I've gotten a lot of new stuff to read thanks to the suggestions.
I feel that the US took a turn over the cliff and hit the gas with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and build-up in 1965 when it tried to bring conventional forces to the table and defeat Hanoi with overwhelming firepower.
The US tactical doctrine sucked, depending as it did on draftees used as disposable shock troops instead of dedicated volunteer professionals.
Guys got really good if they survived and stuck it out for a few tours.
It sucked brass like Westy into the conflict who had zero idea who the Vietnamese were, what their beefs and loves happened to be, and thus ZERO idea of what'd make 'em quit or go home happy.
Abrams had a clue and was willing to listen AFAIK but he had the helm when DC went into CYA cut and run mode. WI if the US put somebody with jungle warfare experience from the WW2 Chindit campaigns who worked with partisans against the Japanese in charge of MACV from 1963 on.
AFAIK, the ones who knew and did it well didn't rise to the top of the Army hierarchy or have good political connections in DC.
We've talked about the piecemeal rotation of people in and out of Vietnam and how much havoc that wrought on unit effectiveness. If the US'd adopted the Kiwi/Aussie training plan for light infantry, they'd have 50,000 less names on the Wall in DC, but would need a colossal paradigm shift and head-from-anus op for the brass to view grunts as worth investing that effort. They did that in Iraq and Afghanistan FORTY years later b/c they didn't have a bottomless well of draftees to feed into the meat-grinder.
HOWEVER, that doesn't mean America wins the war. They're shit-tons more tactically effective, but it doesn't solve the main issue of the Vietnam War.
The big POD's IMO for that to happen are:
I feel that the US took a turn over the cliff and hit the gas with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and build-up in 1965 when it tried to bring conventional forces to the table and defeat Hanoi with overwhelming firepower.
The US tactical doctrine sucked, depending as it did on draftees used as disposable shock troops instead of dedicated volunteer professionals.
Guys got really good if they survived and stuck it out for a few tours.
It sucked brass like Westy into the conflict who had zero idea who the Vietnamese were, what their beefs and loves happened to be, and thus ZERO idea of what'd make 'em quit or go home happy.
Abrams had a clue and was willing to listen AFAIK but he had the helm when DC went into CYA cut and run mode. WI if the US put somebody with jungle warfare experience from the WW2 Chindit campaigns who worked with partisans against the Japanese in charge of MACV from 1963 on.
AFAIK, the ones who knew and did it well didn't rise to the top of the Army hierarchy or have good political connections in DC.
We've talked about the piecemeal rotation of people in and out of Vietnam and how much havoc that wrought on unit effectiveness. If the US'd adopted the Kiwi/Aussie training plan for light infantry, they'd have 50,000 less names on the Wall in DC, but would need a colossal paradigm shift and head-from-anus op for the brass to view grunts as worth investing that effort. They did that in Iraq and Afghanistan FORTY years later b/c they didn't have a bottomless well of draftees to feed into the meat-grinder.
HOWEVER, that doesn't mean America wins the war. They're shit-tons more tactically effective, but it doesn't solve the main issue of the Vietnam War.
The big POD's IMO for that to happen are:
- America NEVER leaps in to be the guarantor of RVN terrirtorial integrity
- RVN develops a national identity of its own and compelling reason to fight for itself.
- US supplies arms and training but not troops.
- RVN gets the confidence to go offensive, (which they did OTL with decidedly mixed success) and allowed to ignore ROE as the PAVN were. That means taking Lam Son 714 and holding it.
Last edited: