America never nukes Japan ?

Project Hula was not designed to aid an Soviet invasion of Hokkaido:



The amount of shipping and material transferred to USSR was insufficient to mount an invasion and information can be found the wiki page you cited:

My bad; I was more trying to point out that the US did transfer material to the Soviets, so it wouldn't be impossible for further transfers to happen, as the US had allowed some in the past. But you are correct that Hula alone was not enough.

But if an invasion does occur, and if casualty projections are accurate or worse, then I do not find it unfathomable that the US would provide the Soviets with further resources to invade, so that the Soviets may do the dying instead of Americans (at the very least).
 
what if for whatever reason, the U.S. never nukes Japan? How long would ww2 go on ?

What will be the cost of a land invasion if it happens ?

Will the USSR intervene ?

And how will it take place ?
Assuming that the bombs are being built, it seems to me that:
Reason for non-atomic bombing must be that the USA has already accepted the Imperial Japanese surrender before the bombs are ready. (If the USA has the bombs it has too many reasons not to drop them if Imperial Japan is still fighting, ranging from avenging Pearl Harbour, to trying to knock Imperial Japan out or to soften it up for an invasion, to field-testing the bombs and trying to overawe Stalin.)
Length of WW2 will be almost certainly shorter than in the original timeline (edit: unless for some reason bomb production is held up as compared to the original timeline).
There will be no home islands invasion (at least I think this is what you actually meant?), because Imperial Japan has already surrendered.
Not sure if the USSR will intervene; depends on how far ahead of the original timeline (assuming that is the case) the Imperial Japanese surrender comes. Stalin needs some time after the German surrender to sort troops and logistics out in the Far East to be ready to 'go'.
 
My bad; I was more trying to point out that the US did transfer material to the Soviets, so it wouldn't be impossible for further transfers to happen, as the US had allowed some in the past. But you are correct that Hula alone was not enough.

But if an invasion does occur, and if casualty projections are accurate or worse, then I do not find it unfathomable that the US would provide the Soviets with further resources to invade, so that the Soviets may do the dying instead of Americans (at the very least).

The Americans may decide to let the Japanese perish from hunger and let the blockade to reduce Japanese resistance further before invasion. Or to continue the firebombing campaign which was horrifyingly effective against the largely wooden Japanese cities and proceed to eliminate the smaller cities and towns once the big cities had been burnt down.
 
The Americans may decide to let the Japanese perish from hunger and let the blockade to reduce Japanese resistance further before invasion. Or to continue the firebombing campaign which was horrifyingly effective against the largely wooden Japanese cities and proceed to eliminate the smaller cities and towns once the big cities had been burnt down.

Agreed in general.Soviet Invasion is far down the list of the likely turnouts.
 
Soviets may have been new to the amphibious game, but they did okay in taking the Kurils in the days before (and just after) the Emperor's surrender announcement. Thinking they could take Hokkaido is a conservative estimate. It's quite plausible they could have gotten onto northern Honshu before March 1946, which was the Pentagon's tentative invasion date for the main island
they only had about 10 (30?)lendlease landing craft and would have had no air cover over Hokkaido. Glanz rebuts Hokkaido invastion here https://www.c-span.org/video/?327355-3/discussion-josef-stalin-soviet-unions-pacific-war-strategy
 
Even if you gave the Soviets adequate numbers of landing craft, LSTs etc to make and support an invasion of Hokkaido, they still will have serious problems with limited/no air cover until they set up landing fields on Hokkaido. With Hokkaido bases then everything including all fuel and ammunition, spare parts, etc will need to be imported putting further strain on the logistics. Equally important as the actual ships etc the Soviets would need to land and support a force on Hokkaido capable of doing the job is TRAINING. The limited number of ships transferred under PROJECT HULA required setting up a whole training program for the Soviets in Alaska to get the crews well enough trained to take the ships to sea independently. If you are giving more and larger ships, a lot more sailors need to be trained. Once you get them well enough trained to be safe at sea, then you need to have them learn how to land troops etc, and doing so in the waters around Hokkaido will take skill. At the same time you need to train the individual soldiers, officers and staff folks like logistics and medical on how to do the amphibious assault. If this is not done, your landings will be at best a marginal successful screw up, more likely is a complete failure or Gallipoli stalemate.

