Rewritten Eastern Front
I've decided to take a new direction so here it is. Hopefully all my readers haven't abandoned with TL just yet

The new information here supersedes anything I've written before. Enjoy and as always, feedback and praise are always welcome.
The German eastern front strategy had its roots in the vagaries of the battlefield, but also in the political infighting among the highest members of the military command. Historians later would be baffled in their attempts to describe the massive shift in OHL policy in late 1914, but the first ripples of change began in September and the Hindenburg-Ludendorff partnership turned to face the Russian general Rennenkampf’s 1st army near the Masurian lakes. After Tannenberg, the remnants of the Samsonov’s army were reforming to the south under their new commander, Scheidemann. To the north, the Russians still had an army on German soil, a fact with the dynamic duo, both Prussians, wanted to change. The only problem was that their army was less numerous than their opponent. The proceeding battles had sapped the 8th army of strength and the actual number of corps were still inferior to the Russians. To make matters worse, their enemy was forming a new army, the 10th, northwest of Bialystok, which would soon emphasize their weakness. OHL was wrapped up in the crucial battles in France, so H-L would need to act alone.
http://www.firstworldwar.com/maps/graphics/maps_20_east_prussia1914_6_(1600).jpg
(the two corps from the west are not present ITTL)
Despite their weakness, the 8th army took to the field near the Masurian lakes, ready to push out the invader. The Germans were aided by the fortifications at Königsberg, which guarded the northern flank. It allowed them to concentrate their numbers on a narrower front, the advantage being that their superior artillery and equipment could compensate for their lack of numbers. Starting on the 5th, the offensive began, with good progress being made on the first day. Given the parity of formations directly engaged on the first day, Hoffmann, the brains behind the H-L command team, directed the battle as a straight breakthrough, rather than a flank attack. This meant though that the Germans only pushed back the Russians rather than maneuvering to turn their flank, as had been the past preference of the Prussian commanders. Nevertheless, in the five day battle, the Russians were forced back to Gumbinnen, the site of the disastrous engagement in the first days of the war that caused the sacking of the first 8th army commander. Unfortunately for H-L, the stain on the honor of their troops was not cleansed, as the Russians finally managed to halt the 8th army, still within the borders of Prussia. Though the Russians managed to stop the Germans they had had the worst of the fighting, but nothing near the unfortunate 2nd army, still recovering in Poland. Rennenkampf stood ready to fight another day, though wary of the wily Prussians.
The battle of the Masurian lakes was not a great victory, but it was a victory. The threat of immediate invasion was postponed, but not eliminated. The press in Germany still praised the H-L duo, but it was muted compared to the tones used to describe the victory at Tannenberg.
The “ordinary” victory was disdained by H-L, but also by the military that had come to believe the hype of the dynamic duo. Indeed, Ludendorff had come to believe in the hype himself, convinced he was a genius and should be leading the war effort. But his confidence was an insecure one, and when he did not get the praise he desired, he lashed out. The one target he sighted was the big fish, Falkenhayn. By the 14th of September, the day after the Masurian lakes and the day that the Westheer had finally stopped retreating in France, Ludendorff began his criticisms of Falkenhayn throughout the army, convinced that the war minister, hardly a REAL soldier, has thrown away Schlieffen’s victory. Many in the army and government felt the same, completely oblivious to the fact that the French had outnumbered the Germans at the decisive point and the quick actions of Falkenhayn had saved the army. Not only that, it looked even more likely that he succeeded in cutting off the Channel Ports, which would fall in the coming weeks. Despite this, Ludendorff gave voice to the grumblings of the army and went so far as to take the unprecedented act of voicing his complaints to the war cabinet and indirectly to the Kaiser. Hindenburg added his considerable weight, both physically and politically, to this campaign of character assassination and backstabbing.
Falkenhayn was well aware of the vulnerable political place he had staked out with his actions. But at the moment, he was despairing, convinced he had lost Germany the war. He believed that Germany could not endure a long war and the loss of the initiative would only lead to ruin. Though he was more concerned about the survival of the army than the immediate consequences of the withdrawal, when his plan to bring up the 6th army, or at least part of it, to continue the sweeping maneuver from a more advantageous position failed, he slipped into his state of despondency. His energetic and clever operations chief, Wetzell, managed to hold things together and get his commander back into the game. The situation had been salvaged and reports coming in from the war ministry were producing numbers that seemed to give Germany a fighting chance in a long war.
