Alternatives to WWII Pacific theatre

Hi all

Wanted to throw this open to the forum to see what everyone else thinks.

As some of you may remember I’m currently working on an alt history novel (see: http://www.africareich.com for details).

However, I’ve hit a bit of a brick wall regarding the Pacific theatre. This is the set up of my world: there has been a limited war between Britain and Germany culminating in a peace accord in 1940. Germany then turns east and defeats the Soviet Union. The US remains neutral throughout.

But what would happen with Japan? I’m assuming the British would still fight... but what about America. Can anyone think of a circumstance where the US would NOT fight in the Pacific? Could there have been an alternative to Pearl Harbour (i.e. the US doesn’t declare war afterwards)? Indeed, is there a possibility that Japan might not have attacked Pearl Harbour at all?

Is there any chance that America’s isolationism could have extended to the Pacific?

I’m sure some of you will disagree with my hypothetical European war... but that’s not the key point here. I’m only interested in the Pacific side of things. Would be grateful – and very interested – to get people’s thoughts on this.

Thanks in advance for your musings.

Altguy3 :)
 
The main problems for the Japanese - and mentioned a thousand times before on this board - is the dependency of Japan upon oil and scrap metal from the US and the position of the Philippines and any US forces there sitting across Japanese supply lines in any campaign into Southeast Asia.
 
The main problems for the Japanese - and mentioned a thousand times before on this board - is the dependency of Japan upon oil and scrap metal from the US and the position of the Philippines and any US forces there sitting across Japanese supply lines in any campaign into Southeast Asia.

Unless Roosevelt completely knuckles under the Pacific War is going to happen.
 
The main problems for the Japanese - and mentioned a thousand times before on this board - is the dependency of Japan upon oil and scrap metal from the US and the position of the Philippines and any US forces there sitting across Japanese supply lines in any campaign into Southeast Asia.
However, the Japanese cannot get US scrap metal (at least in useful quantities :)) by attacking America. Also, if the British have at least a truce with the German's, you have to decide what is happening to the Netherlands East Indies. For example, if a government in exile retreated to the NEI, it would have a strong incentive not to annoy the Japanese by refusing to sell oil, nickel or aluminium. Anyone controlling the French Empire might also sell to Japan (for example, nickel from New Caledonia). In fact, the British have no reason not to trade with Japan if they do not depend on Lend-Lease etc. (simplifies a little - they would like the Japanese bogged down in China but don't want to provoke them). Thus a Pacific War is very unlikely as the USA will not make a military move and Japan is receiving raw materials, is still bogged down in China and perhaps Siberia, and suspects that the USA might join in if they tried to occupy Malaya or the NEI.
 

CalBear

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Japan couldn't afford to ignore the U.S. or count on American disinterest. Wake and Guam represented serious (or potentially serious) threats to the Japanese bases in the Mandates while the Bases in the Phillippines, especially on Luzon, were positioned perfectly to interdict Japanese communications between the "Southern Resource Area" and the Home Islands, operate agaist the IJA effort in China, and present a lethal threat to JNAF & JAAF bases on Formosa. You have to act on what your enemy COULD do, not what they have done.

There is a second, far less discussed economic threat the U.S. presented to Japan, beyond the Oil and scrap metal (which is a LOT more important than the term suggests) embargo. The United States, starting in the mid-30s, was Japan's ONLY source of internationally accepted currency. Any American decision to interdict Dollars going to Japan effectively cut them off from the the Global Marketplace. This was decision that the U.S. could (and IOTL did) enact with virtually no impact on itself that put Japan on a very short clock before bankrupcy.

There is also the long term emnity between the U.S. and Japan. Almost every war game the Japanese ran featured the U.S. (and the USN generally returned the favor against "Orange"), which reflected strategic realities. Japan needed a certain area to be under its control to "feel" it had sufficient strategic depth, the U.S. had a similar need, unfortunately, a significant part of Japan's area was U.S. controlled (Wake, Guam, The Phillipines, Midway, the Aleutians, even the main Hawaiian chain) while Japnese bases in the Mandates and on Formosa interfered in the U.S. perimeter. Unless one country effectively disarmed, these areas of contention were flash points needing only the slightest push to cause a disaster.

