Alternate WW1-Realisitic (hopefully)

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
  • Start date
Are the 2.3-2.5 numbers the total controlled by Germany OTL or in Unicorn?

The delta from historical not total occupied. The historical occupied is not esp. important in either your TL or mine. It is important in Ost Marsch TL's which never seem to adequately factor in how much stronger France would be.
 
How are people escaping during the war? Through Holland and Switzerland, by boat, or the trenches, barbed wire, mines, artillery and machineguns of the lines?
 

Deleted member 1487

Map of Eastern Front

Sorry it hand drawn, I don't have photoshop. This is the situation before the 1915 offensive in the East.

east 2 map.1.jpg
 

Deleted member 1487

Galician Snapshot

Given the myth that has grown up around the Galician offensive, it is easy to lose sight of the facts of the battle. So much emphasis is put on the German successes in crossing the San and crushing Radko-Dmitriev’s 3rd army that it seems the Austrians had little to do with the fighting. However, the Habsburg armies provided the bulk of the troops and in fact did the lion’s share of the work. From the northern bank of the Vistula with Dankl’s first army to Pflanzer’s 7th army near the Bessarbian frontier on the southern bank of the Dniester, of the six Central Powers armies, five were Habsburg. Comprising over 1.5 million men, the Galician offensive was titanic in proportions. They faced the Russian Southwestern front of three armies totally slightly more than 1 million men, but possessed a major advantage in supply and guns.
Conrad was particularly insistent that HIS men remain mostly under his command, parting only with the 1st army, which would report to Mackensen. He wanted to recapture Lemberg with Austrian troops to present to the Emperor, hopefully rehabilitating his image. However, as always, he refused much of the advice of his German allies, considering their meddling tantamount to subordinating his command to Falkenhayn’s. The obstinacy would prove to be his downfall, as political pressure mounted to remove the man from highest command.

The plan was relatively basic, as Mackensen’s command would advance northward to take Cholm and Lublin before breaking up, with the 10th army heading north to Brest-Litovsk and the 1st to Kovel and on to form the left wing of the Austrian advance. The Austrians would form the southern wing, which would press forward to liberate Galicia, starting with Lemberg. The following objectives would include Tarnopol, crossing the Bug and moving on Luck, Dubno, and Rovno in Russia.

Unfortunately, no plan survives contact with the enemy and when the offensive began on June 6th, the Austrian advance halted nearly as soon as it began. To the north, the Germans had meticulously planned their bombardments and organized everything to an intense degree. Even Dankl’s 1st army, under German command was forced to approach war the German way. Their advance proved a smashing success, relying on massed artillery to batter a way forward. Though their advance was slow, it was deliberate. They crossed the San on the 7th after pouring 700,000 shells into the 3rd army, shattering their defenses. Already weakened from the April offensives, the 3rd army was ground down over the course of the following days, as the front commander Ivanov prevented a retreat. Finally after nearly a week of battering, Ivanov relented only to be overruled by STAVKA. Every defensive stand was annihilated by the massed guns of the 1st and 10th army, the Russians unable to reply for lack of shells and often the lack of courage of their gunners for a duel. The 4th army to their north finally managed to send two corps to attack part of Dankl’s 1st army north of Vistula, but their intervention only delayed the inevitable.

Further south, Conrad’s offensive was stuck during the first week, while his armies battered the Dniester line, suffering heavy casualties trying to enlarge their bridgeheads. The only bright spot was the advance of the 4th army, between the San and Dniester, which pushed back the right flank of Brusilov’s 8th army. Taking Mosciska on the 8th, their advance allowed the 3rd to move forward. The collapse of the 3rd army to the north finally threw open the door to the flank of the 8th army, allowing for the Austrians to push over the San taking Lemberg on the 16th. The retreat of the 8th army forced the 11th to maintain their contact with Brusilov’s flank, causing them to fall back on Tarnopol. However, the various river branches of the Dniester gave the 11th army places to stand, stopping the advance of Conrad’s 2nd and 7th armies. But the retreat of the 8th army to the Bug river on June 22nd forced the 11th to retreat, pulling back to the north of Tarnopol. The Austrians were exhausted by their efforts having lost nearly 300,000 men since the beginning of the month. The Russians had lost slightly more in the 8th and 11th armies, but the 3rd army had nearly ceased to exist, only mustering 35,000 men by July. The Southwestern front had lost over 60% of its strength, surrendering 250,000 men and over 1,000 guns. By the first of July nearly all of Galicia was liberated and Poland had been invaded from the south, with Lublin and Cholm falling by the 8th after a week long artillery duel with Russian reinforcments. The Northwest front had also been engaged in late June by the advance out of East Prussia, but the southern most army, the 4th, had been engaged since mid-June by Mackensen’s army group. The 4th had pulled back somewhat, suffering moderate casualties, before being engaged by the Woyrsch detachment on the 27th. From then on, Mackensen’s army group dissolved, as his 10th army headed north, driving the Russian 4th army before it, and the Austrian 1st army headed east, taking Kovel from the remnants of the 3rd army on July 5th.

By July then, the Galician front had become once again exclusively Austrian. The next phase of the battle began, as Dankl’s army had crossed the Bug, outflanking Brusilov on the Bug. His position was untenable anyway, being so far from any major rail line now that that Kowel had fallen. Dankl pushed on to Lutsk, but was soon confronted by the men of the 8th army, as they force marched back to Rovno from the area near Brody. Freed from resistance by the 8th army, the 4th and 3rd armies marched to fill the vacuum, soon facing the 11th army after taking Brody. To the south, the 2nd and 7th armies were confronted by two new Russian armies, the 7th and 9th, filled mainly with conscripts and units taken from the 11th army. The advance halted by August 2nd, with the front running from Rovno south into the vast steppes of Ukraine. The Russian were also catching their breath, as they fell back on their supply lines. But this new front line, proved elastic, as soon Brusilov was on the offensive against the Austrians, with his compatriots fighting further south. Tarnopol fell once again to the Russians by August 15th.

Throughout the month the fighting raged back and forth, the only thing hampering Russian success was the administrative incompetence of the highest level which often left the soldier at the front without weapons or ammo, often improperly clothed and underfed. Though the Austrians were hampered by incompetence in command and stood near the limit of their supply lines, the held and secured Lutsk and threatened Tarnopol once more. Though the front quieted down in September and for most of the rest of the year, the fighting would periodically rise up again, with little gain by either side. Casualties would amount to over 600,000 for the Austrians by the end of the year, over 50% of the initial forces committed. The Russian were worse off, with nearly a million men lost.
The scale of the losses had thrown the southwestern front into disorder ultimately paving the way for Brusilov to take over command for the following year. Much of the intervening time would be filled training conscripts, hording munitions and equipment, and distilling the tactical and operational lessons of modern war. For now the Central Powers would have their breathing space for now, while both sides rebuilt their armies.
 
Given the myth that has grown up around the Galician offensive, it is easy to lose sight of the facts of the battle. So much emphasis is put on the German successes in crossing the San and crushing Radko-Dmitriev’s 3rd army that it seems the Austrians had little to do with the fighting. However, the Habsburg armies provided the bulk of the troops and in fact did the lion’s share of the work. From the northern bank of the Vistula with Dankl’s first army to Pflanzer’s 7th army near the Bessarbian frontier on the southern bank of the Dniester, of the six Central Powers armies, five were Habsburg. Comprising over 1.5 million men, the Galician offensive was titanic in proportions. They faced the Russian Southwestern front of three armies totally slightly more than 1 million men, but possessed a major advantage in supply and guns.
Conrad was particularly insistent that HIS men remain mostly under his command, parting only with the 1st army, which would report to Mackensen. He wanted to recapture Lemberg with Austrian troops to present to the Emperor, hopefully rehabilitating his image. However, as always, he refused much of the advice of his German allies, considering their meddling tantamount to subordinating his command to Falkenhayn’s. The obstinacy would prove to be his downfall, as political pressure mounted to remove the man from highest command.

The plan was relatively basic, as Mackensen’s command would advance northward to take Cholm and Lublin before breaking up, with the 10th army heading north to Brest-Litovsk and the 1st to Kovel and on to form the left wing of the Austrian advance. The Austrians would form the southern wing, which would press forward to liberate Galicia, starting with Lemberg. The following objectives would include Tarnopol, crossing the Bug and moving on Luck, Dubno, and Rovno in Russia.

Unfortunately, no plan survives contact with the enemy and when the offensive began on June 6th, the Austrian advance halted nearly as soon as it began. To the north, the Germans had meticulously planned their bombardments and organized everything to an intense degree. Even Dankl’s 1st army, under German command was forced to approach war the German way. Their advance proved a smashing success, relying on massed artillery to batter a way forward. Though their advance was slow, it was deliberate. They crossed the San on the 7th after pouring 700,000 shells into the 3rd army, shattering their defenses. Already weakened from the April offensives, the 3rd army was ground down over the course of the following days, as the front commander Ivanov prevented a retreat. Finally after nearly a week of battering, Ivanov relented only to be overruled by STAVKA. Every defensive stand was annihilated by the massed guns of the 1st and 10th army, the Russians unable to reply for lack of shells and often the lack of courage of their gunners for a duel. The 4th army to their north finally managed to send two corps to attack part of Dankl’s 1st army north of Vistula, but their intervention only delayed the inevitable.

Further south, Conrad’s offensive was stuck during the first week, while his armies battered the Dniester line, suffering heavy casualties trying to enlarge their bridgeheads. The only bright spot was the advance of the 4th army, between the San and Dniester, which pushed back the right flank of Brusilov’s 8th army. Taking Mosciska on the 8th, their advance allowed the 3rd to move forward. The collapse of the 3rd army to the north finally threw open the door to the flank of the 8th army, allowing for the Austrians to push over the San taking Lemberg on the 16th. The retreat of the 8th army forced the 11th to maintain their contact with Brusilov’s flank, causing them to fall back on Tarnopol. However, the various river branches of the Dniester gave the 11th army places to stand, stopping the advance of Conrad’s 2nd and 7th armies. But the retreat of the 8th army to the Bug river on June 22nd forced the 11th to retreat, pulling back to the north of Tarnopol. The Austrians were exhausted by their efforts having lost nearly 300,000 men since the beginning of the month. The Russians had lost slightly more in the 8th and 11th armies, but the 3rd army had nearly ceased to exist, only mustering 35,000 men by July. The Southwestern front had lost over 60% of its strength, surrendering 250,000 men and over 1,000 guns. By the first of July nearly all of Galicia was liberated and Poland had been invaded from the south, with Lublin and Cholm falling by the 8th after a week long artillery duel with Russian reinforcments. The Northwest front had also been engaged in late June by the advance out of East Prussia, but the southern most army, the 4th, had been engaged since mid-June by Mackensen’s army group. The 4th had pulled back somewhat, suffering moderate casualties, before being engaged by the Woyrsch detachment on the 27th. From then on, Mackensen’s army group dissolved, as his 10th army headed north, driving the Russian 4th army before it, and the Austrian 1st army headed east, taking Kovel from the remnants of the 3rd army on July 5th.

By July then, the Galician front had become once again exclusively Austrian. The next phase of the battle began, as Dankl’s army had crossed the Bug, outflanking Brusilov on the Bug. His position was untenable anyway, being so far from any major rail line now that that Kowel had fallen. Dankl pushed on to Lutsk, but was soon confronted by the men of the 8th army, as they force marched back to Rovno from the area near Brody. Freed from resistance by the 8th army, the 4th and 3rd armies marched to fill the vacuum, soon facing the 11th army after taking Brody. To the south, the 2nd and 7th armies were confronted by two new Russian armies, the 7th and 9th, filled mainly with conscripts and units taken from the 11th army. The advance halted by August 2nd, with the front running from Rovno south into the vast steppes of Ukraine. The Russian were also catching their breath, as they fell back on their supply lines. But this new front line, proved elastic, as soon Brusilov was on the offensive against the Austrians, with his compatriots fighting further south. Tarnopol fell once again to the Russians by August 15th.

Throughout the month the fighting raged back and forth, the only thing hampering Russian success was the administrative incompetence of the highest level which often left the soldier at the front without weapons or ammo, often improperly clothed and underfed. Though the Austrians were hampered by incompetence in command and stood near the limit of their supply lines, the held and secured Lutsk and threatened Tarnopol once more. Though the front quieted down in September and for most of the rest of the year, the fighting would periodically rise up again, with little gain by either side. Casualties would amount to over 600,000 for the Austrians by the end of the year, over 50% of the initial forces committed. The Russian were worse off, with nearly a million men lost.
The scale of the losses had thrown the southwestern front into disorder ultimately paving the way for Brusilov to take over command for the following year. Much of the intervening time would be filled training conscripts, hording munitions and equipment, and distilling the tactical and operational lessons of modern war. For now the Central Powers would have their breathing space for now, while both sides rebuilt their armies.

The Austrians have been spared the massive Carpathian winter losses and I believe Italy is still neutral in your TL so I think you are being too conservative there. At a minimum they should be able to hold Tarnopol.
 

Deleted member 1487

No, the Italians are in as of May-June and the 5th and 6th armies are beating them off in the Alps. I haven't said they wouldn't get Tarnopol eventually, but by September, the Russians have recovered enough to fight back. Conrad was still arrogant and deluded, so it is his screw up that really let the Russians back in.
 

Deleted member 1487

Poland

The second part of OHL’s plan was the offensive to remove the Polish salient. As a prelude to the actual attack, the Lauenstein detachment (later Nieman army) had been formed to misdirect the Russians and turn their flank to the north. The Baltics were of special interest to OHL, both for the resources, and as a path to Petrograd. The Nieman army, a primarily cavalry formation supported by infantry, marched out in May for Libau along the desolate coast of Lithuania. The Russians had left the route open, convinced that the sandy beaches, lack of infrastructure, and imposing fortress of Kovno would deter the Germans. It did not, and the feint turned into something more serious, as the Germans managed to take the antiquated fort after blundering by the Russians left it undefended. The nervous Russians then dispatched larger numbers of troops to bring this increasingly dangerous nuisance to heel. Unfortunately, incompetence seemed to spiral leaving large numbers of territorials in German prison camps and the Nieman army astride the line of communication between Vilna and Riga. The Russians were forced to form two armies, one each holding one of the threatened cities, but neither powerful enough for its task. This low cost maneuver had gained the Germans much, as their enemy was focused on the threat to the north, causing them to ignore what was coming in Galicia.

In June the Galician offensive had begun penetrating the lines to the south. STAVKA had rushed to send reserves to the 3rd and 4th armies, as Mackensen drove deeper and more threateningly into Poland. So on the June 27th , as Mackensen was finishing the 3rd army, the rest of the offensive swung into gear. All along the front the German army launched punishing salvos, much as Mackensen had during his crossing of the San. In the south, the Woyrsch detachment had managed to force the weak flank of the Russian 4th army, which was now oriented south, to defend against the Mackensen army group. Pushing straight to the Vistula, Woyrsch had managed to cross another corps of infantry off the Russian OOB and ford the river north of the dangerous fortress of Ivangorod. The 4th army was hard pressed to deal with this new threat, but was aided by the arrival from the diminishing STAVKA reserve of four corps to help hold Lublin, only to watch as Mackensen obliterated them, taking half prisoner. Though holding him for several days, the Russian 4th army was once again alone and retreating north, leaving Ivangorod besieged, waiting for reduction by the heavy guns of the German foot artillery.

Over the Narev, the 8th, 9th and 10th armies moved across the frontier, battering salients in the Russian lines, massing their artillery in the center, forcing a breach and beating off counter attacks. It would be familiar to the soldiers further south, but here the attrition strategy was new, and the local commanders of the Russian army had no idea of how to cope. This tactic worked well in its concept of bleeding the Russians, but let them escape, as German forces were not properly positioned for pursuits. But Falkenhayn did not want a mobile battle, one that would not work well in the road-poor regions of the east. Instead he wanted to draw the enemy forces in to be destroyed on his terms. Indeed it was working; Russian soldiers surrendered en masse, unwilling and unable to fight back in most cases. Where defenses were properly constructed the Russians fought well, inflicting heavy losses. But that was the exception rather than the rule. For the moment, STAVKA ordered a massive pull back, their nerve gone. This belated move, which should have been taken months before, was now too little too late. Their forces were being wiped out bit by bit. The only success they had experienced so far was the retention of Warsaw, which was holding up the German 12th army, their attacks increasingly expensive. But losses and breakthroughs elsewhere across the front made their success worthless and by late July the city had fallen, after bridges blown and munitions torched.

Further north, Kovno, Grodno, and Bialystok and fallen weeks before estimates told the generals to be worried. It had thrown the entire front into disorder, especially with the moves of the Nieman army further north disrupting communication with Riga and supplies coming to Vilna. Though that unit would suffer setbacks, the overall tenor of the campaign was decided. Ivangorod had fallen earlier in July, battered into submission and the fortress system penetrated on all sides. Brest-Litovsk, the base of the fortress triangle in Poland finally fell in mid-August to Mackensen, and from there the front remained in retreat. Pinsk was occupied as the anemic 3rd army pulled into the swamps of the Pripet Marshes for protection. In fact the marshes running from Dvinsk to Rovno held the Germans as the finally line of retreat was reached in September. There were no fancy encirclements, no pockets to be reduced. But there were hundreds of thousands of prisoners, men that had seen too much and no longer wished to fight. A fire burned in their breasts and in the hearts of the men still fighting for their country. A hatred for their commanders and leaders, whose incompetence had let them suffer so greatly and relegated so many to their deaths, unable to reply in kind. The shell- and just about everything else –shortages had left soldiers defending without ammo, or even in some cases without weapons, to fight. The rot in the soul of the Russian army was deepening, a festering hatred for the incompetence of the Czar and his regime.

The front had straightened and the line held in front of Riga on the Dvina. Supply was now more regular, running on the shorter lines of rail closer to factories. The army, over two million men smaller, was easier to equip and rebuild. The Western Allied commitments to Russia were substantially larger, all promised before the winter arrived and Murmansk, now able to take much larger shipments, froze over. Positions were constructed and heart was given to defenders when the German naval invasion plan to take Riga failed miserably with the loss of several ships and the loss of the invasion force for only a meager price. Moral may have been low, but the will to fight was still not yet gone. The fight was not yet over, but it took a pause, as the Germans and Austrians had to build rail line and extend logistics. Again they would come later in the year, still eager for more land. They would face privation farther away from their borders in unfamiliar terrain; winter was coming. But Falkenhayn was lauded for his great success, the large masses of prisoners and captured equipment a testament to his genius. He gathered his forces, still looking to take positions to knock the Russian from the war, but now he had a reserve to use in the west. Though he was planning for it, for know he still was going to tidy up the Russian from. He also had some issues to settle in Vienna, having had enough with Conrad, the man he was convinced was going to cause the Austrians to fall apart. The Schlamperei that his commanders and staff had exhibited in this offensive were ridiculous, just as the way they wasted their men’s lives. Something had to be done about this situation, soon.
 

Deleted member 1487

The post Eastern Front general offensive culminating in the Great Retreat had straightened the front, leaving the Central Powers the masters of the field. Though strategic success had been achieved, the Austro-German alliance had frayed. Still not fighting under a unified command, it seemed that the more the Germans had fought to preserve the Austrian forces, the more they wanted to assert their independence. In fact the liberation of Przemysl by Mackensen the previous year had only made Conrad more intractable. Convinced his rebuilt and modernized army was just as capable as his German allies, he used every opportunity to assert his independence, which, he discovered, only increased the casualties of his armed forces. The Austrians were still not a modern force in their command, operational, or tactical methods. But every failure made the command staff of the Habsburg forces more bitter and even meager successes were vastly inflated to bolster the low esteem that even the commanders had of themselves and their army. In fact, the soldiers had lost faith in their commanders and in the authority of the Habsburgs to rule. The Czechs and other Slavic groups were experiencing greater desertion rates, even as the army was advancing. Call from several junior officers for a change in command were going unheard, but by September a decisive shift in Austro-German relations was planned by OHL.

Falkenhayn finally approached the Kaiser about a joint trip to Vienna to resolve the situation. Once operations had wound down the pair finally made the trip with their entourage. They found Franz Josef quite cordial and receptive to their requests, but as always the old man was tired and quite fearful of confrontation, something that Conrad excelled. However, after the parade of witnesses to the incompetence of Conrad and his staff, as well as a list of grievances and threats to ensure that a change was made. Resigned and exhausted, Franz finally gave in, summoning Conrad to his palace in Schönbrunn. Under the flinty stare of Falkenhayn, Conrad was informed by the Emperor of his fate; he was to be removed from high command and made the general of the 5th army at the Asiago front on the Italian border. Cursing his monarch with insults relating him to a lap dog of the Germans, he departed after being “escorted” by the bodyguard of the Emperor. Intent on starting a rebellion against German domination, he quickly found that he was not the only one removed from command.

On recommendation of Karl, heir to the thrown of the dual monarchy, Arz von Straußberg obtained the highest command of the army and began to remove ineffective and negligent commanders. Generally these were the appointees of Conrad and his supporters. It removed much of his support, and the impetus for the anti-German resistance. The ones that could not be removed due to political connections, mainly the nobility, had their power curtailed, and had proven chiefs-of-staff appointed to actually wield the authority. The new command choice was especially well received by the Germans, as OHL and Mackensen had worked with him at the front and he had proven himself a very able commander and organizer. Not only that, but he was fully committed to the German alliance, an endearing trait after Conrad’s tenure.

The vast differences in command style made themselves apparent quickly. Armies were reorganized, the Austrians subordinated to German command, tactics and operational procedures were reformed and modernized with German advice, exchanges were made with between the armies so that both sides could learn from one another (though mainly the learning was done on the Austrian side; the Germans mainly just discovered what was wrong with the Austrian system and “suggested” corrections), training was modernized under German supervision, production rationalized, and political goals unified. The changes became apparent rapidly, as the Austrians were able to capture Tarnopol in

November with minimal losses and without the help of the Germans. In fact by December there were no German forces present south of the Pripet marshes other than training cadres and officers attached to various command staffs. A drive on Rovno still did not succeed over the winter, but a Russian attack was beat off in turn with heavy losses to the attackers. The front was fortifying and deeper defensive lines of increasing sophistication were built, a focus on the subsequent lines, based on German suggestions from experiences in France.

The Germans also renewed some limited pushes in the Baltic area, aiming the breach the Riga line, but he extension of supply lines and exhaustion of troops prevented a success. The Russians were determined to resist and in prepared positions of sophistication, so no great change in the line occurred either. As it was, the Ober Ost command changed, Ludendorff and Hindenburg were put in charge of administration, something that Ludendorff excelled. Military command was give over to Prince Leopold of Bavaria with Hoffmann as his Chief-of Staff, a potent combination. Forces began to be transferred west to counter some of the larger allied moves late in the year, something that contributed to the failure of the Riga operation. Ultimately the situation in the East quieted down over the winter, with Russian moves in the German sector failing spectacularly, with many casualties to the undertrained conscripts brought into line in December.

OHL was finally secure enough in their estimation to shift the gravity of the war to the West. Trusting the new Austrian leadership more than the previous administration, Falkenhayn informed them that German forces would begin a draw down in the East for the time being, but left the statement at that. Straußberg was an astute individual and assumed that an offensive was in the works and the importance of secrecy was understood. He did not inform any outside of his inner circle of his staff, but kept it known that offensives were not in the works for his forces. Denying Conrad’s demand for forces to be transferred to his front for a “Strafexpedition” against Italy, instead, Straußberg kept his reserves in the East and took the time to rebuild his forces. He still did not entirely believe the Russian offensive strength was destroyed, the evidence being the winter attacks on this front. The Austrians prepared, readying themselves for another attempt at Rovno in spring 1916. For the moment the Italian front had held up admirably, but the increase in pressure and repeated offensives by Cadorna had left both the Austrians and Italians battered. Reinforcements kept pouring in, but losses could be made good by both sides still, so the bloody game continued.

Further south, the Allies had evacuated their bridgehead in Gallipoli, as the rail lines opened to Istanbul had brought in vast quantities of ammunition (at least by Balkan standards) making the offensive untenable. The operation was ended in August after pointless extensions by Churchill, causing immense loss of life to the new ANZAC formations, as well as the other Allied units. Churchill lost much of his prestige as a result of the failure, another reason he was so obstinate in his demand to maintain the offensive. The units pulled out were used to enlarge the Salonika bridgehead in Greece. Ostensibly there to refit, many of these units became a more-or-less permanent feature in the Balkans. Later many on both sides would refer to the deployment as the largest prison camp of the war, as many soon became victims of Malaria and could not leave until recovered. Several hundreds of thousands were rotated through the area, all would be glad to leave. The ANZACS were to remain their until 1916 after which they would appear on the western front. The Serbs also came back into the line during this period, with over 100,000 men. Sarrail, the darling of the French left, dismissed by Joffre later in 1915 made an appearance as commander of the front after his political allies secured a position for him. He had a disturbing tendency to interfere in Greek politics, helping set up a pro-allied dictatorship that marginalized the pro-German and –neutrality king. The Bulgarians maintained the front mostly by themselves, which caused some trouble with their farming, as many of the soldiers were farmers, but the Austrians also contributed forces to the region, and the ever present groups of bandits in Albanian caused trouble to both sides, but significantly more to the Allies (as the
Habsburgs had come to an “agreement” with them).

For the moment, the East had quieted down, as the years changed. The Russians were desperately trying to plan an offensive, but no one was particularly enthusiastic about fighting the Germans again after the last debacle over the winter. Resigned to another bloodbath on the Northern Front, the Czar was surprised to discover the newly appointed commander of the Southwestern Front, Brusilov, was offering to conduct and offensive against the Austrians with no request for additional troops or artillery. He felt that he possessed all necessary components, he just needed the proper command and operational doctrine to make it work. Brusilov, probably the best commander that Russia would produce during the war, also possessed an exceptional group of subordinates, who would make his job that much easier when he conducted his offensive. The operation was slated for July, while the northern and western fronts would conduct smaller operations to tie down the Germans.

OHL was in the midst of planning their own offensive, but this time in the West. Falkenhayn was insistent on secrecy, even going so far as to cut out most of his staff from planning. Each army on the Western front had to submit a proposal for an offensive in their sector. As he was selecting the operation that he felt was most favorable to the attrition strategy that had worked so well in Russia, he had parts of his staff start planning for operations that were never intended to be conducted. His inner circle would tour the front, observing terrain and conditions to understand where the offensive would most likely succeed. Finally settling on either the Verdun or Belfort region, the actual planning began in the earnest.

Artillery was horded, as were shells, and operational secrecy became the by-word of the day. Not only that, but more formations were formed, units were pulled from the east, and the infantry divisions in the West experienced the final implementation of the three regiment per division policy, the elimination of the two brigade structure was final. Despite protests, the new structure was appreciated by the majority of commanders, happy about the artillery regiment that gave extra fire support to the reduced numbers of soldiers. The German version of the light machine gun was finally produced in enough numbers to fully equip every platoon, but as yet each squad was not in possession of one. At 43 lbs, the Maxim 08/15 was by far the heaviest of the squad machine guns in the war, but it was better than none. New models of artillery were also appearing, and the artillery construction program was bearing fruit. Its full expression would only occur later in the year and 1917, for now it was working quite well.

For the moment, both sides tried to court the remaining neutrals that looked likely to participate in the war. The Allies played hard to drum up sympathy with the Americans, but so far propaganda wasn’t very effective despite attempts by the admiralty, headed by Churchill, to use neutral shipping and neutral flags to goad the U-boots to fire on neutrals. Even with the Q-boats, disguised civilian ships that were manned by the Royal Navy and armed, the Germans still concentrated on interdicting shipping in the Channel and mine laying to devastating effect. Though the Germans had lost heavily in the campaign, their torpedo boats and U-boots were making a worrisome dent in supplies to the continent, periodically shutting down shipping, especially when the threat of a sortee by the High Seas Fleet. So far the German fleet had suffered in the small engagements they had fought with the Royal Navy and despite some successes with their raider strategy, the remaining ships outside the cordon had been sunk or captured. For now, the most major successes had been the sinking of three armored cruisers, obsolete ships, by an enterprising U-boot commander, Weddigen, in 1915. He was later sunk himself when his boat was rammed by a British battleship.

The Romanians, the other minor neutrals, were actively courted by both sides, but they remained steadfast in their neutrality. Wishing the join the Allies so that they could gain Transylvania, the losses suffered by the Russians in 1915 dissuaded them from taking the plunge. So far they traded in limited amounts with the Germans to keep them happy, but sold most of their goods to the Allies, which they had no way of exporting. For the moment, large quantities of oil and wheat remained stockpiled. Their position would change in the coming year.

The lessons learned this year were important to future conduct. The defense in depth was proven yet again to be an effective doctrine, which led to its nearly universal implementation. More use of the reserve slope concept was put into the main battle line, generally the 2nd line of defense. More concrete pill boxes and bunkers for counter attack troops were prepared, and more tunnels were dug where applicable. The front was thickening. The defensive lessons had also taught the Germans that a breakthrough on a large scale, even with vast artillery support was impossible in the West. In fact, the use of large numbers of men generally resulted in more casualties for the same gain. Also, suppression worked just as well, if not better than destruction in bombardments, as a stunned enemy required less shells and time to create than dead enemy soldiers. Further, advantageous ground should be seized as quickly as possible to reduce casualties and so that artillery observation can resume as quickly as possible. All these lessons would be used in the formation of the offensive in 1916, which made the previous plans written in for 1915 obsolete. OHL was hard at work on Operation Gericht.
 

Deleted member 1487

Operation Albion

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/ca/Operation_Albion_Map.jpg

The defenses of Riga were quite formidable, as the marshy ground in front of the Dvina, the river the city was formed around, was part of the line that the Russians had built up since the retreat. The best aspect of the swamps was that they had only a few causeways to transport artillery on, all of which were sighted by the Russians. Without the heavy guns, the city simply could not be taken frontally, a fact that the Germans discovered to great cost. Ober Ost, the body in charge of the Eastern Front, was focused on the problem of advancing the front and knocking the Russians out of the war. The only sector where a decisive advance was possible was near Riga, on the way to Petrograd. But the city was supplied well from the Russian capitol, as it was closer with better communications than the Germans enjoyed from their factories.

It was obvious that the city could only be taken by a thrust at another part of the Dvina line, but were would be effective? Üxküll was the best bet, but it was heavily defended. The Russians had proved highly stubborn and had a will to fight, something making any further push in the sector a brutal proposal. But the city stood on the shores of the Baltic sea, which opened up possibilities for an invader. However, the last time that a seaborne landing was tried, the invasion force was captured or killed and several ships were lost. Since that time the navy had been reluctant to try about, but Hoffmann, the Chief-of-Staff of Ober Ost, had now sufficient clout that they were forced to reconsider. The previous affair had been slapdash and amateur. But the professionals in the army, air force, and navy all had been working on the issue since late 1915. By early 1916 a basic plan had been developed that was widely believed to be able to breach the defenses.

The entire operation would hinge on a naval invasion of the islands off the coast of Livonia near the mouth of the Gulf of Riga. By taking these islands, the flank of the entire position would be turned, allowing for another landing to the rear of the city, this time properly supported. It would also split the Russian’s attention and allow for further coastal operations in the future. However, the islands were well protected, and the operations of the Russian navy and British submarines made the area dangerous. All hope was not lost, as the minefields had been pin pointed and the location and directions of the coastal artillery were known. The Germans were hoping to draw elements of the Russian navy in the area into battle on their terms, and win, reducing the threat to their invasion force. Over winter the waters of the Baltic were frozen preventing any naval action in the area, but the release of units from the High Seas Fleet allowed for stronger operations come the thaw.

The second part of the plan was to penetrate the river line at Üxküll once the Russians were distracted by the naval invasion of the islands. Hoffmann had recognized the talents of a certain artillery commander Bruchmüller during the campaign in 1915 and had him draw up the plans for artillery support of the attack. As many would later note, the man had an instinctual understanding for fire support that bordered on the supernatural. Though he did not innovate the techniques he utilized, Bruchmüller organized them into one system. The most important element of his plan was operational surprise, so no guns were allowed to register prior to the attack, they were registered behind the lines and the specific necessary data to plot their targets in the sector was determined by equations, allowing for surprise in the area of attack. The selected stretch of river had fewer marshes than the rest of the area, allowing for the guns to be brought up, but as per Bruchmüller’s plan, only at night and well camouflaged. Cavalry and bicycle troops were to be utilized for quick exploitation of the river crossing, and special assault boats were to be brought up to bring the horses over the river.

