Alternate WWII with earlier U.S. mobilization

Disclaimer: for reasons I’ll go into at the end of this post, this thread is very likely ASB. For now, I just ask that everyone humor me for a minute and imagine a scenario in which the U.S. prepares earlier for WWII. It’s a combination of the U.S. demobilizing a bit less following WWI, and FDR embracing Keynesian stimulus more whole-heartedly than in OTL so he includes increased military spending as part of his New Deal program (note that this increased military spending is in addition to, not in replace of his increased public works spending).

I’m using 2 sources for this scenario-one is from this webpage:
http://www.changingthetimes.net/samples/ww2/a_year_sooner.htm

The basic premise of this page is that continental defense was popular in the U.S., even with FDR’s domestic opponents, so the U.S. does a better job of preparing for convoy defense. The gist of his proposal is: “Using small shipyards to build cheap freighters, tankers and small anti-submarine ships was simply using resources that were still idle from the Depression” so he doesn’t discuss a large increase in U.S. ground forces.

The second source I’m using for this scenario is from the book What if the Allies Had Fallen: 60 Alternative Scenarios of World War II. On p. 250, one of the contributors suggest that the first Vinson Act of 1934 and the second Vinson Act of 1938, both meant to increase the U.S. Navy to treaty strength, were underfunded. For purposes of my post, I’m going to go along with his proposal and move things up a few years. The Vinson Act of 1934 increases our naval strength to what the second act was intended to do, and the Two Ocean Navy Act of 1940 is instead passed in 1938 (and is adequately funded).

Now I’m going to get a bit more far-fetched. When he takes office in 1933, Roosevelt, with the stated intention of creating more jobs and improving America’s continental defenses (and never brings up the idea of a second AEF, at least not at this point in his presidency), suggests enlarging and adequately supplying America’s standing army. Remember, this is in addition to, not in replace of his public works program. Since a draft is definitely out of the question in the early 1930s, Roosevelt offers significantly increased pay and benefits to voluntary enlistments. With an immediate threat of war not really on anyone’s mind in the early 1930s, the size of the army increases by only a trickle early on. But with the threat of war increasing by the late 1930s followed by the Fall of France in 1940, the growth is far more dramatic. This is the size of the U.S. Army at the end of each calendar year of the Roosevelt Administration:

1933: 225,000
1934: 250,000
1935: 275,000
1936: 325,000
1937: 375,000
1938: 450,000
1939: 600,000
1940: 750,000
1941: 2,500,000 (as in OTL, this dramatic increase results from the Selective Service Act)

As for the remainder of the war, the size of the ground forces increases at roughly the same proportion as in OTL. I’ll push things a step further an thrown in a more concerted effort by the U.S. to get more women and ethnic minorities involved in the war effort (yes, this was done in OTL, but my understanding is that it wasn’t done to the extent that it could have been). So at its peak, the U.S. ground forces have 8.2 million troops instead of the OTL’s 6 million.

Now, realizing I’ve already stretched credibility quite a bit here, I’m going to throw in the scenario that the U.S.’s earlier mobilization means that it has a larger supply of tanks, artillery, and other equipment from 1939-1941 so that it can still provide Lend-Lease to its Allies without seriously depriving its own forces of equipment (or at least not as much as in OTL). So the end result is that at the time of the Arcadia Conference in December 1941/January 1942, the U.S. has a much larger and much more adequately supplied military. Its forces are still green, and there are still some supply shortages due to Lend-Lease, but the military is capable of going into action much sooner than in OTL. My question, then, is what does the U.S. now? I see the following options:

1
. Invasion of France in 1942-this is what the U.S. wanted to do from the beginning, an ITL, it has a much stronger hand to push for this strategy. However, even under my already unrealistic TL, neither the U.S. nor Britain has enough landing craft to stage a successful invasion of France at this point. Neither of them foresaw the Fall of France happening so quickly, so both were planning on landing troops in friendly ports. While an earlier invasion of France is more likely than in OTL, I still don’t see one happening in 1942 under the conditions I’ve described.

2
. Earlier invasion of North Africa-this I see as far more realistic in my timeline. Instead of invading North Africa in November of 1942, the invasion occurs 5-6 months earlier, so probably June of 1942. The U.S. forces are still relatively green, so the Axis forces hardly surrender immediately, but I think it’s well within the realm of possibility that North Africa is in Allied possession by the end of 1942. That leads to even more follow-up questions:

a
. Does the invasion of France then happen in 1943? As in OTL, most Allied forces are in the Mediterranean. The British, after WWI, Dunkirk, Greece, and Dieppe, are likely still reluctant to take on the German army directly at this point. Plus, further Mediterranean operations are not completely devoid of strategic value. The chance to completely clear the Mediterranean for Allied shipping, to knock Italy out of the war, and tie up German troops are very sensible reasons to continue with a Mediterranean strategy.

b
. If the Allies stay with Mediterranean strategy, is next target Sicily, Corsica, and/or Sardinia? I’ve heard differing rationales for each of these choices. Under my accelerated TL, do any of these rationales change? Do the Allies still invade Sicily, or do they go for Sardinia and/or Corsica instead? With a larger and better prepared American military, is an invasion of all 3 possible? Is it even desirable? Do the Allies gain anything by taking all 3 islands in 1943 (assuming they’re successful to begin with?).

c
. What changes about the Italian mainland campaign? Assuming the Allies stick with a Mediterranean campaign in the beginning of 1943, and assuming they are successful in the campaigns I listed above, do they still invade the Italian mainland? If so, what about that campaign changes? Do they invade further north, as many have suggested? Do they still try to take Rome? Are these questions contingent on which of the choices listed in “b” they decide to go with? (Sardinia, Corsica, Sicily, or perhaps all 3).

d
. If the Allies go with a Mediterranean strategy in the beginning of 1943, is an invasion of northern France still possible in late 1943? Since most people have been screaming “ASBs” since my first couple paragraphs (admittedly with some justification), I realize that I’m being really overly optimistic here. But again, with an earlier and better American mobilization, is it possible the Allies could succeed in their Mediterranean strategy in early 1943, and then invade France later in the year? My understanding of the English Channel weather is that September is the latest time of year that an invasion would even be considered. Could the Allies succeed in knocking Italy out of the war by mid-year and then possibly mount a successful cross-channel invasion by September? My gut instinct says no and that such a scenario depends too much on wishful thinking and being overoptimistic about how quickly the Mediterranean campaign would take. But I just wanted to throw the idea out there and see what others thought.

So that’s my post. I freely acknowledge it’s a bit unrealistic and overly optimistic, and likely ASB. But I still would enjoy feedback from other people on this forum, so please let me know what you think.
 
If Springfield Armory gets more funding then OTL production and standardization of the M1 Garand can start sooner and go more smoothly. Perhaps the USMC will start off using M1 Garands instead of Springfield.
 
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... This is the size of the U.S. Army at the end of each calendar year of the Roosevelt Administration:

1933: 225,000
1934: 250,000
1935: 275,000
1936: 325,000
1937: 375,000
1938: 450,000
1939: 600,000
1940: 750,000
1941: 2,500,000 (as in OTL, this dramatic increase results from the Selective Service Act)

....

I think your 1940 & 1941 year end numbers are too low. The size of cadre implied by 450,000 Regular Army at end of 1938 enables a much larger intake in 1940 - 41. Are you counting changes in the Army Reserve, and the National Guard? OTL the Army Reserve had over 60,000 partially trained officers, & the National Guard was in the vicinity of 250,000 men. If they are increased in rough portion to the RA of this ATL then as many as 150,000 Reserve officers could be available. The National Guard proportionatly would be well over one million men.
 
Two Ocean Navy Act of 1940 is instead passed in 1938 (and is adequately funded).
Does this not make it a Europe only war ? would Japan really think about fighting a post two ocean act USN ?

This means that US might not then join in on the OTl timetable ? when would they get involved in the European war ?

