1793, Philadelphia.
In OTL, the Girondins, after taking power in Revolutionary France, sent perhaps the worst possible ambassador to the United States, Edmond-Charles Genet. "Citizen Genet," as the representative of America's crucial ally in the War for Independence, now representing a fellow Repubic, arrived to cheers. However, he set about making himself deeply unpopular - recruiting American privateers to attack British commerce, intervening in domestic politics by encouraging "Democratic-Republican societies," and outfitting an expedition against Spanish Florida.
It wasn't just Anglophiles like Hamilton and Adams who found him appalling - he earned Washington's ire, and even Jefferson found his activities unacceptable. Franco-American relations continued to drift, and ultimately in 1794 the new Jacobin government in France demanded Genet's return, likely to face the guillotine. Ultimately, Hamilton of all people prevailed on Washington to grant Genet asylum. Genet ended up marrying the daughter of New York Governor George Clinton, and died on a farm in the Hudson Valley in 1834.
Genet attempted to invoke American support against Britain and Spain under the 1778 Franco-American treaty: the War of the First Coalition had broken out on February 1, 1793 when France declared war on Britain and the Netherlands. Aside from his outrageous behavior and obvious contempt for the Americans, however, his timing was bad. Genet arrived in Philadelphia on May 18. On April 22, Washington had declared neutrality with the unanimous support of his cabinet.
Despite public support for the Proclaimation of Neutrality, Jefferson - both a Francophile and a revolutionary ideologue - encouraged his protege Madison to engage Hamilton in debate by warring pamphlets (the Pacificus-Helvidius debates). Madison wrote that Hamilton's pamphlets "have been read with singular pleasure and applause by the foreigners and degenerate citizens among us, who hate our republican government and the French Revolution."
Now, a much better choice would surely have been the Revolutionary War hero (on both sides of the Atlantic), the Marquis de Lafayette, who treated the Americans as allied equals and had excellent relations - close personal friendships, with Washington, Hamilton, and Jefferson. Unfortunately, Lafayette - a moderate Republican who had defended the monarchy - had been on the political outs since late 1791, had an outstanding political arrest warrant against him since August 1792, and IOTL 1793 was actually interned in Prussia. Indeed, the U.S. was at the time lending him both diplomatic and financial support.
So we need a very different French government in power in 1793 for this scenario to work. The POD then - which is massive - must be a more moderate French government in power. What if, for whatever reason, sometime between 1789 and 1791 there is a change in French politics that leads to either a French constitutional monarchy or moderate Republic, and this government appoints Lafayette as ambassador to Philadelphia to solicit U.S. support against the British? Let Lafayette arrive in Philadelphia sometime spring-fall 1792.
With Lafayette in Philadelphia, the whole tenor of the discussion changes. Lafayette was deeply respected by Americans and considered them equals. He would not have recruited privateers or organized half-cocked private expeditions against Florida; and he certainly would not have intrigued against his friends Hamilton and Washington. He would, however, have urged President Washington and his cabinet - including a very sympathetic Jeffersom - to consider that the former oppressor of the American colonies, George III, was part of a host of tyrants and despots organizing to take down America's only loyal ally, the French Republic.
I am assuming that the War of the First Coalition was almost inevitable after the Bastille, but preserving the monarchy could change it radically. Killing Louis XVI after a show trial and long after he had lost power was always going to leave a poor taste with most Americans. Let's say that the King is removed from power without his being executed (this should butterfly the Reign of Terror too, which is great news for both the French and for Franco-American friendship). This is still a fundamental threat to the existing European order, and war with the powers - including Britain, Spain, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Austria - is still likely to break out over the course of 1793.
Now, the cause of taking up the French alliance will be much stronger in Philadelphia. Jefferson will openly argue that as France saved America in her hour of peril, so it was America's role to fulfill her treaty obligations and support France. How would America command respect among the nations if she did not stick by her oldest, and only true, ally? Lafayette, too, has Washington's and Hamilton's ear and will argue that after defeating Republicanism in Europe, the British would never let it persist in the New World - and next time the United States would stand alone.
