American industrial contribution to the British war effort post-June 40 if France doesn't fall?

[Bougnas]

Hi everyone,

I had gathered pretty good information on what France was planning to have the Americans build for them in the 1940-41 period if things went as intended. The contribution was massive, to the point where France was financing new factories or tooling to have the Americans produce French military equipment to keep logistics simple. However, Britain never seemed to make use of this industrial potential from what I knew.

So I wanted to gather sources with the board. What do you know about concrete British plans to get American-made equipment or services after June 1940?
I only know about the Packard Merlin license agreement, the P-51, P-40 and Martin Maryland orders, and the refits of British ships planned at American yards. But anything else precisely?

And as a what-if addon, what other equipment may the British have wanted the Americans to build for them if France never fell? This is assuming the US doesn't get into the war. Lend-Lease agreement likely starts more or less as OTL as it was calculated that French cash would also be close to running out by the time it started OTL.

 

[wcv215]

I’m not sure how much would be needed in such a scenario. If Germany’s offensive is blunted and France is still in the war then Germany’s in a pretty bad position. They’re isolated with their only trading partner beibg the USSR. Meanwhile France is going to cut Germany off from Romanian oil, Italy won’t get involved, and the Allies can begin counterattacking once Germany has shot its bolt and France’s orders from the US can begin telling on the war.

Once Germany looks to be losing Stalin, being Stalin, is going to throw Hitler under the bus. Especially since without looting France Germany is in even less a position to pay.

 

[Blyatnik]

Once Germany looks to be losing Stalin, being Stalin, is going to throw Hitler under the bus

He was already going to do that. He was in the middle of re-armament and re-tooling of Soviet industry and military, and when it was ready in 1943 (or sooner/later depending on how things go and what happens in Europe), he wanted to attack the Axis, possibly the rest of Europe. Stalin wasn't going to use 20 divisions of paratroopers and 30,000 modern tanks (both planned for completion in mid-'43) for a defensive war now was he?

 

[raharris1973]

But @wcv215 and @Blyatnik - neither French nor British tactics and operational art were aggressive and fast enough, nor were their financial and domestic industrial pockets deep enough, for increased purchases from America to be *irrelevant* in finishing out the war.

Barring a political miracle of the cliche'd anti-Hitler coup, which given anti-Hitler plotters bad luck and often poor planning for assassination or aftermath, really would be a miracle.

 

[Canuck Wingnut]

One item was maritime patrol aircraft. The British purchased the Lockheed Electra (and derivative designs such as the Hudson) as their land-based MPA at the beginning of the war, and decided on the Consolidated Catalina as their American-purchased seaplane in January 1940. There were some other efforts to meet the urgent need for anti-submarine aircraft as well, such as the purchase of a squadron's worth of the Douglas B-18 for the RCAF. Presumably fewer Catalinas and so on would be purchased compared to OTL thanks to a lower submarine threat, but deliveries would certainly continue.

The North American Harvard training aircraft was in British service since before the war, and orders were continuing. Again, likely largely unaffected compared to OTL for the first year or so after France doesn't fall.

British purchase of the B-17 pre-dated the beginning of the war, with the initial request issued in 1938. Oddly enough, if France had not fallen and the enormous effort put into supporting Bomber Command had to be split with resources for supporting an army in the field in France, its possible that the British would have used more American-built bombers, rather than developing their own heavies as they did OTL.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Hi everyone,

I had gathered pretty good information on what France was planning to have the Americans build for them in the 1940-41 period if things went as intended. The contribution was massive, to the point where France was financing new factories or tooling to have the Americans produce French military equipment to keep logistics simple. However, Britain never seemed to make use of this industrial potential from what I knew.

So I wanted to gather sources with the board. What do you know about concrete British plans to get American-made equipment or services after June 1940?
I only know about the Packard Merlin license agreement, the P-51, P-40 and Martin Maryland orders, and the refits of British ships planned at American yards. But anything else precisely?

And as a what-if addon, what other equipment may the British have wanted the Americans to build for them if France never fell? This is assuming the US doesn't get into the war. Lend-Lease agreement likely starts more or less as OTL as it was calculated that French cash would also be close to running out by the time it started OTL.