With no Pacific war (helps US and GB) and wining the BofA (massively more DDs available for convoys, both from USN/RN) early you will be able to send a huge amount of LL so GB/USSR should easily hold out till USA joins in later than OTL.
 
Does this not make it a Europe only war ? would Japan really think about fighting a post two ocean act USN ?

This means that US might not then join in on the OTl timetable ? when would they get involved in the European war ?

With no Pacific war (helps US and GB) and wining the BofA (massively more DDs available for convoys, both from USN/RN) early you will be able to send a huge amount of LL so GB/USSR should easily hold out till USA joins in later than OTL.

Good question. That did actually occur to me, but admittedly, I don't have an answer. The whole point of the PH attack was to eliminate the threat U.S. posed to Japan. Waiting until after the U.S. has built its 2 ocean navy would pretty much defeat the purpose of the attack to begin with. I guess my ATL creates too many butterflies to really speculate on how things would have proceeded differently.
 
What about a National Defense Infrastructure Act in 1938 or 39?

Money for highways, improvements to railroads (like electrification as far west as Chicago, double tracking key cross country routes, completing the Pennsylvania turnpike in 1940), better prep for mobilization.....instead of being penny wise and pound foolish, penny foolish and pound wise...

Early funding for Andrew Jackson Higgins and Donald Roebling for landing craft...
 
2. Earlier invasion of North Africa-this I see as far more realistic in my timeline. Instead of invading North Africa in November of 1942, the invasion occurs 5-6 months earlier, so probably June of 1942. The U.S. forces are still relatively green, so the Axis forces hardly surrender immediately, but I think it’s well within the realm of possibility that North Africa is in Allied possession by the end of 1942. That leads to even more follow-up questions:

This is the key turning point. More US forces should mean a more rapid takeover of Tunisia and capture of Tripoli from the west, effectively ending the North African campaign (Rommel's final stand is in Benghazi against the 8th Army). It might be possible to land in Sicily before the end of 1942, but that campaign may take longer than OTL.

An invasion of Northern France in 1943 is possible with a decision at the Casablanca conference, as there will be more combat capable US divisions available earlier, even if there is an Italian campaign.

As noted you have not addressed the Pacific. Will an earlier US Navy expansion will the Japanese attack earlier, at the same time, or not at all?If they attack in December 1941 than the US Navy will want to use its extra ships to counterattack earlier which may suck extra resources into the Pacific War and away from Europe.
 
The Vinson Act of 1934 increases our naval strength to what the second act was intended to do, and the Two Ocean Navy Act of 1940 is instead passed in 1938 (and is adequately funded).

This has a lot of knock-ons which can be examined.

For instance, the Essex-class carriers started coming into commission from December 1942, with Essex herself going active in August 1943. If instead they are available two years sooner, then five Essex-class will be operational by January 1942.

I don't suppose the Allies would use them in the Battle of the Atlantic, and construction of CVEs won't start any sooner. But - all those additional big fleet carriers could release the smaller British carriers for Atlantic service. Furious, Eagle, and Hermes would be very useful.

Also the U.S. will have a lot more ASW ships to deploy. Between these two factors, the Battle of the Atlantic should skew toward the Allies compared to OTL.
 
I have no problem with increased Navy spending to create jobs; IMO, he should've done that anyhow. I also think acceleration of DD & SS building in '39 would've been a very good idea; increased DD building starting in '36 or '37, too. (Increases in subs or heavies then might look provocative.) It shouldn't have been a hard sell even to isolationists: a strong navy keeps the enemy away. (If the Navy's getting more money, spend some on live-fire trials of the Mark XIV & Mark XV torpedoes!)

Increases in bomber &/or fighter numbers would be good, too. Buying B-17s instead of B-18s? I'm less sure this is credible, tho...

My question is, how do you sell Congress on increasing the size of the Army?

