American naval decisions in the 1930's

It wasn't. It was an issue of speed: the Mk XIV was faster, so the depth sensors were misreading depth.

  1. fortify the P.I. (when Japan abrogates the Treaty), including provision of modern M1903 rifles, modern artillery, & good ammo. (If this is done at the right time, it could be surplus .30-'06 ammo, which frees up Garand to use a *.276-'06 Short in the M1.:cool::cool:)
Have Dugout Doug walk in front of a bus.

In the PI, any rifle that fired cartridges would have been an improvement. Most of the reserve troops didn't have enough rifles, let alone practice shooting them.

They ended up having to make zip guns to fight the Japanese after 1942
called 'paliuntod'
Filipinoslamfireshotgun1.jpg

http://sipseystreetirregulars.blogspot.com/2013/03/praxis-philippine-guerrilla-slam-fire.html

Really, giving them old rolling blocks in 45-70 would have been a huge improvement.

But anyway, with Mac out of the way, the 276 Pederson gets adopted and the Garand works better with that, freeing the 30 cal Rifles. or they get 45-70s or Krags left over from the Spanish American War.

Same goes for Arty. There were hundreds of M1916 75mm field guns rusting away in the States
 
Result: win the war with Japan at least a year earlier than OTL.
The torpedoes alone ought to account for more than six months. I mean there were 23 US submarines in the Philippines at the start of the Japanese invasion, with torpedoes that were even half-way decent they'd have taken a decent bite out of the Japanese then and there. Hells, if they'd taken a big enough bite out of the Japanese in PI the Japanese might have to reassign forces otherwise destined for DEI, where they'd also be taking a hammering. Might just cripple the Japanese before they'd even started.
 
Just happened to have Ellis 'Brute Force' out to post data in another thread. Ellis 'book of tables' has one for Jpanese cargo ships available/built/sunk.

Start December 1941 5,996,657 tons cargo ships.

..........Built/Captured..........Sunk........Net end of Year
1942.......945,374...........1,123,156........5,818,875
1943.......878,113...........1,820,919........4,876,169
1944....1,734,847...........3,891,019........2,719,897

Note that a significant part of the 1942/43 damage was by methods other than submarine. Aircraft attacks against cargo ships docked or anchored in harbors were effective. The low level or "skip bombing techniques begain use in late 1942 & became widespread in 1943. Surface ships accounted for some in 1942.

1944 of course represents the main weight of the US submarine offensive. I dont have numbers for the US subs available in any of those years, but with those it should be easy to extrapolate some estimates for better US torpedos in 1942.
 
MattII said:
The torpedoes alone ought to account for more than six months.
You'd think so, for all the bad press the Mk XIV gets. Do the math, tho, & you'll see otherwise. (Compare up to Sept '43 to all of '44, on a per patrol average.) Allowing nothing else changes, sinkings maybe improve 25%. You get as much by moving the Asiatic Fleet boats to Hawaii. (It changes the dry patrol rate out of Oz, which was higher.) Just avoiding all the dry patrols around Midway & in the Aleutians is worth almost as much.

The sub sinkings? (All based on the JANAC account postwar, taken from Blair {I could do this from memory, once.:eek:))
1942 (350 patrols)--180 ships, 725,000 tons (net increase in tanker tonnage of 111,000:eek::rolleyes:) (average 8 torpedoes per sinking)
1943 (350 patrols)--335 ships, 1,500,000 tons (net increase in tanker tonnage of 177,000:eek::rolleyes:) (average 11.7 torpedoes/sinking, thanks in part to bigger & better targets)
1944 (520 patrols)--603 ships, 2.7 million tons (average about 10 torpedoes/sinking, thanks in part to bigger & better targets, & to more torpedoes available, so less hesitation to fire full salvoes)

FYI, the Pac Fleet Sub Force torpedo expenditures:
1942--1442 fired (high proportion Mark Xs, but smaller warheads, so fewer sinkings)
1943--3937 fired (still some Mark Xs)
1944--6092 fired (perhaps 10% Mark XVIIIs?)
 
