American naval decisions in the 1930's

[Krases]

LAST TIME ON DRAGON BA- ALTERNATEHISTORY.COM

Folks,

I've been reading "Shattered Sword" and was running a few what-if questions around in my head. Let's say that starting around 1935 you have the power to make any changes to the Japanese navy. Resource limits still apply, policical issues go the same way so still bad relations with the Japanese Army and the United States, etc. The only thing you can change is THREE naval decisions, policies, etc using hindsight on what happened in our TL.

What decisions would you make (again, you cannot avoid war with the US or the war in China) to improve Japan's naval performance in WWII?

For example, would the steel and other resources from the Yamato class = X fleet carriers? Create a policy to deal with protecting your sea lanes (against subs, for example) rather than just on offensive naval battles, loosen the graduation requirements for naval aviation school, etc...

I thought this was an interesting thread and I find it interesting that everyone came up with ideas to improve the Japanese navy during WW2. I feel like their is a want to give the losers a 'heads up' on what the best policies are and see how things go.

Instead of that, I wonder what things could be done to improve the victors. How could the US, taking the social, political and practical limitations of the time, improve its navy in time for WW2? Assuming a POD of 1930 or 35.

Obviously we could just say "make nukes faster" or "don't put the battleships in pearl harbor", but that would be too easy.

 

[Grand Admiral Thrawn]

First thing I would try is have the 2nd London Treaty fail. Not sure on any good PODs though. If it fails to even get the UK, US, and France on, and is an issue during the 1936 US election (hard; I can only think of some racial strife and Landon making it an issue, which is hard). So in Jan 1937, FDR agrees to laying down 2 new battleships a year, using the spare 16 inch guns lying around. I guess a carrier every other year (we know the carriers are more important, but they don't; could stagger like a 5 year cycle of 3-2-3-2-2). I am trying to go for the building tempo right before WW1, but we have the Great Depression and isolationists to dampen the building spree. So scrap the older ships as soon as possible, and announce that the US government will suspend any and all current building as soon a new treaty is signed. And have FDR point out that "our boys, are using 1913 ships... while our enemies are warring." Maybe how the fat cat bankers don't want the money spent so they can get a tax cut.

Another key part is fortifying the Pacific Islands, which a modest building plan started in 1937 should accomplish. The Philippines is an issue; Mac is incompetent. He arrived in 1937 to build up the PI army, had served several tours in the PI previously, and yet did not move enough supplies around when invaded and was forced to burn them. If Guam and Wake hold, they can shave a year off I bet.

 

[Krases]

If possible, I would want to see a large number of carriers and a small number of battleships. To accomplish this, change doctrines to 'mega battleships' that are significantly larger than the Iowa but only build a very small number of them. In turn, really go nuts with large aircraft carriers and light carriers.

 

[MattII]

If you can get some live-fire tests on the Mark 14 and Mark 15 torpedoes so that at least the impact detonation and deep-running problems are solved you shorten the war by a few months and leave the Japanese advances a lot more bloody. At the very least.

 

[sharlin]

I'd say the USN got its building programme pritty much nailed on the head in the OTL. The biggest thing i'd work on with hindsight is the torpedo problem, if the BurOrd still kicked up a fuss and stink i'd probably be inclined to coat them all in Trill and lock them in a budgie enclosure at a zoo at feeding time.

Their ship designs were very good for the most part, i'd also look at replacing the quad 1.1 inch guns and introducing the Bofors 40mm and 20mm oerlikons after looking at the fighting going on in Europe. Oh and don't bother with the Alaska's, just a waste of money and metal.

 

[MattII]

So the BUOrd waits until CNO Pratt is gone and CNO Standley is in and asks for a couple of ships for live-fire testing of the Mark 14 and Mark 15 torpedoes, and the soon-to-be-scrapped USS Duncan and USS O'Brien are offered early in 1935. Tests go ahead, uncovering several deficiencies (likely only the impact-detonation and deep-running issues, but even those corrections will help a lot), which are subsequently corrected, as confirmed by far more successful tests on USS Nicholson and USS Winslow. The rest is history, nearly every engagement from the Philippines onwards that involves USN submarines costs the IJN valuable ships.

 

[HMS Warspite]

There is a major problem in the USA in the 30's, which all has to do with the Great Depression and the political tendensy to focus on domestic, rather than foreign policy. Defence is a foreign policy, so will naturally be cut, when less money can be spended only once. For that reason, the USA will likely make severe cuts in major defence projects, even with no treaty at all. Best it would do is refit what is available already and cut down orders for new units.

 

[sharlin]

You might also need someone to slap King and go "Stop being an anglophobe and listen!" RE convoy's too.

 

[mcdo]

There is a major problem in the USA in the 30's, which all has to do with the Great Depression and the political tendensy to focus on domestic, rather than foreign policy. Defence is a foreign policy, so will naturally be cut, when less money can be spended only once. For that reason, the USA will likely make severe cuts in major defence projects, even with no treaty at all. Best it would do is refit what is available already and cut down orders for new units.

I think we could make this tendency work for us. Convince the Navy to retire a few of the older battleships as a cost-cutting measure. They are expensive to run, and expensive to man. But since it is the Great Depression, also convince them to build some new ships to replace them--shipbuilding means jobs in Philadelphia, New York, etc. As long as the new ships that are build are relatively small and cheap, it's still a cost-cutting measure overall, and it serves to modernize the fleet.

 

[MattII]

Trade out battleships for heavy cruisers? Well you could easily dump the Wyomings, their 12" mains lacked the punch and range of the 14" main guns of later ships. The New Yorks might be slightly harder, but not too much so,, since it was their armour that was outdated (So were the Wyomings, but they're gone). That's four to start off with.

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

Trade the obsolete battleships, not for heavy cruisers, but for a whole fleet of light escorts, so convoyscan be escorted along the coasts sooner, and the battle of the atlantic is over even sooner.

That, and the torpedoes, of course.

I think you could make a good case for shooting some of those people for treason. But, no, they were too politically powerful.

 

[Krases]

Here is my crazy idea: build one or two flight deck cruisers and hope that other powers try to do the same thing. These hybrid ships often in trying to do everything wind up sucking pretty bad. The US is in the unique position of having far more industrial power than Japan, so if Japan wastes its time and resources building any flight deck cruisers to match, they would be at a disadvantage. Bonus points if the flight deck cruisers can be converted to full blow carrier later on.

Another similar idea: build only 2 battleships, but make them huge. Think 120k tons. Try to get Japan to try and match that, wasting resources on Super-Yamatos.

 

[Flubber]

You might also need someone to slap King and go "Stop being an anglophobe and listen!" RE convoy's too.

Those idiotic claims against King have been refuted since the 1970s at the least, so it's rather sad to see them mindlessly repeated here - especially when they've been repeatedly refuted here too. You can read Blair and/or Gannon for a full explanation whats and whys of Operation Drumbeat.

Suffice it to say the US' primary handicaps were in organization and assets. There was no single entity responsible for ASW, no US version Coastal Command as it were, and, even if a coastal command existed, the assets on hand were woefully inadequate. King didn't have the tools he himself had recommended and didn't have control of most the tools that did exist, but it was all King's fault anyway.

Yeah, sure.

The problem was far more complex and nuanced than the mindless "King was a moron" douchebaggery too often repeated.

That being said, three suggestions for better US naval decisions in the 1930s:

- More realistic training. The Navy routinely got it's ass handed to itself by the IJN in surface actions up through 1943. This was in a large part because two decades of fleet exercises had woefully neglected, among other things, night actions between small units as opposed to day actions between battle lines. More realistic training will produce a better level of readiness, turn up material flaws like the torpedo issues, and point out various organizational problems.

- As mentioned previously, scrap the older parts of the battle line in order the fund, build, and man a more overall balanced force. Among the assets that should be constructed is the naval version of the USCG cutter King wanted for ASW/escort work instead of the useless subchasers FDR wanted.

