Alternative to RAF Area Bombing

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Deleted member 1487

Until the British abandon the "give it a few strikes and then move on" system that pretty much everyone used at the time, they aren't going to produce much in the way of extra results. That won't happen until mid-'44 and by then Germany is going to be falling apart from the battlefield losses anyways.
When did they have the 'few strikes and move on'? In 1943 the spent months pounding the Ruhr before moving on and several days hitting Hamburg until the city was a hollow shell.
 

CalBear

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Mossie: range 2400 km, bomb load 4000 lb.
Lancs: range 4000 km, bomb load 14000 lb.

A Mossie only offensive means not being able to hit anything beyond 1000 km from the bases and the need to send 3+ Mossies for each Lancs (e.g. 1600+ Mossies instead of 500 Lancs).

1,000km puts all of Germany, most of France and Czechoslovakia, and part of Poland in range. The speed and general maneuverability of the Mosquito would likely result in fewer losses, and each loss will be less costly (the aircraft was about 1/3 the production cost of a Lancaster, and the crew was only 3 not the seven of the bigger bomber, a major consideration when one looks at the appalling casualty rates suffered by Bomber Command).

The problem with the scenario is that it violates the basic belief systems of air forces at the time. It requires not just going outside the box but exiting the room.
 

Deleted member 1487

1,000km puts all of Germany, most of France and Czechoslovakia, and part of Poland in range. The speed and general maneuverability of the Mosquito would likely result in fewer losses, and each loss will be less costly (the aircraft was about 1/3 the production cost of a Lancaster, and the crew was only 3 not the seven of the bigger bomber, a major consideration when one looks at the appalling casualty rates suffered by Bomber Command).

The problem with the scenario is that it violates the basic belief systems of air forces at the time. It requires not just going outside the box but exiting the room.

I thought there was a fair bit of dissent against the Area Bombing campaign in the British establishment, but Lindemann, Churchill, and Harris were dogged in their commitment to wrecking Germany.
 
When did they have the 'few strikes and move on'? In 1943 the spent months pounding the Ruhr before moving on and several days hitting Hamburg until the city was a hollow shell.

Constantly. We're not talking "a few months" here or striking a city for "several days". We're talking hitting a target again and again and again and again and again and again and again and again... and pretty much ad-infinitum until the facility itself is either confirmed to be totally annihilated or is captured by advancing ground forces. Anything less, and the enemy will quickly be able to overcome the damage done.

Looking at real life targeting campaigns, from World War 2 to the current campaign against ISIS, I keep running into the same problem: the attacker grossly overestimates the effects of his efforts, promptly slackens the pressure, and then the defender recovers in weeks from blows the attacker was sure would have put them down for months or more. Reading through history shows these to be universal problems. They are not something that can be solved by rejiggering this or that aircraft or piece of equipment or kind of bomb or whatever. They are a deeper, more systemic issue.
 
What does that have to do with making the Mossie metal? That info is all well and good for that design, which was conceived of as a metal design from the get go, but can you show anything about switching a wooden design to metal and having it go well?

Nothing, that's why I edited it to remove the quotes.

What I am saying is if the idea was accepted soon enough them there are metal possibilities but they have their own problems.
 
Looking at real life targeting campaigns, from World War 2 to the current campaign against ISIS, I keep running into the same problem: the attacker grossly overestimates the effects of his efforts, promptly slackens the pressure, and then the defender recovers in weeks from blows the attacker was sure would have put them down for months or more. Reading through history shows these to be universal problems. They are not something that can be solved by rejiggering this or that aircraft or piece of equipment or kind of bomb or whatever. They are a deeper, more systemic issue.

The problem is twofold: too light ordnance and insufficient targeting precision. If you drop a bomb near your target you damage it. If you drop a 500 lb bomb on the target you damage it. If you dropped, exactly on the target, a Grand Slam or a T-12, the target would morph into a crater and the question would not how long to repair it but where to rebuild the thing anew. You can survive a few randomly scattered .223 rounds, nobody survives a 14.5mm explosive antimaterial round in the head :D.
 

Deleted member 1487

And from exactly where would the bombers have taken off to hit axis oil targets, mainly in Romania, in March 1943?

The idea is ludicrous.
Besides Libya like IOTL? In reality they just needed to hit the targets in range in the Ruhr and North Germany in 1943 and expand that as they got bases in 1943-44.
 
And from exactly where would the bombers have taken off to hit axis oil targets, mainly in Romania, in March 1943?

The idea is ludicrous.

If you wait late 1943, Lecce to Ploiesti is 820 km, in range even for Mossies. Another alternative is to invade Crete, reducing the scope of italian campaign to just Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica (all of them wonderful unsinkable airfract carriers)

Early 1943, waiting for South Italy invasion, you can keep yourself busy by razing to the ground, once for all, Essen Krups plants and similar Ruhr metallurgical targets. Without steel, it is difficult to wage a modern warfare.
 
I see a possible knock on effect. Assuming some of the big four engined bombers are developed, but not much used to attack Germany, the RAF wtould not have a problem with Coastal Command paying for and accquiring more of the big VLR aicraft production much earlier. If CC has several wings of VLR stood up in early or mid 1942 for long range/endurance ASW missions then the terrible winter of 1942-43 does not develop for the Battle of the Atlantic. That has further effects down the line in both German and Allied strategy and resource allocation.
 
In the case of the skilled woodworkers the Mosquito needed - years. The only way you're going to increase Mosquito production is to exploit furniture makers in the United States. Not necessarily a bad idea, mind - the Mossie was a lot better than American attempts at wooden aircraft!

