Alternatives to a remarkably poor decision on 7 December 1941.

Well, it’s worth remembering that Yamato was right along side with the “everyone else” there. When Admiral Nagano (his boss) proposed a plan for attacking the Dutch but not the Americans, Yamamoto threatened to resign, along with all the other senior officers of Combined Fleet, unless Nagano agreed to his plan for an attack on Pearl Harbor. Nagano capitulated and Yamamoto got his suicidal war.

Yamamoto incorrectly believed that if he did not destroy the American fleet at Pearl it would come west and interfere with the Japanese conquests. In fact the USN had no such intentions. Their own plans called for the abandonment of the western Pacific to the Japanese, while America conducted a massive military build up and then returned a year later andstarted taking it all back.

USN planners had actually considered the possibility of an attack on Pearl. They discounted it for two reasons. The first, because they (incorrectly) assumed it would have to be done with battleships, and they calculated such a raid would be far too dangerous for the Japanese. The second, because they (correctly) assumed that an attack on Hawaii would rile the American populace and ensure a long war that Japan would know she could never win. USN planners continually worried about their ability to sustain the will of the American people in the long war they were planning. They assumed the Japanese would not be stupid enough to solve this, their plan's greatest weakness, for them.

He actually gave a variety of estimates according to Tameichi Hara. Sometimes it was 6 months, sometimes it was a year, other times it was 18 months, usually depending on who he was talking to. Clearly a case of hedging.

How would he know? He was in no position.
 
Not a war of attrition. A war of decisive battle like they wanted. The ideal scenario is they invade the British and Dutch colonies in SEA, wait for the US to spend political capital declaring war in response, and then swoop in and invade the Philippines anyways. Ideally, this would then compel Washington to override the Navies own warplan and order the fleet to sail to relieve the embattled army. Which would probably play out as a second Tsushima. Having inflicted a humiliating defeat on the US for a wargoal that the American public isn't very much behind ("defend Anglo-Dutch colonialism!" doesn't have as good a ring as "Remember Pearl Harbor!") the Japanese then might indeed get the negotiated peace they desired.

Of course the plan is hardly fail proof and still rests on a few assumptions that could be proven false. The most glaring flaw is-



(Emphasis added)

Erm... yeah, that. And frankly I don't know how the Japanese are going to be able to avoid it. The Bataan death march was very much a function of the same institutional attitudes that compelled Japan to seek war in the first place. It runs into the similar issue as the "Notzis" trope. Even as it is, getting the Japanese to adopt the above strategy is asking them to jettison some problematic attitudes, like the heebie-jeebies they got at the prospect of fighting close to home.

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/war-plan-orange.htm

One can see what reality is?
 
How would he know? He was in no position.

He makes the claim in his memoirs, Japanese Destroyer Captain, but I don't know the details. Nor am I sure with what basis you can claim he was in no position: as a Captain in the Imperial Japanese Navy, it is possible for him to have attended any number of functions which Yamamoto may have also attended and hence would have had the opportunity to overhear him discussing things with his fellow officers. So it's entirely possible, although obviously not guaranteed.


Basically what I said? I mean, the article says flat out that in the revision of the plans from 1938 onwards, and I quote, "gave no indication of how long it should take the Navy to advance into the western Pacific and tacitly recognized the hopeless position of the American forces in the Philippines." It further goes onto say that by 1941: "no one in a position of authority at that time (April 1941) believed that anything like this would happen. Informed naval opinion estimated that it would require at least two years for the Pacific Fleet to fight its way across the Pacific. There was no plan to concentrate men and supplies on the west coast and no schedule for their movement to the Philippines. Army planners in early 1941 believed that at the end of six months, if not sooner, supplies would be exhausted and the garrison would go down in defeat. WPO-3 did not say this; instead it said nothing at all."

Edward Miller in "War Plan Orange" covers a lot of the shift in American naval thinking through the various WPOs if you're interested.
 
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Nope. Not what you said at all. And did you mean Edward S. Miller? He does not say what you claim either.
 
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I think that others will be the judge of it, and I am satisfied that they can make up their own minds.

Incidentally Arthur Miller is a playwright. OMMV.
 
I think that others will be the judge of it, and I am satisfied that they can make up their own minds.

'Kay. Whatever.

Incidentally Arthur Miller is a playwright. OMMV.