Now, if you've got FDR & Congress in agreement on increased spending in '36, when Japan abrogates the London Treaty, the U.S. can immediately begin building up in P.I., Hawaii, Wake, & Midway--if improvements to facilities aren't already underway under the 0th Vinson Act.:p

That presupposes there's war with Japan... Better, smarter diplomacy may make that unnecessary. (Maybe that's even more ASB.:p)

Japan did attack knowing the Vinson build was coming; her window of opportunity was narrow. By doing this, even without better diplomacy, you may have butterflied the Pacific War, since things with Japan don't come to a crisis before the 2-Ocean Navy is afloat, & Japan's chance is gone.

Now, if Hitler hasn't provoked Congress, or just had a tantrum,:p the U.S. is likely to sit on the sidelines awhile longer.

Since there will be less demand for supplying her own needs, the U.S. can send more to Britain...
JRH1234 said:
As for the remainder of the war, the size of the ground forces increases at roughly the same proportion as in OTL. I’ll push things a step further an thrown in a more concerted effort by the U.S. to get more women and ethnic minorities involved in the war effort (yes, this was done in OTL, but my understanding is that it wasn’t done to the extent that it could have been). So at its peak, the U.S. ground forces have 8.2 million troops instead of the OTL’s 6 million.
You may have a satisfactory explanation; I haven't studied the numbers. What I've read suggests the U.S. was near, or at, her manpower limits OTL, so I'd want to see your numbers.
JRH1234 said:
has a larger supply of tanks, artillery, and other equipment from 1939-1941 so that it can still provide Lend-Lease to its Allies without seriously depriving its own forces of equipment (or at least not as much as in OTL).
Except, you've also increased the domestic demand with a larger Army & Navy... Plus, & not trivial, you've increased the amount of equipment that will very shortly be revealed to be obsolescent or obsolete junk.:eek: More P-36s & B-18s aren't going to help invade North Africa, let alone France. (Yeah, more B-18s on ASW patrol would be good.)

Getting the B-24 &/or Corsair in production sooner would be better--but I'm far from sure more money would achieve that: it would take a perceived need, & I don't see the U.S. feeling it.
JRH1234 said:
Invasion of France in 1942-this is what the U.S. wanted to do from the beginning, an ITL, it has a much stronger hand to push for this strategy. However, even under my already unrealistic TL, neither the U.S. nor Britain has enough landing craft to stage a successful invasion of France at this point. Neither of them foresaw the Fall of France happening so quickly, so both were planning on landing troops in friendly ports. While an earlier invasion of France is more likely than in OTL, I still don’t see one happening in 1942 under the conditions I’ve described.
Design & construction between 1940-2, with lower demand for other things (given more DDs & merchies means lower losses than OTL), might make this possible. You still have to overcome British disbelief in American ability to fight effectively--& judging by Kasserine, that's a valid point. It might be mitigated by the U.S. Army being larger for longer, tho.
JRH1234 said:
Earlier invasion of North Africa-this I see as far more realistic in my timeline. Instead of invading North Africa in November of 1942, the invasion occurs 5-6 months earlier, so probably June of 1942.
Very possible. Also, with more shipping & larger Army, & with more corporate experience, it might just be possible to persuade Marshal to go ahead with landings at Bone, & shorten the campaign. Add in a "bottling up" of DAK instead of clearing them out...:cool:
JRH1234 said:
Does the invasion of France then happen in 1943?
Very likely, IMO. More shipping available, lower losses (from more DDs), more LCs built (from the already-mentioned changes), & a change in WAllied approach. You do still need to butterfly away the Italian campaign (see the discussion here, frex), & shortening the African campaign as above would be really good.
JRH1234 said:
If the Allies stay with Mediterranean strategy, is next target Sicily, Corsica, and/or Sardinia? I’ve heard differing rationales for each of these choices. Under my accelerated TL, do any of these rationales change? Do the Allies still invade Sicily, or do they go for Sardinia and/or Corsica instead?
I'd still pick Sicily, followed by Sardinia & Corsica; the payoff is high, the manpower & shipping expense comparatively low.
JRH1234 said:
What changes about the Italian mainland campaign?
If you're smart, there never is one.
JRH1234 said:
If the Allies go with a Mediterranean strategy in the beginning of 1943, is an invasion of northern France still possible in late 1943?
With no involvement on the Italian mainland, I'd say it is. Otherwise, you're probably buggered; I don't think even your changed conditions can overcome the increased shipping demand.