Engine counting applies here. Rolls-Royce and Packard can only produce so many Merlins; assuming that the skilled workers can be found, you can only produce twice as many aircraft. Which means twice as many pilots and navigators, though a lot less air gunners. Guess which ones are more expensive and time-consuming to train? ;)

Then it's not a Mosquito any more. It's an entirely different aircraft, which runs the risk of losing all the Mossie's virtues whilst retaining its' vices. If you're doing that, throw the whole lot out and design an entirely new all-metal high-speed bomber.

The thing is they are building an Aircraft using a jig and templates not a bespoke Grand Piano - and as for a lack of skilled workers - Britain had a massive Cabinet making industry in the 1930s - there would be more skilled wood workers at the time than skilled metal workers.

Sir Geoffrey utilised this industry well - and made the aircraft as easy to build as possible - a greater push earlier on getting the type into production would yield greater numbers.

Making them in the US would be perfect - however 'porting' British Designs to the US were often beset by difficulties

Some like the Packard Merlin were over come others like the US attempt at building Hispanio 20mm Cannon - not so much.

Granted Pilots are expensive to train but putting them into Mossies gave the RAF a better return for their investment as far fewer of them would be killed or become POW etc

As for Engines well building 2 for each Lancaster or Merlin powered Halifax gives us our engines - not suggesting that the Mossie could completely replace the Lanc and Halifax but reducing their numbers by 2 or 3 thousand gives upto 6,000 more aircraft

I feel that these planes would do more for the war effort than the 3,000 4 engined bombers that they replaced.
 
In the case of the skilled woodworkers the Mosquito needed - years. The only way you're going to increase Mosquito production is to exploit furniture makers in the United States. Not necessarily a bad idea, mind - the Mossie was a lot better than American attempts at wooden aircraft!

Engine counting applies here. Rolls-Royce and Packard can only produce so many Merlins; assuming that the skilled workers can be found, you can only produce twice as many aircraft. Which means twice as many pilots and navigators, though a lot less air gunners. Guess which ones are more expensive and time-consuming to train? ;)

Then it's not a Mosquito any more. It's an entirely different aircraft, which runs the risk of losing all the Mossie's virtues whilst retaining its' vices. If you're doing that, throw the whole lot out and design an entirely new all-metal high-speed bomber.
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Argentina tried to build metal Mosquitos after WW2 and fails miserably. Starting in 1946, they built 101 "Calquin" light bombers. Due to a shortage of RR Merlin engines, the Argentines installed 1,000 horsepower Pratt & Whitney radial engines. reduced horsepower reduced top speeds by more than 100 mph slower and mimicked the Mossie's unforgiving low speed handling.
One compromise might have been for Canadian Mosquitos to use sheet aluminum aft fuselages and control surfaces. By the time airflow reached the metal bits, it would already be turbulent and exposed rivet heads would make little difference to drag.

As for the relative costs of training air gunners versus pilots ..... WI Prime Minister WL MacKenzie King was horrified at casualties within Bomber Command and forbade training any more Canadians as air gunners?
 
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Ian_W

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That POD is already too late to correct the mistake that is Bomber Command.

Anything that begins in mid-1943 is irrelevant for the war as a whole - the German Army is being reduced in Russia, and the Allies are getting ready to land in Italy in '43 and the France in '44.

If the British learn the correct lesson from the Blitz and Coventry, which is that air bombardment is an expensive failure of a way to prevent enemy war production, then they would indeed dedicate their long-range bombers to antisubmarine work, and the war goes quicker and easier for the Allies.

But 1943 is too late.
 
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Argentina tried to build metal Mosquitos after WW2 and fails miserably. Starting in 1946, they built 101 "Calquin" light bombers. Due to a shortage of RR Merlin engines, the Argentines installed 1,000 horsepower Pratt & Whitney radial engines. reduced horsepower reduced top speeds by more than 100 mph slower and mimicked the Mossie's unforgiving low speed handling.
One compromise might have been for Canadian Mosquitos to use sheet aluminum aft fuselages and control surfaces. By the time airflow reached the metal bits, it would already be turbulent and exposed rivet heads would make little difference to drag.

As for the relative costs of training air gunners versus pilots ..... WI Prime Minister WL MacKenzie King was horrified at casualties within Bomber Command and forbade training any more Canadians as air gunners?

The Calquin was built of local wood, in the style of the Mossie. The Mossie's sngle engine minimum speed, Vmc, was 172 mph, tricky to achieve with one P&W R-1830. The Calquin was followed by the all-metal Nancu, in the style of the Hornet, which was powered by Merlins, and did achieve performance goals. However, the prototype suffered a landing accident and it was the dawn of the jet age, with the Pulqui in the wings.

The Mossie fuselage was built on a mold, in left and right halves. The molds were a very tricky build, and required skilled craftsmen to build, and they wore out. Concrete molds were developed, which did not wear out, but had to be heated to facilitate the glue setting.

At the onset of WWII, the air gunner wasn't even an established trained profession in the RAF, just any aircraftsman that wasn't busy. As a result, of three crewmen in a Fairey Battle, two received VCs, and one, the gunner, got squat. They all died at the same time anyway.
 

Deleted member 1487

Would anything have been gained by more extensive mining of Germany's inland waterways?
If they could pull it off earlier; shutting down German transportation seriously hurt German industry from 1944 on.
 
Would anything have been gained by more extensive mining of Germany's inland waterways?

Well, for starters, if you can fuck up waterborne traffic in the Rhine via aerial mining, that would have been extremely helpful to the Allied war effort. Although, to be fair, Bomber Command did dedicate resources to aerial mining throughout the war, largely on the initiative of Sir Arthur Harris, but never prioritized it. A missed opportunity, I would think
 
And on the subject of aerial mining, I suggest googling ''Mines Away'' (I can't figure out how to directly link to it). ''Mines Away'' is a very informative article on the subject.
 
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