Ah, your right. I got the names a bit mixed up, it was written by Edward Miller. Edited in the correct name.

He does not say what you claim either.

Erm... yeah he does? Miller compares the various pre-war plans to WWII and finds that the by the late-30s the USN planners got most of it right, with exceptions for the usual innovations and fortunes of war. The US Navy planners broke the war down into three phases. Phase I, where Japan would expand with little resistance. In Phase II, the USN would build up and begin attacking outlying Japanese outposts with the first attacks beginning at around six months (give or take), slowly reducing them and pushing the Japanese back into the western Pacific over the course of 18-24 months, and eventually bringing the Japanese fleet to decisive battle at an indeterminate location and destroying it. Phase III would then begin, which would be the isolation and blockade of Japan.

I basically summed up the description of Phase I and II in post 18, where I stated that the USN's " own plans called for the abandonment of the western Pacific to the Japanese, while America conducted a massive military build up and then returned a year later and started taking it all back."

"When the war began, events in the western Pacific unfolded approximately as predicted by Plan Orange. The Japanese reduced the Philippines with overwhelming sea, air and land power. Manila fell in three weeks... Bataan and Corregidor survived for five and six months respectively, rather longer than expected, but the sacrifices of their defenders were of minor military import. Manila Bay was, as [Director of the War Plans Division, General] Embick had said, was "without strategic significance."

"The Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia and the flank extensions to Burma and the Bismarck Archipelago had not been contemplated in Blue-Orange war forecasts (although they had been considered in the Rainbow Plans of 1939-41), yet the extended Phase I campaign of early 1942 was similar to the Philippines scenario of War Plan Orange. . . But Japan's long maritime lifeline was vulnerable to the interdictory response of the prewar strategy. Plan Orange was a fair template for all Phase I operations in the western Pacific."
-Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange, pp.62-62.

Phase II was always going to be less accurate in its predictions, since there were many variables, but historically the Marines kicked off the Guadalcanal campaign only two months later than the original estimates for the beginning of Phase II had assumed. Admiral King called this early phase the "offensive-defensive" portion of the war, where the Americans slowly attritted the Japanese until November of 1943, when they were finally able to begin the "true" offensive, and begin punching into the Western Pacific. This was the point where the US bases were established and no longer under threat and the Americans could finally attack where they chose, penetrating deep into the Japanese sphere. This was almost two years from the start of the war and again roughly matched Orange projections.

On the differences in Phase II Miller summarizes:

"In fact Japan chose to wage attrition battles throughout the war... It confounded old presumptions that it would resist lightly in fringe regions of no great importance and conserve its sting for the inner defensive zone... Japan did not rigorously horde its big ships. It willingly exposed battleships and carriers on several occasions. But the outcome of the campaign validated the prediction that Blue would prevail. Warship casualties in the Southwest Pacific were about equal, but the United States was able to restock and Japan was not."
-War Plan Orange, pp. 335-335.

The Americans had assumed the Japanese would conserve most of their fleet until the Americans were much deeper into their sphere. This is elementary strategy, whereby a defender waits until an attacker has hopefully over-extended themselves and the defender's own lines of communication have compressed increasing their own power, before launching their main counter attacks. The Americans were wrong about that but it doesn't reflect badly on the plan. The ferocious battles around Guadalcanal and the Solomon's saw the Japanese expend their best forces at the end of an attenuated logistics line where they were less effective, did not manage to change the thrust of American strategy, and served only to make the battles west easier.

By the time Phase II ended at the Philippines, it was still essentially in line with the Orange projections, although it was closer to earlier Orange plans from the 20's and 30's by then. Miller remarks on an interesting phenomenon, where as the Americans advanced further and further west and Japanese resistance crumbled, the Americans continually regressed to ever earlier versions of Plan Orange (each of which had worked on the assumption of an ever weaker foe), until by the time they were closing on Japan they were adopting plans similar to those of the Dewy-Mahan era. But by then Phase III was kicking off nevertheless.

Perhaps you are confused by the fact I suggest an IATL where the Japanese don't strike first and pull off a win by getting the USN to sail prematurely. I guess you missed the part where I stated that such an eventuality relies on the American political leadership overriding the Navies war plan. Now I can't speak to the probability of such an eventuality, but the possibility of Washington looking askance at a plan which asks them to declare war and then sit at Hawaii and do nothing for six months while there's a seemingly (to a civilian) perfectly good base at Manilla defended by a large Army just right there under Japan's nose... well, who knows? It's possible they could have been ordered, against all their better judgement, to sail to the Philippines in preparation for immediate offensive operations against Japan.

