside the British and the French.

However the dynamics that lead to Suez in OTL in 1956 were (in only a very minor way) influenced by the tussle for leadership of the Arab World and Nasser's views of the Hashemite states (Jordan and Iraq) as rivals. This would be lessened in TTL because in TTL I don't expect that Iraq would sign up to the OTL CENTO/Baghdad Pact (though signing defensive agreements with Iran and Pakistan seem possible as well as maintaining the then defence relations with the UK much as how Hussein of Jordan couldn't join CENTO because of popular demonstrations against doing so but assured the British in private that he would adhere to the traditional Hashemite-British alliance), but still Nasser (who is still likely to come to power) will be challenging British interests in the 1950s and the British will variously be trying to mend fences (withdrawing from Suez and Sudan) or plotting against him.
 
Lots of Israelis die horribly and China aids the Arabs, giving them lots of offensive weapons unlike the USSR. Egypt, Syria both have advanced missile programmes and maybe even nukes.
Mossad going the old “ kill the scientists” is going to result in the Chinese making diplomatic postings very much unfun for Israeli foreign service.

It would be a monumentally stupid thing for Israel.
 
Lots of Israelis die horribly and China aids the Arabs, giving them lots of offensive weapons unlike the USSR. Egypt, Syria both have advanced missile programmes and maybe even nukes.
Mossad going the old “ kill the scientists” is going to result in the Chinese making diplomatic postings very much unfun for Israeli foreign service.

It would be a monumentally stupid thing for Israel.

Over a single Battalion? I'm pretty sure the Chinese have more important things to worry about.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Agreed. Besides, Israel and the PRC didn't have full diplomatic relations until 1992, anyways.

Lots of Israelis die horribly and China aids the Arabs, giving them lots of offensive weapons unlike the USSR. Egypt, Syria both have advanced missile programmes and maybe even nukes.
Mossad going the old “ kill the scientists” is going to result in the Chinese making diplomatic postings very much unfun for Israeli foreign service.

It would be a monumentally stupid thing for Israel.

Over a single Battalion? I'm pretty sure the Chinese have more important things to worry about.

And the Chinese didn't split with the Soviets until ~1960, and didn't have a nuclear weapon until 1964.
 
And the Chinese didn't split with the Soviets until ~1960, and didn't have a nuclear weapon until 1964.

Not to mention I'm doubting a China in the middle of the Great Leap Forwards or Cultural Revolution would be that great an ally for the Arab states...
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
The problem with the Greek/Turkish example is that Greece and Turkey were both clearly in the Western camp and though rivals, they last fought a war 28 years before. So basically there has been a new generation that has not lived the experience of a Greco-Turkish War, and indeed that current generation instead has lived through World War II and communist machinations against both Greece (Greek communists and the civil war) and Turkey (Soviet designs on Turkish territory). Those factors are lacking with Israel and Egypt/Jordan since they last experienced a war just a year before. There is still a LOT of bad blood. And unlike Greece and Turkey none of those states have really every faced a concerted communist threat by this point (which I would imagine had been a very, very large factor in their neutrality). I would expect that Israel throwing in with the UN forces in Korea would likely see Israel becoming to be seen as very much a Western nation and the Arab states would be drawn closer to the Soviet Union. This would also likely sour relations between the USSR and Israel a few years earlier (and maybe drive Stalin's paranoia in his later years about Jewish Doctors even more). Upshot is that Egypt probably enters an arms deal with the USSR (via an Eastern European satellite like Czechoslovakia) even earlier than it did in 1955 (perhaps in 1953 or 1954 shortly after the 1952 Revolution in Egypt). This might lead to an earlier attempt by the USA and UK to win Egypt back with financial aid for the Aswan Dam (so maybe the Dam gets completed sooner) but end result might still be something like the Suez Crisis, only now Israel has very recent experience of having had some of its soldiers fighting alongside the British and the French. However the dynamics that lead to Suez in OTL in 1956 were (in only a very minor way) influenced by the tussle for leadership of the Arab World and Nasser's views of the Hashemite states (Jordan and Iraq) as rivals. This would be lessened in TTL because in TTL I don't expect that Iraq would sign up to the OTL CENTO/Baghdad Pact (though signing defensive agreements with Iran and Pakistan seem possible as well as maintaining the then defence relations with the UK much as how Hussein of Jordan couldn't join CENTO because of popular demonstrations against doing so but assured the British in private that he would adhere to the traditional Hashemite-British alliance), but still Nasser (who is still likely to come to power) will be challenging British interests in the 1950s and the British will variously be trying to mend fences (withdrawing from Suez and Sudan) or plotting against him.