The operation would not get off the ground until May, but with new forces brought in from OHL’s reserve (6 divisions), the plan could finally start. On May 12th the invasion force finally left Libau with marines, naval infantry, and the 23rd reserve corps. The armada moved up while the minesweepers finished their work, landings began on the western half of Öesel, achieving surprise. The men landed with minimal resistance while the 10 battleships of the fleet bombarded various targets throughout the island, creating surprise and shock. When the hard fighting finally cleared the guns protecting the next island, Dagoe, men were landed on the southern tip of the island after a naval battle was fought with Russians ships. Two of the German battleships were damaged in the exchange and three destroyers were sunk, but the Russians were either turned back or destroyed. Within 15 days the islands had been cleared, but after much fighting and the repulse of the Russian counter invasion. Losses had been high, but the price was worthwhile for the prize that had been won.

As the naval actions were raging up north, the surprise offensive began on the 15th. The depth of Russians positions were hammered as the men of the assault force moved across the Dvina. The heavily defended island blocking the invasion route was taken in 30 minutes with moderate losses, an astonishing feat. Gas was also employed in the operation, making the attack far easier, as it was relatively new on the Eastern Front, and the combination of green cross and blue cross gas terrified the more mystic Russian peasantry. A sizeable bridgehead had been won on the first day of the attack, which was substantially enlarged the next as repeated counter attacks from sector reserves were beaten off. Artillery acted as a shield for the Germans, who remained within range of the opposite bank as more guns were ferried across. Even with the increase in Russian guns and ammunition since the last year, the panic caused by the effectiveness of German artillery and its employment of gas coupled with the loss of the coastal islands had broken the will of the command to resist. The bridgehead had been contained by this point, but the psychological collapse of having their defenses breached caused army command to breakdown before their soldiers actually doing the fighting and dying.

Russian forces on the opposite side of the Dvina, defending the marshes before Riga, were abandoned as the 12th army pulled out ahead of the German advance. Most of the men, left to their fate, surrendered. Nearly 30,000 men had been captured in the operation on land, while on the islands another 12,000 had been taken. The total casualties for the Russians amounted to over 100,000, but the Germans had also lost about 35,000 in the process. But the lynchpin of Russian defenses in the area was lost, causing the front to break wide open and another pull back further into Livonia. Though the Germans crossed the Dvina finally, the found that they having stirred up a hornets nest. STAVKA ordered Riga retaken, which meant that the planned offensive to the south was no longer the major operation, rather it would have to be a subsidiary move while the North Front became a brutal killing field, with the Germans digging in the best they could manage and the Russians throwing masses of infantry and artillery into desperate attacks to reestablish the front.
 
Nice update!

The russian causalities must be horrendrous... How long can the STAVKA hold the command before a revolt errupts?

Keep up the good work!
 

Deleted member 1487

Operation Gericht

The search for a place of decision was renewed after the resolution of the Eastern campaign in 1915. Lessons had been learned from the failures of the French offensives earlier in the year, namely that a concentrated attack must be made, rather than a dispersion of efforts across a wide front. The offensive would need to be an area where the Germans would be able to concentrate enough force easily, while the French were restricted in their deployment of resources. As an attritional battle to wear down the French and prepare them for another attack later on, Operation Gericht must have enough importance to draw the French in an force them to fight on unfavorable ground, rather than breakthrough and fight a mobile battle that there were not enough resources for. Verdun fit the bill nicely; it had only one rail line running into the fortified zone after St. Mihiel had been captured, most of the forts had had their guns removed, posing far less of a threat. Furthermore it was the birthplace of modern Germany and France, not to mention being a crucial lynchpin of the French defensive system. It was also a salient into German lines, meaning it was surrounded on three sides, allowing for multiple angles of attack and that artillery could be concentrated much more easily, while the
French were forced to cram forces into the scarcely 12 km/sq. area.

In the broader strategic sense, fighting a battle of attrition would also be feasible and indeed desirable. Germany had not yet peaked in manpower utilization, the experts at OHL predicting that not to happen until 1917. Yet the French were close to peaking, again predicted accurately by OHL. Now it was necessary to push them down the opposite slope, wrecking their forces. The British were expected to enter the field in large enough numbers to become decisive this year, so it was necessary to knock her best sword from her had, according to Falkenhayn. There was concern that this battle could turn into a mincing machine for the Germans, but the plan was to obtain the heights of the Meuse and use artillery to smash up French counterattacks. The 5th army had submitted a proposal about how to do this very thing; the plan suggested attacks along both banks of the Meuse to force the French to divide their attention and to prevent them from rallying on the west bank of the river.

By February, the proposed start of the offensive, OHL would amass a reserve of 38 divisions, including forces taken from the east, new formations, and troops taken from other sectors. OHL would commit two corps to the west bank offensive and four to east bank, with massive amounts of artillery brought in from the strategic reserve and taken from other units in quiet sectors. Some heavier pieces were actually borrowed from the Austrians and some lighter pieces were actually captured French guns. Falkenhayn objected to the amount of artillery to be thrust into the operation, as he was planning on the attack drawing in a rash British offensive near the Somme to support their allies. He wanted to maintain a reserve large enough to defeat them, but was met by strenuous opposition by his operation chief, who demanded to if the offensive were going to happen at all, it should have the necessary support. Over 1500 guns would be deployed, 600 on the west bank and 900 on the east.
Gas would also be used for the first time on the western front, with intricate plans being drawn up for its use. It had been discovered that the French were now issuing gas masks against the use of Chlorine gas, which had been used on the eastern front. So far, neither side had been particularly eager to break the taboo in the west, though both had developed capabilities since its first use in the east. The Germans though had taken it a step further by inventing a new type of gas, Phosgene, which was mixed with Chlorine to make it more effective. The gas was not immediately fatal; the effects took 24-48 hours to come into effect. The combination shell was marked with a green cross, hence being termed green cross gas by the troops. As the French were already issuing gas masks, a new method was developed to get around it. Tear and vomit inducing gases were to be used with it to get the French to take off their masks and breath in the green cross, as they did not protect against their effects and anyone with a vomit inundated mask was not likely to want to keep it on.

The final new weapon to be used for the first time was the Flammenwerfer. A truly horrific weapon that spit fire for tens of meters, special units were formed to use it on the attack and reduce strong points. All these weapons would be combined to breach the French lines, allowing the forces on the East bank to breakthrough to the heights of the Meuse and dominate the lower ground to the west. Any French attack would have to come up under artillery observation, and endure the results. But the build up would be visible to French intelligence, so it would all need to be done over a long period of time and the civilian population, French of course, would have to be relocated to prevent them from informing of the increased traffic. Commotion was created up and down the line for 80 miles to confuse the French as to where the attack was going to fall. In fact, one of the great naval artillery guns was shipped to the Belfort region to convince the French the attack was coming there. Also, the air war has swung in the favor of the Germans again, at least in the French sector, which gave them a powerful information denial tool. An entire Staffel had been transferred to the Verdun sector, which gave them air supremacy throughout the build up and for a most of the battle.