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The Akron encounters a downburst and crashes with most of the dirigible happy Lighter Than Air mafia aboard. Their replacements build an N class 1,500,000 cubic foot blimp instead of the 6,000,000 cubic foot Macon (scaling up the C class blimps by twice in each dimension). This proves to work pretty well and becomes the US standard blimp and is copied by the British when war starts looking likely.
Blimps are extremely hard to crash from bad weather, are resistant to icing to an amazing degree, and easily replace a destroyer each at a much lower price. They were written out of history by the Heavier Than Air mafia postwar.
British convoys start to use one or two destroyers and several blimps. The blimps spot the subs and the destroyers force the subs to submerge and fall behind the convoy. Blimps also rescue crew from sunk ships (not that there would be many of those since the blimps were so effective at preventing sinkings, though the oft repeated claim that no ship was sunk while protected by blimps is not quite true).
The N class blimps are big enough to install the older, heavier, meter wavelength radar (can spot a sub running on the surface at night) in the late thirties, and retrofit to the centimeter radars (can spot a submerged sub with it's periscope up) afterwards. Radar makes the blimps effective at night and at much longer range than visual.
The subwar in the battle of the Atlantic is very different, like many fewer losses of merchant ships, much more frequent convoys, etc.
More frequent convoys is as important as the lower ship losses. Most ships spent long periods in harbor waiting for a convoy to form up. With four times as many escorts (counting blimps), you get four times as many convoys. The blimps convoy inbound until in aircraft range from Germany, then hand over to an all destroyer force for the close approaches and take over the outbound convoy.
When you've built up a big enough blimp force you assign them to the British hunter killer groups so they can actually accomplish something. The blimps make sure that the subs can't surface long enough to recharge the batteries by spotting them for the attack aircraft from the carrier. After a few days the sub surfaces and surrenders or dies. Then you go do it again.
 
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CalBear

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You really don't need to do that much to have a huge impact.

Fortify Guam. Install The same sort of set-up as eventually existed on Wake, except use two-three Marine Defense Battalions, with provisions/factilites to reinforce with Army units.

Fortify Wake and finish the runways/revetments by the end of 1940.

Don't spend most of a year with your finger in your nose when the Congress passes the Two Ocean Navy Act in July of 1940. Go all in right off the gun.

Lastly (and admittedly, this one is personal) - FIND the idiots who pushed the Alaska class through the procurement process. Send them to Adak Alaska (since they seem to have a soft spot for the area) without their long-johns. Keep them there until the end of the war.

The reality is that there is only so much you can do for the PI. MacArthur isn't going to disappear, he was a favorite of the Commonwealth government and he genuinely loved the Islands. Moreover, it is an exposed post, and one that Congress has already decided to cut loose by the mid-30s (the Commonwealth was supposed to get independence on July 4, 1945) so there is a limit on the amount Congress will spend on long term improvements to the defenses. The geography also makes it virtually impossible to defend. Japan has major bases just across the Taiwan Strait and Tokyo is 2,000 miles closer to Manila than Honolulu is and 4,400 miles closer than San Francisco is to the Islands.

This will allow you to cut at least a year off the build time of the "new" fleet. It will deny the Japanese an easy path to build the defensive perimeter that they believed was necessary. It is even remotely possible that the Japanese would find the situation to be so out of their favor as they don't go to war in the first place.
 
You'd think so, for all the bad press the Mk XIV gets. Do the math, tho, & you'll see otherwise. (Compare up to Sept '43 to all of '44, on a per patrol average.) Allowing nothing else changes, sinkings maybe improve 25%.
25%? Some of the early boats went home without result because all their torpedoes were duds. with torpedoes that worked even 50% of the time surely each boat would be able to score at least 2 targets per run? I think that's a bit more than a 25% increase.
 
How many subs are we looking at & what was the historical ratio of total to those on patrol?

In the first 12 months of WWII the German subs managed about 40,000 to 50,000 tons sunk per submarine patrol.* That was vs unevenly prepared British, and in relatively congested waters around the UK & western/northern approaches. The IJN might be worse prepared than the Brits, but the US subs may be dispatched to patrol the wrong parts of a big ocean.

*From 'Brute Force' again. If I get time I'll cross check that vs Hughes & Costello 'The Battle of the Atlantic'.
 
There is a major problem in the USA in the 30's, which all has to do with the Great Depression and the political tendensy to focus on domestic, rather than foreign policy. Defence is a foreign policy, so will naturally be cut, when less money can be spended only once. For that reason, the USA will likely make severe cuts in major defence projects, even with no treaty at all. Best it would do is refit what is available already and cut down orders for new units.

OTOH, FDR was an old navy man and new naval construction was a useful (and used) way of government pumping up employment numbers. What worked for the CCC and WPA can work for Newport News and other naval builders.

Cancel the Buffalo, speed up the introduction of the Wildcat.
Cancel the 1.1' AA, introduce 40mm Bofors earlier instead.

Was the Wildcat available so early? Were the 40mm Bofors?

It wasn't. It was an issue of speed: the Mk XIV was faster, so the depth sensors were misreading depth.

You may be thinking of the exploder testing, which was done in effectively wrong latitudes.

Even a single live-fire trial would have been good. Why the CNO prohibited using a hulk scheduled for scrapping, IDK.:eek::confused::confused: (1)


So:

arrange to have Asiatic Fleet subs moved back to Hawaii in the event the P.I. are overrun (2)
tie MacArthur to an anchor & throw him overboard on his way to the P.I.:rolleyes: (3)
Optional: shoot Jimmy Fife (highly recommended) & Ralph Christie. (4)

Optional (& highly recommended): persuade CinCPac mining of enemy harbors by subs is much better & more effective use of resources than close surveillance. (5)

Result: win the war with Japan at least a year earlier than OTL (6).

1) A penny-pinching Congress? US spending on ordnance testing has always been a congressional bugaboo. WWIII aircraft dropping WWII bombs.:( Not so anymore, but in the day...

2) Politics. 1936, 1938, and 1940 are election years.

3 & 4) We are talking what CAN be done, not what SHOULD be done.:)

5) Too much offensive-mindedness in the black shoe navy. They were holding the reins of power right up until the Arizona went boom.

6) Hell, 100% working Mark XIVs from Day One will do that. But that Torpedo Mafia...:(

You really don't need to do that much to have a huge impact.

Fortify Guam. Install The same sort of set-up as eventually existed on Wake, except use two-three Marine Defense Battalions, with provisions/factilites to reinforce with Army units.

Fortify Wake and finish the runways/revetments by the end of 1940. (7)

The reality is that there is only so much you can do for the PI. MacArthur isn't going to disappear, he was a favorite of the Commonwealth government and he genuinely loved the Islands. Moreover, it is an exposed post, and one that Congress has already decided to cut loose by the mid-30s (the Commonwealth was supposed to get independence on July 4, 1945) so there is a limit on the amount Congress will spend on long term improvements to the defenses. The geography also makes it virtually impossible to defend. Japan has major bases just across the Taiwan Strait and Tokyo is 2,000 miles closer to Manila than Honolulu is and 4,400 miles closer than San Francisco is to the Islands. (8)

This will allow you to cut at least a year off the build time of the "new" fleet. It will deny the Japanese an easy path to build the defensive perimeter that they believed was necessary. It is even remotely possible that the Japanese would find the situation to be so out of their favor as they don't go to war in the first place. (9)

7) Isn't Wake really too small to turn into a fortress?

8) Good analysis on the Philippines. But politics-politics...:(

9) Skippy would like a word with you.:p The only way that is happening is if FDR tells them to help themselves to China.

How many subs are we looking at & what was the historical ratio of total to those on patrol?

In the first 12 months of WWII the German subs managed about 40,000 to 50,000 tons sunk per submarine patrol.* That was vs unevenly prepared British, and in relatively congested waters around the UK & western/northern approaches. The IJN might be worse prepared than the Brits, but the US subs may be dispatched to patrol the wrong parts of a big ocean (10).

The Germans had the advantage of dealing with an incoming convoy system directed to the UK, and the UK hadn't prepared for wolf-packing.

10) Question asked in admitted ignorance:eek:: What would have happened had the US sent their entire submarine force (available save for pilot rescue and recon) to patrol Japanese home waters?
 

CalBear

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...



7) Isn't Wake really too small to turn into a fortress?

8) Good analysis on the Philippines. But politics-politics...:(

9) Skippy would like a word with you.:p The only way that is happening is if FDR tells them to help themselves to China.



...

7 Depends on what you mean by fortress. Much like Tarawa or Midway, you can't put a huge army there, but you can make it so it would TAKE a huge army to invade with any hope of success. Put a full Marine Defense Battalion there instead of the rump battalion that was there IOTL and fully prepared defensive set up with all guns and AAA properly manned and tied in, and you will need at least a full division to take the place, maybe more.

8. Yep.

9. Well, I did say remotely possible. :D
 
MattII said:
25%? Some of the early boats went home without result because all their torpedoes were duds. with torpedoes that worked even 50% of the time surely each boat would be able to score at least 2 targets per run? I think that's a bit more than a 25% increase.
I know. And for every one of those, there's a fabulous patrol like Morton's, where he expends all his fish & sinks 5 or 6 ships.

The firecontrol solution ain't simple, so misses even in fish set for contact were common. Plus some skippers weren't aggressive enough.:rolleyes: Plus some weren't lucky. Plus they were frequently sent on harbor surveillance, instead of to productive patrol areas.:rolleyes:

Overall, when you look at '43 against '44, the increase in sinkings is about 25%.

Look at the year record: the increase isn't 2:1, it's only 17.5%.

Grab a copy of Blair, & page back to the patrol record tables. Do the math for yourself.
Carl Schwamberger said:
How many subs are we looking at & what was the historical ratio of total to those on patrol?
Total force PTO was on the order of 45 fleet boats & 6-8 Sugar boats (more in Cavite than Pearl). SOP would have 1 on patrol, 1 en route, & 1 in refit. (Turnaround improved when Midway became available for fuelling, provisioning, & stayovers. If Wake is from the start, you've given Japan such nightmares as they can't imagine.:eek:)
Carl Schwamberger said:
In the first 12 months of WWII the German subs managed about 40,000 to 50,000 tons sunk per submarine patrol.
BdU got it right from the start: better doctrine, better deployments, & (in the main) better torpedoes, plus B-Dienst was reading BAMS (as readily as the Admiralty:eek::rolleyes:).

None of that obtained PTO.:mad:
usertron2020 said:
OTOH, FDR was an old navy man and new naval construction was a useful (and used) way of government pumping up employment numbers. What worked for the CCC and WPA can work for Newport News and other naval builders.
That's been my thought all along. Some on site here believe he couldn't overcome the isolationist lobby. Give them the choice of unemployment...& tell them a stronger Navy will keep the enemies over there, instead of on the doorstep.:rolleyes:
usertron2020 said:
Was the Wildcat available so early?
Offhand, I'd say so.

I'd also add, speed up production of the F4U, & really give the IJNAF fits.:eek::cool::cool:
usertron2020 said:
A penny-pinching Congress? US spending on ordnance testing has always been a congressional bugaboo.
Part of it. Part of it was the entrenched BuOrd bureaucracy, which was resistant to criticism (by tradition, it was frowned on, AIUI). Part of it sheer stupidity.:rolleyes:
usertron2020 said:
Politics. 1936, 1938, and 1940 are election years.
Not at all. Once war starts, politics fall out of it, & that's what I mean. Basing in Oz was a PR stunt to bolster the locals; they were better aided by more (& more visible) Army presence.
usertron2020 said:
We are talking what CAN be done, not what SHOULD be done.:)
Accidents can be arranged...:p
usertron2020 said:
Too much offensive-mindedness in the black shoe navy. They were holding the reins of power right up until the Arizona went boom.
Fair point. It only needs to be examined prewar, & to have a CinCPac willing to adopt it. By accounts, Nimitz opposed mining.
usertron2020 said:
Hell, 100% working Mark XIVs from Day One will do that.
Not alone...
usertron2020 said:
Isn't Wake really too small to turn into a fortress?
Don't need a fortress as such, just enough to force Japan to face contested landings. They were terrible with those...
usertron2020 said:
UK hadn't prepared for wolf-packing
In the first 6-9mo, the number of U-boats was too small for wolfpacks. Plus, don't forget, most sinkings for the duration were of single ships, not ships in convoy.
usertron2020 said:
Question asked in admitted ignorance:eek:: What would have happened had the US sent their entire submarine force (available save for pilot rescue and recon) to patrol Japanese home waters?
Changing nothing else? You shorten the war about a year. You put them in the most productive patrol areas from day one, & keep them there for the duration.

That, however, needs Nimitz to have a way to monitor IJN harbors. I recommend DF & traffic analysis, plus reading the movement cypher (which I presume Hypo can do, if it's not already), plus mining the harbors. (Why that? Bottle them up, & watch for minesweepers in the movement cypher--then shoot the sweepers.:eek::cool:)

Higher priority on tankers from Day One would be a really good idea, too.:cool: So, tankers #1, DDs #2, merchants #3, CVs #4.
 
That's been my thought all along. Some on site here believe he couldn't overcome the isolationist lobby. Give them the choice of unemployment...& tell them a stronger Navy will keep the enemies over there, instead of on the doorstep.:rolleyes:

While I'm sure that congressmen in coastal districts will love it, the majority of the most hardcore Isolationists tended to come from very inland states. As in, "So what if Hitler invades Connecticut?:eek: My constituents in Nebraska will still be safe!":p

Offhand, I'd say so.

I'd also add, speed up production of the F4U, & really give the IJNAF fits.:eek::cool::cool:

Won't that mean leaving the US Navy to soldier on with biplane fighters until the F4F was fully available?

Not at all. Once war starts, politics fall out of it, & that's what I mean. Basing in Oz was a PR stunt to bolster the locals; they were better aided by more (& more visible) Army presence.

Considering the welcome regarding material support that the US 32nd and 41st Divisions got from the Australians once they got there...WHY? Why send more troops that will have to offload their own ships, load their own trucks, build their own bases right down to their own barracks...:mad: So they spent months doing all this rather than training for battle, and were rushed up to Port Moresby untrained as well as green as can be. To get slaughtered at Buna while the veteran 7th Australian stomped the Japanese at Gona (to MacArthur's chagrin and Blamey's crowing).

I wouldn't be so upset if not for the contrast with the performance of the Americal Division. They kicked ass in their baptism of fire despite being as green as the 32nd and 41st. That was because they spent their entire time training, not building fresh facilities, thanks to their getting what they needed. In New Caledonia. Granted, they were training in jungle, which stood them in good stead in Guadacanal.

This is what happens when a labor union (Waterside Workers) has a foreign policy.:rolleyes: *end rant*

Accidents can be arranged...:p

Only if you know they SHOULD be arranged.:(

Fair point. It only needs to be examined prewar, & to have a CinCPac willing to adopt it. By accounts, Nimitz opposed mining.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't mining by submarine require removal of the stern tube(s)? If true, you could never get me in one of those things.

Not alone...

Heretic

Don't need a fortress as such, just enough to force Japan to face contested landings. They were terrible with those...

The Japanese HAD to take Wake. With all that extra defense, the IJN wouldn't have sent the initial anemic force that they did OTL. No ifs ands or buts about it. Wake had to go. It would have been Midway x10. With working Mark XIVs, x100. The Imperial Japanese were stupid, but they weren't dumb. If Wake is built up, a larger initial IJN force is sent, and defeated. With a second force sent that is even stronger that the OTL second force. It may well delay operations in the south by forcing the IJN to deploy battleships with HE to blast the tiny island to bits, and hit it with all the troops they can muster, but it will and must be done.

At worst, an enormous humiliation for the IJN in a campaign that might well last into 1942. But not long into the year.

Changing nothing else? You shorten the war about a year. You put them in the most productive patrol areas from day one, & keep them there for the duration.

That, however, needs Nimitz to have a way to monitor IJN harbors. I recommend DF & traffic analysis, plus reading the movement cypher (which I presume Hypo can do, if it's not already), plus mining the harbors. (Why that? Bottle them up, & watch for minesweepers in the movement cypher--then shoot the sweepers.:eek::cool:)

Higher priority on tankers from Day One would be a really good idea, too.:cool: So, tankers #1, DDs #2, merchants #3, CVs #4.