Washington had good reason to be skeptical of joining a war against Britain and Spain. The United States is brand new, and just in 1791 faced a fairly serious civil insurrection with the Whiskey Rebellion. As Commander in Chief, Washington actually commanded an army in the field to crush this uprising - the only time in American history IOTL that a U.S. President has taken a field command while in office. Hamilton and Adams will similarly worry about the effect of renewed war with on the emerging nation, with its shaky finances, infrastructure, army and navy.
Unsuited as the United States is for war militarily or organizationally, the ideological and strategic case for war is clear. The Revolutionary War, which only ended in 1783 and in part inspired the French Revolution, is fresh in American minds. The nation is not yet sectionally split as it was by 1812 IOTL - for example, the Governor of Massachusetts in 1793 was Sam Adams of the Sons of Liberty, about as anti-British a figure as you might find.
To Washington, I suspect that violating the Franco-American Treaty would be considered dishonorable. Between Robespierre and George III IOTL, neutrality seemed like a course between Scylla and Charybdis. With a more moderate France represented by Lafayette opposed by an array of monarchs led by the author of the Intolerable Acts, I believe the call to alliance would be answered. Even if not, over the next year or two British impressment and French military and political victories may begin to change the calculus. The Jay Treaty will likely be impossible in the current climate, which means the illegal British occupation of frontier fortresses in the Old Northwest (the Great Lakes region) and New York will remain a further provocation, and a source for an intolerable strategic threat: British ability to arm Indians/Native Americans with the power to block American westward settlement.
If the US joins the war on the French side while Washington is President, I suspect that he takes the term Commander in Chief literally, just as he did during the Whiskey Rebellion, and takes the field against the British. Unless there is peace by 1796 (which seems unlikely, Washington, against his wishes, runs for a third presidential term as the only candidate who can maintain unity among the states and the Army. His likely successor, by the way, would be either Hamilton, the military man and centralizer, or Jefferson, the champion of the French alliance - not Adams, the civilian Anglophile. The deep partisan divides between the Federalists and Republicans will be averted or delayed, and quite changed if it ever does occur - for now the sentiments of all national leaders will be for unity against the old British enemy (and their Spanish allies).
How well can the United States fair against Britain and Spain in the timeframe of the War of the First Coalition (1792-97)? Certainly, both opponents are distracted by a primary focus on the European theater. In 1794, France IOTL seized the Rhineland and the Netherlands up to the Rhine, invaded Catalonia successfully and Piedmont unsuccessfully, and maintained a plucky naval challenge to Britain in the West Indies.
Still, Spanish control of New Orleans (and effectively the Mississippi) and British effective control of the Great Lakes places the Americans in a dangerous strategic position. The Atlantic is clearly dominated by the British, and any American city is open to British invasion. Georgia in particular will be consumed by the Spanish threat that their colony was founded to oppose. American whites in the Northwest Territory will face British-inspired native attacks soon accompanied by actual companies of Redcoats, with Mad Anthony Wayne's Indian War taking on the character of a war for national defense.
The first priorities for the U.S., after defending the Atlantic seaboard, would be defeating the natives of the Old Northwest, capturing New Orleans, and relieving the occupied forts on U.S. territory (Niagara, Oswego, Dearborn, etc.). Given the opportunity, Canada and Florida should be conquered to deprive Britain and Spain of the ability to invade the United States so easily in the future. Britain and Spain certainly have the ability to counter these plans, but it depends on the resources which the governments in London and Madrid dedicate to the New World while facing a threat much closer to home. William Pitt the Younger, the British Prime Minister throughout this period, always had a soft spot for the Americans (who he considered fellow Englishmen).
IOTL, Spain was defeated in Europe in 1795, recognizing Revolutionary France and ceding San Domingo with the Treaty of Basel. The next year, in 1796, Spain (the power being Spain's chief minister Manuel de Godoy) allied with France in the Treaty of San Ildefonso. The British blockaded Spain, cutting her off from her colonial empire. Under one of the secret provisions of San Ildefonso, Louisiana was ceded to France, which later sold it to the United States.
ITTL the United States should be involved in the Franco-Spanish peace talks, and Louisiana and Florida are likely to be annexed. This major coup - based much more on events in Europe than the United States - would likely rally the American public further to embrace "Washington's War." Of course, continued British opposition will mean that actual control of New Orleans and St. Augustine may be fleeting, but the U.S. now has strong allies on her southern flank - France, Spain, and the Batavian Republic. Well, in the case of Spain, more a very nervous co-belligerent. This will have very interesting knock-on effects in the Spanish colonial possessions down the line.
