Alternate WW1-Realisitic (hopefully)

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Deleted member 1487

It looks like you're convinced that the Entente will automatically play WW1 as they did IOTL, irrespective of what happens on the field.

IMHO, the loss of the Channel ports and the worse mauling of the Russians should make people more wary (in particular the Italians: getting more concessions from someone who's drowning does not strike me as a great idea).

Anyway, it's your TL.

I don't think they will play it exactly the same, though it would make my job easier ;)

With the Italians, I think their faulty reasoning for getting in the war in the first place would still fly here. Propaganda and arrogance clouded judgment OTL and I am assuming it would here. As to Gallipoli, well, keeping Russia in the game, or at least attempting to to prevent a separate peace, which would cause far more pain than Gallipoli did.

But then again, I have done extensive rewrites, so perhaps I will change my mind.
 
One of the main reasons the Italians are likely to enter the war is they felt they were great enough they should be there. But they didn't just have issue with Austria-Hungary, there were issues with France too. So if Italy hold off and Russia looks so weak and the Western Front was static they could join the central powers.

It certainly would be interesting to see a Mediterranean front and a North African Front in WWI, quite different, I don't think I've seen it done before.

Possible Targets for Italy:
Corsica, Savoy, Nice, Tunisia, Malta, Albania, French Somalia, British Somaliland etc.
 
One of the main reasons the Italians are likely to enter the war is they felt they were great enough they should be there. But they didn't just have issue with Austria-Hungary, there were issues with France too. So if Italy hold off and Russia looks so weak and the Western Front was static they could join the central powers.

It certainly would be interesting to see a Mediterranean front and a North African Front in WWI, quite different, I don't think I've seen it done before.

Possible Targets for Italy:
Corsica, Savoy, Nice, Tunisia, Malta, Albania, French Somalia, British Somaliland etc.

Italy was certainly not ready to enter the war in August 1914: the time required for mobilization would have voided any real action on either front (western against France or eastern against A-H) before late autumn.

There was also a significant portion of the population who did not look forward to a war (mainly catholics and socialists).

It is true that Italy had claims against both France and A-H, but at the time of the war the bad blood with France was mostly over (the worse period had been in the 1880s), while A-H was seen as the traditional enemy of all the independence wars (and was also Italy's biggest rival in the Balkans, which were seen as a possible sphere of influence for Italian appetites: contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Tripartite Alliance, A-H had always refused compensations to Italy for Habsburg's expansion in the Balkans - the annexion of Bosnia Hercegovina was a very sore point). The strongest reason not to join the CPs, however, was the obvious impossibility of contesting the Mediterranean against the combined French and British fleets:
there had been joint naval exercise of the Austrian and italian fleets, but not after 1911 (when A-H was friendly to the Ottomans during the Lybian war) - and in any case it would not have been enough without a sizeable element of the German fleet.

IOTL, A-H always refused territorial compensation, and ultimately Italy signed the London treaty and entered the war on the Entente side; I can easily believe that Italy might have remained neutral (it was touch and go, and was likely to be the best option). I have a lot of difficulties in accepting Italy on the CPs side, unless there had been a significant change in Austrian politics after 1900.
 
Coal

Italy was certainly not ready to enter the war in August 1914: the time required for mobilization would have voided any real action on either front (western against France or eastern against A-H) before late autumn.

There was also a significant portion of the population who did not look forward to a war (mainly catholics and socialists).

It is true that Italy had claims against both France and A-H, but at the time of the war the bad blood with France was mostly over (the worse period had been in the 1880s), while A-H was seen as the traditional enemy of all the independence wars (and was also Italy's biggest rival in the Balkans, which were seen as a possible sphere of influence for Italian appetites: contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Tripartite Alliance, A-H had always refused compensations to Italy for Habsburg's expansion in the Balkans - the annexion of Bosnia Hercegovina was a very sore point). The strongest reason not to join the CPs, however, was the obvious impossibility of contesting the Mediterranean against the combined French and British fleets:
there had been joint naval exercise of the Austrian and italian fleets, but not after 1911 (when A-H was friendly to the Ottomans during the Lybian war) - and in any case it would not have been enough without a sizeable element of the German fleet.

