Alternative Soviet Navy during World War II.
- Thread starter Aley
- Start date
I'm really enjoying this thread!
Thank you for the comment, colleague, and then somehow do not indulge.
As much as I did enjoy the thread I've got a question, and a few nitpicking points.
How did the Soviet Union get over the major problems of quality control and how did they manage to accelerate production? As prior to the construction of the Sovetsky Soyuz class the largest warship built in the Soviet Union post-war was the Kirov class cruisers which suffered from a number of production problems. Those problems were only amplified when the shipyards were tasked with building the larger and more complicated Sovetsky Soyuz class. If the Soviet Navy is building more capital ships these quality control issues would be amplified tenfold.
Also Soviet rivets were terrible quality, to the point where the Sovetskaya Belorussiya irl was scrapped because some 70,000 rivets used in her hull plating were of inferior quality. Through the late 1930's and 1940's Soviet armor plate plants proved incapable of producing plates of cemented armor thicker than 230 mm (9.1 in) so any Soviet Battleship would be under-gunned, and under-armored in comparison to rival navy battleships.
Adding to their rl difficulties the Soviet's had production problems with turbines, and had to order them from the Swiss. They also had difficulties with gun production, having to adopt a obsolete 1895 12" gun for the main battery because Soviet gun manufactures couldn't produce more modern 14" or 16" guns.
How did the Soviet Union get over the major problems of quality control and how did they manage to accelerate production? As prior to the construction of the Sovetsky Soyuz class the largest warship built in the Soviet Union post-war was the Kirov class cruisers which suffered from a number of production problems. Those problems were only amplified when the shipyards were tasked with building the larger and more complicated Sovetsky Soyuz class. If the Soviet Navy is building more capital ships these quality control issues would be amplified tenfold.
Also Soviet rivets were terrible quality, to the point where the Sovetskaya Belorussiya irl was scrapped because some 70,000 rivets used in her hull plating were of inferior quality. Through the late 1930's and 1940's Soviet armor plate plants proved incapable of producing plates of cemented armor thicker than 230 mm (9.1 in) so any Soviet Battleship would be under-gunned, and under-armored in comparison to rival navy battleships.
Adding to their rl difficulties the Soviet's had production problems with turbines, and had to order them from the Swiss. They also had difficulties with gun production, having to adopt a obsolete 1895 12" gun for the main battery because Soviet gun manufactures couldn't produce more modern 14" or 16" guns.
First, I wrote that in Soviet factories in the late 20's and early 30's., destruction occurred "unnecessary" equipment, primarily for the production of armor and turrets of battleships. This was due to the partial re-profiling works on other products: the tanks and civil ships.
Production of tanks eventually exceeded all imaginable norms, so that from a couple of thousand of them may well be abandoned. If the construction of the cruisers began 1930, the machine park (often unique machines!) have been able to maintain and would not have to immediately replace it with a new second half of the 30s. The gradual increase of the number of ships under construction, too, would have a favorable impact on their construction. For example: in the course of one year (December 1935-December 1936) on Soviet factories were laid down 53 destroyers. Not surprisingly, the industry is overstrained, and their completion was delayed.
This applies only to the battleship "Sovetskaya Belorussia", in other plants such was not. The fact is that in Molotovske worked mainly prisoners and slave labor is unproductive, it's Marx wrote. At the same time, according to my information (from the archives of the Severodvinsk), rivets were merely a pretext to stop the construction, but true reason was the realization that the construction of the master of so many ships at once Soviet industry could not. In the end, decided to donate a battleship.
About the armor is not true, plate thickness 375 mm and thicker already started to produce, but the war did not have time to finish, although behind schedule was great.
Turbines: I knowingly accepted for battleships and aircraft carriers turbine aggregate capacity 55 000 hp, which have already been exploited in the real sector (here I made the purchase of drawings and one set of turbines from the Italians, as in real history). On the battleships of the "Soviet Union", in the real story behind the turbine rated at 77,000 hp, it was too bold step forward.