If you look at the Allied record in this sort of thing, even with the Marines who had been working on this for most of the 1930s, the skill/quality of the landings got much better from the first in 1942 through 1945. Even given the Soviet attitude towards casualties (as in "who cares"), even with the transfer of enough equipment, to train and be ready for such an assault is simply not possible for 1945, spring, 1946 more likely. You could do it sooner if the USA transfers and trains sooner, and if the Soviets can set aside personnel for this before Germany surrenders (not happening), and of course you need to have the USA be OK with the Soviets occupying Hokkaido (also not happening).
 
I think many people have the false impression that the Japanese were most worried about Soviet invasion of the Home Islands, which they obviously couldn't do. No, they were most worried about a Soviet invasion of their Chinese territories.

The whole war started over controlling China. When the Soviets sweep up Manchuria, that's when the war ends - bombs or not.

So really, since nothing changes strategically, the delayed use of nuclear weapons will only have an impact on culture, and later wars, such as Korea and Cuba.
 
Hell to Pay: Operation DOWNFALL and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947 by D. M. Giangreco

51L+3b5-NeL._SX329_BO1,204,203,200_.jpg


The best source I'll recommend. I've been interested in this since my grandfather and uncles all WWII talked about it when I was a kid.

I will say this:
Nowhere in his broadcast did the Emporer mention the USSR. Though he did say that by laying down their arms Japan was, in fact, saving the world. Some in Japan still see it that way, but the Chinese, Koreans, and others would beg to differ.

The Japanese Imperial Army and Navy were the real power in Japan (like the warlords of another era) and when the Emporer sided with the surrender side of the debate in Tokyo and give the order to stop fighting, he did so at great risk knowing what often happened to others on the "divine" throne that stepped beyond their "traditional" boundaries. The threat from "below" in the ranks was very real in Japan, not even the "living god" was fully safe from it. Speaking of the military side, they would only agree to an end to the war if; Japan avoided an occupation (like WWI Germany), would hold for trial Japanese war criminals themselves (like WWI Germany) would allow the various government/military institutions in Tokyo (that help lead to war in the first place) remain intact. Also, be allowed to retain Manchuria and Korea as that was considered the "Core" of the Japanese Empire. They told the emperor that after they defeated or at least blunted the US Invasion (Gallipoli style x1000 and with the execution every allied POW throughout every Japanese-held territory) and sent enough Americans home in boxes, the US electorate would force a more "Treaty of Versailles" end on the war in which millions of people still under the Japanese gun used as bargaining chips at the negotiation table.

Now, this is what I call the "one and two" punch that ended WWII; The USSR declaration of war and invasion of Manchuria (and threatening Korea) told the Emperor that Japan would lose the "core" of its empire anyway, and with the atomic bombs he thought; "They don't even need to invade, they'll just drop more of these super bombs and blockade us into starvation without setting foot on Japanese soil (we only had a few of them for immediate use, but he didn't know that, hence the bluff). The USSR's entry into the war in the Pacific did indeed help end it but still not enough on its own. Both events close together to force a decision on the part of Japan was important.

Truman was focused on ending the war quickly and with the lest American casualties possible. With Germany out of the war, the US electorate made it very clear they wanted a quick end. Playing warm-ups to the Cold War was far from the US President's mind.
 
There was a coup attempt when the Emperor made the surrender decision. Some leaders in the IJA attempted to stop the recording of the surrender from getting to the radio station, and made an attempt to "kidnap" the Emperor - who had obviously been deceived and badly served by the peace group. Manchuria, Formosa, and Korea were to be kept, and basically Japan "left alone" with some demilitarization. The "just guarantee the Imperial system and Emperor stay and that's all we ask" meme simply is not true.
 