IOTL, A-H always refused territorial compensation, and ultimately Italy signed the London treaty and entered the war on the Entente side; I can easily believe that Italy might have remained neutral (it was touch and go, and was likely to be the best option). I have a lot of difficulties in accepting Italy on the CPs side, unless there had been a significant change in Austrian politics after 1900.

An important factor weighing against Italy joining the CP (except maybe in the 9th inning) is that it was very dependent on GB for coal. She can only get a fraction of that from Germany due to limited rail capacity at this time (which was increased postwar and even in WWII she did not get all she wanted) There was a lengthy discussion of this over at http://alternatehistoryfictory.yuku.com/forums/2/t/Alternate-History-Fiction.html in the OU May 20 Part III thread.
 

Deleted member 1487

Italy was not going for the CPs, despite pro-CP ministers. So long as Britain is pro-Entente, they are going to be neutral of Entente. Reading "the winter war" by mark thompson, it really looks like a few men in the Italian government really just strong-armed the nation into war. A large majority of the population was against going to war, but the propaganada effort was bankrolled by the Entente to convince the various anti-war segements that it was actually a brilliant idea. It definitely didn't help they were promised an entire empire that would make Mussolini jealous.

Basically the Italian entry hinged on the perception that the Austrains would simply be swept away before the Italian all-conquering armies, a perception that Cadorna helped to establish. Also, the perception of Austro-Hungarian weakness, not German strength was a crucial factor. By declaring war at the height of the Russian offensives in Galicia (ITTL) while the CPs are bogged down in Serbia (wrapping up the campaign), the Italian generals have essentially convinced the Salandro with their promises of victory by Christmas, that nothing could go wrong.

Not only that, but, as with OTL, the Italians only declared war against the Austrians. They did not take into account German strength, as it is inconsequential to their front (the germans are neck deep on all other fronts). Besides, it appears the Austrians won't be able to transfer the necessary men to defend against a breakthrough. What could go wrong?

The Italians were suseptible to arrogance, just as every nation was in WW1. All though they could just breakthrough with the might of their armies and all would be right. The Italians learned the hard way that they are dead wrong.

Salonika is going to be cancelled ITTL I've decided. Without the Serbs as a draw, I think that they Entente is not going to be eager for another Balkan adventure, especially now that Churchill is out of favor.

So what happens to the manpower? Obviously the British and French are going to the West Front, perhaps a few to the middle east, but what about the Serbs? Would it make sense to ship them to Italy to fight the Austrians? Or would they head to the West Front too? I'm leaning to Italy, but I don't believe their relations were that good, so I am open to the expert opinions on this board.
 
It would make a lot of sense to make a landing in Istria, near Trieste, threatening an encirclement of the A-H troops massed on the Isonzo river.
The A-H navy will be bottled in Pola (as it was IOTL for the duration of the war) and the landing will also put the navy at risk: Pola would be under siege from land and sea.
Landing in Dalmatia or more to the south would not be effective, given the lack of good roads and railway.

Your recapitulation of the moods in pre-war Italy is not completely correct: a lot of money was certainly spent by the Entente to promote their cause, but it is doubtful that Cadorna (who had become Commander in Chief after the sudden death of gen. Pollio, 1 July 1914) was pressing to enter the war.
There was a major disconnect between the politicians and the army, and Cadorna was not kept informed of the progress in the negotiations with the Entente, much less abot the clause that committed Italy to a war declaration within 30 days of the signature of the London treaty.
IOTL the treaty was signed on 26 April, but Cadorna was ordered to proceed with the full mobilization only on 5 May: 10 days were lost, and with them the chance to force the Isonzo, which was not massively defended and probably reach Trieste. It could be argued that Cadorna (no brilliant strategist and a rather pedestrian general) would not have launched an immediate offensive in any case, but who knows? In real history the fighting started not earlier than 29 May, when the window of opportunity was already closed.

IOTL, 6 divisions of Serbs were evacuated from Valona (Albania) and ended up fighting in the Salonika front. I suppose that it would make sense to try and evacuate them ITTL too. If the Entente goes for the Istrian gambit, these troops would be useful, and at the same time these troops would be separated from the main armies on the Isonzo. In any case, the evacuated Serbian troops should not be hostile, at least until the war is won or lost.
 

Deleted member 1487

It would make a lot of sense to make a landing in Istria, near Trieste, threatening an encirclement of the A-H troops massed on the Isonzo river.
The A-H navy will be bottled in Pola (as it was IOTL for the duration of the war) and the landing will also put the navy at risk: Pola would be under siege from land and sea.
Landing in Dalmatia or more to the south would not be effective, given the lack of good roads and railway.

Your recapitulation of the moods in pre-war Italy is not completely correct: a lot of money was certainly spent by the Entente to promote their cause, but it is doubtful that Cadorna (who had become Commander in Chief after the sudden death of gen. Pollio, 1 July 1914) was pressing to enter the war.
There was a major disconnect between the politicians and the army, and Cadorna was not kept informed of the progress in the negotiations with the Entente, much less abot the clause that committed Italy to a war declaration within 30 days of the signature of the London treaty.
IOTL the treaty was signed on 26 April, but Cadorna was ordered to proceed with the full mobilization only on 5 May: 10 days were lost, and with them the chance to force the Isonzo, which was not massively defended and probably reach Trieste. It could be argued that Cadorna (no brilliant strategist and a rather pedestrian general) would not have launched an immediate offensive in any case, but who knows? In real history the fighting started not earlier than 29 May, when the window of opportunity was already closed.

IOTL, 6 divisions of Serbs were evacuated from Valona (Albania) and ended up fighting in the Salonika front. I suppose that it would make sense to try and evacuate them ITTL too. If the Entente goes for the Istrian gambit, these troops would be useful, and at the same time these troops would be separated from the main armies on the Isonzo. In any case, the evacuated Serbian troops should not be hostile, at least until the war is won or lost.

I did not mean to imply that Cadorna was pushing for war or a major player in the decision to enter the war. He strikes me as a man loyal to the political regime, regardless of its objectives. He was actually planning to deploy to the French border earlier in the war, before being ordered to do the exact opposite and reposition to the Austrian one instead. His effect is that he gives Salandro an overinflated picture of what the Italian army could achieve. He was very much a man of grandeous perceptions, much like what the various generals of the major powers had predicted in 1914. But as a general he was incompetent. Really Salandra was the driving force, basically making promises to the Allies and telling his government that they needed to comply.

Basically what you described above it correct. Mobilization takes too long and the opportunity is lost, as the Austrians start transferring in troops from the Balkans and reserves to cover the front, leaving Cadorna to bash his armies to pieces. By April war has been declared leaving the Italians no option but to finish things. It generally is understood that they made a bad decision, especially after the Russians lose in Galicia in April-May. Then, as the CPs are attacking in June-September on the Eastern front, the Italians still cannot fight their way through the Alps. They are actually less successful than OTL, as the Austrians did not suffer the nearly 1 million casualties in the winter battles in the Carpathians and at Przemysl. The surviving men thus were able form a corps of experienced soldiers that makes the Austrians more effective instead of throwing half-trained men into the field just to hold the line. Furthermore, the Habsburgs are more stable, as they have not lost the faith of the soldiers as much or quickly as OTL. And the removal of Conrad and the modernization under
Straußberg gives them a bit more faith too.

I will definitely keep your ideas for the Italian front under advisment, but I have a few questions that I hope someone can answer. What has the Austro-Hungarian ability to resist this move? Naval or land based (costal defense guns)? Also, what about the German and Austrians subs operating out of the area? I thought that Trieste was a major naval base.
 
Cadorna was more concerned with real (or imagined) slights than with throwing away tens of thousands of men. His doctrine was the French one: elan, elan, elan, but it was not too different from the approach of most of WW1 generals (the Austrian doctrine recited "Vorwarts bis in den Feind", or "Forward, always forward, against the enemy").

To tell the truth, the disposition of the Italian armies before the order of full mobilization dates back to August 1914: a partial mobilization was carried out;
one third of the army was placed on the western Alps, to face the French, and two thirds were in Friuli and on the eastern Alps, facing A-H (plus another 55,000 men were in Lybia). The disposition was mainly defensive, and to switch to an offensive mode (not to mention the problems to move one third of the army from piedmont to Friuli) was not a piece of cake.