For battleships of the "Soviet Union" before the war had to produce 12 406-mm guns, so that the manufacture of guns did not present a problem. The bigger problem was the construction of the towers. In pre-revolutionary Russia had several workshops for the manufacture of towers battleships, including the construction finished in 1916, a workshop for the manufacture of towers, 16-inch caliber. By the mid-30s. all these facilities were destroyed and had to build new ones.
In its alternative, I kept this shop at the Obukhov factory, helped by the earlier construction of the cruisers.
Not in the Soviet Union. Realistically based on their experiences with Submarine, warship, and fighter production more ships would only amplify existing production problems, and quality control issues because the Soviet worker was basically a under-motivated slave who's orders were to work hard, and meet quotas but in reality often didn't and for the most part delivered very low quality products because he didn't take pride in the quality of his work. (Kirov, Romeo, Mig-21, ectra) Also looking at your numbers more closely 53 Destroyers?
Also the Soviet industry only matured to the point where they could build aircraft carriers in the post-war world, in fact it would take 22 years after WW2 for the Soviet shipbuilding industry to mature enough to build the Moskova, and that wasn't a true carrier just a helicopter carrier. Kiev was the first true aircraft carrier and it was launched in 1975, some 30 years after the war ended. Destroying key parts of this industry in favor of tank production would only amplify the problems faced by the Soviet's as the factories would half to be re-built or re-converted to handle production of warship components.
My source for the Armor is Wikipedia's own (detailedish) page on the Sovetsky Soyuz-class battleship, however I can probably provide you with additional resources if you don't believe me that the Soviet's were incapable of sustaining heavy armor production at a rate that would be conductive to the realistic production schedule of the Battleship. As for guns the Soviet's had a history of turning to the Germans for their naval guns because of their own industry's shortfalls.
Also the Kirov's construction are a excellent reference for problems with Soviet shipbuilding. However the majority of them all boil down to one thing, a lack of quality control on the production line. which ends up resulting in a inferior product every time.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obukhovskii_12%22/52_Pattern_1907_gun
A reference to the main 12" guns used on the Sovetsky Soyuz-class battleship. Not some new 14" or 16" design, but instead a obsolete 12" gun.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/38_cm_SK_C/34_naval_gun
The German 15" naval gun, the primary armament chosen for the Kronshtadt class battle-cruisers, yet more evidence in support of the Soviet shipyard industry's inability to build ships through the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's.
The Soviet's after 1932 historically used the very short and efficient North East Passage to transfer ships from the Atlantic to the Pacific with the assistance of icebreakers, and this route was sailed as far back as the Russian Revolution, even in the Russian-Japanese war ships were transferred to the Pacific fleet via the long Pacific Ocean route, and not by railway's. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_East_Passage
Finally Ships were assembled in the East because that was where the Soviet Union's largest shipyards and the majority of the shipbuilding industry was located. Building ships in the west creates its own set of logistic problems, since you half to wait for the railway to delivery the ship components over some 8,000 +km.
Also the Soviet industry only matured to the point where they could build aircraft carriers in the post-war world, in fact it would take 22 years after WW2 for the Soviet shipbuilding industry to mature enough to build the Moskova, and that wasn't a true carrier just a helicopter carrier. Kiev was the first true aircraft carrier and it was launched in 1975, some 30 years after the war ended. Destroying key parts of this industry in favor of tank production would only amplify the problems faced by the Soviet's as the factories would half to be re-built or re-converted to handle production of warship components.
My source for the Armor is Wikipedia's own (detailedish) page on the Sovetsky Soyuz-class battleship, however I can probably provide you with additional resources if you don't believe me that the Soviet's were incapable of sustaining heavy armor production at a rate that would be conductive to the realistic production schedule of the Battleship. As for guns the Soviet's had a history of turning to the Germans for their naval guns because of their own industry's shortfalls.