I suspected, but I wanted your opinion first. Personally though, I'd go for DDs first. After all, they are the ones killing your subs. And the way they arranged their "convoys", you wouldn't face many, unless it was an invasion force or fleet.
 
I know. And for every one of those, there's a fabulous patrol like Morton's, where he expends all his fish & sinks 5 or 6 ships.

The firecontrol solution ain't simple, so misses even in fish set for contact were common. Plus some skippers weren't aggressive enough.:rolleyes: Plus some weren't lucky. Plus they were frequently sent on harbor surveillance, instead of to productive patrol areas.:rolleyes:

Overall, when you look at '43 against '44, the increase in sinkings is about 25%.

Look at the year record: the increase isn't 2:1, it's only 17.5%.
Okay, fair enough, but every ship hit in '41/early '42 is going to be a ship not available for operation later, which means either smaller occupation forces, or fewer islands occupied, either way, the Japanese aren't going to give the US the same fight as they did OTL, especially as many of those early PI and DEI ships were carrying troops, so the Japanese aren't goig to have as many troops in there from the start.
 
Wildcat

A lenghty quote from Air vectors:http://www.airvectors.net/avwcat.html
The XF4F-2 performed its initial flight on 2 September 1937, with company test pilot Robert L. Hall at the controls. The XF4F-2 was a mid-wing monoplane with non-folding wings; a P&W R-1830-66 air-cooled 14-cylinder two-row Twin Wasp radial engine with 785 kW (1,050 HP) driving a Hamilton Standard three-bladed variable-pitch prop; and retractable landing gear in a tailwheel configuration, with the main gear tucking into the fuselage and a fixed, swiveling tailwheel. Armament consisted of twin 7.62 millimeter (0.30 caliber) Browning machine guns mounted in the top of the engine cowling and firing through the propeller arc, and a 12.7 millimeter (0.50 caliber) Browning in the wings, for a total of four guns.
* Full naval trials pitting the Grumman and Brewster designs against each other took place at NAS Anacostia, in the Washington DC area, in early 1938. The Grumman offering suffered from engine overheating, and in fact an engine failure on 11 April 1938 led to a rough landing in a farm field that flipped the aircraft over onto its back. The pilot, a Navy lieutenant named Gurney, was not seriously hurt, but the machine was badly damaged and had to be sent back to the factory for repairs.
Due to engine and other problems with the XF4F-2, the competing Brewster design was selected for production in June 1938 under the name "Buffalo". The Buffalo was the Navy's first fully operational monoplane fighter, though it would have a generally infamous combat career later. Fortunately there were those in the Navy procurement bureaucracy who were skeptical of the Buffalo's potential, and so Grumman was awarded a contract in October 1938 to rebuild their prototype into an improved configuration, the "Model G-36" or "XF4F-3".
The XF4F-3 first flew on 12 February 1939, once again with Bob Hall at the controls. It featured an XR-1830-76 Twin Wasp engine with 895 kW (1,200 HP) and a two-stage supercharger; fuselage modifications; a bigger wing, with square instead of rounded wingtips; and a modified tailfin. Additional modifications were added after evaluation flights, such as a further redesigned tailfin with a forward extension and the tailplane moved up onto the tailfin. Experiments were performed with a large prop spinner to improve aerodynamics, that being something of a "fad" in aircraft design at the time, but as was the case with most of these exercises, the spinners turned out to be little more than dead weight and were abandoned.
Performance was excellent, the Navy was impressed, and Grumman was awarded a production contract for 78 "F4F-3s" in August 1939, with the first production aircraft flying in February 1940, followed by formal Navy acceptance in January 1941. The type would be officially given the name "Wildcat" in the fall of 1941, before Pearl Harbor. It is unclear if this name was in unofficial use before that time, but for simplicity the name "Wildcat" will be used without throughout this document

If the Buffalo had been rejected, the revised Wildcat could have been speeded up, the October 38 contract being pulled back to June. Since OTL changes only took four months, the F4F-3 could have been ordered in November 1938 if we give the Navy one month to test it. That gives an extra nine months of production. Now all that had to be done was to put a zero on that initial order. Rather than 78 order a 780 aircraft first batch.
There would also be implications for the RN, that might be getting Wildcats sonner.
As for the implications that the USN would be using Biplanes for a few extra months, that might be better than Buffalos. And there's plenty of time to have a lot of Wilcats ready for action in December 1941. There might also be quite a few in Dutch and British hands in time to make life harder for the japanese.
 
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More Coast Guard Cutters

The Coast Guard Cutters were found to be very good ASW platforms in the war. Building a lot more, claimming a civilian need for anti smuggling assets, would have been a way to aprove building a substancial ASW force discretly.

Taney_1958.jpg
 
MattII said:
Okay, fair enough, but every ship hit in '41/early '42 is going to be a ship not available for operation later, which means either smaller occupation forces, or fewer islands occupied, either way, the Japanese aren't going to give the US the same fight as they did OTL, especially as many of those early PI and DEI ships were carrying troops, so the Japanese aren't goig to have as many troops in there from the start.
No argument there. It's just damn hard to measure that, without examining every single patrol report.:eek: (Feel free.:p)
usertron2020 said:
While I'm sure that congressmen in coastal districts will love it, the majority of the most hardcore Isolationists tended to come from very inland states. As in, "So what if Hitler invades Connecticut?:eek: My constituents in Nebraska will still be safe!":p
:p That's why you offer Nebraska jobs. Shipbuilding draws on lots of stuff from around the country. (Plus you'll need more sailors...;))
usertron2020 said:
Won't that mean leaving the US Navy to soldier on with biplane fighters until the F4F was fully available?
Without checking the date, the F2A was in service already & F4F entering service, so the acceleration of the F4U changes nothing except when she reaches the Corps. (Passing her carrier quals is still going to be a problem.)
usertron2020 said:
Considering the welcome regarding material support that the US 32nd and 41st Divisions got from the Australians once they got there...WHY? Why send more troops that will have to offload their own ships, load their own trucks, build their own bases right down to their own barracks...:mad: So they spent months doing all this rather than training for battle, and were rushed up to Port Moresby untrained as well as green as can be. To get slaughtered at Buna while the veteran 7th Australian stomped the Japanese at Gona (to MacArthur's chagrin and Blamey's crowing).
I will make no judgements on that.;) I only say putting subs in Oz, which by nature operated in secret & which were at a serious geographic disadvantage from basing there, plus causing all PTO boats from being prohibited from the most productive patrol area (Luzon/Formosa Strait), was the height of stupidity. (Not quite the MacArthurian pinnacle, but certainly in sight of it.;))
usertron2020 said:
Only if you know they SHOULD be arranged.:(
Fair point. So Jimmy Fife is safe, but Christie still shouldn't be: he led the design team...:mad:
usertron2020 said:
Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't mining by submarine require removal of the stern tube(s)?
Nope, tube launched. (Mark X mine? Mark XII?) OTL, they were substituted when NTS, Alexandria, & (someplace in Washington state I can't recall:eek:) couldn't keep up with expenditure. (8 fish aft =16 mines. With some equipment rearranging, it could've been 12 fish or 24 mines.)
usertron2020 said:
;) I used to think so. Then I did the math.;) (Ain't science wonderful?:p)
usertron2020 said:
The Japanese HAD to take Wake.
And you are offering USN an opportunity to execute Midway in December 1941, as Japan attacks a fortified island with inadequate preparation & manpower, & very possibly with American carriers awaiting to ambush them.:eek:

The rest of your post on it, I entirely agree with.;)
usertron2020 said:
I suspected, but I wanted your opinion first. Personally though, I'd go for DDs first. After all, they are the ones killing your subs. And the way they arranged their "convoys", you wouldn't face many, unless it was an invasion force or fleet.
You're not entirely wrong on escorts, but if you go after tankers, you paralyze everything else.