I understand that the declaration of war would be on the same date as IOTL (23 May), and it would not make sense to anticipate it: the Isonzo would be still in flood and there would be snow on the Dolomiti and Adamello.
With hindsight, he should have grabbed the best units available in the east, and throw them immediately beyond the Isonzo, and toward Trieste: frankly, this is 20/20 hindsight, and does not match the man or the prevailing doctrine of the time.

The A-H capital ships are all in Pola, at the southern tip of Istria. IOTL, the stayed the war there, with just a couple of minor and half-hearted sorties.
Trieste was the main commercial port, and IIRC there were just destroyers and some light cruisers there. I am not sure 100%, but I never heard of Austrian submarines in the Adriatic.

I have seen the harbor of Trieste, and there are a couple of forts protecting the entry; I don't think it was anything too strong though.
Don't know about Pola, but it should be something similar.
The blockade of Pola (and the bay of Carnaro) should be taken care of with destroyers and torpedo boats - plus mines obviously. The Italian torpedo boats were pretty effective, btw, and sunk the battleship Viribus Unitis IOTL.

I would go for a landing at Capodistria (top western Istria, some 15-20 km from Trieste), with a small fishing port. A beachead there, protected by the guns of the capital ships offshore, would give flexible options for an advance (even if I think the optimum solution is to invest Trieste and threaten the encirclement).
 
The hills are alive...

. I am not sure 100%, but I never heard of Austrian submarines in the Adriatic..

Listen it's The Sound of Music!

In addition to his exploits another KuK sub torpedoed (but did not sink) FS Jean Bart in 1914 after which the MN were much less aggressive in their Adriatic sweeps. And let us not forget the German Pola Flotilla which was formed in 1915 from U-Boats that made it to the Med plus a few UB coastal boats that were assembled at Pola.
 

Deleted member 1487

With all questions about history: If it were so obvious, why was it not attempted OTL?

The issue of the subs is one thing that needs to be addressed. They were painfully effective during Gallipoli at sinking allied shipping in the Mediterrean, to the point that the Allies thought that an entire flotilla had been transferred rather than a handfull of boats.
 

Deleted member 1487

Listen it's The Sound of Music!

In addition to his exploits another KuK sub torpedoed (but did not sink) FS Jean Bart in 1914 after which the MN were much less aggressive in their Adriatic sweeps. And let us not forget the German Pola Flotilla which was formed in 1915 from U-Boats that made it to the Med plus a few UB coastal boats that were assembled at Pola.


Ah yes, von Trapp. What about Admiral Hothy?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Strait_of_Otranto_(1917)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otranto_Barrage
 

Deleted member 1487

Horthy only took over late in the war. Haus was in charge for most of the war and he was very conservative. However with an attack on Trieste I would see him becoming galvanized.

There is in Halpern my favorite naval history source for WWI some discussion of an Adriatic amphibious strategy:

http://books.google.com/books?id=6h...tfjzDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4

From what I have been able to acertain, it seems the blockade was further south and the austrians managed to raid as far south as Albania and Corfu. I highly doubt the allies would be willing to risk a landing so close to the Austrian bases if the allies were having to maintain their cordon so far away in the first place.

edit: According to Tom's link the very same idea was suggested by the italian navy, but was shot down by Cadorna, the ultimate arbitrator of Italian strategy. So, as long as he is around no naval invasion.

But I am quickly warming to the idea of adding the Serbs to the Italian front.
Not only that, but I am wondering what effects the Salonika troops will have on the fighting in France
 
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Deleted member 1487

Verdun day 1

The morning of February 21st was filled with the sounds of screaming shells impacting on French positions all across the Verdun sector, battering trenches and bunkers into dust. The bombardment had been going on since nightfall the previous night without let up. The Germans watched eagerly from their Stollen, the darkness continuously lit up by the flashes of bursting shells. The French soldiers had a much different and altogether more horrifying experience. The first and second defensive positions were specially targeted, an experience that did not make the infantry feel very special. Forested hills were denuded within hours, men blasted into oblivion or crushed when their positions collapsed, and mutilated bodies decorated the shattered trees like satanic tinsel as the German artillery worked its macabre magic. Gas also permeated every position, the insidious chemicals working their way into the masks and pores of the defenders, causing agony, as men were reduced to vomiting in their masks and clenching burning cavities that were once eyes. Tearing their masks off to free themselves from the foulness inside, the tormented men often succumbed to the suffocating Chlorine-Phosgene mixture accompanying the other gases. Those that did not would suffer and fall in the coming hours and the slow-acting Phosgene disintegrated their lungs, leaving corpses with a bloody froth at their lips. Particularly hard hit was the 67th division on the west bank of the Meuse; being a new division, the men did the worst thing possible to escape from the gas: they ran from their positions into the barrage isolating them from the rear.

When the order came to attack at 0400, the soldiers of the 5th army left their positions falling on the French with a fury borne of desire; they wanted to win and no one was going to stand in their way. Proceeding the echeloned assault were the men of the pioneer and special Flammenwerfer units, clearing obstacles and marking attack paths for the infantry. Astonishingly, men actually survived the brutal onslaught of artillery that prepared the attack. Especially around Brabant, Haumont, Ornes, and Beaumont, pill boxes and scattered groups of infantry fired into the attackers, desperate, deaf, and furious.

West Bank

On the West Bank, two corps where on attack, with assistance from a third on the flank of the advance. Forge fell with little resistance and the Cote d’Oie was mounted by an entire corps, the few organized pockets of resistance being overrun or wiped out by attacks on their flank or rear. The forest was cleared by the afternoon, with an assault starting on the Mort Homme from three sides. The peak was captured by 2200 hrs with the last pocket of resistance falling soon thereafter.

To the west, another corps took Bethincourt and Haucort quickly, and proceeded to ascend the heights above. The goal rested on the peak of Cote 304, which overlooked the action below. A division from the 6th reserve corps also participated in the attack, capturing the town of Avocourt and attacking Cote 304 from the west. By nightfall the peak had fallen, and the village of Esnes was in sight.

The men of the French 7th corps that had been tasked with holding the west bank were savaged by the bombardment the starting the previous day. Being new to the area and occupying incomplete defenses, the artillery worked horrors on them, making the fall of their crucial zone much easier. Though the corps artillery survived, it fell back with the survivors, all having been pummeled by the German guns, many having
been gassed.

East Bank

The fighting on the east bank was especially fierce, was the men of the French 30 corps were dug in and ready to die beating off their attackers. The 72nd division, with the famous Cl. Driant, was the subject of the flamethrower-wielding pioneers, and suffered badly, despite inflicting heavy casualties to these formations. Tongues of flame licked the pillboxes and bunkers of the 72nd, the shrieks of the men and pops of cartridges cooking off echoing in the ears of the assault formations.

On the extreme west of the sector, the 7th reserve corps echeloned its divisions for an attack on Brabant, the first taking the hill by early afternoon and the second moving through to take Samogneux and moving up the neighboring hill by the evening.

To their sides was the 5th reserve corps, which contributed a division to taking Haumont, which they did with heavy casualties. The survivors moved forward, stopping on the foothills of the next range of hills. The 18th corps attacked along both sides the road running from Ville to Beaumont, pushing through the Bois le Comte and Bois de Ville, ending the day in Bois des Coures and Bois la Wavrille, exhausted and having lost significant numbers of men. Attacking from the flank, the 3rd corps captured the destroyed villaged of Ornes quickly, but bogging down quickly while moving up the Bois le Chaume. Their other division pushed through the Bois Herbebois, crossing a road junction and stopping for the evening on the edge of the Bois des Fosses.

Overall it was a tremendously successful day, with first and second lines of French resistance shattered, and the better part of two French corps wiped out. The success came at a price of nearly 20,000 casualties and the fighting was only beginning. Artillery began displacing, moving forward along the inadequate roads, trying to keep the advance within range. However, the French managed to scrape together over half of the artillery of the battered formations and about twenty percent of the infantry. The 14th division on the flank of the advance had not been engaged and pulled out of the Woevre plains, setting up on the heights overnight at la Vauche, Bezonvaux and later moving on the Haudromont the next day. The remaining French forces attempted to set up on Cote 344, Mormont farm and to the northeast of Louvemont, attempting to hold the Germans coming toward Bois des Fosses. On the West bank, things were much more grim, with the few units left holding at Esnes and the heights about
Chattencourt.

