Or maybe (some) historians since then have used a more accurate count than that.
No. These figures derive from a proper search of the Confederate records, filtering out Lee's special pleading.
So he was disturbed by the fact one division had been mauled (Sedgewick's) hopelessly and the other troops there had fought hard and suffered accordingly because of attacks that went in (referring to the overall assault, if that term can be used, of the Army of the Potomac) piecemeal. No wonder he couldn't force Lee from the field, his concern is so focused on not being forced from the field himself that even an army in the shape Lee's is in can take on the Army of the Potomac.
Well, the attack wasn't really piecemeal. The attack was a proper en echelon attack reasonably well done apart from French's division getting lost, hitting the wrong location and then being reinforced in their mistaken attack on DH Hill. The blame there lies with Sumner, he lost 2 of his divisions when they wandered off. Remember each attack (except Sedgwicks) was successful, and was countered by Lee committing fresh reserves.
In either case, I should have clarified - I had more his comments on Lee's army being a wreck.
This is overblown special pleading by the Confederate commanders (inc. Lee) who ballsed up.
The figures, such as they are, do not show an even distribution of straggling as might be expected. Hood, Walker, DH Hill and Ewell's divisions show little straggling compared to others. What we must do is disambiguate various different straggling events:
1. How many refused to cross the Potomac? (Answer: none of significance, observations of Lee's force in Frederick are consistent with 76,000 combatants)
2. How many dropped out in the slow movements up to the 13th? (Answer: none of significance, or they'd have been swept up by the advancing Federals).
3. How many dropped out in Jackson's march to Harper's Ferry (Answer: possibly some, but they'd have been swept up by Longstreet's forces as the day of rapid marching was north of the Potomac)
4. How many dropped out in the concentration at Sharpsburg (Answer: probably a lot, these were rapid marches, conducted in friendly territory which would have allowed dropouts)
5. How many made it to Sharpsburg but hung around at the back of the field (Answer: again probably a lot).
The men Lee couldn't get into line of battle weren't scattered over western Maryland or cooling their heals at Leesburg. They were scattered around Harper's Ferry and Boteler's Ford.
You can recommend anything you think is well researched, but I'd like to know why the numbers here are more reliable than other numbers if you're going to use it as proof of Lee having so many men.
The number he had on the field are an unresolved mystery. These are the numbers he took into Maryland by Confederate returns.
Or maybe the Army of the Potomac would actually get off to a vigorous start like the Army of the Tennessee.
The Army of West Tennessee (as Grant's force was called) doesn't exist until March 1862. It spends 1861 occupying Missouri (it was formed by the mergers of the districts of SE Missouri and Cairo) and then in the Union invasion of Kentucky (indeed precipitates it when Foote's gunboats entered Paducah with troop steamers from Grant's force already en route before the Confederates invade). It doesn't really do much until February 1862, when involved in an amphibious desant, and is soundly beaten in April and then stuck in a pointless siege until 30th May (i.e. the time of Seven Pines/ Fair Oaks in Virginia). In fact the western armies are no more active than the Eastern ones, in fact less so, but this is explainable by the low priority the west got before summer 1862 (
http://67thtigers.blogspot.com/2010/08/strength-of-army-in-east-and-west.html )
Its not as if the Army of Northern Virginia (not sure if this was used at that particular time, but its the name we know the Virginia army under) is in great shape to face an offense.
Yes, it was the ANV, but it was one of many armies in the east. They hadn't yet been merged into a single unified force. They held a pretty strong position and were pretty strong, but Davis' policies of dispersion robbed them of the strategic initiative.