Deleted member 1487
Edit: First section excised for revisions after new information was brought to my attention
In the west, the situation had changed dramatically. Crown Prince Rupprecht was furious that his planned offensive against the French to follow up his success to date had been cancelled. When the French had been thrown back by his riposte and retreated, they called off the invasion of Alsace-Lorraine. Rupprecht saw a chance to make his mark in history, but now he was reduced to the ignominy of defense while his army was stripped on the necessary units. The general staff had decided that attacking the French in their fortified positions would simply result in similar casualties to what had been just experienced by the enemy. Besides, the excess divisions of the 6th and 7th armies were needed in the north to support Bülow and Kluck. Reinforcements that had been planned for Rupprecht plus an additional three corps were taken from the army group of only 16 divisions. The neutered force would remain on the frontier to hopefully lock French forces in. These units would make an important contribution when they were added to the forces surrounding Antwerp, as the very real risk remained that the garrison of 80,000 would sortee against the outnumbered besiegers and threaten the advance into northern France. Additionally a corps was sent to support Kluck’s 1st army, but they would have to advance by foot after reaching the limits of the rail line. These divisions would prove vital in the coming battles.
In the meantime, vast forces were crashing together in the Ardennes. Elements of the attacking Ruffey’s 3rd army and de Cary’s 4th army collided with the German 4th and 5th armies on the 21st of August. By the 22nd the full force of both army groups were smashing together, locked in the fight of their lives. The carnage of the battle has been graphically detailed in other histories, but suffice to say that for the men present on those days, hell had been unleashed on earth. By the evening of the 23rd a decision had been reached and the savaged forces of the French fell back on the Moselle through Sedan, Stenay, and Verdun. In the north the battle of Charleroi was raging as the German 2nd army established bridgeheads across the Sambre. Lanrezac’s 5th army was bearing the brunt of the attacks and by the 22nd was experiencing assaults by 3 corps of Bülow’s army on his entire front. The lack of artillery was hurting the 5th army, weakened by the transfer of units to Lorraine. Badly outnumbered and outgunned, the center around Charleroi began to fall back on the 23rd. The German 3rd army had in the meantime crossed the Meuse and launched attacks against the right wing of the French 5th, but this advance was checked and successfully counterattacked by a corps commanded by the energetic d’Esperey. Lanerzac was forced to withdraw after receiving the news that the 4th army had retreated from the Ardennes.
The BEF had begun to poke its nose into the battle on the 22nd, as cavalry recon had convinced John French that he was confronted with an inferior force. The eager general ordered his forces to join battle without realizing that he was inserting his outnumbered soldiers in the path of the 160,000 1st army of von Kluck. The Battle of Mons began on the 23rd and ended that evening with the plucky “Old Contemptibles” serving Kluck a bloody nose. The BEF was then allowed to disengage and fall back on the 24th, beginning the “Great Retreat”. The British and French forces would then retreat for 14 days, falling back as the Germans advanced on Paris and what they considered to be certain victory.
Further back in Koblenz, Falkenhayn had arrived during the afternoon of the 21st of August. Tired, but driven, he received his first briefing immediately after arriving. Appalled by the disorder and lack of insight into what was actually going on, he ordered the general staff to prepare to move out. Stunned, the staff began to protest, citing innumerable reasons to delay the relocation of the HQ, but none of this deterred the hoary minister of war; the simple lack of information was inexcusable. If he were to run this war information must be available. Part of the relocation involved dispatching representatives of the staff to the HQ’s of the various armies to find out what was going on. The most significant dispatch would be the assignment of Oberstleutnant Richard Hentsch to the staff of Alexander von Kluck of the 1st army.
In the west, the situation had changed dramatically. Crown Prince Rupprecht was furious that his planned offensive against the French to follow up his success to date had been cancelled. When the French had been thrown back by his riposte and retreated, they called off the invasion of Alsace-Lorraine. Rupprecht saw a chance to make his mark in history, but now he was reduced to the ignominy of defense while his army was stripped on the necessary units. The general staff had decided that attacking the French in their fortified positions would simply result in similar casualties to what had been just experienced by the enemy. Besides, the excess divisions of the 6th and 7th armies were needed in the north to support Bülow and Kluck. Reinforcements that had been planned for Rupprecht plus an additional three corps were taken from the army group of only 16 divisions. The neutered force would remain on the frontier to hopefully lock French forces in. These units would make an important contribution when they were added to the forces surrounding Antwerp, as the very real risk remained that the garrison of 80,000 would sortee against the outnumbered besiegers and threaten the advance into northern France. Additionally a corps was sent to support Kluck’s 1st army, but they would have to advance by foot after reaching the limits of the rail line. These divisions would prove vital in the coming battles.
In the meantime, vast forces were crashing together in the Ardennes. Elements of the attacking Ruffey’s 3rd army and de Cary’s 4th army collided with the German 4th and 5th armies on the 21st of August. By the 22nd the full force of both army groups were smashing together, locked in the fight of their lives. The carnage of the battle has been graphically detailed in other histories, but suffice to say that for the men present on those days, hell had been unleashed on earth. By the evening of the 23rd a decision had been reached and the savaged forces of the French fell back on the Moselle through Sedan, Stenay, and Verdun. In the north the battle of Charleroi was raging as the German 2nd army established bridgeheads across the Sambre. Lanrezac’s 5th army was bearing the brunt of the attacks and by the 22nd was experiencing assaults by 3 corps of Bülow’s army on his entire front. The lack of artillery was hurting the 5th army, weakened by the transfer of units to Lorraine. Badly outnumbered and outgunned, the center around Charleroi began to fall back on the 23rd. The German 3rd army had in the meantime crossed the Meuse and launched attacks against the right wing of the French 5th, but this advance was checked and successfully counterattacked by a corps commanded by the energetic d’Esperey. Lanerzac was forced to withdraw after receiving the news that the 4th army had retreated from the Ardennes.
The BEF had begun to poke its nose into the battle on the 22nd, as cavalry recon had convinced John French that he was confronted with an inferior force. The eager general ordered his forces to join battle without realizing that he was inserting his outnumbered soldiers in the path of the 160,000 1st army of von Kluck. The Battle of Mons began on the 23rd and ended that evening with the plucky “Old Contemptibles” serving Kluck a bloody nose. The BEF was then allowed to disengage and fall back on the 24th, beginning the “Great Retreat”. The British and French forces would then retreat for 14 days, falling back as the Germans advanced on Paris and what they considered to be certain victory.
Further back in Koblenz, Falkenhayn had arrived during the afternoon of the 21st of August. Tired, but driven, he received his first briefing immediately after arriving. Appalled by the disorder and lack of insight into what was actually going on, he ordered the general staff to prepare to move out. Stunned, the staff began to protest, citing innumerable reasons to delay the relocation of the HQ, but none of this deterred the hoary minister of war; the simple lack of information was inexcusable. If he were to run this war information must be available. Part of the relocation involved dispatching representatives of the staff to the HQ’s of the various armies to find out what was going on. The most significant dispatch would be the assignment of Oberstleutnant Richard Hentsch to the staff of Alexander von Kluck of the 1st army.
Last edited by a moderator: