An Alternate Kentucky Campaign of 1862?

i have always wondered why there are so many atl's of the civil war that mainly focus on the eastern theater, mainly gettysburg, antietam, etc. I know that there are some atl's for the west, mainly shiolh, vicksburg, and the atlanta campaign, but has anyone seriously consider how different the war might have gone if the Kentucky Campaign of 1862 had gone different?

For starters, one of the main reasons in my opinion that it failed was that not one person was in charge overseeing the cooperate of generals like bragg or kirby smith. How differnent would the confederate offensive had been if bragg had gotten along with someone other than kirby smith? Or, maybe Bragg would have pulled rank and told kirby smith that he was in charge and that smith obey him.

In my mind, there are so many possiblities of how different the campaign could have unfolded. Another example could be that Bragg tells Smith not to leave for Kentucky untill Bragg's enitre amry was at Chattanooga and then both forces would combined and either bing buell to battle and defeat him before the move into kentucky or march into kentucky and force buell to follow.

Does anyone think this plausable? Yes, no? Thoughts? Comments? How would this have worked?
 
Interesting question. I do not know enough about the campaign to speak reasonably about it. Assuming that Buell does not concentrate his forces sooner, the combined forces of Bragg and Smith should have had a chance at mauling whomever shows up to fight at Perryville. I do not know whether Bragg could sustain a larger army for much longer; I'm guessing that the geography of eastern Kentucky was not too kind on logistics. From the little I did read before writing this, Bragg may have done a little better on recruiting after such a victory, but he wasn't doing lots better. And there were still enough Union troops in the state (or even in Tennessee if it came to that) to slow or stop him from sweeping east to west.

The one interesting idea I see is that if Bragg is able to at least threaten eastern and central Kentucky into early 1863, it could take some Union troops away from the Vicksburg campaign.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Much responsibility for the failure to take Kentucky rests on the shoulders of Jefferson Davis. He never made it clear whether Smith was subject to Bragg's orders and just assumed that they'd work together effectively. What he should have done was specify unambiguously that Bragg was in command and Smith had to follow his orders.

Another potential POD is the infamous meeting of generals organized by Polk to decide whether or not they should obey Bragg's orders to strike north against the Union forces advancing on Frankfort. Call me crazy, but when the commanding general orders you to do something, you're supposed to do it. Now, it's entirely possible that this would have brought on a battle in which the Confederate would have been defeated, but it also might have resulted in a success.

In either case, what happened was basically a mutiny and the fact that it went unpunished taught the generals of the Army of Tennessee a lesson: they could obey or disobey orders as was their whim. This infected the army with a mindset that would spell doom in later campaigns and result in the loss of golden opportunities at places like McLemore's Cove, Cassville, and Spring Hill.
 
Then entire thing was a clusterf*ck. A POD comes to mind, and i'm not sure where it would lead. When the war had begun, two opposing regiments were raised in Lexington. There was almost a fight between them, but John Hunt Morgan managed to diffuse the situation. If fighting broke out, I have no idea where things would head, especially if the Confederates won. I might be wrong, but I'm pretty sure Hunt's raid was what brought about the KY campaign. A confederate success might spur one sooner.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
I might be wrong, but I'm pretty sure Hunt's raid was what brought about the KY campaign.

The grand reception that Morgan's men received from the people during their raid persuaded the Confederate authorities that the Kentuckians would rise up against the Federals if a major Confederate army entered the state. The big-wigs among the Kentucky Confederates, including Morgan, Buckner, and Breckinridge (the latter usually so level-headed) also fed this idea. As it was, Bragg met a reasonably warm reception when he entered Kentucky. Supplies were forthcoming and there were a lot of popular demonstrations of Confederate support. But there were relatively few recruits, certainly far less than had been expected. Smith, operating in the more pro-Union eastern part of the state, had a decidedly more icy reception.

Now, one wonders what might have happened if the Confederates had won a significant battlefield victory and been able to go into winter quarters in Kentucky, having set up the basis of a functioning state government.
 
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The grand reception that Morgan's men received from the people during their war persuaded the Confederate authorities that the Kentuckians would rise up against the Federals if a major Confederate army entered the state. The big-wigs among the Kentucky Confederates, including Morgan, Buckner, and Breckinridge (the latter usually so level-headed) also fed this idea. As it was, Bragg met a reasonably warm reception when he entered Kentucky. Supplies were forthcoming and there were a lot of popular demonstrations of Confederate support. But there were relatively few recruits, certainly far less than had been expected. Smith, operating in the more pro-Union eastern part of the state, had a decidedly more icy reception.

Now, one wonders what might have happened if the Confederates had won a significant battlefield victory and been able to go into winter quarters in Kentucky, having set up the basis of a functioning state government.

From my reading of the situation in Kentucky (admittedly filtered through primarily second hand sources versus primary sources like my understanding of Canada, Washington, and Britain of the time) it seems that while there was plenty of warm reception to the Confederates in the Western part of the state (especially the Jackson Purchase) and in the rural regions, the north east wasn't very receptive to the Confederate army, and Louisville was a Unionist stronghold.

I think it was McPherson who wrote that (paraphrasing) "The people of Kentucky would back a winner" which is something that A.S. Johnston, Beauregard, and Bragg never provided.

The Confederates wintering in Kentucky would give them something to think about.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
The problem for the rebels, however, is that:

Buell estimated his total field force at the time of Perryville (October, 1862) as 61,000, with as many as 22,000 more in defensive positions in Kentucky, for a total of 83,000; the rebel forces in the theater were estimated at 68,000.

Source is BaL, Vol. III, The Opposing Forces at Perryville, which is drawn from the OR and various reports by both Buell and Bragg.

The other problem is that getting from Tupelo, Mississippi, to Perryville, Kentucky, in 1862 is hardly a simple task; even today, it is 400 miles on the interstate, a route that was unavailable to Bragg or Kirby Smith.;)

So again, the "rebel victory in 1862 in the West" idea is subject to the same problems as the "rebel victory in 1862 in the East" concept; time, distance, superior US forces (on the defensive, remember), lousy logistics for the rebels, poor rebel command structure and organization, etc.

Think about this:

Bragg's senior officers were Polk, Cheatham, Hardee, and (detached) Kirby Smith.

Buell's were Thomas, McCook, Crittenden, Gilbert, and Sill (facing Kirby Smith).

Meanwhile, Price and Van Dorn face Grant in Mississippi.;)

Best,
 
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i have always wondered why there are so many atl's of the civil war that mainly focus on the eastern theater, mainly gettysburg, antietam, etc. I know that there are some atl's for the west, mainly shiolh, vicksburg, and the atlanta campaign, but has anyone seriously consider how different the war might have gone if the Kentucky Campaign of 1862 had gone different?

For starters, one of the main reasons in my opinion that it failed was that not one person was in charge overseeing the cooperate of generals like bragg or kirby smith. How differnent would the confederate offensive had been if bragg had gotten along with someone other than kirby smith? Or, maybe Bragg would have pulled rank and told kirby smith that he was in charge and that smith obey him.

In my mind, there are so many possiblities of how different the campaign could have unfolded. Another example could be that Bragg tells Smith not to leave for Kentucky untill Bragg's enitre amry was at Chattanooga and then both forces would combined and either bing buell to battle and defeat him before the move into kentucky or march into kentucky and force buell to follow.

Does anyone think this plausable? Yes, no? Thoughts? Comments? How would this have worked?

Bragg is in charge, for one. And he's far from his railroad, which weren't exactly stellar to begin with. Buell against Bragg is not exactly a meeting of the A-listers. Each side could draw a good deal of support from different sections of the state. But all other things being equal(1), the fact that Buell is quite to his sources of reinforcements and supply and Bragg is conversely far from either means Kentucky is a steep hill to climb - and likely still a steep if you butterfly in A. S. Johnson.

(1) This includes troop quality. Althistory.com sexy gray uniform factor aside, man for man the two sides were generally equivalent, with no mystic factors multiplying Southern combat effectiveness. The 20th Maine supports this ideas; as does the 1st Minnesota. For less victorious circumstances, the Irish Brigade... anywhere in 1862, and the USCT at the Crater show that there was no lack of fighting spirit on the Union side even when they were executing poor plans while armed with smoothbores.
 
Bragg is in charge, for one. And he's far from his railroad, which weren't exactly stellar to begin with. Buell against Bragg is not exactly a meeting of the A-listers. Each side could draw a good deal of support from different sections of the state. But all other things being equal(1), the fact that Buell is quite to his sources of reinforcements and supply and Bragg is conversely far from either means Kentucky is a steep hill to climb - and likely still a steep if you butterfly in A. S. Johnson.

Well even if A.S Johnston survives Shiloh and wises up to his mistakes (and that really depends on how you interpret what happened at Shiloh) he's not about to become the General Lee of the West. People might listen to him more than Bragg and he might win a victory or two which would drag out the campaign in Kentucky and spare Tennessee the harshness of war for a while, but he'd be lucky to winter in Kentucky during 62-63 and not get driven out come spring.
 
Well even if A.S Johnston survives Shiloh and wises up to his mistakes (and that really depends on how you interpret what happened at Shiloh) he's not about to become the General Lee of the West. People might listen to him more than Bragg and he might win a victory or two which would drag out the campaign in Kentucky and spare Tennessee the harshness of war for a while, but he'd be lucky to winter in Kentucky during 62-63 and not get driven out come spring.

