MattII said:
25%? Some of the early boats went home without result because all their torpedoes were duds. with torpedoes that worked even 50% of the time surely each boat would be able to score at least 2 targets per run? I think that's a bit more than a 25% increase.
I know. And for every one of those, there's a fabulous patrol like Morton's, where he expends all his fish & sinks 5 or 6 ships.
The firecontrol solution ain't simple, so misses even in fish set for contact were common. Plus some skippers weren't aggressive enough.

Plus some weren't lucky. Plus they were frequently sent on harbor surveillance, instead of to productive patrol areas.
Overall, when you look at '43 against '44, the increase in sinkings is about 25%.
Look at the year record: the increase isn't 2:1, it's only 17.5%.
Grab a copy of Blair, & page back to the patrol record tables. Do the math for yourself.
Carl Schwamberger said:
How many subs are we looking at & what was the historical ratio of total to those on patrol?
Total force PTO was on the order of 45 fleet boats & 6-8 Sugar boats (more in Cavite than Pearl). SOP would have 1 on patrol, 1
en route, & 1 in refit. (Turnaround improved when Midway became available for fuelling, provisioning, & stayovers. If Wake is from the start, you've given Japan such nightmares as they can't imagine.

)
Carl Schwamberger said:
In the first 12 months of WWII the German subs managed about 40,000 to 50,000 tons sunk per submarine patrol.
BdU got it right from the start: better doctrine, better deployments, & (in the main) better torpedoes, plus
B-Dienst was reading BAMS (as readily as the Admiralty


).
None of that obtained PTO.
usertron2020 said:
OTOH, FDR was an old navy man and new naval construction was a useful (and used) way of government pumping up employment numbers. What worked for the CCC and WPA can work for Newport News and other naval builders.
That's been my thought all along. Some on site here believe he couldn't overcome the isolationist lobby. Give them the choice of unemployment...& tell them a stronger Navy will keep the enemies
over there, instead of on the doorstep.
usertron2020 said:
Was the Wildcat available so early?
Offhand, I'd say so.
I'd also add, speed up production of the F4U, & really give the IJNAF fits.


usertron2020 said:
A penny-pinching Congress? US spending on ordnance testing has always been a congressional bugaboo.
Part of it. Part of it was the entrenched BuOrd bureaucracy, which was resistant to criticism (by tradition, it was frowned on, AIUI). Part of it sheer stupidity.
usertron2020 said:
Politics. 1936, 1938, and 1940 are election years.
Not at all. Once war starts, politics fall out of it, & that's what I mean. Basing in Oz was a PR stunt to bolster the locals; they were better aided by more (& more visible) Army presence.
usertron2020 said:
We are talking what CAN be done, not what SHOULD be done.
Accidents
can be arranged...
usertron2020 said:
Too much offensive-mindedness in the black shoe navy. They were holding the reins of power right up until the Arizona went boom.
Fair point. It only needs to be examined prewar, & to have a CinCPac willing to adopt it. By accounts, Nimitz opposed mining.
usertron2020 said:
Hell, 100% working Mark XIVs from Day One will do that.
Not alone...
usertron2020 said:
Isn't Wake really too small to turn into a fortress?
Don't need a fortress as such, just enough to force Japan to face contested landings. They were terrible with those...
usertron2020 said:
UK hadn't prepared for wolf-packing
In the first 6-9mo, the number of U-boats was too small for wolfpacks. Plus, don't forget, most sinkings for the duration were of single ships, not ships in convoy.
usertron2020 said:
Question asked in admitted ignorance

: What would have happened had the US sent their entire submarine force (available save for pilot rescue and recon) to patrol Japanese home waters?
Changing nothing else? You shorten the war about a year. You put them in the most productive patrol areas from day one, &
keep them there for the duration.
That, however, needs Nimitz to have a way to monitor IJN harbors. I recommend DF & traffic analysis, plus reading the movement cypher (which I presume Hypo can do, if it's not already), plus mining the harbors. (Why that? Bottle them up, & watch for minesweepers in the movement cypher--then shoot the sweepers.


)
Higher priority on tankers from Day One would be a really good idea, too.

So, tankers #1, DDs #2, merchants #3, CVs #4.