IOTL, the War of the First Coalition ended with the Treat of Campo Formio in October 1797. However, Britain remained at war. France maintained an uneasy truce with her Continental foes but overthrew the Swiss and Neapolitan governments and demanded additional territory from Austria. In 1799, a Second Coalition anchored by Britain, Russia, and Austria was organized. Only in 1802, after France had again imposed peace on the Continent under Bonaparte's leadership, did Britain make peace with the Treaty of Amiens. Continued French expansionism in Germany and Italy brought about the Third Coalition. Anglo-French war resumed in 1805 and lasted until Waterloo, with a brief hiatus in the winter of 1814-15 after Bonaparte's first defeat.
Now, from an American perspective, war with Britain is the war. So they will lobby for a treaty resolution with Britain as soon as possible. The longer Britain has to gear up for a long naval struggle, the better equipped she is to wage a separate war in North America with resources the Americans will have trouble matching. Some conservatives in Britain will take the logic of Restoration to its extreme and demand that Republicanism be stamped out not only in Europe, but in America. On the other hand, eventual French domination of the Continent will mean British distraction from the New World. Depending on strategic choices of governments and military officers, this TL may be anything from an Ameriwank to a restoration of British rule in the colonies. If successful, the United States may end as part of an international alliance of Republics that dominates most of the European Continent and is bitterly opposed by Russia and Britain.
The positions of Spain and Portugal ITTL are quite interesting. Do they maintain control of their colonies? Lose them to Britain, or to the US, or to independence? If there are new American republics in Central and South America, do they look to the United States as an inspiration or a threat? All of these, I think, are viable possibilities depending on circumstances.
In the long run, a moderate France dominating the Continent and allied to the U.S. poses a strategic combination that Britain cannot hope to rival - even if their allies or neutrals are in control in Latin America, Scandinavia, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire (all of which depend on circumstances and could end in the Franco-American camp).
I'm thinking of fleshing out this timeline if there is any interest in this concept.
In OTL, the Girondins, after taking power in Revolutionary France, sent perhaps the worst possible ambassador to the United States, Edmond-Charles Genet. "Citizen Genet," as the representative of America's crucial ally in the War for Independence, now representing a fellow Repubic, arrived to cheers. However, he set about making himself deeply unpopular - recruiting American privateers to attack British commerce, intervening in domestic politics by encouraging "Democratic-Republican societies," and outfitting an expedition against Spanish Florida.
It wasn't just Anglophiles like Hamilton and Adams who found him appalling - he earned Washington's ire, and even Jefferson found his activities unacceptable. Franco-American relations continued to drift, and ultimately in 1794 the new Jacobin government in France demanded Genet's return, likely to face the guillotine. Ultimately, Hamilton of all people prevailed on Washington to grant Genet asylum. Genet ended up marrying the daughter of New York Governor George Clinton, and died on a farm in the Hudson Valley in 1834.
Genet attempted to invoke American support against Britain and Spain under the 1778 Franco-American treaty: the War of the First Coalition had broken out on February 1, 1793 when France declared war on Britain and the Netherlands. Aside from his outrageous behavior and obvious contempt for the Americans, however, his timing was bad. Genet arrived in Philadelphia on May 18. On April 22, Washington had declared neutrality with the unanimous support of his cabinet.
Despite public support for the Proclaimation of Neutrality, Jefferson - both a Francophile and a revolutionary ideologue - encouraged his protege Madison to engage Hamilton in debate by warring pamphlets (the Pacificus-Helvidius debates). Madison wrote that Hamilton's pamphlets "have been read with singular pleasure and applause by the foreigners and degenerate citizens among us, who hate our republican government and the French Revolution."
Now, a much better choice would surely have been the Revolutionary War hero (on both sides of the Atlantic), the Marquis de Lafayette, who treated the Americans as allied equals and had excellent relations - close personal friendships, with Washington, Hamilton, and Jefferson. Unfortunately, Lafayette - a moderate Republican who had defended the monarchy - had been on the political outs since late 1791, had an outstanding political arrest warrant against him since August 1792, and IOTL 1793 was actually interned in Prussia. Indeed, the U.S. was at the time lending him both diplomatic and financial support.