At that point, Japan might have had its decisive battle and its short war and it would have had it at the Philippines, relatively close to Japan where Japan had every logistic advantage and when the Americans were at the end of a dangerously long string of communication, with inadequate bases, and insufficient supplies.

Or they might not have. Roosevelt did tend to listen to his military men on such matters after all. Point is, it's a better shot then what the Japanese did OTL.
 
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YMMV> But that is the way it is. I just happen to think you spin your conclusions and see stuff that is obviously not there (See immediately ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ where many details are wrong.) ON. MMWV on this and I allow for deviation on interpretation, but not when I read it on the page.

Arthur Miller is still a playwright.
 
YMMV> But that is the way it is. I just happen to think you spin your conclusions and see stuff that is obviously not there (See immediately ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ where many details are wrong.) ON. MMWV on this and I allow for deviation on interpretation, but not when I read it on the page.

Says the guy who took "Truman was beginning to consider a new policy on the Soviet Union" to mean "Truman would fight the Soviet Union to defend Japan while the US was still at war with Japan". That's quite the projection. Your inability to point out what details are wrong speaks volumes more then any vapid assertion you might make.

Arthur Miller is still a playwright.

Yes, and? I acknowledged that and admitted I got him mixed up with Edward Miller. Are you so unable to argue your point that you are only able to harp on getting two people confused? Jesus, your sad.
 
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We can go round and round. I find your view of history as you write it to be "interesting" and very inaccurate.

I use a president's convergent real actions in RTL historical parallels to estimate what he would do in a "what if". (Korea, Truman fought when the real odds and policy choices were far worse.) not claimed dubious public opinion polls and deliberate misinterpretation of "alleged policy" as second guessed by people who have no primary source scholarship to back up their "opinions".
 
We can go round and round. I find your view of history as you write it to be "interesting" and very inaccurate.

So inaccurate you can't even describe how it's inaccurate. Because you can't do something as simple as argue your point.

I use a president's convergent real actions in RTL historical parallels to estimate what he would do in a "what if". (Korea, Truman fought when the real odds and policy choices were far worse.) not claimed dubious public opinion polls and deliberate misinterpretation of "alleged policy" as second guessed by people who have no primary source scholarship to back up their "opinions".

Yeah, you took the President's actions in a specific geopolitical environment for how he would react in a completely different situation. Your vague accusations of no academic works are hilarious, given your dismissal of actual academic works like the one I quoted up there or Bobs discussing Japanese actions in Manchuria.
 
Japan must conquer China.
To conquer China, Japan must be self-sufficient (there's an argument to swap the first two around, but it's immaterial as both meant the same and led to the same place).
To be self sufficient, Japan must have oil.
To have oil, Japan must conquer the Dutch EI.
To have the Dutch EI, Japan must remove the US from the Philippines (which could interfere with the supply routes).
To remove the US from the Philippines, Japan must defeat the US in war.
To defeat the US in war, Japan must destroy the numerically superior US fleet.
To destroy the numerically superior US fleet, Japan must rely on a defensive "perimeter" of ground-based aircraft to support a single decisive naval battle.
To construct a defensive "perimeter" of ground-based aircraft, Japan needs time.
To buy time, Japan needs to swiftly destroy, or at least put out of immediate action, the US Pacific Fleet.
To put the US Pacific Fleet out of action, Japan must bomb Pearl Harbor.
That appears to have been Japan's thinking, & it's certainly the belief of most today. However, there are several "breaks" where the U.S. had an opportunity to use diplomacy.

Given Chiang was more concerned about Mao, at the time, than Japan, it's been suggested (& I agree) it might have been possible to arrange a peace deal (if Japan, & Chiang, could be persuaded or bullied enough).

It might have been possible to avoid the U.S. oil embargo being total (which was expressly not what FDR wanted), thereby eliminating the need to seize the DEI.

The attack on Hawaii may have had as much to do with internal Japanese politics & IJN not wanting to become irrelevant, if IJA kept getting more & more of the defense budget.