Lastly, there is the U.S. Congressional reaction to Fall of France, which was something akin to utter panic. The resulting building programs, both of ships and aircraft, presented Japan with an absolute deadline of Spring 1943 if there was to be any chance of engaging and defeating the U.S. military before it grew so powerful that it was invincible (if one looks at the "Two Ocean Navy" act, one finds that virtually the entire force that crushed Japan is listed, all the increased wartime spending did was preserve platforms that would have been scrapped and sped construction).

Japan could not count on the U.S. sitting on the sideline, could not delay the attack the U.S. in hopes of the U.S. sitting on the sidelanes, or hopre to achieve its strategic goals even if the U.S. DID sit on the sidelines.

If Japan was going to attempt to expand its colonial holdings (which was considered critical by Japan) it had to attack the U.S. as soon as it could. It needed SIX carriers to make it work. It got the 6th carrier in mid-November 1941.
 
Japan couldn't afford to ignore the U.S. or count on American disinterest. Wake and Guam represented serious (or potentially serious) threats to the Japanese bases in the Mandates while the Bases in the Phillippines, especially on Luzon, were positioned perfectly to interdict Japanese communications between the "Southern Resource Area" and the Home Islands, operate agaist the IJA effort in China, and present a lethal threat to JNAF & JAAF bases on Formosa. You have to act on what your enemy COULD do, not what they have done.
Yet almost everyone in Japan wanted to avoid war with America in 1941 even with the embargo as I argued in an earlier thread https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?p=2620226#post2620226

There is a second, far less discussed economic threat the U.S. presented to Japan, beyond the Oil and scrap metal (which is a LOT more important than the term suggests) embargo. The United States, starting in the mid-30s, was Japan's ONLY source of internationally accepted currency. Any American decision to interdict Dollars going to Japan effectively cut them off from the the Global Marketplace. This was decision that the U.S. could (and IOTL did) enact with virtually no impact on itself that put Japan on a very short clock before bankrupcy.
Trade between NEI could have been denominated in Yen as it would have involved textiles for raw materials. Also note that Japan may control some of Siberia in this POD.

There is also the long term emnity between the U.S. and Japan. Almost every war game the Japanese ran featured the U.S. (and the USN generally returned the favor against "Orange"), which reflected strategic realities.
Well the IJN wargames. Some people doubt if the IJA had heard of America although that is probably harsh. I suspect it was the US who started the games rather than returning the favour but both navies needed funds, so an improbable war was better than nothing.

If Japan was going to attempt to expand its colonial holdings (which was considered critical by Japan) it had to attack the U.S. as soon as it could. It needed SIX carriers to make it work. It got the 6th carrier in mid-November 1941.
My reading of Japanese discussions in 1941, suggests that any compromise allowing the IJA to claim victory in China would have been accepted.
 
The only way no Pearl harbor is if the Brits and the Dutch don't get on board with the U.S. embargo and sell Japan materials especially oil - and work out payments in other than US dollars. If the Germans stomping the Russians early on allows Japan to get N Sakhalin, all the Kuriles, Kamchatka & part of the Soviet pacific (perhaps Vladivostok) which is connected to Korea whic Japan already owns then they have a free hand in Manchukuo/N. China and the IJA may find a stop line that can be dealt with.

While the US can still interdict oil etc from NEI/Borneo the Brits and the Dutch would be pissed because they are selling it freely (relatively so). As much as FDR, the navy & whomever sees a geopolitical interest in "stopping" Japan the US population will not support a war sending American boys over to help Chiang recover parts of China - aid yes, bodies no.

BTW if Britain gets an armistice in 1940, then the pound is not in such bad shape, and the dollar not as ascendent as it was post WWII OTL.
 
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