The worst part of the tragedy was that the sector commander was not even aware that a major offensive was on. Due to the disruption of communications the massive losses on the frontier were not known, and the limited reports that did come in were dismissed as diversions. The rest of the front from Alsace through Verdun were under bombardment and Joffre was convinced it was all a feint. He issued an order to the front to disregard probing attacks in the Verdun region, as they were probably being made to draw forces away from the main offensive. As a result, the only action taken by sector command was to issue a warning order to the 37th division, the sector reserve. While the French waited, the Germans prepared for the next morning.

grotekaart.jpg
 
Listen it's The Sound of Music!

In addition to his exploits another KuK sub torpedoed (but did not sink) FS Jean Bart in 1914 after which the MN were much less aggressive in their Adriatic sweeps. And let us not forget the German Pola Flotilla which was formed in 1915 from U-Boats that made it to the Med plus a few UB coastal boats that were assembled at Pola.

I never claimed to be a navy buff. However, it does not look that the Austrian and German submarines created havoc in the Adriatic. I am under the impression that most of thir missions were in the Mediterranean, which appears more suitable for u-boats: the Adriatic is too shallow, and with good water visibility. I would say that Italian torpedo boats were much more suitable for raids and torpedoing in this theatre, and they performed much better than submarines on either side.

From what I have been able to acertain, it seems the blockade was further south and the austrians managed to raid as far south as Albania and Corfu. I highly doubt the allies would be willing to risk a landing so close to the Austrian bases if the allies were having to maintain their cordon so far away in the first place.

edit: According to Tom's link the very same idea was suggested by the italian navy, but was shot down by Cadorna, the ultimate arbitrator of Italian strategy. So, as long as he is around no naval invasion.

But I am quickly warming to the idea of adding the Serbs to the Italian front.
Not only that, but I am wondering what effects the Salonika troops will have on the fighting in France

The blockade was on the Otranto-Corfu line because it was the only place were the Entente controlled both sides and was in place mainly to prevent u-boats entering the Mediterranean. Its location has nothing to do with risks or strategies.
The Austrian raids were mostly aimed to the drifters line between Otranto and Corfu, and were always carried out with medium and light ships.
It looks quite obvious that the Entente never seriously considered amphibious operations in the Northern Adriatic or a blockade of the A-H navy at Pola.
I would say that there were a number of reasons and none of them was a good one:
  • the Italian front was always considered a sideshow
  • there were always fights between Italians and French concerning the allocation of the overall command of the operations in the Adriatic
  • as it was noted, Cadorna was against anything which might take away troops from the Isonzo line. Was it because he was just a plodder or because he was afraid that his leadership would be diminished? No one can say, but his opposition to amphibious operations was quite real. Another major damage for which he is responsible. It is difficult not to think that the most lucky event for Italy would have been Cadorna suddenly dieing in early 1915.

The overall result is that there were 11 battles on the Isonzo, with huge losses and no gain and that when the entente decided to open a new front they choose Salonika.
Another point which is quite obvious is that there was a kind of dichotomy between generals and admirals in WW1: generals were ready and more than willing to spend tens of thousands of men in a single battle; the admirals mostly hoarded their capital ships like misers.
 

Valdemar II

Banned
Another point which is quite obvious is that there was a kind of dichotomy between generals and admirals in WW1: generals were ready and more than willing to spend tens of thousands of men in a single battle; the admirals mostly hoarded their capital ships like misers.

Quite logical a ships was a lot harder to replace.
 
Quite logical a ships was a lot harder to replace.

Leaving asides any ethical consideration, what good is a fleet if you loose the war? After all, one cannot take his money with him when he leaves for the last mandatory trip (*)

(*) at best one is allowed the two mandatory coins to pay the Ferryman
 
I never claimed to be a navy buff. However, it does not look that the Austrian and German submarines created havoc in the Adriatic. I am under the impression that most of thir missions were in the Mediterranean, which appears more suitable for u-boats: the Adriatic is too shallow, and with good water visibility. I would say that Italian torpedo boats were much more suitable for raids and torpedoing in this theatre, and they performed much better than submarines on either side..

