Alternative locations for Britain's 1930s Pacific Base?

The Washington Treaty forbade the British Empire from building any fortifications east of the 110 East meridian apart from the coast or Australia, Canada and New Zealand. That leaves out the likes of Hong Kong, PNG, Rabual or Fiji and basically makes Singapore the most forward place a naval base can be built. Similar conditions applied to the US, Hawaii, Philippines, Guam and other Pacific Islands being off limits. Apparently this was an important condition for the Japanese to accept the inferiority in ships and was negotiated in 1920-21, 20 years before the Pacific war.

As for why you'd want to counter Japan by building a naval base in the Indian Ocean, I have no idea.
 

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With a POD at the start and f the war, Sept 39, could the British me be to the Philippines?
 
As for why you'd want to counter Japan by building a naval base in the Indian Ocean, I have no idea.
Who exactly are you going to fight from a base in the Indian Ocean? The only non-British base is what, the French in Madagascar? Japan is only a threat in the Indian Ocean if they have already conquered most of South-East Asia - and if that is a major risk then you should really be doing everything you can to prevent it (i.e. reinforcing Singapore) rather than planning for contingencies should it actually happen.
 
Who exactly are you going to fight from a base in the Indian Ocean? The only non-British base is what, the French in Madagascar? Japan is only a threat in the Indian Ocean if they have already conquered most of South-East Asia - and if that is a major risk then you should really be doing everything you can to prevent it (i.e. reinforcing Singapore) rather than planning for contingencies should it actually happen.

Yep. From the perspective of 1923 the list of events that lead to the fall of Singapore is both long and when listed all together seems somewhat unlikely.
 
Yep. From the perspective of 1923 the list of events that lead to the fall of Singapore is both long and when listed all together seems somewhat unlikely.

I expect if it had been proposed ins some Alt Hist club back in 1924 the members would have judged it ASB enabled & accused the proponent of too much brandy that evening.
 
The Washington Treaty forbade the British Empire from building any fortifications east of the 110 East meridian apart from the coast or Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
Too bad Britain didn't have submarines like the USN's Gato class. Their 12,000 nautical mile range would have enabled RN submarines to operate from nearly anywhere in the Pacific Britain had naval facilities, including Esquimalt (4,100 miles).

Gents, as to the OP, I'm not suggesting that Singapore be ignored, no more than Hong Kong would have been. However Singapore was the ONLY port in British hands in the Pacific with battleship sized drydock and service facilities, and served as one of the largest bunker fuel depots in the eastern empire.

By all means have Force Z, Percival, Buffalos and everything you want per OTL in Singapore and Malaya. But perhaps putting Britain's only base capable of supporting large fleet ops would be better placed in a rear guard location, such as Calcutta or Australia? Indeed, just prior to Singapore falling, Australia began construction of the Captain Cook Graving Dock (opened 24 March 1945, KGV-class battleship in dock below) resulting in the RN having zero battleship sized drydock or repair facilities in the eastern IO or Pacific until then. Perhaps expansion of the Garden Island Dockyard would have been the smarter move in the 1930s.

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Too bad Britain didn't have submarines like the USN's Gato class. Their 12,000 nautical mile range would have enabled RN submarines to operate from nearly anywhere in the Pacific Britain had naval facilities, including Esquimalt (4,100 miles).
The T-class were designed for exactly that - 8,000 NM at 10 kts, the difference being that the UK was anticipating having bases nearer to the fight. Darwin to Yokohama is only 3,000 NM, and Singapore 2,900. San Francisco to Yokohama is 4,500 NM.

Gents, as to the OP, I'm not suggesting that Singapore be ignored, no more than Hong Kong would have been. However Singapore was the ONLY port in British hands in the Pacific with battleship sized drydock and service facilities, and served as one of the largest bunker fuel depots in the eastern empire.
There's a reason for only having one - such things are hideously expensive.

By all means have Force Z, Percival, Buffalos and everything you want per OTL in Singapore and Malaya. But perhaps putting Britain's only base capable of supporting large fleet ops would be better placed in a rear guard location, such as Calcutta or Australia? Indeed, just prior to Singapore falling, Australia began construction of the Captain Cook Graving Dock (opened 24 March 1945, KGV-class battleship in dock below) resulting in the RN having zero battleship sized drydock or repair facilities in the eastern IO or Pacific until then. Perhaps expansion of the Garden Island Dockyard would have been the smarter move in the 1930s.
Problem is doing that makes Singapore far more likely to fall in the first place - if trying to defend Malaya then anything which needs dockyard support or fuel supplies has an extra 8,500 NM round trip while they're not part of the fighting to deal with - that's an additional two weeks of steaming. That means any time your ships are damaged that's a major amount of virtual attrition that they're subject to - and vulnerable to submarines and mines on the way too. Bad news all round - it all comes back to the best option being to defend Singapore better, rather than move the dockyard away.
 
it all comes back to the best option being to defend Singapore better, rather than move the dockyard away.
I agree with you there. And the worst part is that it was without hindsight or impacting other theatres arguably quite feasible using existing and available troops and kit deployed elsewhere, combined with better leadership.