Also the Kirov's construction are a excellent reference for problems with Soviet shipbuilding. However the majority of them all boil down to one thing, a lack of quality control on the production line. which ends up resulting in a inferior product every time.
And for the record the Kirov's were armed with (7.1 in) B-1-P guns. Based on my understanding of how bad the Kirov's guns were the Soviets were very lucky that the guns were not defective, and did not blow up when fired.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obukhovskii_12%22/52_Pattern_1907_gun
A reference to the main 12" guns used on the Sovetsky Soyuz-class battleship. Not some new 14" or 16" design, but instead a obsolete 12" gun.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/38_cm_SK_C/34_naval_gun
The German 15" naval gun, the primary armament chosen for the Kronshtadt class battle-cruisers, yet more evidence in support of the Soviet shipyard industry's inability to build ships through the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's.
The Soviet's after 1932 historically used the very short and efficient North East Passage to transfer ships from the Atlantic to the Pacific with the assistance of icebreakers, and this route was sailed as far back as the Russian Revolution, even in the Russian-Japanese war ships were transferred to the Pacific fleet via the long Pacific Ocean route, and not by railway's. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_East_Passage
Finally Ships were assembled in the East because that was where the Soviet Union's largest shipyards and the majority of the shipbuilding industry was located. Building ships in the west creates its own set of logistic problems, since you half to wait for the railway to delivery the ship components over some 8,000 +km.
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A common misconception is based on the lowest level of the workers in the USSR. Actually among the workers promoted the initiative, which, combined with distrust of engineers often led to negative results. The workers were on a mission on my own, considering the engineers wrecking.
"Kirov" was quite ordinary, but not in a bad cruiser, although it is not anything outstanding, as assured by Soviet propaganda.
You are confused by number laid down destroyers? But it is a fact, there are documents proving each ship. Just after the explosion in a mine in 1937 British destroyer "Hunter", the project 7 was declared sabotage, building most of the destroyers stopped and started drafting their alterations to the layout of the flight level turbine and boiler rooms. Six ships in the least degree of readiness cut, 18 on the amended draft 7-U, with the official new laid down. It took a considerable period of time, so you can assume that if it were not stopping construction, all 53 ships have been built before the war, although as planned, of course, would have missed.
Colleague, the construction of battleships is much more difficult to build aircraft carriers and battleships were built in the USSR. Late start of construction of aircraft carriers in the Soviet Union is not due to the inability of their construction, and the persistent lack of understanding of the role of government. Convinced that the carriers are targeted by anti-ship missiles, aircraft carriers, the government considered expensive and unnecessary toys. So military had to go to aircraft carriers circuitous route, creating the first helicopter, and then the bastard aircraft carriers of the "Kiev".
"Kirov" was founded after the "Voroshilov", he was the first, except that the date of commencement of construction it is the ceremonial laying. In reality, he was laid before.
That's strange, you say that Soviet factories produced products of poor quality, but referring to the fact that the Italian turbines were worse than the Soviets. Indeed, the Italian manufacturing turbines were with defects (still do not know whether it was negligence or deliberate sabotage). "Kirov" was the most low-speed cruisers of this type, which exceeded the design speed.
Exceeding the displacement was caused by increased weapons instead of 2-gun turrets relied on the project, set the 3-gun.
This caused problems with the towers, designed for less stress. 180-mm guns for the war improved by changing the depth of cut stems, so that they become fully combat-ready.
On the "Soviet Union" had to stand just a 16-inch guns. One of them has been tested on the range and showed a very high combat qualities.
On the production of large-caliber guns in pre-revolutionary Russia: time to make most of the 14-inch guns of battle cruisers such as "Ishmael." Subsequently, some of them were used for coastal defense, including the installation on rail transporters. In 1915, planned to start the construction of battleships with 16-inch guns, abandoned those plans after the war began. But this caliber guns were manufactured both in Russia and in England, and on the Russian weapon tests showed better than the English.
