Alternative German Heer and smaller Kaiserliche Marine

Deleted member 94680

So, I was wondering, if the Germans managed a detente with the British and therefore ended the naval arms race, how would the money saved be better spent in regards the army?

Would simply more regiments be the answer, or would the money be better used in Heavy Artillery and border fortifications? Would a detente with Britain mean a more defensive mindset in regards to the French and therefore a set up designed to invite French aggression?

Would more soldiers allow the Germans to strengthen their colonial forces, allowing them to take the War to France in Africa more readily?

Thoughts, as ever, would be welcome...

N.B. I'm not really interested in the mechanism of the detente with the British, suffice to say it's happened and there's less of a need for a big Navy.
 
If the the Germans manage a detente (Let's say Wilhelm dies before becoming Kaiser and his more sensible brother Heinrich ascends to the throne), I could definitely seeing them employing a more defensive strategy in the war. If this includes them not invading Belgium I would think that the British would not join the war on the French side. Especially sense they would not fear a German naval hegemony.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
First :
It would depend a bit how the agreement between Germany and Britain would look alike in details : restricting the german fleet in all classes to a 1:2 ratio or only in the 'capital ships' classes (dreadnoughts and Battlecruisers). If the latter Germany might spend more on cruisers for a 'proper' colonial fleet, what to some extent, would be counterproductive for Britain => bigger colonial ambitions of Germany => many more possibilities for colonial clashes leading to maybe something bigger (remember the Morocco-Crisis').
Second :
The mones spared ... to be spend for - more and better guns and some fortifications (esp. in the East with its 'invasion-inviting' terrain) but not too many more troop (the officer problems : not enough 'junkers' for officers and it takes an awfull lot of time to educate good officers).

But I don't see Schlieffen, Waldersee and Moltke or even von der Goltz abandon the 'strategic' offense. And THE MIGHTMARE FEAR was and will also ITTL be the russian steamroller. ... in combination with the french eager for retaliation on d'Alsac-Lorraine. Therefore the two-front war threat remains with - at that time - only 'sensible' solution of what became what we call today the "Schlieffen-Plan".
 

Perkeo

Banned
But I don't see Schlieffen, Waldersee and Moltke or even von der Goltz abandon the 'strategic' offense. And THE MIGHTMARE FEAR was and will also ITTL be the russian steamroller. ... in combination with the french eager for retaliation on d'Alsac-Lorraine. Therefore the two-front war threat remains with - at that time - only 'sensible' solution of what became what we call today the "Schlieffen-Plan".

I don't think there was anything sensible about the Schlieffen Plan. Even in 1870/1871, it took seven months to bring down France, even then the French army was far from unable to keep the Germans busy and wait for the British and Russian cavallery if the Russians and British had joined the fight.

The only snsible answer to the Franco-Russian thread is to find more allys - or to at least keep the British from joining the Entente.
 

Deleted member 94680

I don't envision it being "limited", just more like Germany doesn't need as many warships as Britain isn't seen as a rival. It isn't forced on them, they just know they can spend money and resources elsewhere.

By the nature of the fact Germany and Britain have a detente, I wouldn't see them having colonial conflicts as those sorts of things would be negotiated out.

I agree that fortifying the eastern border more would make sense and maybe even more troops as well. Whether they come from the West and the singular threat of France means a better plan is developed involving a new kind of defensive-offensive warfare remains a possibility.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Beneficial: The Germans had a good army, so really start working on the 9th army is a good start. More infantry, artillery, or transport regiments make sense. So does more forces in colonial regions. And the UK was right, the Germans need a higher % of tonnage in smaller ships (cruisers, Torpedo boats, subs). So, yes, I am in the "build 15% fewer BB, and spend the money on any other military item" school.

Realistically: German politics was very complicated. Expansion of the army, especially infantry regiments was limited by the number of available Prussian officers and the need to deal with the various states. Colonial politics is fascinating. So is the naval lobby. You could easily end up with the money not spent, spent on more smaller ships, spent on more marines, spent on the army, etc. Everytime we get into German appropriates pre-1914, we get really complicated discussions
 

Deleted member 94680

Expansion of the army, especially infantry regiments was limited by the number of available Prussian officers and the need to deal with the various states.

Well that wouldn't affect the Bavarian Army, the Army of Saxony or the Army of Wurttemburg. Although the latter two were under Prussian control, they weren't made up of Prussian troops.

Anyway, by 1914 with the expansion of the Heer under OTL conditions, the percentage of Junker Officers was diminishing, so further expansion of the Heer would probably accelerate that process. The OHL isn't going to give up on having more troops just because they're limited by the the numbers of Prussian aristocrats available to lead them.

You might see a 'compromise' where the top jobs are retained by the Junkers and the lower jobs (regimental and divisional command) are open more to commoners - after all, in combat, the Heer didn't have a problem with SNCOs giving commands where the situation required it (auftragstaktiks).
 