It does depend on how much you've built prewar, tho...

It also depends on what else the WAllies are doing. Did King have enough DDs in '42 to institute coastal convoys? Did the AAF have enough B-18s (or even B-17s:cool:) to fly armed ASW patrol in '40-2 over the St Lawrence approaches? Either or both things would dramatically cut shipping losses to U-boats. More DDs for escort duty, too. (This also allows more to be turned over to Britain, which has an additional benefit.)

The big issues IMO are the political ones in FDR getting Congress to sign off on any of it. Can he sell it all as a jobs program? Can he sell the isolationists on it as keeping war away? If so...
 
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My question is, how do you sell Congress on increasing the size of the Army?

....

The big issues IMO are the political ones in FDR getting Congress to sign off on any of it. Can he sell it all as a jobs program? Can he sell the isolationists on it as keeping war away? If so...

Southern Democrats were all for the build-up; they voted something like 115-4 for the 1941 draft extension, and Vinson, "father of the Two-Ocean Navy", was from Georgia.

And the southern bloc was the dominant force in the Democrats in this period. If the build-up includes shipyards in the Gulf states, that will be very popular in the South.

Also I think even the isolationists would go along with a "defense" build-up, at least until there was significant talk about how the enhanced U.S. forces could be used in interventions. Few of them were pacificists (Jeannette Rankin was, but she was an outlier.)
 
Anarch said:
Southern Democrats were all for the build-up; they voted something like 115-4 for the 1941 draft extension, and Vinson, "father of the Two-Ocean Navy", was from Georgia.

And the southern bloc was the dominant force in the Democrats in this period. If the build-up includes shipyards in the Gulf states, that will be very popular in the South.

Also I think even the isolationists would go along with a "defense" build-up, at least until there was significant talk about how the enhanced U.S. forces could be used in interventions. Few of them were pacificists (Jeannette Rankin was, but she was an outlier.)
I'm satisfied it can be done, then. It's a bit of a puzzle why FDR, politically astute as he was, didn't do it...:confused:

Keeping quiet about "intervention" would be a really good idea, & not only to sell it to Congress. It risks backfiring & provoking Hitler to DoW before the buildup is in place--& now you've got a bigger U.S. force to supply before it ever leaves the depots.:eek:
 
To those people suggesting Roosevelt happily authorising lots of extra ships, remember that the USA was tied by the Naval Treaty. It wasn't really until 1938 that everyone had admitted(at least in private) that it was dead and they would just build what they wanted.

So if you want a bigger navy, you have to butterfly the treaty or at least have higher limits.
 
The Guns and Butter The American Way

Your idea of an earlier US rearmament and mobilization maybe ASB but it would be not to impossible if the political conditions of inter-war years has radically changed.


1st change is that the peace of the Great War aftermath isn't an easy peace but turned into a wary one due to the emerging military powerhouses of both a belligerent Soviet Union(Tsarists' government has fallen after 1915 and a sinister secret group have help the Russians industrialize much faster than normal) and an earlier Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere(China and Japan are real allies hostile to the Western Powers).

2nd change is the Central Powers has stalemated the Allies to the point of forcing earlier peace settlements upon the Allies and in the late 1920s, an arms race starts up.

3rd change is that FDR is the winner of the 1929 US Presidential election and creates an earlier New Deal package and uses it to create small-scale rearmament production for reasons of replacing obsolete weapon systems and promote new stratagems with an smaller military force and increase build-up when hostile powers start bullying the USA and its allies.:p
 
To those people suggesting Roosevelt happily authorising lots of extra ships, remember that the USA was tied by the Naval Treaty. It wasn't really until 1938 that everyone had admitted(at least in private) that it was dead and they would just build what they wanted.

