Alternative to RAF Area Bombing

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Deleted member 1487

What if an alternative to area bombing was chosen? Let's say that that Harris suffers a heart attack in 1942 so whomever his replacement is opts to go for a more accurate bombing campaign against specific industrial targets thanks to increased nigh accuracy afforded by the OBOE and H2S guidance systems.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oboe_(navigation)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H2S_(radar)

So what if instead of the Battle of the Ruhr as we know it they opted to go after the oil industry with the Light Night Strike Force and the heavies?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pathfinder_(RAF)#Light_Night_Striking_Force

Richard Overy mentioned this as an alternative option to the area bombing campaign and claimed it could have crippled the Luftwaffe a year early and probably brought the war to an early end, while stating that the Area Bombing might have dragged out the war and created unnecessary problems at the end of it.

What effect would it have had on the war to have the RAF start targeting specific and critical targets like that from Spring 1943 on? The technology used in mid-1944 to hit those targets was there in Spring 1943:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_Campaign_of_World_War_II#Opinions_on_outcome
The RAF averaged 16% inside the factory. Bomber Command's efforts against oil were more efficient in some regards - although delivering a smaller total tonnage it did so from 2/3 base area. The USSBS believed that Bomber Command's heavy bombs - 4,000 lb "cookies" - were more effective than an equivalent weight of smaller bombs.
 

jahenders

Banned
Then RAF Bomber Command suffers losses more like the USAAF. They may not be willing/able to accept that. However, it would also cause more Luftwaffe losses (from the bombers themselves and from escorting fighters).

Also, it would force closer coordination between the US and UK on what targets to hit.

In general, it would likely shorten the war, though that depends on how well the US/UK coordinate targeting -- there were lots of missteps/bad assumptions about "critical targets."
 

Deleted member 1487

Then RAF Bomber Command suffers losses more like the USAAF. They may not be willing/able to accept that. However, it would also cause more Luftwaffe losses (from the bombers themselves and from escorting fighters).

Also, it would force closer coordination between the US and UK on what targets to hit.

In general, it would likely shorten the war, though that depends on how well the US/UK coordinate targeting -- there were lots of missteps/bad assumptions about "critical targets."

At night? They bombing oil historically at night, which they would do as they did IOTL. Also oil was the right target that did end up killing the Luftwaffe and with it created the conditions to collapse German coordinated resistance.
 
Yep - got for the oil and do a lot more gardening and you probs take something off the end of the war

and on the upside we got a lot less 'Allies were monsters' for what they did to Dresden
 
As wiking pointed out, Oboe was fantastically precise and GEE-H was not much worse.

A Bomber Command in which the 5th Group specializes in high precision attacks on petrochemical plant would have been a disaster for Germany; if the initial attack of the 5th was reinforced by the other groups, even better.
 

Deleted member 1487

As wiking pointed out, Oboe was fantastically precise and GEE-H was not much worse.

A Bomber Command in which the 5th Group specializes in high precision attacks on petrochemical plant would have been a disaster for Germany; if the initial attack of the 5th was reinforced by the other groups, even better.
A quicker, less destructive defeat would also make the occupation a lot less difficult, especially in the early years and may ensure the Soviets end further East. In the meantime the Luftwaffe and Panzerwaffe if immobilized or at least badly hampered seriously helps the Soviets and Wallies in 1943-44, including in terms of getting more bombers through in daylight.
 
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Deleted member 1487

10 000 Mosquito bombers, hitting a hundred key transport points each day either at dawn or dusk
Operating that many all at once would take longer than WW2 to build. Fielding maybe 500-1000 per raid would be doable by 1944.
 
Operating that many all at once would take longer than WW2 to build. Fielding maybe 500-1000 per raid would be doable by 1944.

6,710 Mossies were built during wartime and given their low operational loss rate relative to other aircraft types a large number would still be usable

Allocating less resources to Lancaster and Halifax (of which 7,000+ and 6,000+ were built) and use this on the DH 98s instead would easily allow many thousands more to be built

Certainly by late 1944 you could be having them conducting X,000 bomber raids - their losses were very light and their hi speed allowed them to potentially conduct 2 missions a night - also a lost Mossie is 2 crew lost not 7 or 8 - 'and' their speed would allow them to be used in day light (at least until very high speed and jet interceptors were brought into service).

Also being smaller, faster and more manoeuvrable than a 4 Engined bomber makes for a harder target for AAA and interceptors as well as the unexpected bonus of being more 'stealthy' with regards to the ability of Radar to detect them.

Target Oil, Electricity and communication hubs including rail and canal viaducts and tunnels (that coal is not going to transport itself)

The Oil refinery and industry is a no brainier - the campaign to destroy the Axis POL production was just beginning to pinch when the Heavy bombers were switched to support missions for D-Day.

Electricity production was not something that could easily be routed around Germany - so targeting the power stations near to major zones of industry would have had a serious impact on those factories ability to operate.

Destroying the rail and Canal hubs, Viaducts and Tunnels as well as the coal mine 'Mine Heads' or 'Head frames' would also have serious ramifications

Of course this implies a higher standard of bomb delivery that was otherwise generally un-available at night until 1944 at the earliest
 
Mossie: range 2400 km, bomb load 4000 lb.
Lancs: range 4000 km, bomb load 14000 lb.

A Mossie only offensive means not being able to hit anything beyond 1000 km from the bases and the need to send 3+ Mossies for each Lancs (e.g. 1600+ Mossies instead of 500 Lancs).
 