On the French side, Verdun had been declared a fortified region, as it was realized that forts no longer could stand on their own; they required support from a field force, which needed trenches to support the forts. The area was given manpower to prepare defenses throughout 1915, but this was constantly stripped to feed the offensives against St. Mihiel and in the Champagne. Every time operations were suspended, the returning soldiers found that they needed to renew their work, as trench lines had not been maintained in their absence and need to be rebuilt. By 1916 work was far from finished.

French intelligence was aware that a German offensive was in the works, but there was no idea where it be launched. Verdun was identified as a threatened sector, but Joffre was still not convinced that it would be attacked; even if it were, he was convinced that an attack there would be wasteful to the Germans, he had declared it fortified already. Reality was not of concern to him and he boasted to other “let the Germans attack there, we will crush them!” Nonetheless, intelligence determined increased traffic in the region and were reasonably certain by late January that the attack would fall there. This information would be continually dismissed by Joffre, who thought it was simply a diversion and the main blow would fall on Belfort. Action was not taken to rectify the situation over the course of February despite the protests of Colonel Driant, a deputy of a local village, who now commanded a regiment at the front that was to be posted to Verdun, and reported to the government about Joffre’s inadequacies. Silly command problems in the sector remained too, as the army units stationed in the area had a different command chain than the fortress command, complicating matters significantly.

The only completed section of defenses was the first line, occupied by seven divisions across the entire front on both banks. The second line was mostly complete with gaps and the third line was hardly a ditch, mostly just marked out by stakes in the ground. Joffre had finally been pressured to bring in further troops and guns to reinforce the front, which he belatedly ordered on the 15th of February. The troops of the 30th corps would not arrive before the 19th.

Finally, as the D-day approached, trouble remained for the Germans, as the build up on the west bank was in danger of being observed, which it had been to a degree. Then, on February 12th, as if by divine intervention, a blizzard descended on the area. Visibility was limited, allowing the Germans to bring in the remainder of their forces at will. However, the weather would last for over a week, pushing back the offensive, which the assault troops, warm in their rearward positions were thrilled about. The French also brought in troops, including the 30th corps, with had three divisions, one of which had Driant’s corps. Now, on the east bank, the 30th corps with the 72nd and 51st between Haumont, Beaumont, and Ornes, the 14th division was between Dieppe, Maucourt, and Mogeville stood to the north while to the south the 2nd corps held the heights overlooking the Woevre. The 7th corps stood on the west bank between the river and Avocourt. The 37th division remained in reserve with the corps artillery, ready to deploy where needed. The new units were still unfamiliar with the terrain and not fully deployed by the time the weather broke on the 20th. The German troops entered their Stollen and readied themselves for the attack. The guns opened on the night of the 20th. With them the entire 80 miles from the front on the Swiss border to the north lit up with artillery fire in what the allies called a Chinese fire drill, no one knowing where the blow was to fall. No one at GQG was even aware that the troops at Verdun were being slowly annihilated, with German assault troops grimly waiting for the order to attack.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c6/Verdun_and_Vincinity_-_Map.jpg
(this gives the General layout of the French and Germans, but the latter has two extra corps on the west bank and another two in reserve on the east)
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Catching Up

Did Gallipoli last as long enough for Suvla Bay to be tried? I don't see that happening because the rail line was opened. In fact I see a withdrawal in July at the latest. Note the deception tactics that worked so well in OTL during the winter are likely to be much less effective in the summer.

I have had some doubts that you can have a Salonika as early as you are doing. Research the time table of the political situation inside Greece in 1915.

Italian entry into the Entente is less likely with the CP doing better. The weakness of AH in April OTL combined with Gallipoli gave Salandra a false impression of the war being at a pivotal point. That does not exist in your TL.

In OTL the BEF wasn't very enthusiastic about major offensives on the Western Front in 1915 though they did finally participate in Big Push (resulting in Sir John French's downfall). With the Channel Ports in German hands they are going to want to get them back and I would see at least one full scale offensive with that objective by mid summer at the latest. This is another reason why Suvla Bay ain't going to happen.

It looks the Russian attempt to retake Riga replaces Lake Naroch. I have no objection to that.

Historically Falkenhayn launched a diversionary effort in the vicinity of Belfort (Operation Black Forest) before Verdun. He had at one point considered Belfort as an alternative to Verdun.
 
Is there a way to bring the HSF into the fight in the Baltic? In my opinion the underuse of this national asset was a considerable reason for defeat.
 
Did Gallipoli last as long enough for Suvla Bay to be tried? I don't see that happening because the rail line was opened. In fact I see a withdrawal in July at the latest. Note the deception tactics that worked so well in OTL during the winter are likely to be much less effective in the summer.
With the Channel ports in German hands there is still a Gallipoli gambit? It was dumb IOTL, and it's certainly dumber here

I have had some doubts that you can have a Salonika as early as you are doing. Research the time table of the political situation inside Greece in 1915.
Greece is still leaning towards the CP at this stage, there are less troops available and the Allies go for an early Salonika?

Italian entry into the Entente is less likely with the CP doing better. The weakness of AH in April OTL combined with Gallipoli gave Salandra a false impression of the war being at a pivotal point. That does not exist in your TL.
Agreed 100%: the flavor here is rather for a pivotal point in favor of the CPs: IMHO Italy would stay out of the war.

In OTL the BEF wasn't very enthusiastic about major offensives on the Western Front in 1915 though they did finally participate in Big Push (resulting in Sir John French's downfall). With the Channel Ports in German hands they are going to want to get them back and I would see at least one full scale offensive with that objective by mid summer at the latest. This is another reason why Suvla Bay ain't going to happen.
Again 100% agreed
 

Deleted member 1487

Did Gallipoli last as long enough for Suvla Bay to be tried? I don't see that happening because the rail line was opened. In fact I see a withdrawal in July at the latest. Note the deception tactics that worked so well in OTL during the winter are likely to be much less effective in the summer.

I have had some doubts that you can have a Salonika as early as you are doing. Research the time table of the political situation inside Greece in 1915.

Italian entry into the Entente is less likely with the CP doing better. The weakness of AH in April OTL combined with Gallipoli gave Salandra a false impression of the war being at a pivotal point. That does not exist in your TL.