There was a coup attempt when the Emperor made the surrender decision. Some leaders in the IJA attempted to stop the recording of the surrender from getting to the radio station, and made an attempt to "kidnap" the Emperor - who had obviously been deceived and badly served by the peace group. Manchuria, Formosa, and Korea were to be kept, and basically Japan "left alone" with some demilitarization. The "just guarantee the Imperial system and Emperor stay and that's all we ask" meme simply is not true.

Given that the IJA officers participating in the coup attempt are all low to middle rank officers, I have reservations to say the IJA leadership was a part of the coup attempt. There were some hesitation on the part of some IJA generals, but at the end they all decided to complied with Imperial edict to surrender.
 
Besides a threat of Soviet occupation, the Soviet entry in the war also made sure that Japanese fantasies about a Soviet brokered peace deal were shattered. This did have a significant psychological effect on the Japanese leadership and contributed to their willingness to contemplate a surrender.

These discussions often also forget to mention the fear of internal rebellion which kept many people in the Japanese leadership awake at nights.

Nowhere in his broadcast did the Emporer mention the USSR. Though he did say that by laying down their arms Japan was, in fact, saving the world. Some in Japan still see it that way, but the Chinese, Koreans, and others would beg to differ.

Emperor's broadcast shouldn't be given too much emphasis when analyzing reasons for the Japanese surrender. It was for public consumption and directed at Americans. Unlike the USSR, the Japanese leadership calculated that the US would be more ready to agree to keep the kokutai intact, so it was important that they surrendered to Americans. IOTL the USSR did constantly claim that it should have a larger role in the occupation. If the Emperor had actually mentioned the Soviet invasion in his speech, the Soviets could have use that in their arguments and public rhetoric. Even if they can't achieve anything concrete, it could have been used to strengthen their propaganda efforts.

Given that the IJA officers participating in the coup attempt are all low to middle rank officers, I have reservations to say the IJA leadership was a part of the coup attempt. There were some hesitation on the part of some IJA generals, but at the end they all decided to complied with Imperial edict to surrender.

Personally I believe that the coup d'eta attempt gets more attention than it probably deserves.
 
Now, this is what I call the "one and two" punch that ended WWII; The USSR declaration of war and invasion of Manchuria (and threatening Korea) told the Emperor that Japan would lose the "core" of its empire anyway, and with the atomic bombs he thought; "They don't even need to invade, they'll just drop more of these super bombs and blockade us into starvation without setting foot on Japanese soil (we only had a few of them for immediate use, but he didn't know that, hence the bluff). The USSR's entry into the war in the Pacific did indeed help end it but still not enough on its own. Both events close together to force a decision on the part of Japan was important.

I overall like your analysis but I disagree with the pop-history notion the use of two A-bombs was a bluff. They merely made clear the objective reality. The air campaign was busy de-civilising Japan all by itself, by which I mean had Japan held out it would have found it had fewer urban areas and manufacturing resources as time went on. The only question being when would Japan collapse under what was in effectiveness a much heavier, more sustained and above all less impeded aerial onslaught than Germany had endured? As you say the blockade made the continued hold on the Japanese mainland Empire irrelevant.

The invasion of the Home Islands was in itself unnecessary but it is a clear hold over from the mindset that gave us the First World War that taught a total war must be fought to the complete destruction of the enemy. It may seem strange to suggest this but it seems that the Japanese high commands (Army V Navy) had never truly grasped the theory of total war nor the hold it had at the time on the Western psyche. They still assumed they were fighting a neat little 19th Century conflict for moderate diplomatic concessions, the fact they were forced to desperate no going measures like planning to execute their POWs should have told them something was different but as we know today people find shifting their entire world view somewhat of a stretch.
 