Buying towers in Germany for the "Kronstadt" and "Sevastopol" was associated with the production behind schedule towers of the main fire. So the decision to buy the German tower to stop making 12-inch, and all efforts should be concentrated on the production of 16-inch towers "Soviet Union."
The main shipbuilding capacity of the USSR have focused precisely on the west (the Leningrad and Nikolayev). Construction of the plant in the Amur started a stupidity, all the parts for the ships drove through the whole continent, a part of the road was lost, with the result that the cost of the ships built in Komsomolsk 3-5 times higher than the cost of which were built in the western plants.
In my alternative to the ships were built in the European part of the country, and make the transition to the Far East via the Suez Canal.
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The leaders of the project 71.
Immediately after the August 1937 decision to discontinue new tabs 38 project leaders began the development of new ships: the leader project 71 and destroyer 72 project. In the experience of the Spanish war was made of the location of artillery weapons in towers, protecting them from bullets calculations attack aircraft. At the same time, due to the large dimensions of such facilities for small-caliber anti-aircraft guns, they are generally abandoned, limiting four turrets with twin 12.7 mm machine guns. Torpedoes armament has been strengthened by installing new five-funnel torpedo tubes, the development of which before the war had not been completed.
Due to delays in the production of new towers, leaders began to come into operation until the end of 1940, so that the Northern Fleet had put a head "Gubitelnyy". Pacific Fleet as to which were built in Nikolayev four leaders of the project 71 not get any until 1942, when the system includes built in Komsomolsk leaders "Sposobnyy" and "Soobrazitel'nyy". However, both of these ships did not stay at the Pacific Fleet, shortly after leaving the Northern Sea Route in Murmansk and joined the Northern Fleet.
Prior to the beginning of the war the same time to enter into service 14 leaders of the project 71.
The big problem was the lack of never finished developing five-funnel torpedo tubes that caused to re-start production of the torpedo tubes old type, which were armed leaders.
Immediately after the war revealed the fallacy decision to abandon the small-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns and lack of available DShK to defend against dive bombers. I had to urgently strengthen the arms leaders with 37-mm machine guns in one-gun installations.
The leaders project 71 demonstrated a good seaworthiness and were recognized as the best ships of this class in the Soviet Navy during the Great Patriotic War.
Design Displacement: 2,010 tons (standard), 2,648 tons (full).
Speed: 38 knots at capacity machines 58,000 hp.
Armament: 3x2 130-mm/50 guns, 1x2 76-mm/55 anti-aircraft guns, 4x2 12.7-mm machine guns, 2x4 533-mm tubes.
CWL dimensions: 117,0 x 11,5 x 3,65 m
1. Gubitelnyy 38-38-40 Balt. Shipyard NF
2. Gulkiy 38-38-41 Balt. Shipyard BF
3. Vedushchiy 38-39-41 Nawal BSF
4. Vstrechnyy 38-39-41 Nawal BSF
5. Boykiy 38-39-41 Put. Shipyard BF
6. Buynyy 38-39-41 Put. Shipyard BF
7. Gonkiy 38-39-41 Put. Shipyard BF
8. Godnyy 38-39-41 Put. Shipyard BF
9. Stoykiy 38-39-41 Nawal BSF
10. Statnyy 38-39-41 Nawal BSF
11. Geroyskiy 38-39-41 Balt. Shipyard BF
12. Gramotnyy 38-39-41 Balt. Shipyard BF
13. Bezukoriznennyy 39-40-41. Put. Shipyard BF
14. Besposhchadnyy 39-40-41. Put. Shipyard BF
15. Sposobnyy 39-41 - (42) Komsomolsk
16. Soobrazitelnyy 39-41 - (42) Komsomolsk
17. Velikolepnyy 39-40 - (41) Nawal
18. Vliyatelnyy 39-40 - (42) Nawal
19. Bespokoynyy 39-40 - (41) Balt. Shipyard
20. Bezboyaznennyy 39-41 - (41) Balt. Shipyard
21. Burnyy 39-40 - (41) Put. Shipyard
22. Bravyy 39-41 - (41) Put. Shipyard
23. Svetlyy 39-(42-43) Komsomolsk
24. Spravedlivyy 39-(42-44) Komsomolsk
Immediately after the August 1937 decision to discontinue new tabs 38 project leaders began the development of new ships: the leader project 71 and destroyer 72 project. In the experience of the Spanish war was made of the location of artillery weapons in towers, protecting them from bullets calculations attack aircraft. At the same time, due to the large dimensions of such facilities for small-caliber anti-aircraft guns, they are generally abandoned, limiting four turrets with twin 12.7 mm machine guns. Torpedoes armament has been strengthened by installing new five-funnel torpedo tubes, the development of which before the war had not been completed.