Bingo. We (and I mean everyone, because gallant stories are far more enjoyable) tend to forget that the broad contours of the American Civil War shape so much of the individual actions. The rifled musket combined with closed order tactics gives the defender an edge. The railroad gives anyone near their own a huge supply edge as long as they don't go full Sherman.
 
Bingo. We (and I mean everyone, because gallant stories are far more enjoyable) tend to forget that the broad contours of the American Civil War shape so much of the individual actions. The rifled musket combined with closed order tactics gives the defender an edge. The railroad gives anyone near their own a huge supply edge as long as they don't go full Sherman.

Indeed. The only edge the Confederates had was their cavalry, which provided good screens and were able to (however briefly) sever those very railroads which supplied the Union armies. Then Grant and Sherman realized they could live off the land, and we all know how that worked out.

Delay might be the best word for the Confederate options out West.
 
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Indeed. The only edge the Confederates had was their cavalry, which provided good screens and were able to (however briefly) sever those very railroads which supplied the Union armies. Then Grant and Sherman realized they could live off the land, and we all know how that worked out.

Delay might be the best word for the Confederate options out West.

It is a Confederate strength, the number and quality of men they could rely on to know how to ride and fight and find a group of people while doing so. Even if mentioning the existence of the slave patrols boo-boos the feelings of some on this board, it gave the South a hell of a lot of good light cavalry men to draw on. Confederate armies had good recon, no two ways about that.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
The thing is, even if AS Johnston survives

Well even if A.S Johnston survives Shiloh and wises up to his mistakes (and that really depends on how you interpret what happened at Shiloh) he's not about to become the General Lee of the West. People might listen to him more than Bragg and he might win a victory or two which would drag out the campaign in Kentucky and spare Tennessee the harshness of war for a while, but he'd be lucky to winter in Kentucky during 62-63 and not get driven out come spring.

The thing is, even if AS Johnston survives Shiloh, the US forces are on the defensive the first day, but are ready to take the offensive, heavily reinforced with fresh troops (Wallace and Buell's leading elements), the second; the rebels have shot their bolt.

After Shiloh, presumably Halleck mounts the world's slowest offensive, and he and Johnston collide at Iuka-Corinth, which results (given the differential in forces) in yet another rebel withdrawal ... And then Halleck gets called east, and Grant is on the Mississippi and Buell in Tennessee.

Which means that by the time the rebels are in a position to try and mount whatever passes for the Tennessee-Kentucky campaign in this version of 1862, it's pretty much an open question who is in command in a) Mississippi and b) Tenessee for the rebellion - Johnston, Beauregard, Bragg, van Dorn, etc.

Cripes, it could be Polk.

Best,
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
After Shiloh, presumably Halleck mounts the world's slowest offensive, and he and Johnston collide at Iuka-Corinth, which results (given the differential in forces) in yet another rebel withdrawal ... And then Halleck gets called east, and Grant is on the Mississippi and Buell in Tennessee.

Having superior numbers is certainly an important advantage but never a guarantee of victory. Many battles in the Civil War were won by the side with fewer numbers (and not just on the Confederate side - Pea Ridge was a victory won by a heavily outnumbered Union army). Moreover, Halleck was a slow and cautious man, who often became confused and alarmed when unexpected things happened.

Since he died so early, it's hard to say what kind of general A.S. Johnston might have turned out to be had he survived. Certainly his strategic performance during the crisis over Forts Henry and Donelson doesn't inspire much confidence. But presumably he would have learned lessons there and at Shiloh, in the same way Lee learned during the Seven Days Battles.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
True, but superior numbers tend to provide

Having superior numbers is certainly an important advantage but never a guarantee of victory. Many battles in the Civil War were won by the side with fewer numbers (and not just on the Confederate side - Pea Ridge was a victory won by a heavily outnumbered Union army). Moreover, Halleck was a slow and cautious man, who often became confused and alarmed when unexpected things happened.

Since he died so early, it's hard to say what kind of general A.S. Johnston might have turned out to be had he survived. Certainly his strategic performance during the crisis over Forts Henry and Donelson doesn't inspire much confidence. But presumably he would have learned lessons there and at Shiloh, in the same way Lee learned during the Seven Days Battles.


True, but superior numbers tend to provide the cushion necessary to absorb the enemy doing the unexpected - not unlike Grant at Shiloh.

A S Johnston was hardly Hood, but he wasn't Joe Johnston, either; and Halleck was the original "slow trot" but presumably he could handle a defensive battle. It is undoubtedly the sort of action he'd be best suited for ... In some ways, he strikes me as akin to Thomas in that way.

Best,
 
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