The threat of the P.I. (& U.S. action from them) is moot if the U.S. doesn't actually declare war, which seems pretty unlikely in defense of British &/or Dutch colonies, no matter what FDR promised--except for Japan's mistaken belief the U.S. & Britain were inseparable... (Would that have been a big gamble for Japan? Yep. Would it have paid off in serious gains? I think so.)
Yamamoto had been a student in the United States, acknowledged the might of the american industry, and knew Japan couldn't win any war against America.
Am I wrong ?
You're not. I'm of the view Yamamoto's "6mo" quote (or 18mo) wasn't a brag, but a warning: if IJA didn't have a way to gain victory by then (& it didn't:rolleyes:), don't start anything, because the U.S. will finish it for you.

They didn't listen, because they didn't understand the different nature of the opponent, & the war, they were undertaking, & had a deficient grasp of the difference between "tactical" & "strategic".:rolleyes::confounded:
The ideal scenario is they invade the British and Dutch colonies in SEA, wait for the US to spend political capital declaring war in response, and then swoop in and invade the Philippines anyways.
The trouble with that is, it's so damn unlikely Congress signs off on an actual war to defend British & Dutch colonies, let alone recover them. (Nor would anti-colonialist FDR likely support it, either.)

So it was actually within Japan's reach to take the DEI without invading the P.I. & provoking the U.S. to begin with...

That being true, why did Yamamoto believe it was essential to attack Hawaii? Because of a belief the U.S. & Britain were inseparable (based on action in the Atlantic, & Lend-Lease)--but also because, if IJN didn't take some kind of bold action, it might be reduced to little more than the Army Sea Transport Service...:eek::eek: In the event, that would have been better for Japan.:rolleyes:

And ObsessedNuker is right about Miller & WPO. Moreover, Wilmott in Barrier & the Javelin advances the proposition for bypassing the P.I., suggesting the U.S. didn't feel it was "U.S. territory" in the same was as Hawaii, & therefore might have even been willing to sacrifice it,:eek: absent an attack on Hawaii, too.
 
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So inaccurate you can't even describe how it's inaccurate. Because you can't do something as simple as argue your point.

I don't have to do people's thinking for them. They can read for themselves where you are wrong. All I have to do is point, here and there. (See below.)

Yeah, you took the President's actions in a specific geopolitical environment for how he would react in a completely different situation. Your vague accusations of no academic works are hilarious, given your dismissal of actual academic works like the one I quoted up there or Bobs discussing Japanese actions in Manchuria.

You didn't know the author. That is the first sign you didn't pay attention to the book.

Bob's statements about Japan in Manchuria is an appeal to "authority" fallacy; especially an "authority" whose interpretation bias does not fit the historical record.

As for Truman, as I pointed out, and I will repeat it because it is necessary; he acted to keep the Russians out of Japan and out of southern Korea. Both were actions reflective of a nascent "containment policy" in *45 that would be formally articulated in *47.

Actions are irrefutable facts. Not opinions, not interpretations, but actions.

AND... as to actions... We already know from the Kuriles debacles they suffered; that the Russians simply have not the sea lift to mount any kind of sustainable operation into Hokkaido.

So... I really don't see what the fuss is about, except last wordism.

So, excuse me for absolutely rejecting such claims "the Russians could do this, or they would do that" as utterly groundless.

LOGISTICS. The Russians are lousy at it.
 
That being true, why did Yamamoto believe it was essential to attack Hawaii? Because of a belief the U.S. & Britain were inseparable (based on action in the Atlantic, & Lend-Lease)--but also because, if IJN didn't take some kind of bold action, it might be reduced to little more than the Army Sea Transport Service...In the event, that would have been better for Japan.

That may have been some of it but it was also driven by the events (and probably myths) of the Russo-Japanese War where the IJN initiates hostilities with a bold preemptive strike on the Russians at Port Arthur (and Yamamoto was a veteran of Tsushima). It's the same basic construct, a decisive surprise attack to knock the enemy back on his heels and set the groundwork for victory. Whether that's true or not is not important, that's the Kool Aid the IJN drank.

In terms of the IJN becoming the Army's Sea Transport Service. Well, when navies don't have other navies to fight, that's what they are. That along with providing some capacity to attack land targets from the sea if you have sea based airpower of in this day and age, sea launched LACMs.
 