I suspect the best sources are in French. In English Kleins 'A Call to Arms' has a chapter or two on the effects of French and British funds on jump starting the US arms industry. The Neutrality Acts were neutered in the summer /autum of 1939 & the Cash & Carry policy instituted. This resulted in a mass of orders for arms and other industrial goods. One of the points Klein made was US industry demanded pmts up front for planning costs, new factory floor space, retooling, prototypes, ect... That was for reasons stretching back to 1917-1919. This was not a problem for 1939-1940 as both Britain and France had a couple years worth of currency, Gold, and other reserves. ie: in March 1940 France sent two warships with Gold bullion to the depository in Toronto as collateral for intended orders and pmts for existing orders.

One of the results was the construction of a final assembly facility and parts depot for Martin Aircraft in Morocco, that was assembling M-167 bombers in the Spring of 1940. Douglass had completed a similar facility in Algeria in April or May 1940. Initially to assemble DB-7 bombers. The two types were manufactured to French specs in the US and the assembled wings and fuselages sent separately to Africa for completion and flight testing. Assembled Hawk 75 interceptors (modified P36) were also sent to France. Altogether some 300 aircraft were accepted by the French air force April through May 1940, and another 300+ were enroute from the US. From third hand sources I've seen estimates another 1500+ aircraft were scheduled for delivery in the remainder of 1940 & orders for 3000+ aircraft were in negotiation for 1941. The French planners aimed for a standing operational air strength facing Germany in late 1941 of 10,000 aircraft. Combined from French, US, and British manufacture. To maintain a operating number of that the track record of the war suggests a a annual production of 5X would be needed. Since the British were able to reach a gross production alone of 30,000+ in 1941 a combined gross production of the two Allies and US purchases of 50,000 in 1941 does not seem beyond belief. I'd have to check, but I recall gross German production for 1941 was about 75% of the British gross*.

I don't have any useful sources for French finances. Some guesswork suggests their monetary reserves would have run out in 1942. that suggests why they were aiming at inflicting economic & military collapse on Germany NLT early 1943.

*
'Brute Force' by John Ellis has a table showing annual aircraft production by the major powers from 1939 to 1945 & the US from 1942 to 1945. It was not until 1942 German production obtained parity with the British. It was actually fairly lame 1939-1941.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

One item was maritime patrol aircraft. The British purchased the Lockheed Electra (and derivative designs such as the Hudson) as their land-based MPA at the beginning of the war, and decided on the Consolidated Catalina as their American-purchased seaplane in January 1940. There were some other efforts to meet the urgent need for anti-submarine aircraft as well, such as the purchase of a squadron's worth of the Douglas B-18 for the RCAF. Presumably fewer Catalinas and so on would be purchased compared to OTL thanks to a lower submarine threat, but deliveries would certainly continue.

The North American Harvard training aircraft was in British service since before the war, and orders were continuing. Again, likely largely unaffected compared to OTL for the first year or so after France doesn't fall.

British purchase of the B-17 pre-dated the beginning of the war, with the initial request issued in 1938. Oddly enough, if France had not fallen and the enormous effort put into supporting Bomber Command had to be split with resources for supporting an army in the field in France, its possible that the British would have used more American-built bombers, rather than developing their own heavies as they did OTL.

The design that eventually be came the B24 Liberator interested both the French and British. Before the first prototype flew French agents were studying the specs and questioning the designers on alterations for French specifications. We can speculate this could lead to a maritime Very Long Range version on ASW patrols in late 1941, or 1942. The B25 & B26 were both attractive in French bomber doctrine. The prototypes intended as ultra fast medium range strike bombers, similar to what the French had in the M-167 & DB-7. Where they might have gone from the Hawk 75 I cant say. In 1939 both the French and the US thought interms of short ranged point defense interceptors. That did not fundamentally change for the US AAF until the implications of the long ranges of a Pacific War were forced on the leaders in latter 1941.

 

[Bougnas]

I suspect the best sources are in French. In English Kleins 'A Call to Arms' has a chapter or two on the effects of French and British funds on jump starting the US arms industry. The Neutrality Acts were neutered in the summer /autum of 1939 & the Cash & Carry policy instituted. This resulted in a mass of orders for arms and other industrial goods. One of the points Klein made was US industry demanded pmts up front for planning costs, new factory floor space, retooling, prototypes, ect... That was for reasons stretching back to 1917-1919. This was not a problem for 1939-1940 as both Britain and France had a couple years worth of currency, Gold, and other reserves. ie: in March 1940 France sent two warships with Gold bullion to the depository in Toronto as collateral for intended orders and pmts for existing orders.