In 1950, seems like the collective security argument (i.e., lots of US aid) might be enough for the Egyptians, especially if Ben Gurion is getting tangible results for making an IDF battalion happen. Not a huge "Soviet" threat to Colombia, Ethiopia, Thailand, or the Philippines in 1950, and although they all had internal issues, all four of the "small" non-NATO powers that contributed combat troops to the UN order of battle managed to do it. The Colombians relieved their battalion four times and contributed a frigate, as well.

Egypt was a founding member state of the UN in 1945, as were Colombia and Ethiopia. Jordan didn't join until 1955, so presumably they're out of the mix.

There's a minor butterfly for 1952 - and afterwards - here as well - if the Egyptians contribute a battalion in 1950-51, who are the officers? Nasser and Sadat were both serving officers, and infantry specialists as much as anything. Naguib stepping down to command a battalion, along the lines of Magrin-Vernerey, is probably the best choice, with Nasser or Sadat as his executive officer. Saad al-Shazly, historically, formed the first Egyptian airborne battalion in 1955, so perhaps he's a company commander.
 
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Dave Shoup

Banned
Not to mention I'm doubting a China in the middle of the Great Leap Forwards or Cultural Revolution would be that great an ally for the Arab states...

True that.

None of the Arab states liked the British, but they liked the French and the Russians even less. If the US can get even one frontline state aboard for Korea through the UN and collective security, there are - potentially - some significant ripples. Likewise, if the US can avoid making Israel the favorite in that part of the world, that could do a huge amount to retaining the honest broker role the US had tried to portray itself as in the region, going back to the King-Crane Commission. Eisenhower tried as late as 1956-57, after all, so it was far from a foregone conclusion...
 
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Dave Shoup

Banned
@Chris S explains it well, so need need for me to restate the obvious. USSR becomes even more involved and supports the Arab States.

Dunno; historically, it took quite a few steps - multiple coups, the formation of CENTO, the Canal crisis, the '56 war, the Aswan saga, the UAR saga, etc. - before Egypt and Syria moved from neutrality with significant Western ties to becoming full client states of the Soviets, and even then then one of the former young officers was willing to kick the Soviets out of Egypt, given enough incentives.

Speaking of which, no better way to get some Young Officers out of Egypt then sending them halfway around the world to defend the rights of small neutrals under the UN Charter, is there? ;)

And from the Soviet side, in an era where they are still rebuilding from WW II AND there's a proxy war in northeast Asia with a substantial need for Soviet airpower, AND NATO is being stood up, they may decide to go slow in Southwest Asia; it's not like they had the sealift and airlift capabilities in 1950 they had in 1960 (much less 1970). The Syrians were flying Meteors as their front-line fighter in the '56 war, as an example; MiGs were on their way, but there would not have been any to spare in 1950.

And a sure way to cement US economic assistance during the Cold War was a willingness to pony up troops; if the Israelis and the Egyptians had done so in 1950-51, there's certainly a path toward a type and level of US involvement in the region that might prevent the worst of the US-Soviet proxy conflict that arose historically.
 
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In 1950, seems like the collective security argument (i.e., lots of US aid) might be enough for the Egyptians, especially if Ben Gurion is getting tangible results for making an IDF battalion happen. Not a huge "Soviet" threat to Colombia, Ethiopia, Thailand, or the Philippines in 1950,

Except for Ethiopia, all four of those had a traditional defensive treaty with the US or were intimately linked to the US militarily - the Philippines only got independence in 1946 after the shared experience of WWII, Colombia was party to the Rio Treaty. Thailand has a had a long and friendly history with the US. The Thai declaration of war on the US and UK in 1942 resulted in no US declaration of war on Thailand and throughout the war the US helped organize the Free Thai Movement and at the end didn't deal with Thailand as a defeated enemy.

Even with Ethiopia, it was US pressure in the 1940s that helped end the British treatment of Ethiopia as a defeated enemy territory after the end of the East Africa campaign and end the arrangements that turned Ethiopia into little more than a British protectorate.