In OTL the BEF wasn't very enthusiastic about major offensives on the Western Front in 1915 though they did finally participate in Big Push (resulting in Sir John French's downfall). With the Channel Ports in German hands they are going to want to get them back and I would see at least one full scale offensive with that objective by mid summer at the latest. This is another reason why Suvla Bay ain't going to happen.

It looks the Russian attempt to retake Riga replaces Lake Naroch. I have no objection to that.

Historically Falkenhayn launched a diversionary effort in the vicinity of Belfort (Operation Black Forest) before Verdun. He had at one point considered Belfort as an alternative to Verdun.


In fact Sulva bay was not attempted here. I as a bit unsure about the Salonika thing, but Allies really had the Greeks by the balls, which was the only reason the king wasn't even more pro-german. Basically, if they wanted to, the Allies could utterly cripple the Greek economy, so it behooves them to play along, despite the violation of national sovereignty. Things might be even more contentious, but at the end of the day, the Greek king (whose name I can never remember) won't risk war despite this affront, because he knows the Central Powers cannot help him either militarily or economically. Perhaps a partisan movement starts, but I am up in the air about the dynamic there. Unfortunately it is but a side show to the TL, so I won't really be dwelling on it.

As for the Brits, they did launch several attacks on the Somme line, all of which ended in bloody failure TTL. French has fallen, but I did not mention that. I will need to rethink the Italian entry, I did not consider some of the butterflies. Guess I need to consult my copy of the "White War".

Lake Narotch happens here, as it occured before the capture of Riga. I did not refer to it by name, but I did mention it in passing. The recapture of Riga is going to be instead of a full scale Brusilov offensive actually. While the Brusilov attack is still going to happen, it will not have the support that it did OTL, because the recapture of Riga will be viewed as the more crucial operation. Instead it is going to be a diversionary op to draw off German forces. Whether it succeeds or not...well, just stay tuned.

As far as Belfort goes, my impression was that it was really nothing more than planned, but replaced by Gericht. Instead "Schwarzwald" was a "chinese fire drill", all noise and no action. A naval artillery gun was used there to help confuse French intelligence, which it did to a degree, but they had a pretty clear picture of what German plans were by the time Gericht kicked off, but Joffre didn't believe them.
 

Deleted member 1487

With the Channel ports in German hands there is still a Gallipoli gambit? It was dumb IOTL, and it's certainly dumber here

Greece is still leaning towards the CP at this stage, there are less troops available and the Allies go for an early Salonika?


Agreed 100%: the flavor here is rather for a pivotal point in favor of the CPs: IMHO Italy would stay out of the war.


Again 100% agreed

Did Gallipoli last as long enough for Suvla Bay to be tried? I don't see that happening because the rail line was opened. In fact I see a withdrawal in July at the latest. Note the deception tactics that worked so well in OTL during the winter are likely to be much less effective in the summer.

I have had some doubts that you can have a Salonika as early as you are doing. Research the time table of the political situation inside Greece in 1915.

Italian entry into the Entente is less likely with the CP doing better. The weakness of AH in April OTL combined with Gallipoli gave Salandra a false impression of the war being at a pivotal point. That does not exist in your TL.


I'm going to keep Italian entry for the following reasons: The Germans/Austrians are still wrapping up Serbia and are locked down. The Russians are starting their offensive in Galicia in April, further giving the Italians hope of being the decisive factor. Gallipoli is still occuring, the failure of which OTL gave Salandra the impression that he could lever more concessions out of the Allies, which proved true. Also the Austrian entry into Albania didn't help; it was on the list of Italian demands (or at least part of it) and the presence of the Austro-Hungarian troops there and their good will to the Albainians undercuts their ability to encroach on the area.

Also, the Italian and allied militaries thought that they could break through the Alps without issue, causing them to act in an overconfident manner, which their later attacks proved. All the elements of the Italian entry are there, so I am going to keep it.

However, upon further research into the Salonika issue, Tom and LordKalvan are right. This front cannot happen until later, which will still happen, as the Allies are going to want a front in the Balkans to threaten the Bulgarians/Turks, especially in the wake of the failed invasion of Gallipoli.

Now, as to why Gallipoli happened despite the channel ports, the simple answer is to keep Russian in the game. Russia was smacked around in 1914 and with the closing of the straights, the Russians have their exports cut off, meaning they cannot raise foreign captial, and they cannot receive shipments from their allies just when their munitions and equipment production are at a critical phase. Also, every sortee by German ships has been beaten quite badly reducing fears of invasion from the ports. There is also a fear of launching an invasion of the continent from England, as the channel defenses, mining, and the large presence of torpedo boats and U-boots, which have proven quite dangerous to shipping/capital ships, are likely to cause unexceptable losses to the fleet, helping the High Seas fleet close the numbers gap.
 
I'm going to keep Italian entry for the following reasons: The Germans/Austrians are still wrapping up Serbia and are locked down. The Russians are starting their offensive in Galicia in April, further giving the Italians hope of being the decisive factor. Gallipoli is still occuring, the failure of which OTL gave Salandra the impression that he could lever more concessions out of the Allies, which proved true. Also the Austrian entry into Albania didn't help; it was on the list of Italian demands (or at least part of it) and the presence of the Austro-Hungarian troops there and their good will to the Albainians undercuts their ability to encroach on the area.

Also, the Italian and allied militaries thought that they could break through the Alps without issue, causing them to act in an overconfident manner, which their later attacks proved. All the elements of the Italian entry are there, so I am going to keep it.

However, upon further research into the Salonika issue, Tom and LordKalvan are right. This front cannot happen until later, which will still happen, as the Allies are going to want a front in the Balkans to threaten the Bulgarians/Turks, especially in the wake of the failed invasion of Gallipoli.

Now, as to why Gallipoli happened despite the channel ports, the simple answer is to keep Russian in the game. Russia was smacked around in 1914 and with the closing of the straights, the Russians have their exports cut off, meaning they cannot raise foreign captial, and they cannot receive shipments from their allies just when their munitions and equipment production are at a critical phase. Also, every sortee by German ships has been beaten quite badly reducing fears of invasion from the ports. There is also a fear of launching an invasion of the continent from England, as the channel defenses, mining, and the large presence of torpedo boats and U-boots, which have proven quite dangerous to shipping/capital ships, are likely to cause unexceptable losses to the fleet, helping the High Seas fleet close the numbers gap.

It looks like you're convinced that the Entente will automatically play WW1 as they did IOTL, irrespective of what happens on the field.

IMHO, the loss of the Channel ports and the worse mauling of the Russians should make people more wary (in particular the Italians: getting more concessions from someone who's drowning does not strike me as a great idea).

Anyway, it's your TL.
 
Top