I overall like your analysis but I disagree with the pop-history notion the use of two A-bombs was a bluff. They merely made clear the objective reality. The air campaign was busy de-civilizing Japan all by itself, by which I mean had Japan held out it would have found it had fewer urban areas and manufacturing resources as time went on. The only question is when would Japan collapse under what was in effect a much heavier, more sustained and above all less impeded aerial onslaught than Germany had endured? As you say the blockade made the continued hold on the Japanese mainland Empire irrelevant.

The invasion of the Home Islands was in itself unnecessary but it is a clear holdover from the mindset that gave us the First World War that taught a total war must be fought to the complete destruction of the enemy. It may seem strange to suggest this but it seems that the Japanese high commands (Army V Navy) had never truly grasped the theory of total war nor the hold it had at the time on the Western psyche. They still assumed they were fighting a neat little 19th Century conflict for moderate diplomatic concessions, the fact they were forced to desperate no going measures like planning to execute their POWs should have told them something was different but as we know today people find shifting their entire worldview somewhat of a stretch.

The fight and surrender sides were deadlocked in Tokyo and it would take the emperor to break that deadlock. The "bluff" was to get Japan to surrender before the invasion was to begin on "X-Day", which was scheduled for 1 November 1945. If Japan called the Americans bluff then the conventional blockade and bombardment by air (set to spread out from the cities and focus on food and a fragile railroad network). An invasion is necessary if you want a quicker end to the war as a blockade/bombardment would take much longer, and the willingness of the American electorate to tolerate another year of war even with half-demobilization seems to have been doubted by American leadership at the time. A "treaty" end of the war was also unacceptable because the allied nations remembered how the First World War ended and did not want their children or grandchildren fighting the same enemy again. Japan had to know it was beaten and that required occupation and full disarmament. Also, whether blockade and or invasions both would have taken time and in that amount of time say into '46 and maybe beyond more people, mostly civilians not only in the home island but everywhere else in the Pacific/Asian theater. Isolated from Home or not Japanese forces abroad would keep fighting unless Tokyo told them to stop are they were overwhelmed.

We took a chance to break the deadlock in Tokyo by using the atomic bombs and it paid off. Saving far more lives than they took.
 
Some of those taking part in this thread would have been able to carry out a more realistic discussion of this matter if they’d been familiar with the works of Richard B. Frank, D.M. Giangreco, and David M. Glantz. There are many scholars who have made valuable contributions in this area. So much, in fact, that it is almost impossible to catch up with it all. However, anyone studying the books and articles of this trio will come away with a strong grounding in the factors determining how the war actually played out and why. Naturally no one is going to plow through their work during the short life of this thread but I hope that if this or a similar subject comes up in the future – and it undoubtedly will – that a few more correspondents will have had a chance to check out these historians who have a comprehensive understanding of the endgame in the Pacific and East Asia.

See Frank’s book is Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, https://www.amazon.com/Downfall-End-Imperial-Japanese-Empire/dp/0141001461, and here is his superb presentation at the Harry S. Truman Library, https://www.c-span.org/video/?327055-1/discussion-fall-japanese-empire where he spoke about the events leading up to Japan’s surrender. Giangreco’s Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947, https://www.amazon.com/D.-M.-Giangreco/e/B001IU0QNC, is regularly described as the definitive work on U.S. and Japanese plans for both the invasion and defense of Japan. A view of his work and experience, somewhat different than his standard Naval Institute Press bio, appears on reddit, https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/9ieegj/whats_your_opinion_on_dm_giangrecos_hell_to_pay/.

David Glantz (Colonel, US Army, ret.) was the founding director of the Soviet Army Studies Office, at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, an organization that continues to do important work today under the name Foreign Military Studies Office. Glantz is also the long-time founder and editor of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies and has written dozens of authoritative books and articles on the military of the former Soviet Union. His “August Storm” volumes on the Soviet offensive against Japan at the end of World War II are absolutely priceless.