- More naval air squadrons. As Lunstrom's The First Team correctly points out, the USN's prewar naval aviators were the best trained on the planet and routinely beat their opposite numbers in the IJN despite flying inferior equipment. Because the USN didn't permanently link certain squadrons to certain carriers, more squadrons can exist than there is carrier capacity for and those "extra" squadrons can perform other roles. Imagine a "carrier wing" stationed on Midway June 5th instead of the near useless B-17s or a larger Cactus Air Force operating out of Henderson.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

You might also need someone to slap King and go "Stop being an anglophobe and listen!" RE convoy's too.

The problem went far beyond King. Others had their hand in it long before he became CoS, or even commander of the Atlantic fleet. To win the Battle of the Atlantic sooner, or at least lose the intermeadiate battles less badly you have to reach back into the 1930s

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

T
- More naval air squadrons. As Lunstrom's The First Team correctly points out, the USN's prewar naval aviators were the best trained on the planet and routinely beat their opposite numbers in the IJN despite flying inferior equipment. Because the USN didn't permanently link certain squadrons to certain carriers, more squadrons can exist than there is carrier capacity for and those "extra" squadrons can perform other roles. Imagine a "carrier wing" stationed on Midway June 5th instead of the near useless B-17s or a larger Cactus Air Force operating out of Henderson.

Technically the USN extras were the USMC air groups. However those were still thin even in 1942 so your point stands.

 

[jayel]

I have read that part of the problem with the deep running torpedos was all the testing (such as it was) was done in cold north Atlantic waters, torpedos fired in the less dense warm waters of the Pacific naturally ran deeper

 

[Pangur]

The torpedo issue has been covered so the only thing I can think of would be radar, more to the point making sets small enough to be used operationally on submarines earlier

 

[AdA]

Cancel the Buffalo, speed up the introduction of the Wildcat.
Cancel the 1.1' AA, introduce 40mm Bofors earlier instead.

 

[phx1138]

I have read that part of the problem with the deep running torpedos was all the testing (such as it was) was done in cold north Atlantic waters, torpedos fired in the less dense warm waters of the Pacific naturally ran deeper

It wasn't. It was an issue of speed: the Mk XIV was faster, so the depth sensors were misreading depth.

You may be thinking of the exploder testing, which was done in effectively wrong latitudes.

Even a single live-fire trial would have been good. Why the CNO prohibited using a hulk scheduled for scrapping, IDK.

So:

1. fix the Mark XIV & Mark XV
2. fortify the P.I. (when Japan abrogates the Treaty), including provision of modern M1903 rifles, modern artillery, & good ammo. (If this is done at the right time, it could be surplus .30-'06 ammo, which frees up Garand to use a *.276-'06 Short in the M1.)
3. surplus off the 4-pipers
4. replace 4-pipers with new-built *Porters
5. standardize on Tambor & increase construction rate (roughly double it, perhaps more)
6. increase production of torpedoes (hire a civilian contractor?) to make up for desperately bad rate of output (on the order of 2.5/day)
7. tell Customs officials not to f*ck around with other people's (Japan's...) merchant marine codebooks...
8. arrange to have Asiatic Fleet subs moved back to Hawaii in the event the P.I. are overrun
9. put tankers at #1 priority, & DDs #2
10. tie MacArthur to an anchor & throw him overboard on his way to the P.I.

Optional: shoot Jimmy Fife (highly recommended) & Ralph Christie.
Optional (& highly recommended): persuade CinCPac mining of enemy harbors by subs is much better & more effective use of resources than close surveillance.

Result: win the war with Japan at least a year earlier than OTL.

 

[Shadow Master]

One change I would have liked to see:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simon_Bolivar_Buckner,_Jr.#Alaska


Get Buckner to Alaska by the end of '36, and turn him loose. Judging by what he accomplished OTL without funds and against orders, imagine what he could have done with funds starting in 1937. Would PH have even taken place?