Clark in The Sleepwalkers proposes an interesting answer for the antagonism between Germany and Brittain. It says that Brittains main goal was to secure her Empire. The main treat were the Russians with their ambitions in China and treatening India. The French also pose a bigger problem than Germany because of their own huge Empire.

To secure the Empire Brittain tried to strenghten ties with Germany around 1900. However in the crisis in China from 1900 this approach proved to be wrong. It came to light that Germany wont fight a two front continental war for British interests. On the German part i think this is an understandable position.

But if they cant count on Germany the other way to secure the Empire is if they come to an understanding with those who are threatening it. And this is what happened. First with France and after Japan stopped the Russian advances in China with Russia as well.

The conclusion he reaches is that Brittain became anti german because he "joined" the Russians and France and didnt join them because he was against Germany to begin with.

If this is more or less true than the only way for a British-German detente would be if Germany would have been ready to guarantee the British Empire and interest all over the world in exchange for.... Brittain not joining his enemies. I cant imagine any sane German government would be willing to do that altough from hindsight we know they would be better off.
 

Deleted member 94680

If this is more or less true than the only way for a British-German detente would be if Germany would have been ready to guarantee the British Empire and interest all over the world in exchange for.... Brittain not joining his enemies. I cant imagine any sane German government would be willing to do that altough from hindsight we know they would be better off.

Well, "Britain not joining her enemies" means a lack of British men, navy and financial resources that would make the Franco-Russian alliance easier to defeat. Germany wanted a detente with Britain, but they expected too much from Britain. In truth, it was the Germans that expected the British to fight - or allow to be fought - a two front European conflict to protect her Empire. They would preserve the Empire, in exchange for a European hegemon which could turn on them at any moment. Britain found it a price too high to pay and went for the Entente with Russia and France instead.

My idea is for a less agressive Germany to accept the British detente for security against Russia and France, rather than Wilhelm II's idea of trying to bully Britain into acceptance of their hegemony of Europe.

But, as my original post says, I don't really want to get into a discussion about how the detente came about.
 
Well, "Britain not joining her enemies" means a lack of British men, navy and financial resources that would make the Franco-Russian alliance easier to defeat.

We agree on this - see the end of my former comment. The problem is to take an actual OTL crisis as an example: Manchuria. Germany refused to act in Manchuria. Germany strongly refused to even risk conflict with Russia over this. They gave a very minimal diplomatic support and that was it. Brittain wanted much more. This left them turning to Japan in China and away from Germany in Europe.

If the German government would be willing to give the British all the support it wanted it would end with either Russia backing down in Manchuria or a WWI starting in 1901-2. I expect France support of Russia would be much more fortcoming if Germany was the enemy. This would lead to very good German-British relation.

Another not unlikely possibility in the case of an alliance that the germans considered was that in war Britain would be happy to send minimal amount of troops and fight a naval war letting do the germans the fighting and dying. This if the conflict started because of british interest is another reason against the alliance for Germany.

The problem is that we say this in hindsight. Yes, Germany would be much better off if Britain was neutral or an ally of them. But i dont believe you could sell a war like the one above to the german populace.

Germany wanted a detente with Britain, but they expected too much from Britain. In truth, it was the Germans that expected the British to fight - or allow to be fought - a two front European conflict to protect her Empire.

Thats the other part of the problem. If Germany risked a scenario like above with an alliance with Britain i think the German would want something in exchange. Knowing them that would be a British guarantee for Alsaice at the least. This is already unlikely to be accepted by Britain. And the other unaccaptable point Germany would likely raise - i seem to remember that it did emerge during english-german negotiations around this time but im not sure - is that Britain joins the CP formally thus becoming an ally to Austria-Hungary and becoming entangled in the Balkans.

In the end I think both had too much unacceptable demands for an alliance to make that work. And at this point neutrality is not really a possibility for Brittain. They have to choose a side and this shows it couldnt be Germany.

They would preserve the Empire, in exchange for a European hegemon which could turn on them at any moment. Britain found it a price too high to pay and went for the Entente with Russia and France instead.

I see the picture in Europe very different from you. Before the Russo-Japanese war made evident the weakness of Russia i dont think Germany was considered a hegemon. Maybe slightly stronger than her enemies but thats it. And even after that IOTL i believe that Germany wanted to keep up the status quo in Europe. The ones who wanted change were Russia - agressive expansion in the Balkans - and France - wanted back Alsaice. Because of this Germany believed it vital that they are stronger than this two powers. This was changing rapidly with the Russian military build up and Germany decided to fight while he still believed had a chance instead of waiting to see if France and Russia attacks her when they are clearly stronger.

My idea is for a less agressive Germany to accept the British detente for security against Russia and France, rather than Wilhelm II's idea of trying to bully Britain into acceptance of their hegemony of Europe.

But, as my original post says, I don't really want to get into a discussion about how the detente came about.

As i said i dont believe Germany was aggressive. The problem is that if what Clark says is true the detente is impossible as Britain will be on the side of France and Russia for sure. You would need to butterfly away the whole FRA-RUS vs GER-AH situation for that.
 
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