Also, attacking DDs at all at that time was pretty unusual. Plus the torpedoes weren't really ideal for shallow-draft targets (aside the chances of duds & prematures:rolleyes:): they didn't run a constant depth (contrary to Hollywood), but on a sine wave; set shallow enough for a 'can, they'd often porpoise.
 
;) I used to think so. Then I did the math.;) (Ain't science wonderful?:p)

I said you were a Heretic. I didn't say you were factually wrong. Big difference. Just ask Joan of Arc.:p

phx1138 said:
And you are offering USN an opportunity to execute Midway in December 1941, as Japan attacks a fortified island with inadequate preparation & manpower, & very possibly with American carriers awaiting to ambush them.:eek:

And you are offering Yamamoto HIS chance to get his kessen kentai far earlier than he expected, and within land based Japanese air range.:cool: All this, at this same time that CincPac is going through musical chairs command changes from Admirals Kimmel to Pye to Nimitz. In terms of smoothness of transfer of command, Tinker to Evers to Chance it was not.:rolleyes: With Kimmel's removal on December 17th, his temporary replacement Pye (the displaced Battle Force Commander) was in no mood for any Nelsonian gestures.

phx1138 said:
The rest of your post on it, I entirely agree with.;)

That is because you are a gentleman and a scholar, and there aren't too many of us left.:)
 
usertron2020 said:
I said you were a Heretic. I didn't say you were factually wrong. Big difference. Just ask Joan of Arc.:p
Noted.;) Not that heresy bothers me, exactly, since I've been apostate since I was about 6 years old.;)
usertron2020 said:
And you are offering Yamamoto HIS chance to get his kessen kentai far earlier than he expected, and within land based Japanese air range.:cool: All this, at this same time that CincPac is going through musical chairs command changes from Admirals Kimmel to Pye to Nimitz. In terms of smoothness of transfer of command, Tinker to Evers to Chance it was not.:rolleyes: With Kimmel's removal on December 17th, his temporary replacement Pye (the displaced Battle Force Commander) was in no mood for any Nelsonian gestures.
True, & I expect the fight, if it's a carrier battle, will be to Pye's disadvantage. However... When does the battle actually happen? Is it Kimmel who's still CinCPac, not Pye (who's just seen Kimmel removed, whence the withdrawal from Wake OTL)? And who's SOPA? Halsey? Tell me Halsey won't be spoiling for a fight.

Yes, it could look like Midway in reverse.:eek::eek: Either way, it ends with Japan not in control of Wake, which is very, very bad for Japan.:eek::eek:
usertron2020 said:
That is because you are a gentleman and a scholar, and there aren't too many of us left.:)
TY.:) And, may I say, so are you. I count myself in good company.:cool:

Which good company extends to a great many on this site, TBH...:cool::cool:
 
Wake with radar, a sub base, proper sized marine defenders, protection for a proper sized air fleet. Let the japanese send in their landbased bombers. If wake had radar they could attrit those planes, and perhaps more to the point, pilots like crazy.

If Japan felt they HAD to take wake, and i could see they might, they might have to abandon one of the other major operations. If theyve misread what they need to take it as badly as they did iotl with midway, theyll still go ahead with Pearl, the Philippinnes and Malaya. Whiich means taking Wake saves the DEI until they take Wake..


By which time the Dutch Buffallos willl have been replacedd by p40s. And radaar?

Thee jappanesee wooullddr bee in a woorld of hurt..

Blast this stupid nnonnkeyboarrd.
 
The Coast Guard Cutters were found to be very good ASW platforms in the war. Building a lot more, claimming a civilian need for anti smuggling assets, would have been a way to aprove building a substancial ASW force discretly.

Good & creative idea, they did seem to do well (perhaps mostly due to having an experienced crew compared to green crews on warships?) however:
- there were relatively few Coast Guard ships around (especially if you only take the suitable ships), so even a 100% increase isn't going to make much of a difference;
- the Coast Guard ships had only a limited range, which meant they were often stationed in Iceland, which meant losing much escort time on ferrying to and from Iceland instead of escorting a convoy from the US to Britain.

IIRC my source for the above is Martin Middlebrook's 'Convoy SC122 & HX229', but please take it with a pinch of salt as it has been a while since I read it.
 
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