American Presidential Veto was Curtailed or Removed

When the US Constitution was enacted, it contained a provision where the President can veto legislation which can only be overridden by a 2/3 super-majority of Congress.

But what if the founders decided against giving the President veto power or decided to water it down for various reasons (didn't want one man to override the "will of the people", wanted the POTUS to be less powerful, etc etc).

One possibility might be for the veto to only be temporary so that it acts more or less the same way as a "suspension veto" in other countries (where a bill can be delayed but not blocked completely absent a super-majority).

Another possibility is to remove the veto altogether.

Would the removal of or weakening of the Presidential veto have a profound effect on American politics by making Congress legislatively "supreme"? Would it make US politics more "parliamentary-like"? Or would it have little effect?
 
You’re kidding, right? Can the president just decide not to sign a bill? Or are you forcing him to sign everything he’s sent?

There's more or less two possibilities:
1) Weakening of the Veto:
Allow the president to sign or disapprove bills. But disapproval means just a temporary delay and his disapproval can be overridden by a simple majority at a later time (a few months up to a max of one year perhaps?)

2) Remove the veto:
All bills passed by Congress become Bill and no Presidential approval is required. This is how it is in parliamentary systems actually. In most parliamentary systems, there is a theoretical possibility of a veto but the President or Monarch is expected to almost never exercise it.
 
What if they only gave him the power of a line-item veto and not the ability to veto the entire thing?

What's to prevent him vetoing the whole thing by vetoing each and every part individually? Simply put, there's no way to delineate "line-item veto" from "veto of the whole bill" in any practical, meaningful way.

A line-item veto would strengthen his veto power not weaken it.
 
When the US Constitution was enacted, it contained a provision where the President can veto legislation which can only be overridden by a 2/3 super-majority of Congress.

But what if the founders decided against giving the President veto power or decided to water it down for various reasons (didn't want one man to override the "will of the people", wanted the POTUS to be less powerful, etc etc).

One possibility might be for the veto to only be temporary so that it acts more or less the same way as a "suspension veto" in other countries (where a bill can be delayed but not blocked completely absent a super-majority).

Another possibility is to remove the veto altogether.

Would the removal of or weakening of the Presidential veto have a profound effect on American politics by making Congress legislatively "supreme"? Would it make US politics more "parliamentary-like"? Or would it have little effect?

That would go against the whole separation of powers. What's to prevent the Congress from just passing laws that would wittle down the President's power? The founders even toyed with the idea of an absolute veto, and a 3/4 veto.

In those days, the legislature was seen as the most powerful branch of government. Just look at how long Article 1 is compared to Article 2. That is why they put those safeguards, to make the executive branch equal to the legislative branch. They did not want to make the legislative supreme, which would be the implication of no veto. They wanted three equal branches with the ability to check each other's actions.

Unless you change the minds of Madison, Hamilton, Randolph, etc, then a veto that would be a real check to Congress would remain.
 
How about a specification that the veto may only be used where the President believes the bill to be unconstitutional? All the early vetoes were on that basis - the idea of the veto as a partisan tool took a while to get going.
 
How about a specification that the veto may only be used where the President believes the bill to be unconstitutional? All the early vetoes were on that basis - the idea of the veto as a partisan tool took a while to get going.
Maybe the Veto could just automatically send the bill to the Supreme Court for judgement?
 
What's to prevent him vetoing the whole thing by vetoing each and every part individually? Simply put, there's no way to delineate "line-item veto" from "veto of the whole bill" in any practical, meaningful way.

A line-item veto would strengthen his veto power not weaken it.

Allow a line-item veto but don't allow him to change the general intent of the bill. Of course the meaning of "general intent" would be argued in court, but still...

Maybe the Veto could just automatically send the bill to the Supreme Court for judgement?

Isn't that similar to what happens in Ireland?
 
Maybe the Veto could just automatically send the bill to the Supreme Court for judgement?

I highly doubt the founders would go for that, it makes the judiciary more powerful and requires the judiciary to arbitrate between the other branches, some SCOTUS has traditionally tried to avoid.
 

Vitruvius

Donor
What about a very limited suspension veto to compensate for the fact that the President is elected every four years and the Congress is renewed every two. Say if the President vetos a Bill it works like our current veto but the next Congress elected after the midterms could then pass an identical bill and override a veto with a simple majority. The logic being that the people have spoken on the issue by electing a new Congress that intends to pass said law. The people shouldn't have to wait until the next Presidential election to change Presidents in order to see the bill become law. So it would be rather limited in scope. It wouldn't carry over from one Presidential term to the next. So a new President isn't limited by his predecessors vetoes. New bills vetoed for the first time in the second half of a President's term would then take at least three Congresses to pass assuming the President is reelected and vetoes again or a new President is elected who likewise vetoes an identical bill during the next Congress.

The implications are complicated and interesting. I suppose it would change the 'lame duck' issue somehwat. If an unfavorable Congress comes out of the midterms they'd be overriding a Presidential veto rather easily (assuming the same majority was also in power the first two years and was earlier thwarted by a veto). But on the other hand a President in the last two years of his second term could thwart the will of the Congress with a veto on new legislation that it could possibly take another two election cycles after he's out of office to allow for the Congress to pass by simple majority depending on how subsequent elections play out. So it would certainly tie the productivity of a current Congress to the actions of the previous Congress in a way that might slow them down and negate the obvious advantage of a simple majority to override a Presidential veto.

I think it would really only strengthen the hand of a Congress when a President of the opposite party is narrowly elected because if they can simply maintain a majority after the midterms they could pretty much pass whatever they want. So I suppose in order to avoid becoming a true lame duck in the second two years of his term a President would need to win big and carry with him a favorable Congressional majority. At least that way if his party looses during the midterms he can still wield some power with a veto against whatever the new Congress tries to do. So it would, over the course of the full Presidential term, negate the effects of close Presidential elections where the winner squeaks by and the Congress is narrowly divided. If he has to 'use up' his veto in the first two years and his party can't take control of the Congress in the midterms (unlikely for an already weak President) then he's basically done on the domestic policy front for the rest of his term. The system has then course corrected, in two years rather than four, against a President who was only barely elected, and without the support of the peoples Congressional representatives in the first place. Domestic policy is wholly given over to the legislature to reflect the will of the electorate while the President carries on with foreign policy and more limited executive duties. The system then resets with the next Presidential election.
 
If the President has no veto power, what's the point of him signing bills? Why not just have bills automatically become law when passed by both Houses?

It would be totally silly to force him to sign bills.
 
One thing I should point out is that if the veto was curtailed or eliminated completely, the American political system would somewhat resemble France's "Semi-Presidential System".

Note that the French President cannot veto bills outright but only has a sort of suspension "veto" that delays a bill from immediately becoming law. However he is nevertheless the head of state and chief executive and commander-in-chief of France.

Thus in effect, another way of looking at my OP is:
What if the US had a "semi-presidential" system of government (sort of like France) from its founding?

Of course, there are still a lot of differences between an American system with simply a curtailed veto vs the current French system. But its another POV to consider.
 
If the President has no veto power, what's the point of him signing bills? Why not just have bills automatically become law when passed by both Houses?

It would be totally silly to force him to sign bills.

If the veto were completely eliminated, then signing could be done away with or the Constitution would simply state that if 10 days have elapsed, it becomes a bill without his signature (which is actually what the Constitution says now). In that case, his "veto" power becomes almost (but not completely) non-existent since there are a few situations where this "pocket veto" might have some effect greater than a 10 day delay. For instance, if Congress adjourns during the 10-day period, then the bill does not become law but these situations are rare.
 
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