Disclaimer: for reasons I’ll go into at the end of this post, this thread is very likely ASB. For now, I just ask that everyone humor me for a minute and imagine a scenario in which the U.S. prepares earlier for WWII. It’s a combination of the U.S. demobilizing a bit less following WWI, and FDR embracing Keynesian stimulus more whole-heartedly than in OTL so he includes increased military spending as part of his New Deal program (note that this increased military spending is in addition to, not in replace of his increased public works spending).
I’m using 2 sources for this scenario-one is from this webpage:
http://www.changingthetimes.net/samples/ww2/a_year_sooner.htm
The basic premise of this page is that continental defense was popular in the U.S., even with FDR’s domestic opponents, so the U.S. does a better job of preparing for convoy defense. The gist of his proposal is: “Using small shipyards to build cheap freighters, tankers and small anti-submarine ships was simply using resources that were still idle from the Depression” so he doesn’t discuss a large increase in U.S. ground forces.
The second source I’m using for this scenario is from the book What if the Allies Had Fallen: 60 Alternative Scenarios of World War II. On p. 250, one of the contributors suggest that the first Vinson Act of 1934 and the second Vinson Act of 1938, both meant to increase the U.S. Navy to treaty strength, were underfunded. For purposes of my post, I’m going to go along with his proposal and move things up a few years. The Vinson Act of 1934 increases our naval strength to what the second act was intended to do, and the Two Ocean Navy Act of 1940 is instead passed in 1938 (and is adequately funded).
Now I’m going to get a bit more far-fetched. When he takes office in 1933, Roosevelt, with the stated intention of creating more jobs and improving America’s continental defenses (and never brings up the idea of a second AEF, at least not at this point in his presidency), suggests enlarging and adequately supplying America’s standing army. Remember, this is in addition to, not in replace of his public works program. Since a draft is definitely out of the question in the early 1930s, Roosevelt offers significantly increased pay and benefits to voluntary enlistments. With an immediate threat of war not really on anyone’s mind in the early 1930s, the size of the army increases by only a trickle early on. But with the threat of war increasing by the late 1930s followed by the Fall of France in 1940, the growth is far more dramatic. This is the size of the U.S. Army at the end of each calendar year of the Roosevelt Administration:
1933: 225,000
1934: 250,000
1935: 275,000
1936: 325,000
1937: 375,000
1938: 450,000
1939: 600,000
1940: 750,000
1941: 2,500,000 (as in OTL, this dramatic increase results from the Selective Service Act)
As for the remainder of the war, the size of the ground forces increases at roughly the same proportion as in OTL. I’ll push things a step further an thrown in a more concerted effort by the U.S. to get more women and ethnic minorities involved in the war effort (yes, this was done in OTL, but my understanding is that it wasn’t done to the extent that it could have been). So at its peak, the U.S. ground forces have 8.2 million troops instead of the OTL’s 6 million.
Now, realizing I’ve already stretched credibility quite a bit here, I’m going to throw in the scenario that the U.S.’s earlier mobilization means that it has a larger supply of tanks, artillery, and other equipment from 1939-1941 so that it can still provide Lend-Lease to its Allies without seriously depriving its own forces of equipment (or at least not as much as in OTL). So the end result is that at the time of the Arcadia Conference in December 1941/January 1942, the U.S. has a much larger and much more adequately supplied military. Its forces are still green, and there are still some supply shortages due to Lend-Lease, but the military is capable of going into action much sooner than in OTL. My question, then, is what does the U.S. now? I see the following options:
1
.
Invasion of France in 1942-this is what the U.S. wanted to do from the beginning, an ITL, it has a much stronger hand to push for this strategy. However, even under my already unrealistic TL, neither the U.S. nor Britain has enough landing craft to stage a successful invasion of France at this point. Neither of them foresaw the Fall of France happening so quickly, so both were planning on landing troops in friendly ports. While an earlier invasion of France is more likely than in OTL, I still don’t see one happening in 1942 under the conditions I’ve described.
2
.
Earlier invasion of North Africa-this I see as far more realistic in my timeline. Instead of invading North Africa in November of 1942, the invasion occurs 5-6 months earlier, so probably June of 1942. The U.S. forces are still relatively green, so the Axis forces hardly surrender immediately, but I think it’s well within the realm of possibility that North Africa is in Allied possession by the end of 1942. That leads to even more follow-up questions:
a
.
Does the invasion of France then happen in 1943? As in OTL, most Allied forces are in the Mediterranean. The British, after WWI, Dunkirk, Greece, and Dieppe, are likely still reluctant to take on the German army directly at this point. Plus, further Mediterranean operations are not completely devoid of strategic value. The chance to completely clear the Mediterranean for Allied shipping, to knock Italy out of the war, and tie up German troops are very sensible reasons to continue with a Mediterranean strategy.
b
.
If the Allies stay with Mediterranean strategy, is next target Sicily, Corsica, and/or Sardinia? I’ve heard differing rationales for each of these choices. Under my accelerated TL, do any of these rationales change? Do the Allies still invade Sicily, or do they go for Sardinia and/or Corsica instead? With a larger and better prepared American military, is an invasion of all 3 possible? Is it even desirable? Do the Allies gain anything by taking all 3 islands in 1943 (assuming they’re successful to begin with?).
c
.
What changes about the Italian mainland campaign? Assuming the Allies stick with a Mediterranean campaign in the beginning of 1943, and assuming they are successful in the campaigns I listed above, do they still invade the Italian mainland? If so, what about that campaign changes? Do they invade further north, as many have suggested? Do they still try to take Rome? Are these questions contingent on which of the choices listed in “b” they decide to go with? (Sardinia, Corsica, Sicily, or perhaps all 3).
d
.
If the Allies go with a Mediterranean strategy in the beginning of 1943, is an invasion of northern France still possible in late 1943? Since most people have been screaming “ASBs” since my first couple paragraphs (admittedly with some justification), I realize that I’m being really overly optimistic here. But again, with an earlier and better American mobilization, is it possible the Allies could succeed in their Mediterranean strategy in early 1943, and then invade France later in the year? My understanding of the English Channel weather is that September is the latest time of year that an invasion would even be considered. Could the Allies succeed in knocking Italy out of the war by mid-year and then possibly mount a successful cross-channel invasion by September? My gut instinct says no and that such a scenario depends too much on wishful thinking and being overoptimistic about how quickly the Mediterranean campaign would take. But I just wanted to throw the idea out there and see what others thought.
So that’s my post. I freely acknowledge it’s a bit unrealistic and overly optimistic, and likely ASB. But I still would enjoy feedback from other people on this forum, so please let me know what you think.