6,710 Mossies were built during wartime and given their low operational loss rate relative to other aircraft types a large number would still be usable

Allocating less resources to Lancaster and Halifax (of which 7,000+ and 6,000+ were built) and use this on the DH 98s instead would easily allow many thousands more to be built
Can't be done. Mosquito production leveraged skilled woodworkers, who were scarce and take a long time to train. Lancaster and Halifax production leveraged metalworkers, who were fairly numerous and could be trained very quickly. There was no scope to increase Mosquito production by any more than a nominal amount.
 
Can't be done. Mosquito production leveraged skilled woodworkers, who were scarce and take a long time to train. Lancaster and Halifax production leveraged metalworkers, who were fairly numerous and could be trained very quickly. There was no scope to increase Mosquito production by any more than a nominal amount.

Not buying that.

How long is a long time to train people?

Lots of people involved in the aircraft industry had never handled a screw driver before the war and yet still.......

If the decesion had been made to go with the Mossie earlier (and there in lies the problem!) then those workers would have been trained up.

As for sending 3 Mossies for each lancaster -

Mossie could carry 4 x 500 pound Bombs

Lancaster could carry 14 x 500 pound Bombs

On average by 1944 both aircraft would 'hit the target' with 2 bombs - which means that each Mossie was as effective as each Lancaster - it simple missed a lot less.
 
Can't be done. Mosquito production leveraged skilled woodworkers, who were scarce and take a long time to train. Lancaster and Halifax production leveraged metalworkers, who were fairly numerous and could be trained very quickly. There was no scope to increase Mosquito production by any more than a nominal amount.

Why not make all metal Mosquitoes? If the Mossie is your primary bomber then cut back or stop producing the Halifax and use the metal to build mosquitoes. Also could Canada pick up thr slack for metal mosquitoes?
 

Deleted member 1487

Why not make all metal Mosquitoes? If the Mossie is your primary bomber then cut back or stop producing the Halifax and use the metal to build mosquitoes. Also could Canada pick up thr slack for metal mosquitoes?
Besides the loss in performance and major engineering changes and production method alternation that would be required to switch from wood to metal?
 
Not buying that.

How long is a long time to train people?
In the case of the skilled woodworkers the Mosquito needed - years. The only way you're going to increase Mosquito production is to exploit furniture makers in the United States. Not necessarily a bad idea, mind - the Mossie was a lot better than American attempts at wooden aircraft!
As for sending 3 Mossies for each lancaster
Engine counting applies here. Rolls-Royce and Packard can only produce so many Merlins; assuming that the skilled workers can be found, you can only produce twice as many aircraft. Which means twice as many pilots and navigators, though a lot less air gunners. Guess which ones are more expensive and time-consuming to train? ;)
Why not make all metal Mosquitoes? If the Mossie is your primary bomber then cut back or stop producing the Halifax and use the metal to build mosquitoes. Also could Canada pick up thr slack for metal mosquitoes?
Then it's not a Mosquito any more. It's an entirely different aircraft, which runs the risk of losing all the Mossie's virtues whilst retaining its' vices. If you're doing that, throw the whole lot out and design an entirely new all-metal high-speed bomber.
 
Well, there is the Hawker P.1005 but that would need Sabre engines.

Designed to the B.11/41 spec, Hawkers estimated its all-metal aircraft with a 70ft wingspan (P.1005) could carry a 4,000lb for 1,130 miles cruising at 345mph while at economical power and 242mph the range could be 1,600 miles. The maximum speed was estimated at 420mph and ceiling at 36,000ft


There is also the HP High Speed P.13/36 design study.

In May 1937 George Volkert, chief designer at Handley Page, completed a twenty-page document called 'A Memorandum on Bombing Policy and its Influence on design'. This was prepared, possibly in response to an approach from the Air Ministry's Research & Development department, with a view to assessing the 'benefits' to a bomber if it did not have to carry defensive armament and crew, a subject about which Volkert felt most strongly.

He presented an unarmed bomber project as a comparison to the existing P.13/36 medium bomber - this possessed a near perfect aerodynamic fuselage with a pointed nose and tail, BSP gives this:

Wingspan 88.6ft

Length 74.6ft

Wing Area 988 sqft

With two Vultures top speed was 380mph and cruise was 300mph with 3,000lb bombs (max bomb load being 7,000lb)


Problem is Vultures are needed.
 

Deleted member 1487

Well, there is the Hawker P.1005 but that would need Sabre engines.

Designed to the B.11/41 spec, Hawkers estimated its all-metal aircraft with a 70ft wingspan (P.1005) could carry a 4,000lb for 1,130 miles cruising at 345mph while at economical power and 242mph the range could be 1,600 miles. The maximum speed was estimated at 420mph and ceiling at 36,000ft


There is also the HP High Speed P.13/36 design study.

In May 1937 George Volkert, chief designer at Handley Page, completed a twenty-page document called 'A Memorandum on Bombing Policy and its Influence on design'. This was prepared, possibly in response to an approach from the Air Ministry's Research & Development department, with a view to assessing the 'benefits' to a bomber if it did not have to carry defensive armament and crew, a subject about which Volkert felt most strongly.

He presented an unarmed bomber project as a comparison to the existing P.13/36 medium bomber - this possessed a near perfect aerodynamic fuselage with a pointed nose and tail, BSP gives this:

Wingspan 88.6ft

Length 74.6ft

Wing Area 988 sqft

With two Vultures top speed was 380mph and cruise was 300mph with 3,000lb bombs (max bomb load being 7,000lb)


Problem is Vultures are needed.

What does that have to do with making the Mossie metal? That info is all well and good for that design, which was conceived of as a metal design from the get go, but can you show anything about switching a wooden design to metal and having it go well?
 
Until the British adopt the most vital concept of relentless target restrike that even the Americans never really got around too until the dying days of WWII, they aren't going to produce much in the way of extra results. That won't happen until mid-'44 and by then Germany is going to be falling apart from the battlefield losses anyways.
 
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