Ethiopia itself would likely have been very, very cognizant of how the failure of collective security in the League of Nations paved the way for Italy to conquer Ethiopia in the 1930s. So it should be little surprise that Ethiopia was among those to respond to a UN call for collective security.


Egypt comes from an entirely different background. It was a battlefield for the Italians and British but that was really two outside powers fighting it out on their land. Up to that point the British had negotiated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 but in 1945 (very shortly after WWII ended) the Egyptian government demanded the modification of the treaty to terminate the British military presence, and also to allow the annexation of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Following the Wafd Party's victory in the boycotted 1950 election of Egypt, the new Wafd government unilaterally abrogated the treaty in October 1951. Egypt didn't like the treaty because it still left the British with too much control. Added on to that, US relations with Egypt were pretty much non-existent unlike with say Colombia, Thailand or the Philippines and unlike Ethiopia, Egypt couldn't think back to a past instance in the 1940s where the US helped pressure the UK into restoring its independence (on the contrary the US stayed out of the whole Anglo-Egyptian saga from 1936 onwards except when it came to Allied efforts to defeat the Italians and Germans in North Africa).

On top of all of that is that the fact that the Arab world was outraged by the UN General Assembly Resolution on Palestine in 1947. No Muslim majority country (including all of the Arab countries then a part of the UN) had voted in favour of the resolution. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Turkey all voted against the resolution to partition Palestine. Egypt was also the only member of the UN Securty Council to vote against Israeli membership of the UN in 1949 and the same 10 countries I listed a couple of sentences before either voted against Israeli membership in the General Assembly or abstained (Turkey) in 1949.

Fast forward a couple of years and this comes back into play as while Egypt voted for UN Security Council Resolution 82 (which condemned the North Korean attack and demanded that North Korea cease the attacks and withdraw) it (Egypt) basically abstained from UNSC Resolutions 83 and 84 which called on and organized a UN military response to North Korea's invasion.

So Egypt wasn't happy with the British or the UN in the 1950s because of Suez, Sudan and Palestine/Israel and the 1936 Treaty.

You simply aren't going to get Egypt/Iraq/Syria/Lebanon/Saudi Arabia/Yemen to actively send soldiers to die fighting alongside Israeli soldiers in 1950 in Korea. At best you can either get Israeli soldiers under UN command in Korea or you can get Egyptian/Iraqi/Syrian/Lebanese/Saudi/Yemeni soldiers under UN command but you can't get both without a radically different 1945-1950. The POD you outlined with Marcus surviving simply isn't going to be enough.

EDIT: While securing US assistance by providing troops to wars involving the US is likely to be recognized, the Egyptian King and Hashemite monarchs of Jordan and Iraq aren't stupid. They also know the quickest way to having their monarchies ended and republics established via coups is to be seen sending their soldiers to fight alongside Israelis just over a year after they a ceasefire came into play between them and the Israelis. The demonstrations and public rioting that prevented Hussein of Jordan from joining CENTO will be nothing compared to outright rebellion in Cairo/Damascus/Baghdad/Beirut that would follow the news that local soldiers were going to fight with the UN in Korea alongside the Israelis.

In fact, I would expect that if any Arab country sent soldiers first, their contingent would be withdrawn upon the news of the Israelis sending a contingent.
 
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Interesting concept with a cool POD.

I would imagine that Israel joining the American camp earlier and so emphatically would lead to the Arab nations jumping into the Soviet camp earlier and more deliberately, as other people have pointed out. Expect the nature of the Israeli-Arab Conflict to be even more of a proxy-war than OTL- perhaps the Suez Crisis sees American support for the Anglo-Franco-Israeli intervention since the alternative would be to leave the invaluable Suez Canal in the hands of an explicitly pro-Soviet Egypt.
 
Agreed; presumably the Golani Brigade is well-represented in the IDF Battalion in Korea, and the veterans of the IDF Battalion from Korea are well-represented in the Golani Brigade afterwards.

My thought is if the Israelis make a commitment under UN auspices, one or more of the frontline Arab states - seeing the potential diplomatic payoff - is willing to "compete" ... think the Turks and Greeks, historically; the Greeks actually offered a brigade, as an equivalent to the Turkish Brigade, but the logistics were such the US asked for a battalion instead. Given that, one would think either an Egyptian volunteer battalion, or a Jordanian one - presumably drawing heavily on Arab Legion veterans - would be in the realm of possibility.