So we need a very different French government in power in 1793 for this scenario to work. The POD then - which is massive - must be a more moderate French government in power. What if, for whatever reason, sometime between 1789 and 1791 there is a change in French politics that leads to either a French constitutional monarchy or moderate Republic, and this government appoints Lafayette as ambassador to Philadelphia to solicit U.S. support against the British? Let Lafayette arrive in Philadelphia sometime spring-fall 1792.
With Lafayette in Philadelphia, the whole tenor of the discussion changes. Lafayette was deeply respected by Americans and considered them equals. He would not have recruited privateers or organized half-cocked private expeditions against Florida; and he certainly would not have intrigued against his friends Hamilton and Washington. He would, however, have urged President Washington and his cabinet - including a very sympathetic Jeffersom - to consider that the former oppressor of the American colonies, George III, was part of a host of tyrants and despots organizing to take down America's only loyal ally, the French Republic.
I am assuming that the War of the First Coalition was almost inevitable after the Bastille, but preserving the monarchy could change it radically. Killing Louis XVI after a show trial and long after he had lost power was always going to leave a poor taste with most Americans. Let's say that the King is removed from power without his being executed (this should butterfly the Reign of Terror too, which is great news for both the French and for Franco-American friendship). This is still a fundamental threat to the existing European order, and war with the powers - including Britain, Spain, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Austria - is still likely to break out over the course of 1793.
Now, the cause of taking up the French alliance will be much stronger in Philadelphia. Jefferson will openly argue that as France saved America in her hour of peril, so it was America's role to fulfill her treaty obligations and support France. How would America command respect among the nations if she did not stick by her oldest, and only true, ally? Lafayette, too, has Washington's and Hamilton's ear and will argue that after defeating Republicanism in Europe, the British would never let it persist in the New World - and next time the United States would stand alone.
Washington had good reason to be skeptical of joining a war against Britain and Spain. The United States is brand new, and just in 1791 faced a fairly serious civil insurrection with the Whiskey Rebellion. As Commander in Chief, Washington actually commanded an army in the field to crush this uprising - the only time in American history IOTL that a U.S. President has taken a field command while in office. Hamilton and Adams will similarly worry about the effect of renewed war with on the emerging nation, with its shaky finances, infrastructure, army and navy.
Unsuited as the United States is for war militarily or organizationally, the ideological and strategic case for war is clear. The Revolutionary War, which only ended in 1783 and in part inspired the French Revolution, is fresh in American minds. The nation is not yet sectionally split as it was by 1812 IOTL - for example, the Governor of Massachusetts in 1793 was Sam Adams of the Sons of Liberty, about as anti-British a figure as you might find.
To Washington, I suspect that violating the Franco-American Treaty would be considered dishonorable. Between Robespierre and George III IOTL, neutrality seemed like a course between Scylla and Charybdis. With a more moderate France represented by Lafayette opposed by an array of monarchs led by the author of the Intolerable Acts, I believe the call to alliance would be answered. Even if not, over the next year or two British impressment and French military and political victories may begin to change the calculus. The Jay Treaty will likely be impossible in the current climate, which means the illegal British occupation of frontier fortresses in the Old Northwest (the Great Lakes region) and New York will remain a further provocation, and a source for an intolerable strategic threat: British ability to arm Indians/Native Americans with the power to block American westward settlement.
If the US joins the war on the French side while Washington is President, I suspect that he takes the term Commander in Chief literally, just as he did during the Whiskey Rebellion, and takes the field against the British. Unless there is peace by 1796 (which seems unlikely, Washington, against his wishes, runs for a third presidential term as the only candidate who can maintain unity among the states and the Army. His likely successor, by the way, would be either Hamilton, the military man and centralizer, or Jefferson, the champion of the French alliance - not Adams, the civilian Anglophile. The deep partisan divides between the Federalists and Republicans will be averted or delayed, and quite changed if it ever does occur - for now the sentiments of all national leaders will be for unity against the old British enemy (and their Spanish allies).