Due to delays in the production of new towers, leaders began to come into operation until the end of 1940, so that the Northern Fleet had put a head "Gubitelnyy". Pacific Fleet as to which were built in Nikolayev four leaders of the project 71 not get any until 1942, when the system includes built in Komsomolsk leaders "Sposobnyy" and "Soobrazitel'nyy". However, both of these ships did not stay at the Pacific Fleet, shortly after leaving the Northern Sea Route in Murmansk and joined the Northern Fleet.
Prior to the beginning of the war the same time to enter into service 14 leaders of the project 71.
The big problem was the lack of never finished developing five-funnel torpedo tubes that caused to re-start production of the torpedo tubes old type, which were armed leaders.
Immediately after the war revealed the fallacy decision to abandon the small-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns and lack of available DShK to defend against dive bombers. I had to urgently strengthen the arms leaders with 37-mm machine guns in one-gun installations.
The leaders project 71 demonstrated a good seaworthiness and were recognized as the best ships of this class in the Soviet Navy during the Great Patriotic War.
Design Displacement: 2,010 tons (standard), 2,648 tons (full).
Speed: 38 knots at capacity machines 58,000 hp.
Armament: 3x2 130-mm/50 guns, 1x2 76-mm/55 anti-aircraft guns, 4x2 12.7-mm machine guns, 2x4 533-mm tubes.
CWL dimensions: 117,0 x 11,5 x 3,65 m
1. Gubitelnyy 38-38-40 Balt. Shipyard NF
2. Gulkiy 38-38-41 Balt. Shipyard BF
3. Vedushchiy 38-39-41 Nawal BSF
4. Vstrechnyy 38-39-41 Nawal BSF
5. Boykiy 38-39-41 Put. Shipyard BF
6. Buynyy 38-39-41 Put. Shipyard BF
7. Gonkiy 38-39-41 Put. Shipyard BF
8. Godnyy 38-39-41 Put. Shipyard BF
9. Stoykiy 38-39-41 Nawal BSF
10. Statnyy 38-39-41 Nawal BSF
11. Geroyskiy 38-39-41 Balt. Shipyard BF
12. Gramotnyy 38-39-41 Balt. Shipyard BF
13. Bezukoriznennyy 39-40-41. Put. Shipyard BF
14. Besposhchadnyy 39-40-41. Put. Shipyard BF
15. Sposobnyy 39-41 - (42) Komsomolsk
16. Soobrazitelnyy 39-41 - (42) Komsomolsk
17. Velikolepnyy 39-40 - (41) Nawal
18. Vliyatelnyy 39-40 - (42) Nawal
19. Bespokoynyy 39-40 - (41) Balt. Shipyard
20. Bezboyaznennyy 39-41 - (41) Balt. Shipyard
21. Burnyy 39-40 - (41) Put. Shipyard
22. Bravyy 39-41 - (41) Put. Shipyard
23. Svetlyy 39-(42-43) Komsomolsk
24. Spravedlivyy 39-(42-44) Komsomolsk
Destroyers of the project 72-bis.