One could also probably "nudge" the Egyptians somewhat with the Ethiopian example, as well.

Greece and Turkey were actually allied at the time and trying to join NATO together (and supporting each others candidacy). They offered troops for Korea,in part at least to support their candidacies for NATO..
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
On top of all of that is that the fact that the Arab world was outraged by the UN General Assembly Resolution on Palestine in 1947. No Muslim majority country (including all of the Arab countries then a part of the UN) had voted in favour of the resolution. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Turkey all voted against the resolution to partition Palestine. Egypt was also the only member of the UN Securty Council to vote against Israeli membership of the UN in 1949 and the same 10 countries I listed a couple of sentences before either voted against Israeli membership in the General Assembly or abstained (Turkey) in 1949.

Fast forward a couple of years and this comes back into play as while Egypt voted for UN Security Council Resolution 82 (which condemned the North Korean attack and demanded that North Korea cease the attacks and withdraw) it (Egypt) basically abstained from UNSC Resolutions 83 and 84 which called on and organized a UN military response to North Korea's invasion.

EDIT: While securing US assistance by providing troops to wars involving the US is likely to be recognized, the Egyptian King and Hashemite monarchs of Jordan and Iraq aren't stupid. They also know the quickest way to having their monarchies ended and republics established via coups is to be seen sending their soldiers to fight alongside Israelis just over a year after they a ceasefire came into play between them and the Israelis. The demonstrations and public rioting that prevented Hussein of Jordan from joining CENTO will be nothing compared to outright rebellion in Cairo/Damascus/Baghdad/Beirut that would follow the news that local soldiers were going to fight with the UN in Korea alongside the Israelis.

In fact, I would expect that if any Arab country sent soldiers first, their contingent would be withdrawn upon the news of the Israelis sending a contingent.

Thanks for the post. Fair points, although there is another option, for Israel or Egypt, in terms of doing more than they did historically, if not to the extent of combat ground troops: aviation, maritime, or medical support.
  • South Africa provided a fighter squadron, initially with P-51s and then F-86s, that was attached to a US fighter wing.
  • Italy (NATO member), India (neutral), Norway (NATO member), Sweden (neutral), and Denmark (NATO member) all sent medical units; the Danes sent the hospital ship Jutlandia and the Indians actually sent an airborne (parachute-qualified) medical company, whose service included a combat jump by a dozen Indian Army medics attached to the US 187th Parachute Infantry Regiment.
Given the realities of US interest in walking a narrower path in the region in the 1950s than in the 1960s and afterward, I can see a possible path forward. God knows the results wouldn't have been any worse for the typical resident of Southwest Asia than what occurred historically.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Interesting concept with a cool POD.

I would imagine that Israel joining the American camp earlier and so emphatically would lead to the Arab nations jumping into the Soviet camp earlier and more deliberately, as other people have pointed out. Expect the nature of the Israeli-Arab Conflict to be even more of a proxy-war than OTL- perhaps the Suez Crisis sees American support for the Anglo-Franco-Israeli intervention since the alternative would be to leave the invaluable Suez Canal in the hands of an explicitly pro-Soviet Egypt.

Thanks; always find it somewhat more realistic to at least consider the historical personalities for a POD than simply a "reasons." handwave. And Col. Marcus seems like an interesting character. ;)

The question I'd have would be if the Israelis do participate under UN command, given the abilities of the Arab frontline states to (historically) play the West and the Soviets off against each other from (say) 1955-95, I'm not quite as willing to condemn the Arab frontline governments of not seeing the possibilities of supporting "poor little Korea" under a UN banner in terms of gaining real positives with the West generally and the US in particular. And considering the realities of the East-West correlation of forces in the 1950s (as opposed to the 1960s), I'm not sure that a) the Soviets can spare much, realistically, or b) the Americans - especially under pragmatists, notably Eisenhower - would not be willing to spread more of the USAID and MDAP goodness around.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Greece and Turkey were actually allied at the time and trying to join NATO together (and supporting each others candidacy). They offered troops for Korea,in part at least to support their candidacies for NATO..

True. All that useful American cash and material aid didn't hurt, either. Same dynamic, presumably, would at least be considered in 1950, as far as the cost/benefit sheet goes for the Israelis and the Egyptians.
 
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