I don't have to do people's thinking for them. They can read for themselves where you are wrong. All I have to do is point, here and there. (See below.)

this is a discussion board. "Read it yourself" is not discussion. So yes,you do have to do peoples thinking for them and then post it to them so they might accept it,or your entire "contribution" here is meaningless.
 
this is a discussion board. "Read it yourself" is not discussion. So yes,you do have to do peoples thinking for them and then post it to them so they might accept it,or your entire "contribution" here is meaningless.

I did cover the salient. Why waste words?

THIS was enough;

Actions are irrefutable facts. Not opinions, not interpretations, but actions.

AND... as to actions... We already know from the Kuriles debacles they suffered; that the Russians simply have not the sea lift to mount any kind of sustainable operation into Hokkaido (This is to the bias exhibited by those two gentlemen in another thread about what the Japanese did or the Russians can do. McPherson)

So... I really don't see what the fuss is about, except last wordism.

So, excuse me for absolutely rejecting such claims "the Russians could do this, or they [Japanese] would do that" as utterly groundless.

LOGISTICS. The Russians are lousy at it.

Or this:

Perhaps you are confused by the fact I suggest an IATL where the Japanese don't strike first and pull off a win by getting the USN to sail prematurely. I guess you missed the part where I stated that such an eventuality relies on the American political leadership overriding the Navies war plan. Now I can't speak to the probability of such an eventuality, but the possibility of Washington looking askance at a plan which asks them to declare war and then sit at Hawaii and do nothing for six months while there's a seemingly (to a civilian) perfectly good base at Manilla defended by a large Army just right there under Japan's nose... well, who knows? It's possible they could have been ordered, against all their better judgement, to sail to the Philippines in preparation for immediate offensive operations against Japan.

The POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (Roosevelt) acted and did overrule the warplan. (The fight O'Richardson put up against the decision to put the US fleet within the strike radius of the Japanese First Air Fleet is legendary.) CINCUS lost the decision to move the PacFleet from the west coast to Pearl and the result was predictable. WAS predictable. Inevitably so. And Miller kind of said that, which ON missed as well as the author's name.

QED.
 
That being true, why did Yamamoto believe it was essential to attack Hawaii? Because of a belief the U.S. & Britain were inseparable (based on action in the Atlantic, & Lend-Lease)--but also because, if IJN didn't take some kind of bold action, it might be reduced to little more than the Army Sea Transport Service...

Japan's cutthroat interservice rivalry certainly was at play but it was one factor in a number of them. Another factor, just to name another one, was the fact that fighting near the Home Islands gave the IJN heebie jeebies despite being logistically logical.

I don't have to do people's thinking for them. They can read for themselves where you are wrong. All I have to do is point, here and there. (See below.)

No, you also have to back up your claims because fundamentally that is what you are doing: you are claiming. Claims without support can be dismissed without support.

You didn't know the author.

Correction, I misremembered the author's name off the top of my head. It's a relatively easy thing to do.

Bob's statements about Japan in Manchuria is an appeal to "authority" fallacy; especially an "authority" whose interpretation bias does not fit the historical record.

Still sore about being caught out on your goalpost moving, I see.

As for Truman, as I pointed out, and I will repeat it because it is necessary; he acted to keep the Russians out of Japan and out of southern Korea. Both were actions reflective of a nascent "containment policy" in *45 that would be formally articulated in *47.

Yes, he acted five years later when the war with Japan was over, containment policy was fully developed, and the tensions with the USSR had boiled over into actual crises occurring. None of this was the case prior to Japan's surrender.

Actions are irrefutable facts. Not opinions, not interpretations, but actions.

Actions take place within, and as a result of, a context. Change the context and you get different actions. The context in 1945 is different from that of 1950. Japan in 1945 is a bitter enemy, not a valued strategic friend as was the case in 1950. Korea didn't even register yet: both sides divided it as basically an afterthought when Japan agreed to surrender. The enmity with the Soviet Union hasn't broken into the open. Public opinion, a crucial factor in a democracy, won't tolerate defending the hated Japanese against a still well-regarded ally. All of this means that the action Truman takes to a Soviet landing will be different.

AND... as to actions... We already know from the Kuriles debacles they suffered; that the Russians simply have not the sea lift to mount any kind of sustainable operation into Hokkaido.

