Chapter 16: Heart of Darkness
“God created war so that Americans would learn geography.”- Mark Twain (OTL)
In 1960, when given a map of the globe, most Americans would not be able to tell where Katanga was located. By 1963, it was common knowledge and first on President Bush's hit list of belligerents in the Congo War. The fief of Moise Tshombe had been supported by the Belgians since its declaration of independence in order to preserve their mining interests. Bush and Mobutu, however, saw it as obstructing a united front against the forces of Lumumba and were gunning hard to take down Katanga.
After an inevitable round of political conflict within Belgium itself, the Belgians endorsed the DATO and Mobutu-led attack on Katanga in exchange for a favorable Belgian-Congolese trade deal once Mobutu had defeated Tshombe. Mobutu, being a nationalist, resented the deal, however, realizing that Western support was the only thing allowing his side to win, accepted the deal. The operation to decapitate Katanga would be known as Operation Ivory Tower.
On March 5th, 1963, American and DATO helicopters dropped 12,000 troops outside Elizabethville, the capital of Katanga, in the first large scale heliborne operation and use of air cavalry in history. They were supported by a mixed force of 20,000 American and Congolese troops approaching through the narrow jungle roads into the city, facing numerous ambushes and attacks along the way that drastically diminished their effectiveness, with American planners underestimating Katangan numbers guarding the city. As a result, what should have been a swift, surgical seizure of Elizabethville turned into three weeks of pitched street fighting with Tshombe’s forces. Tshombe himself escaped with a significant number of his men and insurrection persisted through Katanga, especially near the Luapula River. In response to the strategic failure of Operation Ivory Tower, Bush sacked the American commander for the congo, General William Westmoreland and replaced him with the much more down to earth and aggressive Lieutenant General Henry “Gunfighter” Emerson who diverted increasing amounts of airborne power to beat the Katangans into submission.
Meanwhile, Lumumba's forces continued to be well supplied, thanks to a trickle of Soviet supplies coming in from nominally neutral Sudan. By the fall of 1963, after numerous American backed offensives against Lumumba's forces ending in strategic stalemates for defeats, Bush and his commanders decided to work on starving Lumumba of both blood and lead. A blockade of Sudan was out of the question, as US naval forces in the region were almost nonexistent. Bombing supply depots and routes inside the Congo had proven ineffective, as the sites could simply be moved after an attack. And then, a wild Secretary of State Nixon appeared. Nixon proposed using Saudi Arabia, which was under the control of the pro-western Free Princes movement itching to bolster their relations in the west, to base US bombers out of for the purpose of bombing the routes through Sudan, as well as arming Christian rebels in South Sudan in order to cut the lines once and for all. The bombing campaign would be called Operation Stonebreaker. Immediately, a fierce debate erupted in the Bush cabinet, with Vice President Knowland and Nixon in support of Operation Stonebreaker and National Security Advisor Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. and Chief of Staff Christian Herter opposing setting it would weaken America's national standing due to the illegal nature of the attack. Bush, after 2 days of deliberation, reluctantly gave the go-ahead for Operation Stonebreaker.
Operation Stonebreaker as an instrument of warfare, was an act of genius. Supply convoys to Lumumba would be picked off in the desert by American bombers or South Sudanese guerrillas, the latter group often stealing the weapons for themselves. Lumumba, by January 1964, was feeling the pinch and the intensity of his attacks began to ebb. It also helped the American war effort that during this time, Moise Tshombe had managed to secure a reasonable peace agreement in December of 1963, securing autonomy for Katanga and amnesty for himself and his soldiers. The Congo War was at least, in the eyes most of the players involved, about to reach its conclusion.
Domestically, however, Operation Stonebreaker proved immediately controversial, with the resignation of Henry Cabot Lodge and Secretary of Labor Jacob Javits from the cabinet only being the start. Bush’s decision to approve the plan was met with condemnation from liberals and a surprising number of moderates through the country, with the flagrant violation of international law contrasting with his previous speeches on the necessity of honor, decorum and peace in foreign relations earlier, The decision not to consult a single congressional leader before approving the plan alienated many of Bush’s liberal Republican allies in congress and gave his opponents more lines of attack over his “flagrant disregard for international and constitutional law” as well as “Bloody Bush’s” authorization of strikes on civilian centers in Sudan as a part of Operation Stonebreaker (although strikes on Sudanese civilian centers were uncommon and major cities were never targets). Nixon also received a great deal of flak for his hand in the operation, choosing not to run for the Republican nomination in 1964 as a result, opting instead to run for his old Senate seat in California. Bush retained the support of diehard hawks and conservatives, but public opinion had concluded that Bush at the very least had ”jumped the gun” and “betrayed his principles” with Operation Stonebreaker. These attacks on Bush would be echoed by a certain Democrat, a hard-charging southerner with the mission of redeeming the Democratic Party, Southern Democrats and the nature of the south itself.