You are belaboring the MAS boat. That weapon had a very steep learning curve before the late war successes. In fact little is to be expected on it before mid 1916 as per this source http://www.historynet.com/naval-weaponry-italys-mas-torpedo-boats.htm
 

Deleted member 1487

The situation on the morning of February 22nd was desperate for the French and sector command was starting to wake up to what was going on. Reports from the east bank were still sketchy at best, and miscommunication had left the impression that the situation was in hand. On the West bank, the picture was clearer, but the full catastrophe was not fully understood. The 37th division was dispatched before noon to the Bois Bourrus, but given their position, wouldn’t completely arrive before nightfall. They would move up the Voie Sacree, the road that would see so much traffic in the coming months. The Germans had managed to continue the advance on both banks, aided by the residual casualties of the Phosgene. Men began to feel the effects 24 hours later, when many dropped dead or felt the corruption in their lungs cripple them. The most important casualties were the horses, which were necessary to pull the guns in the hills of the area. Their loss left the guns of the retreating divisions immobile and prey to the advancing enemy.

The loss of Cote 344 around noon was grievous to the defense line that the remnants of the French 30 corps. It left the German 7th reserve corps capable of taking the Cote de Talou, Champ, and Champneuville, which all fell by the end of the day, leaving Vacherauville as the front line. Elsewhere the German advance began to slow, as the assault troops outpaced their artillery, which had a difficult time moving forward over the unpaved back roads and broken, shell pocked ground while trying to keep pace. Mormont farm nevertheless fell by the afternoon, as the Germans finally swept over the heavily pressed defenders, dying almost to a man.

Bois des Fosses was cleared and Louvemont was captured, bringing the Germans to the Haudromont Quarries and the front lines of the French 14th division’s positions. On the far right of the advance, the 3rd corps was checked by the 14th division, which had unexpectedly put of heavy resistance, having been spared most of the opening bombardment the previous day. Though the corps artillery was still in range, the defenders were able to contain most of the breaches pushed into their positions.

The 3rd corps was still dealing with their losses from the previous day and the French artillery had still not been spotted. German aircraft would help pinpoint these guns, attacking them themselves and providing artillery with a clear picture of the French positions. The situation was not good for the 14th division and the only reason it managed to hold the line for the day, was the exhaustion and disorganization of German infantry after covering so much wooded and broken ground so quickly. The next day would promise change.

On the West bank the situation was similar, but still incredibly dangerous. Chattancourt and Esnes fell without too much of a struggle, as the vastly more numerous Germans were simply able to envelop any positions and carry it from the flank or rear. This meant that the few remaining infantry were further reduced in number, while the others fled. The artillery was able to provide so assistance, but when the Germans neared, their advance covered by the wooded hills, their remained too few horses to reposition. Many of the remaining artillery men surrendered or fled, leaving the way to the west open. The German artillery was still having problems moving up on the west bank, and would be left behind by the rapid advance of the infantry. This problem would become severe soon, as men from the 37th division finally arrived in the area, only to be thrown into the fight piecemeal. Even limited counter attacks by battalions without artillery made a difference in these hills, halting the Germans in the hills to the west of Marre by nightfall, but leaving the other corps to take Montzeville unopposed. Sector command finally bit the bullet and made a request to high command for support, something Joffre was loath to do, as the Verdun sector was to him a diversion for the main assault to come. However, the threat was real, so he sent a corps from GQG reserves, which wouldn’t arrive until the next evening (the request being put in the evening of the 22nd). Sector command had not emphasized the full threat, as it was unknown. Disrupted communications and German air supremacy had left them blind, but the following day would elucidate the situation for all.
 
Verdun Day I

So you are having Falkenayn attack both banks on day one unlike OTL. The French defenses on going to hinge on holding the Bois Bourrus ridge. I see the fight being hard for both sides there. (Oh you posted at the same time That happens)

On a different topic you should think through the implications of a much earlier end of Gallipoli will have on the Caucasian Front where Enver will be able to reinforce Third Army much earlier.
 
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