The flawed, yet still ultimately successful, landing on the Kuriles as well as the simultaneous successful landings in Korea and Sakhalin actually demonstrates the opposite given that in order for the "debacle" to occur, the Soviets had to have the sealift capacity to get forces to the island and sustain them there.

LOGISTICS. The Russians are lousy at it.

Not supported by the historical record, where the Russians sustaining major mechanized forces over hundreds of kilometers of hostile environments and in regions of poor to nonexistent infrastructure. That would have been impossible for a force lousy at logistics.

I did cover the salient. Why waste words?

No, you did not. You simply threw out a link and did nothing else. When I looked into the link, I ultimately saw that it vindicated my statement and pointed that out, actually quoting the relevant parts which showed such. The most you were able to respond was with a childish "no, it doesn't" and nothing else.

The POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (Roosevelt) acted and did overrule the warplan.

No they did not. For Roosevelt to have overruled the War Plan would have been something like moving the fleet all the way out to Manila Bay. The movement from San Diego to Hawaii, while not explicit in the pre-war planning documentation, in no way actually violated the war planning given that it did not move the fleet beyond the Marianas which was the "cut-off" point beyond which the fleet was not supposed to operate in the opening phase of the war. Kimmel intended to play a bit fast and loose with these orders and try and draw the Japanese fleet into a major battle near Wake, but even that is more then 2,000 kilometers east of the Marianas and he didn't have the authority, or the logistics, to interfere with a Japanese conquest of the Philippines or the Dutch Indies.
 
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Japan's cutthroat interservice rivalry certainly was at play but it was one factor in a number of them. Another factor, just to name another one, was the fact that fighting near the Home Islands gave the IJN heebie jeebies despite being logistically logical.
I don't mean to say the only factor, but my thinking is, had the budget not been an issue, IJN's excuse (Anglo-British unity) would have been less necessary & a "no P.I." option might have proven more acceptable.
Not supported by the historical record, where the Russians sustaining major mechanized forces over hundreds of kilometers of hostile environments and in regions of poor to nonexistent infrastructure. That would have been impossible for a force lousy at logistics.

...No they did. For Roosevelt to have overruled the War Plan would have been something like moving the fleet all the way out to Manila Bay. The movement from San Diego to Hawaii, while not explicit in the pre-war planning documentation, in no way actually violated the war planning given that it did not move the fleet beyond the Marianas which was the "cut-off" point beyond which the fleet was not supposed to operate in the opening phase of the war. Kimmel intended to play a bit fast and loose with these orders and try and draw the Japanese fleet into a major battle near Wake, but even that is more then 2,000 kilometers east of the Marianas and he didn't have the authority, or the logistics, to interfere with a Japanese conquest of the Philippines or the Dutch Indies.
Let me thank you for recapping the situation. IMO, being reminded of the context never hurts--even when I agree with you.:) And Kimmel's lack of ability to interfere with an invasion of the P.I. or DEI was, let's not forget, why there was an Asiatic Fleet in the first place.;)
 
And Kimmel's lack of ability to interfere with an invasion of the P.I. or DEI was, let's not forget, why there was an Asiatic Fleet in the first place.;)

The USN’s attitude towards the Asiatic fleet was that it was basically there to show the flag. In an actual Japanese attack it would be, and was, dead meat. In fact, the commander was encouraged not to stand and fight in the event of war with Japan by being given permission to withdraw to the Indian Ocean. They put no stock in it being able to achieve anything out there other then maybe take a few Japanese ships with them. In the end, the fleet fulfilled expectations: it lost nearly 50% of it’s surface ships and achieved little. It’s main accomplishment was surviving to retreat to Australia where it was folded in with the rest of the Pacific Fleet under South West Pacific Area Command.
 
The USN’s attitude towards the Asiatic fleet was that it was basically there to show the flag. In an actual Japanese attack it would be, and was, dead meat. In fact, the commander was encouraged not to stand and fight in the event of war with Japan by being given permission to withdraw to the Indian Ocean. They put no stock in it being able to achieve anything out there other then maybe take a few Japanese ships with them. In the end, the fleet fulfilled expectations: it lost nearly 50% of it’s surface ships and achieved little. It’s main accomplishment was surviving to retreat to Australia where it was folded in with the rest of the Pacific Fleet under South West Pacific Area Command.

The surface fleet yes. However, great things were expected of the submarines and the B-17s (yes I know those were USAAF not USN).
 
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