Anyone looking to purchase used copies of his “August Storm” volumes should, however, be aware that there are two different sets available that have very similar names. They’ll want to make sure that they are getting the 2003 volumes, Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945: August Storm and Soviet Operational and Tactical Combat in Manchuria, 1945: August Storm from Frank Cass Publishers. The earlier and less comprehensive 1983 volumes – which are nevertheless rock-solid works – are titled August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria (Leavenworth Papers No. 7) and August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945 (Leavenworth Papers No. 8).

By the time that Glantz produced the 2003 set he’d been able to benefit greatly from the upsurge in archival material that became available after the breakup of the Soviet Union. And it was a good thing that he took advantage of this while he could because the “openness” started to close off almost as quickly as it had begun and now comes in the form of periodic, official spurts instead of through independent research of primary source materials. Nevertheless, the result is that his knowledge, which broadened exponentially between the 1983 and 2003 sets, is still expanding because, unlike many authors who will write a book or two on a given subject and then move on, he continues to educate himself. This has prompted Glantz, as Genrexx noted earlier, to modify his opinion in some areas. For example, while he formerly expressed that the Soviets might have been able to conduct a successful operation in Northern Hokkaido, he has since come to the conclusion that “any military operations against Hokkaido were infeasible, even if Stalin had decided to challenge Truman – which he didn’t.” (D.M. Giangreco, Hell to Pay, p258)

Interestingly, the change (or maybe it’s better to say “refinement”) of his opinion over the years is itself of some value to this thread because his earlier, discarded views are far better known than what he knows now. Giangreco notes that: “When producing the 2003 book [Glantz] had less information available to him and knowledge of the Japanese situation was largely limited to how it was characterized in the Russian after-action reports. The piecemealing out of documents from the former Soviet Union has been an ongoing frustration for Glantz. He notes that the material available to researchers is still limited and that this is unlikely to change significantly any time soon. Said Glantz: ‘The mail’s still out. There’s one more – maybe three, four, five more – rounds [of document releases to come] before we’re through’.” (Giangreco, Hell to Pay, p509)

Here is Glantz speaking on “Stalin and the Soviet Union's Pacific War Strategy” at the same Navy Memorial event where be made the statements quoted by Giangreco, https://www.c-span.org/video/?327355-3/discussion-josef-stalin-soviet-unions-pacific-war-strategy. Giangreco’s presentation later that evening on U.S., Soviet and Japanese operational plans for combat on Hokkaido can be found at, https://www.c-span.org/video/?327355-5/strategies-invasion-defense-japan, and includes Frank and Glantz who were invited on stage by Giangreco during the Q&A to elaborate on Soviet intentions and capabilities. The two new chapters in Hell to Pay on the secret and extensive U.S.-Soviet cooperation against Japan, 11 and 17, are a must read. Chapter 17 covers U.S., Soviet, and Japanese plans for the invasion – and defense – of Hokkaido and Chapter 11 the massive U.S. support to Soviet operations in the Far East.

Giangreco also has some interesting thoughts on how and why this support remained essentially unknown for so long at a shortened text version of a Pritzker Military Museum presentation here, https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/169567. Although it was apparently on the Web at one time through the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, I have been unable to locate the paper on the secret Project Milepost deliveries by Jacob W. Kipp and former Soviet general Makhmut Akhmetevich Gareev. However, while Richard A. Russell’s Project Hula: Secret Soviet-American Cooperation in the War Against Japan (Navy Historical Center, 1997) is out of print, it can be easily obtained on the Web.

And, by the way, Barry Bull’s comment that “Project Hula was not designed to aid a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido” is completely supported, not in Giangreco’s Chapter 17, The Hokkaido Myth, but in Chapter 11, To Break Japan’s Spine where the secret pre-Yalta negotiations and massive shipment of supplies to directly support Soviet operations against Japan are exhaustively detailed. Chapter 17 fully supports sloreck and Genrexx.
 