One of the results was the construction of a final assembly facility and parts depot for Martin Aircraft in Morocco, that was assembling M-167 bombers in the Spring of 1940. Douglass had completed a similar facility in Algeria in April or May 1940. Initially to assemble DB-7 bombers. The two types were manufactured to French specs in the US and the assembled wings and fuselages sent separately to Africa for completion and flight testing. Assembled Hawk 75 interceptors (modified P36) were also sent to France. Altogether some 300 aircraft were accepted by the French air force April through May 1940, and another 300+ were enroute from the US. From third hand sources I've seen estimates another 1500+ aircraft were scheduled for delivery in the remainder of 1940 & orders for 3000+ aircraft were in negotiation for 1941. The French planners aimed for a standing operational air strength facing Germany in late 1941 of 10,000 aircraft. Combined from French, US, and British manufacture. To maintain a operating number of that the track record of the war suggests a a annual production of 5X would be needed. Since the British were able to reach a gross production alone of 30,000+ in 1941 a combined gross production of the two Allies and US purchases of 50,000 in 1941 does not seem beyond belief. I'd have to check, but I recall gross German production for 1941 was about 75% of the British gross*.

I don't have any useful sources for French finances. Some guesswork suggests their monetary reserves would have run out in 1942. that suggests why they were aiming at inflicting economic & military collapse on Germany NLT early 1943.

*
'Brute Force' by John Ellis has a table showing annual aircraft production by the major powers from 1939 to 1945 & the US from 1942 to 1945. It was not until 1942 German production obtained parity with the British. It was actually fairly lame 1939-1941.

I was thinking mostly about British orders in America only. I know about the French efforts, which were frankly amazing.

The design that eventually be came the B24 Liberator interested both the French and British. Before the first prototype flew French agents were studying the specs and questioning the designers on alterations for French specifications. We can speculate this could lead to a maritime Very Long Range version on ASW patrols in late 1941, or 1942. The B25 & B26 were both attractive in French bomber doctrine. The prototypes intended as ultra fast medium range strike bombers, similar to what the French had in the M-167 & DB-7. Where they might have gone from the Hawk 75 I cant say. In 1939 both the French and the US thought interms of short ranged point defense interceptors. That did not fundamentally change for the US AAF until the implications of the long ranges of a Pacific War were forced on the leaders in latter 1941.

France was to receive P-40s in the second half of 1940.



One thing that was likely to happen for the Brits imo is them purchasing American engines or getting them to produce British engines for tanks, possibly more parts. Britain couldn't really sustain high production rates for tank parts at the same time as everything else.

 

[tomo pauk]

So I wanted to gather sources with the board. What do you know about concrete British plans to get American-made equipment or services after June 1940?
I only know about the Packard Merlin license agreement, the P-51, P-40 and Martin Maryland orders, and the refits of British ships planned at American yards. But anything else precisely?

Lockheed Lightning, both the ones with turboes and the small quantity without turboes.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I was thinking mostly about British orders in America only. I know about the French efforts, which were frankly amazing.

Can you recommend any sources for this? In French or English?

France was to receive P-40s in the second half of 1940.

A logical step from the Hawk 75. I wonder what the differences would be in the French version?

One thing that was likely to happen for the Brits imo is them purchasing American engines or getting them to produce British engines for tanks, possibly more parts. Britain couldn't really sustain high production rates for tank parts at the same time as everything else.

Engines would not be a big problem, unless the Brits insisted on complete retooling for their designs. Beyond that the US did not really have a tank production industry in 1939. Just a design & prototype capability. Building 100+ M2 mediums & a assortment of light tanks and "combat cars" hit the limits of 1939. The locomotive industry, largely Baldwin, had to adapt to do the large cast & forged steel components of the light and Medium tanks of 1940-41. It was not until 1943 the manufacturing space and trained labor existed to crank out 25,000+ M4 mediums.

 

[marathag]

1939 both the French and the US thought interms of short ranged point defense interceptors. That did not fundamentally change for the US AAF until the implications of the long ranges of a Pacific War were forced on the leaders in latter 1941.

To be fair, the Hawk 75/P-36 had longer range than any other single engine fighter in Europe, Axis or Allied.

 

[Bougnas]

Can you recommend any sources for this? In French or English?





A logical step from the Hawk 75. I wonder what the differences would be in the French version?