Development the destroyer of the project 72 began almost simultaneously with the design of the project leaders of the 71, but was carried out much more slowly, despite a government decree on the priority given to the project of creating a new destroyer, which had fewer than leaders of displacement and, consequently, a lower cost. The fact that the creation of 72 projects was entrusted to the same group of engineers that designed the project 32 patrol ships, which caused a serious delay works. The second reason for the delay was the desire military to establish a new destroyers universal 130mm installation of the main fire that had just started to be developed.
Destroyers of the new project, intended for a more mass than the leaders of construction, should be adopted consisting of 4 130-mm guns of the main fire, located in two tower installations, 4x2 12.7-mm machine-gun turrets and 2x5 533 mm torpedo tubes.
To increase the navigability has been reduced ratio of length to width of the projected ships same architecture buildings was performed a flush-deck, following the example of patrol ships of the project 32.
Since the summer of 1940 until the beginning of the war, a few plants have laid down 14 destroyers a new type, but none of them did not even manage to pull on the water. After the war, they were dismantled on the stocks.
The requirement of Stalin on the construction of an increasing number of destroyers led to the intensive care unit post-war project 72, now as a modernized – 72-bis.
Corps pledged since 1947, new destroyers all-welded, reinforced by the installation of anti-aircraft weaponry 1x4 and 4x2 37-mm gun mounts.
In total, between 1947 and 1952 were built in build 88 destroyers, 72-bis of the project, which showed on tests higher of navigability.
Design Displacement: 2,142 tons (standard), 2,705 tons (full).
Speed: 37 knots, at a power of machines 50,000 hp.
Armament: 2x2 130-mm/50 guns, 1x4 and 4x2 37mm automatic, 2x5 533-mm tubes.
CWL dimensions: 107,6x11,32x3,87 m.
Development the destroyer of the project 72 began almost simultaneously with the design of the project leaders of the 71, but was carried out much more slowly, despite a government decree on the priority given to the project of creating a new destroyer, which had fewer than leaders of displacement and, consequently, a lower cost. The fact that the creation of 72 projects was entrusted to the same group of engineers that designed the project 32 patrol ships, which caused a serious delay works. The second reason for the delay was the desire military to establish a new destroyers universal 130mm installation of the main fire that had just started to be developed.
Destroyers of the new project, intended for a more mass than the leaders of construction, should be adopted consisting of 4 130-mm guns of the main fire, located in two tower installations, 4x2 12.7-mm machine-gun turrets and 2x5 533 mm torpedo tubes.
To increase the navigability has been reduced ratio of length to width of the projected ships same architecture buildings was performed a flush-deck, following the example of patrol ships of the project 32.
Since the summer of 1940 until the beginning of the war, a few plants have laid down 14 destroyers a new type, but none of them did not even manage to pull on the water. After the war, they were dismantled on the stocks.
The requirement of Stalin on the construction of an increasing number of destroyers led to the intensive care unit post-war project 72, now as a modernized – 72-bis.
Corps pledged since 1947, new destroyers all-welded, reinforced by the installation of anti-aircraft weaponry 1x4 and 4x2 37-mm gun mounts.
In total, between 1947 and 1952 were built in build 88 destroyers, 72-bis of the project, which showed on tests higher of navigability.
Design Displacement: 2,142 tons (standard), 2,705 tons (full).
Speed: 37 knots, at a power of machines 50,000 hp.
Armament: 2x2 130-mm/50 guns, 1x4 and 4x2 37mm automatic, 2x5 533-mm tubes.
CWL dimensions: 107,6x11,32x3,87 m.
A question about the Soviet carrier air groups: can the squadrons be swapped around among the carriers as per British and American practice or are they tethered to the ships like what the Japanese did?
Because of the small size of the fleet during the Second World War, the squadron can only act together. After the war, as the number of ships, the gradual transition to the American version.
Light cruisers type of "Zhdanov".