So if you want a bigger navy, you have to butterfly the treaty or at least have higher limits.
Are you not free from number limits by 1937 so you could replace (that rapidly then becomes keep as well as) all the Omaha's CLs and build a few more flotillas of DDs and SSs easily (and speed up battleships and CVs)

The fun part if you might be forced into the same 14" gun fun that the RN had with the KVGs for your first pair of battleships if you rush them in Jan 1937 (but 14" fast BB would be fine v a Kongo so would not be a problem really)
 
Are you not free from number limits by 1937 so you could replace (that rapidly then becomes keep as well as) all the Omaha's CLs and build a few more flotillas of DDs and SSs easily (and speed up battleships and CVs)

The fun part if you might be forced into the same 14" gun fun that the RN had with the KVGs for your first pair of battleships if you rush them in Jan 1937 (but 14" fast BB would be fine v a Kongo so would not be a problem really)

No, actually.
The later treaty basically set displacements rather than numbers.

The limitation of cruisers to a displacement of 8,000t badly hits the USN as they wanted larger ships with 8" guns. Bigger cruisers need the same relaxation as the BB displacement/gun calibre.

The older treaty holds until 1/1/37, so any changes will have to be after this. Also you have to give notice, which the Admiralty reckoned took 6-8 months.

So until 1937, any naval rearmament will be limited
 
Good question. That did actually occur to me, but admittedly, I don't have an answer. The whole point of the PH attack was to eliminate the threat U.S. posed to Japan. Waiting until after the U.S. has built its 2 ocean navy would pretty much defeat the purpose of the attack to begin with. I guess my ATL creates too many butterflies to really speculate on how things would have proceeded differently.

The requirements for the Pearl Harbor attack were based on an absolute requirement for six fast full fleet carriers. No CVLs, no CVEs, no slow CVs. So its the full Kido Butai or nothing. That requires the Shokaku-class to be available, and when (IIRC) the Zuikaku left port for Hawaii she still had wet paint on her! December 7th 1941 was literally as soon as humanely possible for Japan to do the attack. She had insufficient steel in process to do the carrier construction any faster. So too they would have had a number of more obsolescent aircraft on board with an earlier strike, even IF they wanted to risk a more anemic attack.

And all this assumes Roosevelt sends the fleet to Pearl sooner than OTL.
 
This has a lot of knock-ons which can be examined.

For instance, the Essex-class carriers started coming into commission from December 1942, with Essex herself going active in August 1943. If instead they are available two years sooner, then five Essex-class will be operational by January 1942.

I don't suppose the Allies would use them in the Battle of the Atlantic, and construction of CVEs won't start any sooner. But - all those additional big fleet carriers could release the smaller British carriers for Atlantic service. Furious, Eagle, and Hermes would be very useful.

Also the U.S. will have a lot more ASW ships to deploy. Between these two factors, the Battle of the Atlantic should skew toward the Allies compared to OTL.


If your Building 'Essex' carrier 2 years earlier then I would suspect that these would effectively be Yorktowns. The final Essex design was influenced by early war events and the rapid changes to technology that was occouring at the time.

Not that 5 additional Yorktown class carriers in 1941 is a bad thing! :D

That would give the USN 8 Yorktowns and 2 Lexingtons
 
If your Building 'Essex' carrier 2 years earlier then I would suspect that these would effectively be Yorktowns. The final Essex design was influenced by early war events and the rapid changes to technology that was occouring at the time.

Not that 5 additional Yorktown class carriers in 1941 is a bad thing! :D

That would give the USN 8 Yorktowns and 2 Lexingtons

And one Ranger:)
 
Even allowing the Treaty is in force until 1937, a naval buildup is possible: build slower escorts with fewer, smaller-caliber guns (4"/50cal instead of 5"/38 cal or 5"/51cal) & no TT. These, comparable to the "Treasury" cutters, make excellent ocean escorts. Or, better still, make "super-corvettes" of a similar size, to civil-ship design, so they can be built in non-specialist yards & crewed by civilians when war comes.

The Army buildup issues AIUI, outside fortifications, are outside Treaty limits anyhow. Most of the facility building can easily be done from Jan '37 anyhow & still be ready before Japan is...
 
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