Engines would not be a big problem, unless the Brits insisted on complete retooling for their designs. Beyond that the US did not really have a tank production industry in 1939. Just a design & prototype capability. Building 100+ M2 mediums & a assortment of light tanks and "combat cars" hit the limits of 1939. The locomotive industry, largely Baldwin, had to adapt to do the large cast & forged steel components of the light and Medium tanks of 1940-41. It was not until 1943 the manufacturing space and trained labor existed to crank out 25,000+ M4 mediums.

France Fights On website gathered sources about the French orders, but I don't have the sources myself. Rest is just random search that is in my memory.

If I recall, the French H-81s were basically P-40Bs and then CUs with a seat compatible with the French parachute, metric equipment, inverted controls and 7.5mm MGs in the wings instead of .30 cals.

As for tank production, to be fair the French were going to have the US ramp that up more than the UK. France had bought terrain to build one or two large factories at Savannah so that they could build Somua S40s, Hotchkiss H39s and B1 Ter parts or complete tanks. The fall of France also created financing problems for some military production programs now taken by the US or UK that prevented a substantial rise in American production in 1940 and 1941. As in, 50+ percent.

 

[Driftless]

With the D.522 (Allison V-1710-C1) variant of the D.520, was that seen just as a contingency notion, or was there real intent to see how that combination of airframe and engine could be made to work? And from a work standpoint, was that a big production run capacity vs basic performance? The OTL project ceased with the Armistice. Merlins were also considered

 

[marathag]

A logical step from the Hawk 75. I wonder what the differences would be in the French version?

The Hawk H-81A was on order by France. These were pretty close to the P-40B or C
The Curtiss Model 87 that was the P-40D was a fallback fix, as the XP-46 of 1939 made no-one happy during testing.
The Model 87 was almost a whole different aircraft, not much interchanged with the earlier versions.
What would more French influence on Curtiss have? I feel it would have been positive.

 

[marathag]

Also, Ford was in talks to build V-12 engines outside of Paris at the new Ford complex there at Poissy

 

[Bougnas]

With the D.522 (Allison V-1710-C1) variant of the D.520, was that seen just as a contingency notion, or was there real intent to see how that combination of airframe and engine could be made to work? And from a work standpoint, was that a big production run capacity vs basic performance? The OTL project ceased with the Armistice. Merlins were also considered

French aircrafts with American engines were specifically designed for that, to meet production rates that the French engine industry couldn't achieve. And yes, big capacity, I don't have the exact numbers but French aircraft requirements meant that American-engined aircrafts would have to make up a substantial proportion of those numbers.

 

[Driftless]

If French buyers made positive working relationship with Glenn Martin Aircraft Company, as was done with the Glenn Martin 167/Maryland (in British service), would they have proceeded to the follow-on version (187/Baltimore), or on to the B-26 Marauder? Of course, those possibilities would depend on where the post-June 1940 front line would have been.

 

[wcv215]

neither French nor British tactics and operational art were aggressive and fast enough, nor were their financial and domestic industrial pockets deep enough, for increased purchases from America to be *irrelevant* in finishing out the war.

I specifically mentioned French orders in America coming in, and that once this had happened and Germany’s chance for quick war was gone that was when Germany would be dolmed, and the Allies could begin pushing back. Probably in 1941-42. How well this goes mostly depends on how far Stalin is willing to keep shipping Germany stuff without actually being paid. Which…who knows. OTL he was for quite a while, but that was when France had fallen and Germany ruled most of Europe. If Germany’s in a bad way and Stalin cuts them off in 1941 things in Germany are going to get really bad. Not because of some coup that’s never happening, but because without food, gas, and other materials from the Soviets Germany doesn’t have the resources to keep going indefinitely. Note that as I mentioned they don’t even have Romanian oil since France can cut thise exports off.

 

[Driftless]

On that US and British aircraft engines theme, both the Liore et Olivier 45x and Amiot 35x were considered for various combinations of US and British Radials and Merlins, but those developments probably ran out time as well. If the French can crank out sufficient numbers of airframes, the engine availability shouldn't be as much of a problem. Throw in Allison's or Packard Merlins as possibilities, too.

 

[ArtosStark]

Also, Ford was in talks to build V-12 engines outside of Paris at the new Ford complex there at Poissy

They likely would have struggled at first. The French Ford factory had no experience with non-standard designs. They generally had all plans and drawings, and often jigs prepared for them by the parent company. So unless they are Ford engines (which is possible) then the factory will have to go through the a steep learning curve before they are a reliable source of material.