Design of "light cruiser escort" began in the late 1940s. As conceived by the military such ships were to accompany the connection battleships and aircraft carriers, serving as protection of large ships from attack destroyers and enemy aircraft.
After the war, had suspended work on the project 91, resumed with a maximum energy, helped by the almost complete absence of the Soviet Navy ships of this class. By the end of the 40s, in addition completely lost their military value "Chervona Ukraina" and "Krasnyy Krym", there were only two relatively modern light cruisers - trophy "Admiral Makarov" and "Admiral Nakhimov".
According to the experience of war weapons designed cruisers was strengthened installing third-tier towers in the extremities and brought to 20 130-mm guns, 16 of which could participate in the broadside. Auxiliary gauge were 20 45-mm machine located in ten two-gun-stabilized units. Was increased from 80 to 120 mm thick armor belt, all these innovations led to an increase in the standard displacement of 10,000 tons, so the new light cruisers are not inferior in size to available heavy.
As a result, the USSR Ministry of the Navy has proposed to strengthen weapons designed cruisers, installing them on the 12 universal 152-mm guns, arranged in three-gun turrets, which increased the combat capability of the project in a collision with the light cruisers of foreign powers. However, the study of this variant showed that the standard displacement of cruisers will exceed 15,000 tons, the developers of a 152-mm universal towers faced a number of difficulties associated with providing the necessary speed horizontal and vertical lay guns. As a result, limited to the replacement of the towers of the 130-mm caliber for new plants SM-2-1, all the more so as reasonably noted SRI fleet, with a large surface combat ships of the enemy were to take on the heavy cruiser of the new generation.
The construction of new light cruisers began to fall in 1949 at three plants, and, in spite of the advanced technology of the manufacture of welded shells was conducted behind schedule, helped by the slow production of the towers of the new design LMZ and Obukhov plant.
As a result, up to Nikita Khrushchev initiated the decision to discontinue the construction of large surface ships factories had to hand over only ten ships. Located on the building berths of the cruiser "Admiral Kornilov," "Admiral Lazarev", "Shcherbakov", "Admiral Istomin," as already deflated Baltic Plant "Admiral Butakov" were excluded from the list of Navy and scrapped.
1. Zhdanov 1949-1950-1953 Balt. plant
2. Alexander Nevsky 1950-1951-1953 Adm. plant
3. Admiral Ushakov 1950-1952-1954 Russud
4. Alexander Suvorov 1950-1952-1954 Adm. plant
5. Admiral Senyavin 1950-1951-1953 Balt. plant
6. Dmitry Pozharsky 1951-5192-1954 Adm. plant
7. Mikhail Kutuzov 1951-1952-1954 Balt. plant
8. Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1952-1953-1954 Russud
9. Kozma Minin 1952-1953-1954 Adm. plant
10. Dmitry Donskoy 1952-1953-1955 Adm. plant
Design Displacement: 10,000 tons (standard) 13100 tons (full).
Speed: 34 knots, at a power of machines 110,000 horsepower.
Armament: 10x2 130-mm/58 guns, 10x2 45-mm machine guns, 2x3 533-mm tubes.
Reservations: board - 120 mm, deck - 50 mm.
CWL dimensions: 189.7 x 18.2 x 5.7 m.
After the war, had suspended work on the project 91, resumed with a maximum energy, helped by the almost complete absence of the Soviet Navy ships of this class. By the end of the 40s, in addition completely lost their military value "Chervona Ukraina" and "Krasnyy Krym", there were only two relatively modern light cruisers - trophy "Admiral Makarov" and "Admiral Nakhimov".
According to the experience of war weapons designed cruisers was strengthened installing third-tier towers in the extremities and brought to 20 130-mm guns, 16 of which could participate in the broadside. Auxiliary gauge were 20 45-mm machine located in ten two-gun-stabilized units. Was increased from 80 to 120 mm thick armor belt, all these innovations led to an increase in the standard displacement of 10,000 tons, so the new light cruisers are not inferior in size to available heavy.