How well can the United States fair against Britain and Spain in the timeframe of the War of the First Coalition (1792-97)? Certainly, both opponents are distracted by a primary focus on the European theater. In 1794, France IOTL seized the Rhineland and the Netherlands up to the Rhine, invaded Catalonia successfully and Piedmont unsuccessfully, and maintained a plucky naval challenge to Britain in the West Indies.
Still, Spanish control of New Orleans (and effectively the Mississippi) and British effective control of the Great Lakes places the Americans in a dangerous strategic position. The Atlantic is clearly dominated by the British, and any American city is open to British invasion. Georgia in particular will be consumed by the Spanish threat that their colony was founded to oppose. American whites in the Northwest Territory will face British-inspired native attacks soon accompanied by actual companies of Redcoats, with Mad Anthony Wayne's Indian War taking on the character of a war for national defense.
The first priorities for the U.S., after defending the Atlantic seaboard, would be defeating the natives of the Old Northwest, capturing New Orleans, and relieving the occupied forts on U.S. territory (Niagara, Oswego, Dearborn, etc.). Given the opportunity, Canada and Florida should be conquered to deprive Britain and Spain of the ability to invade the United States so easily in the future. Britain and Spain certainly have the ability to counter these plans, but it depends on the resources which the governments in London and Madrid dedicate to the New World while facing a threat much closer to home. William Pitt the Younger, the British Prime Minister throughout this period, always had a soft spot for the Americans (who he considered fellow Englishmen).
IOTL, Spain was defeated in Europe in 1795, recognizing Revolutionary France and ceding San Domingo with the Treaty of Basel. The next year, in 1796, Spain (the power being Spain's chief minister Manuel de Godoy) allied with France in the Treaty of San Ildefonso. The British blockaded Spain, cutting her off from her colonial empire. Under one of the secret provisions of San Ildefonso, Louisiana was ceded to France, which later sold it to the United States.
ITTL the United States should be involved in the Franco-Spanish peace talks, and Louisiana and Florida are likely to be annexed. This major coup - based much more on events in Europe than the United States - would likely rally the American public further to embrace "Washington's War." Of course, continued British opposition will mean that actual control of New Orleans and St. Augustine may be fleeting, but the U.S. now has strong allies on her southern flank - France, Spain, and the Batavian Republic. Well, in the case of Spain, more a very nervous co-belligerent. This will have very interesting knock-on effects in the Spanish colonial possessions down the line.
IOTL, the War of the First Coalition ended with the Treat of Campo Formio in October 1797. However, Britain remained at war. France maintained an uneasy truce with her Continental foes but overthrew the Swiss and Neapolitan governments and demanded additional territory from Austria. In 1799, a Second Coalition anchored by Britain, Russia, and Austria was organized. Only in 1802, after France had again imposed peace on the Continent under Bonaparte's leadership, did Britain make peace with the Treaty of Amiens. Continued French expansionism in Germany and Italy brought about the Third Coalition. Anglo-French war resumed in 1805 and lasted until Waterloo, with a brief hiatus in the winter of 1814-15 after Bonaparte's first defeat.
Now, from an American perspective, war with Britain is the war. So they will lobby for a treaty resolution with Britain as soon as possible. The longer Britain has to gear up for a long naval struggle, the better equipped she is to wage a separate war in North America with resources the Americans will have trouble matching. Some conservatives in Britain will take the logic of Restoration to its extreme and demand that Republicanism be stamped out not only in Europe, but in America. On the other hand, eventual French domination of the Continent will mean British distraction from the New World. Depending on strategic choices of governments and military officers, this TL may be anything from an Ameriwank to a restoration of British rule in the colonies. If successful, the United States may end as part of an international alliance of Republics that dominates most of the European Continent and is bitterly opposed by Russia and Britain.
The positions of Spain and Portugal ITTL are quite interesting. Do they maintain control of their colonies? Lose them to Britain, or to the US, or to independence? If there are new American republics in Central and South America, do they look to the United States as an inspiration or a threat? All of these, I think, are viable possibilities depending on circumstances.
In the long run, a moderate France dominating the Continent and allied to the U.S. poses a strategic combination that Britain cannot hope to rival - even if their allies or neutrals are in control in Latin America, Scandinavia, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire (all of which depend on circumstances and could end in the Franco-American camp).
I'm thinking of fleshing out this timeline if there is any interest in this concept.
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