Last edited:
Some of those taking part in this thread would have been able to carry out a more realistic discussion of this matter if they’d been familiar with the works of Richard B. Frank, D.M. Giangreco, and David M. Glantz. There are many scholars who have made valuable contributions in this area. So much, in fact, that it is almost impossible to catch up with it all. However, anyone studying the books and articles of this trio will come away with a strong grounding in the factors determining how the war actually played out and why. Naturally no one is going to plow through their work during the short life of this thread but I hope that if this or a similar subject comes up in the future – and it undoubtedly will – that a few more correspondents will have had a chance to check out these historians who have a comprehensive understanding of the endgame in the Pacific and East Asia.

See Frank’s book is Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, https://www.amazon.com/Downfall-End-Imperial-Japanese-Empire/dp/0141001461, and here is his superb presentation at the Harry S. Truman Library, https://www.c-span.org/video/?327055-1/discussion-fall-japanese-empire where he spoke about the events leading up to Japan’s surrender. Giangreco’s Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947, https://www.amazon.com/D.-M.-Giangreco/e/B001IU0QNC, is regularly described as the definitive work on U.S. and Japanese plans for both the invasion and defense of Japan. A view of his work and experience, somewhat different than his standard Naval Institute Press bio, appears on reddit, https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/9ieegj/whats_your_opinion_on_dm_giangrecos_hell_to_pay/.

David Glantz (Colonel, US Army, ret.) was the founding director of the Soviet Army Studies Office, at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, an organization that continues to do important work today under the name Foreign Military Studies Office. Glantz is also the long-time founder and editor of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies and has written dozens of authoritative books and articles on the military of the former Soviet Union. His “August Storm” volumes on the Soviet offensive against Japan at the end of World War II are absolutely priceless.

Anyone looking to purchase used copies of his “August Storm” volumes should, however, be aware that there are two different sets available that have very similar names. They’ll want to make sure that they are getting the 2003 volumes, Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945: August Storm and Soviet Operational and Tactical Combat in Manchuria, 1945: August Storm from Frank Cass Publishers. The earlier and less comprehensive 1983 volumes – which are nevertheless rock-solid works – are titled August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria (Leavenworth Papers No. 7) and August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945 (Leavenworth Papers No. 8).

By the time that Glantz produced the 2003 set he’d been able to benefit greatly from the upsurge in archival material that became available after the breakup of the Soviet Union. And it was a good thing that he took advantage of this while he could because the “openness” started to close off almost as quickly as it had begun and now comes in the form of periodic, official spurts instead of through independent research of primary source materials. Nevertheless, the result is that his knowledge, which broadened exponentially between the 1983 and 2003 sets, is still expanding because, unlike many authors who will write a book or two on a given subject and then move on, he continues to educate himself. This has prompted Glantz, as Genrexx noted earlier, to modify his opinion in some areas. For example, while he formerly expressed that the Soviets might have been able to conduct a successful operation in Northern Hokkaido, he has since come to the conclusion that “any military operations against Hokkaido were infeasible, even if Stalin had decided to challenge Truman – which he didn’t.” (D.M. Giangreco, Hell to Pay, p258)

Interestingly, the change (or maybe it’s better to say “refinement”) of his opinion over the years is itself of some value to this thread because his earlier, discarded views are far better known than what he knows now. Giangreco notes that: “When producing the 2003 book [Glantz] had less information available to him and knowledge of the Japanese situation was largely limited to how it was characterized in the Russian after-action reports. The piecemealing out of documents from the former Soviet Union has been an ongoing frustration for Glantz. He notes that the material available to researchers is still limited and that this is unlikely to change significantly any time soon. Said Glantz: ‘The mail’s still out. There’s one more – maybe three, four, five more – rounds [of document releases to come] before we’re through’.” (Giangreco, Hell to Pay, p509)