As a result, the USSR Ministry of the Navy has proposed to strengthen weapons designed cruisers, installing them on the 12 universal 152-mm guns, arranged in three-gun turrets, which increased the combat capability of the project in a collision with the light cruisers of foreign powers. However, the study of this variant showed that the standard displacement of cruisers will exceed 15,000 tons, the developers of a 152-mm universal towers faced a number of difficulties associated with providing the necessary speed horizontal and vertical lay guns. As a result, limited to the replacement of the towers of the 130-mm caliber for new plants SM-2-1, all the more so as reasonably noted SRI fleet, with a large surface combat ships of the enemy were to take on the heavy cruiser of the new generation.
The construction of new light cruisers began to fall in 1949 at three plants, and, in spite of the advanced technology of the manufacture of welded shells was conducted behind schedule, helped by the slow production of the towers of the new design LMZ and Obukhov plant.
As a result, up to Nikita Khrushchev initiated the decision to discontinue the construction of large surface ships factories had to hand over only ten ships. Located on the building berths of the cruiser "Admiral Kornilov," "Admiral Lazarev", "Shcherbakov", "Admiral Istomin," as already deflated Baltic Plant "Admiral Butakov" were excluded from the list of Navy and scrapped.
1. Zhdanov 1949-1950-1953 Balt. plant
2. Alexander Nevsky 1950-1951-1953 Adm. plant
3. Admiral Ushakov 1950-1952-1954 Russud
4. Alexander Suvorov 1950-1952-1954 Adm. plant
5. Admiral Senyavin 1950-1951-1953 Balt. plant
6. Dmitry Pozharsky 1951-5192-1954 Adm. plant
7. Mikhail Kutuzov 1951-1952-1954 Balt. plant
8. Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1952-1953-1954 Russud
9. Kozma Minin 1952-1953-1954 Adm. plant
10. Dmitry Donskoy 1952-1953-1955 Adm. plant
Speed: 34 knots, at a power of machines 110,000 horsepower.
Armament: 10x2 130-mm/58 guns, 10x2 45-mm machine guns, 2x3 533-mm tubes.
Reservations: board - 120 mm, deck - 50 mm.
CWL dimensions: 189.7 x 18.2 x 5.7 m.
I think the #1 problem is that the USSR need an army and an air force far more than they needed a navy in WWII. Every man that is put on deck is a man not fighting in the field. Every ton of steel used making ships is a ton of steel not making tanks. Every shell built for use on ships is a number of smaller shells not being made for the artillery and tanks. With the Germans invading and the allies doing their own convey protection it made little sense for the USSR to build a very capable navy. It doesn't help you very much to have the route to Archangel and Murmansk clear of German ships if the Germans take Moscow!
In any case, the construction of warships in the Soviet Union had been discontinued after the war began. Therefore, no material consumption in the Navy, to the detriment of the tank building, was not.
As for the need for the Navy of the USSR, the Peter I said, "Every ruler who has an army - one hand is, the one and the navy and the army has - has two hands.
Most likely the Soviets wind up selling the ships for supplies. It wouldn't make sense to waste the manpower and money manning and maintaining a big navy when they need the money and manpower on the front lines. Cruisers won't stop the Germans from taking Moscow but tanks and infantry will. It would prefer having both but it probably has to choose. The Germans were on the doorstep of Moscow as is. If the Soviets have to pick between an army and a navy the army wins every time.
I have already said that the construction of the fleet in my alternative, as in real history, is only in times of peace. If we talk about the army, the SSSSR built before the Second World War, 27,000 tanks, where it is more?
Most of which were obsolete which is why the USSR built more tanks and artillery the entire war. What the Russians need are tanks, planes and artillery to stop the Germans. What it doesn't need are big, expensive ships that cost it a lot of manpower and money that can be used better on the front lines against the Germans.