Alternative Med strategy, 1943

Both Hitler and Badoglio expected the Wallies to take Sardinia first, followed by Corsica. This would provide the basis for an air offensive against Italy, probably enough in itself to cause a (attempted)change of government in Italy. Critically it would also make the whole south of Italy indefensible, given the possibility of a landing south of the Apennines.
Sicily was chosen because:
It was closer and easier.
The USAF was keen to base bombers in Naples and Foggia to attack the Romanian oil fields.

Given how things went OTL, a case might be constructed that the Sardinia/Corsica option was the right choice.
Has AH discussed this extensively before/recently?
 

katchen

Banned
It makes sense to me. And it would have fit normal American military doctrine since the Civil War, which is to cut one's enemy's position into pieces. It could be followed up with an attack across the Adriatic, landing in the Istrian Peninsula and then Trieste and then moving into he Julian Alps to take the passes and maybe Ljubljana before circling around through Udine to take Venice, Verona , Milan and Turin. And it could all be done before Winter 1944.
The only downsides I can see to this strategy are that knocking Italy out of the war quickly might well tie down more Allied troops in occupation than they would German troops. It would take fewer German troops to defend the Alpine passes against the Allies than it would to attempt to defend Italy. And instead of German troops in Slovenia, the Americans and British might well face Hungarian troops, who actually did quite a good job defending Hungary against invading Soviet troops in 1944 at Debrecen. The Hungarians were no pushovers and the Allies were in 1943, short of available troops. So strangely enough, knocking out Italy might not have the desired effect of forcing the Germans into retreat on the Eastern Front post Kursk.
 
Has AH discussed this extensively before/recently?

There was a similar thread i this forum just a few months ago. some interesting informations emerged. Perhaps I can make time later to locate and link it here.

Both Hitler and Badoglio expected the Wallies to take Sardinia first, followed by Corsica. This would provide the basis for an air offensive against Italy, probably enough in itself to cause a (attempted)change of government in Italy. Critically it would also make the whole south of Italy indefensible, given the possibility of a landing south of the Apennines.
Sicily was chosen because:
It was closer and easier.

Brooke argued for Sicily as Allied control of it would allow the use of the Mediterranean sea route to the Indian Ocean again. After having this route denied for over two years the British were very anxious to reopen it. Brooke easily convinced Churchill and the other proposed operations against Sardinia/Corsica were postphoned. This is made fairly clear in the records of the 'Symbol Confrence' at Casablanca in January 1943. WGF Jackson out lined the critical decisions of this confrence in his 1960s classic history 'The Battle for Italy'. Several other historians, like Grigg in the 1970s and more recently Atkinson: 'Army at Dawn' and Day of Battle' have been over the same records of the Symbol confrence and provide a similar description of the decisions as WGF Jackson.

The USAF was keen to base bombers in Naples and Foggia to attack the Romanian oil fields.

Correct, tho even before the last German soldier departed Corsica in November the USAAF and Free French were hard at work improving the existing airfields and building new. By January no less than six US & French bomber Wings were based on Corsica, along with a similar number of fighter, reconissance, maritime, and support aircraft. Over two thousand aircraft operated off the two islands supporting the 'Shingle' operations at Anzio and other air ops over Italy and southern Europe that winter. By August 1944 some 4,000 aircraft were permanently or temporarily operating off Sardinia & Corsica. So we see the USAAF had it both ways, using the airbases of southern Italy, and on these two islands.


Given how things went OTL, a case might be constructed that the Sardinia/Corsica option was the right choice.

The original proposal for Sardinia/Corsica (Operation Brimstone) made at the Symbol Confrence was for the British 1st Army to make the invasion in March or April 1943. Unlike Sicily control of Tunisia was not necessary for attacking Sardinia. As it was the requirement to secure Tunisia first delayed the Sicilian operation (Husky) until July.

Both Hitler and Badoglio expected the Wallies to take Sardinia first, followed by Corsica. ..... Critically it would also make the whole south of Italy indefensible, given the possibility of a landing south of the Apennines. ....

A important point here. To understand this look at the map and note how even short ranged bombers and the Allied fighters of 1943 could cover the entire Italian west coast, including Sicilly. If the Allied sieze Sardinia in March 1943 there is little need for a major offensive in Tunisia by a entire Allied army group as in OTL. If the Axis try to hold Tunisia or reinforce it the Allies are in a position to invade Sicily from the north and take control of the sea lanes.

Brooke had many justifications for his lack of confidence in Allied capabilities and his policy of low risk. Perhaps he was correct in many cases, but given the poor Axis defenses of Sardinia and Allied naval & air superiority in 1943 one does have wonder if Tunisia first- then Sicilly was the wrong choice.
 
Thanks for the input. That's a thread I'd like to read. I must have missed when it appeared.
 
this is the thread you talk about?

Not really. I was looking for the one Carl talked about:

"There was a similar thread i this forum just a few months ago. some interesting informations emerged. Perhaps I can make time later to locate and link it here."

Specifically the concept is:
After Torch, the allies land in Sardinia. Establish air bases. Take Cosica (OTL Corsica kind of liberated itself). Initiate an air offensive against Italy. Mussolini falls (probably without landings in Italy mainland). Now the Germans either seize control of Italy, as in OTL, or retreat behind the Alps. In the first case the Allies land in the North of Italy and threaten to cut them off so they retreat hurriedly.
If Sardinia is taken before Tunisia falls, axis forces there are cutt off and will find it very difficult to extrincate themselves from Africa.
The Allies can now (Fall 1943) hold a defensive line facing the Alps. They have excelent air bases, and can prepare to either attack France from the South, or liberate Greece, etc.
My first instinct would be to revise plans for the liberation of France, using a two stage operation, landing first in the south, then in the north.
Italy can this way be had with minimal allied casualties.
My point is that in 1943 the allies did not fully exploit the advantages their naval and air superiority gave them.
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by katchen
knocking Italy out of the war quickly might well tie down more Allied troops in occupation

That's exactly what invading Italy did do.

The largest cost for the Allies was in cargo ships to supply the italian population with grain and coal. Neither food, nor fuel for winter heat and electrical generation was present in southern Italy and the Allies found the further north they advanced the larger the requirement. The Italian cargo fleet was in sad condition, the government bankrupt, & the population on the edge of famine and epidemic diseases. Churchill, passed lightly over this cost in his history of the war :rolleyes:

..but yes, the cost in Allied soldiers was high. It took the weight (and supply requirements) of three armies to force the way out of southern Italy. Over the entire mainland campaign from September 1943 to May 1945 half a million Commonwealth, French, and US soldiers were maimed or killed there.
 
Carl Schwamberger said:
The largest cost for the Allies was in cargo ships to supply the italian population with grain and coal. Neither food, nor fuel for winter heat and electrical generation was present in southern Italy and the Allies found the further north they advanced the larger the requirement. The Italian cargo fleet was in sad condition, the government bankrupt, & the population on the edge of famine and epidemic diseases. Churchill, passed lightly over this cost in his history of the war :rolleyes:

..but yes, the cost in Allied soldiers was high. It took the weight (and supply requirements) of three armies to force the way out of southern Italy. Over the entire mainland campaign from September 1943 to May 1945 half a million Commonwealth, French, and US soldiers were maimed or killed there.
More important, it freed Germany from having to do it... It also delayed the buildup for Neptune, which was, one would've thought, the higher priority...:rolleyes:

In addition, Italy tied up some experienced troops that would have been very useful in Normandy, notably I Canadian Corps; had they been in front of Falaise, chances are the Gap would've been closed instead of bungled. (II Corps was too green to bring it off, AIUI.)
 
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