Here is Glantz speaking on “Stalin and the Soviet Union's Pacific War Strategy” at the same Navy Memorial event where be made the statements quoted by Giangreco, https://www.c-span.org/video/?327355-3/discussion-josef-stalin-soviet-unions-pacific-war-strategy. Giangreco’s presentation later that evening on U.S., Soviet and Japanese operational plans for combat on Hokkaido can be found at, https://www.c-span.org/video/?327355-5/strategies-invasion-defense-japan, and includes Frank and Glantz who were invited on stage by Giangreco during the Q&A to elaborate on Soviet intentions and capabilities. The two new chapters in Hell to Pay on the secret and extensive U.S.-Soviet cooperation against Japan, 11 and 17, are a must read. Chapter 17 covers U.S., Soviet, and Japanese plans for the invasion – and defense – of Hokkaido and Chapter 11 the massive U.S. support to Soviet operations in the Far East.

Giangreco also has some interesting thoughts on how and why this support remained essentially unknown for so long at a shortened text version of a Pritzker Military Museum presentation here, https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/169567. Although it was apparently on the Web at one time through the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, I have been unable to locate the paper on the secret Project Milepost deliveries by Jacob W. Kipp and former Soviet general Makhmut Akhmetevich Gareev. However, while Richard A. Russell’s Project Hula: Secret Soviet-American Cooperation in the War Against Japan (Navy Historical Center, 1997) is out of print, it can be easily obtained on the Web.

And, by the way, Barry Bull’s comment that “Project Hula was not designed to aid a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido” is completely supported, not in Giangreco’s Chapter 17, The Hokkaido Myth, but in Chapter 11, To Break Japan’s Spine where the secret pre-Yalta negotiations and massive shipment of supplies to directly support Soviet operations against Japan are exhaustively detailed. Chapter 17 fully supports sloreck and Genrexx.

For those interested, Glantz's 2003 books are available for purchase on Google Books.
 
While I have only read some of these sources, they do generally support the idea that absent significant ADDITIONAL US support in terms of ships, training, etc, the odds of a significant Soviet success in Hokkaido is limited at best. Given the time it took to train the limited number of Soviet sailors on the ships they took over OTL, this would mean starting at least 6-8 months in advance of any Soviet assault on Hokkaido, preferably a year to train up in not only the basics of shiphandling, maintenance etc but also at least some basics of amphibious operations. Not only do the Soviets have to send a fair number of naval officers and ratings with some level of skill to the US training sites (Alaska or Pacific Northwest), but the USA will have to enlarge the establishment for training both personnel and equipment. IMHO it is questionable if in winter, 1945, either the USSR or the USA can devote the resources of all sorts to do this to get the Soviets ready for an assault before the weather/marine conditions make such an assault impractical. Getting the Soviets ready for such an assault in the early spring of 1946 when conditions are reasonable, is another matter.
 
While I have only read some of these sources, they do generally support the idea that absent significant ADDITIONAL US support in terms of ships, training, etc, the odds of a significant Soviet success in Hokkaido is limited at best. Given the time it took to train the limited number of Soviet sailors on the ships they took over OTL, this would mean starting at least 6-8 months in advance of any Soviet assault on Hokkaido, preferably a year to train up in not only the basics of shiphandling, maintenance etc but also at least some basics of amphibious operations. Not only do the Soviets have to send a fair number of naval officers and ratings with some level of skill to the US training sites (Alaska or Pacific Northwest), but the USA will have to enlarge the establishment for training both personnel and equipment. IMHO it is questionable if in winter, 1945, either the USSR or the USA can devote the resources of all sorts to do this to get the Soviets ready for an assault before the weather/marine conditions make such an assault impractical. Getting the Soviets ready for such an assault in the early spring of 1946 when conditions are reasonable, is another matter.

What the Soviets obtained through Project Hula was sufficient for, at best, a sustained brigade sized amphibious landing.
 
Top