Americans don't get duped by German National Redoubt story

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
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Deleted member 1487

Apparently there was quite an effort to convince the US that they were building a national redoubt in the Alps, which they bought completely and diverted significant efforts to head off. Assuming that for whatever reason they got better intel and discounted it, how would Wallied army groups have conducted their advance differently in 1944-45?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alpine_Fortress
A number of intelligence reports to the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) identified the area held stores of foodstuffs and military supplies built up over the preceding six months, and could even be harbouring armaments production facilities. Within this fortified terrain, they said, Hitler would be able to evade the Allies and cause tremendous difficulties for the occupying Allied forces throughout Germany.

The minister of propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, set up a special unit to invent and spread rumours about an Alpenfestung. Goebbels also sent out rumours to neutral governments, thus keeping the Redoubt myth alive and its state of readiness unclear. He enlisted the assistance of the intelligence service of the SS, the SD, to produce faked blueprints and reports on construction supplies, armament production and troop transfers to the Redoubt. This utter deception of allied military intelligence is considered to be one of the greatest feats of the German Abwehr during the entire war.

http://www.allworldwars.com/Ultra-and-The-Myth-of-the-National-Redoubt-by-Marvin-Meek.html
General Eisenhower's April 1945 decision to reorient his main effort from Berlin towards southern Germany remains one of the most misunderstood decisions made by the Allies during the war in Europe. Eisenhower's staff at SHAEF convinced him that Hitler was fortifying his remaining forces into an Alpine stronghold. An examination of evidence shows that not only the Americans, but the British, Russians, and even the Germans were confused about its very existence. Only the end of the war in Europe brought a complete understanding of Hitler's plans. The National Redoubt was simply a desperate, fanciful delusion of a crumbling regime.

Fig. 1. Map of central Europe showing location of the National Redoubt. Source: SHAEF, Weekly Intelligence Summary, no. 54 (1 April 1945).
National-Redoubt-01.jpg



Below we can see in April-May the US advanced into the Alps to head of this eventuality, how might they have advanced differently? If they advanced on Berlin, what would it mean in terms of Operation Paperclip and US-Soviet relations? How about unoccupied Bavaria/Austria in May 1945?

Final_Operations_-_19_April-7_Mai_1945.jpg
 
I can't see any major differences other than perhaps having the United States get a little deeper into East Germany and potentially getting the chance to capture Prague before the Soviets do.
 
Eisenhower knew the agreed occupation boundary with the USSR was the Elbe. He had zero interest in wasting US lives in capturing a lot territory they'd have to withdraw from. Perhaps a deeper advance into Bohemia?
 
Bigger US advance into Bohemia. US liberates Prague. Breakup of Czechoslovakia, western allied Czechoslovakia (Bohemia and Moravia), Soviet allied Slovakia. Austria probably still divided by Allies.
 

Deleted member 1487

Bigger US advance into Bohemia. US liberates Prague. Breakup of Czechoslovakia, western allied Czechoslovakia (Bohemia and Moravia), Soviet allied Slovakia. Austria probably still divided by Allies.
What impact would a Western aligned Czechia have on the Cold War?
 
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