One example, I've read that concrete that could have been used to construct defences or road blocks was still in bags in the warehouses because the governor didn't want to alarm the locals.
 
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In Armchair General, they presented two alternative scenarios where Force Z could've been used much more effectively against the Japanese.
 
I agree with you there. And the worst part is that it was without hindsight or impacting other theatres arguably quite feasible using existing and available troops and kit deployed elsewhere, combined with better leadership.

One example, I've read that concrete that could have been used to construct defences or road blocks was still in bags in the warehouses because the governor didn't want to alarm the locals.

I had an idea a while ago that Brooke Popham was appointed Governor of Malaya rather than CinC of Far East Command. BP was Gov and CinC of Kenya 1937-39 and did a good job preparing Kenya against the Italian threat from Ethiopia. He could do the same in Malaya, organising with the Malayan Sultans for training of the Army and undertaking other preparations.
 
I had an idea a while ago that Brooke Popham was appointed Governor of Malaya rather than CinC of Far East Command. BP was Gov and CinC of Kenya 1937-39 and did a good job preparing Kenya against the Italian threat from Ethiopia. He could do the same in Malaya, organising with the Malayan Sultans for training of the Army and undertaking other preparations.
Makes we wonder how Monty would have done, perhaps Britain's best defensive leader. Though he'd be missed in North Africa.

I hate a threadjacking as much as anyone (even if it's my thread), so here's a good discussion on the topic already underway https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=321340
 
Monty would still have to deal with Governor Shelton and by association the Sultans of the Federated and Non Federated Malay states when it came to moving exercising and deploying his troops and building fortifications. Monty most likely would bully (for want of a better word) Shelton to get his own way and he was known to be a good trainer of men, so that would put the defenders on a much better footing. What rank was Monty in Nov 40 to Apr 41?
 
I had an idea a while ago that Brooke Popham was appointed Governor of Malaya rather than CinC of Far East Command. BP was Gov and CinC of Kenya 1937-39 and did a good job preparing Kenya against the Italian threat from Ethiopia. He could do the same in Malaya, organising with the Malayan Sultans for training of the Army and undertaking other preparations.

When was Dowding 'retired'? Effectively Nov 1940!

I wonder if he could bring a fighter command 'ethos' to the Malaya command instead of upsetting our friends on the other side of the Atlantic as Senior officer of the British Air Mission to the USA.
 
Lt Gen then I suppose, same rank to Percival and Heath and equal to Brooke Popham. I don't know where Wavell and the Auk fitted into this, IIUC Wavell was promoted to full General during the ABDACOM months, so would have been senior to Monty and the rest.
 
When was Dowding 'retired'? Effectively Nov 1940!

I wonder if he could bring a fighter command 'ethos' to the Malaya command instead of upsetting our friends on the other side of the Atlantic as Senior officer of the British Air Mission to the USA.

Keith Park was also fired for winning the BoB. He spent time at Training Command before he had to run off to save Malta. Singapore would acclimatize him well for Malta. He and Dowding were close, and he knew all the tricks.
 
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Originally Posted by Admiral Beez
Too bad Britain didn't have submarines like the USN's Gato class. Their 12,000 nautical mile range would have enabled RN submarines to operate from nearly anywhere in the Pacific Britain had naval facilities, including Esquimalt (4,100 miles).

The T-class were designed for exactly that - 8,000 NM at 10 kts, the difference being that the UK was anticipating having bases nearer to the fight. Darwin to Yokohama is only 3,000 NM, and Singapore 2,900. San Francisco to Yokohama is 4,500 NM....

The tragedy of the Brit submarine fleet is the T class were wasted in the Med attempting to interdict the Italy-Tripoli sea route. These large fast deep diving boats were unsuitable for the shallow shoal riddled Mediterranean. Those that were not sunk were worn down, and deployed in the wrong sea when the Japanese struck. Too few were available in the winter of 1941-42. had the original T class fleet of 1940 been intact and ready Japan would have had a lot more trouble with cargo and warship losses that first year of the war.
 
had the original T class fleet of 1940 been intact and ready Japan would have had a lot more trouble with cargo and warship losses that first year of the war.
I agree. Even their limited Pacific service was impactful, just two examples below...

HMS Truculent - sank three Japanese cargo ships, five smaller vessels and damaged the Japanese minelayer Hatsutaka

HMS Trenchant - sank Japanese cargo ships, a German U-boat, and the IJN cruiser Ashigara (taking down 1,600 Japanese Army troops).
 
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