As the fighting to maintain the front in France continued in its new phase, H-L had taken a risk to save the Austrians. Taking two of their precious corps from the 8th army, joining them with the smattering of units from the Kummer group, and adding in two corps and two cavalry divisions from the west that were begged for, the 9th army was formed near Cracow to launch an attack in late September to salvage the Galician front. This transfer had left two corps to defend against two Russian armies in Prussia. The ruse fell through toward the end of the thrust toward Warsaw by the 9th army, as Rennenkampf and the new 10th army moved in again on Prussia. This pushed the front lines back to the pre-Masurian lakes positions and the situation was saved only through the gutsy attacks of the remaining units, who convinced the Russians that more troops had been brought in by their bold counter attacks. Though nothing especially disastrous occurred in Prussia, the mere act of leaving the area without a reserve and with two active Russian armies waiting on the edge served to damage the standing of H-L within the very group that they were courting, the war cabinet in Berlin. The threat of a Russian breakthrough still remained, and with the furious fighting in France tying down reinforcements, some of the ministers thought it irresponsible that H-L went off gallivanting in Poland. This fact would aid Falkenhayn in the coming political melee.
As it was, H-L damaged their reputation further, as their advance into Poland turned for the worse. As they moved into Congress Poland, they were unopposed, allowing for dramatic gains, something that the duo made sure the media took note of, especially as Falkenhayn seemed to be redeeming himself in northern France. Ultimately the offensive meet disaster, as the Russians plans were captured detailing their realignment of forces over the Vistula. The Germans were walking in to four Russian armies realigning to invade Germany. After some clashes along the banks of the Vistula and in front of Warsaw, the 9th army was forced to retreat, destroying all infrastructure along the way. This obviously slowed the Russian advance, but to the south the Austrians were having a far worse time, as they had to abandon Przemysl to the Russians once again and flee to the safety of the Carpathians. By the beginning of November H-L had retreated back to their start lines having only 40,000 casualties to show for their troubles.
Despite the spin attempts by H-L, the media and the German military were starting to question the abilities of the supposed “genius” pair. What was worse was that Falkenhayn had finally been able to enter the political fray and fire back at his enemies in the military. Having achieved his position by his political savvy, Falkenhayn was experienced at just this kind of backstabbing and favor-currying. As Groener, the rail expert at OHL, once remarked about the characteristics of Falkenhayn making him an excellent politician, he displayed his skill in all its glory. Fighting back against all his opponents in and out of the military, he took special notice of H-L. The duo was powerful for its fame with the public and its reputation with the military. Ludendorff especially had no qualms about using either to get his way, just as he had been able to lever 2 corps and cavalry divisions out of him. Falkenhayn turned right around and subtly reminded members of the war cabinet of just what H-L had accomplished with those units. Further more, Falkenhayn had the Kaiser’s ear and the man hated Ludendorff. To the Kaiser, Ludendorff was a loud mouth self-promoter who did not know his position. Sharing the same opinion of the man, Falkenhayn used the Kaiser to inoculate his war cabinet from the duo. Further, he also had various junior members of the military silenced by having them transferred to dead-end positions, including having his former operations chief, Tappen, his most vocal critic, stripped of rank and discharged from the military. The Kaiser even harshly reprimanded his own son, the commander of the 5th army, based on a recommendation from Falkenhayn. By the time OHL turned its attention east, Falkenhayn had reasserted control over the mutinous elements of his army.
The turn east seemed abrupt to many, especially those without contact in OHL. Throughout September and early October, Falkenhayn was forced to reevaluate his strategy for the war now that his plans had fallen through.
As his men were defending along the Somme-Aisne line, he was working with his operations chief to redefine modern war. Realizing Germany no longer had the capability to win the war outright now that three of the most powerful nations in Europe opposed him, Falkenhayn realized that at least one of the opponents must be knocked out so that the war could be conducted against the others. Russian had its strategic depth, Britain the Channel, but France was occupied and forced to fight. OHL had settled on knocking France out of the war, but outright victory imposed by breakthrough was impossible in the trench warfare that the West had dissolved into. Instead France was going to have to be broken down through attrition. This process seemed to be happening without much effort, as the French army dutifully threw themselves into the guns of the Germans. The situation was being aided by the efforts of men like von Mudra, gnawing away in the Ardennes with his recently developed combined arms limited battle. The French soldiers were being smashed trying to stand up to it, at minimal cost to the men of Mudra’s command. This method, also being practiced in the Vosges and Alsace, was being codified and distributed by the operations section of OHL, after being brought to the attention of Falkenhayn by his ever-dutiful and –observant sidekick, Wetzell. Though this new strategy was just being developed in October, the situation in the East drew the attention of OHL.
With the breakdown of Ludendorff’s offensive in Poland, he demanded even more troops to help stop the oncoming Russian hordes, slowly grinding toward Silesia. Relatively unoccupied now that the allied offensives were contained and winding down in France and the Channel Ports had been occupied, Falkenhayn had a stroke of genius. The situation in the East needed to be resolved; both the Habsburgs and Germans had Russians bearing down on them and an offensive solution was necessary to salvage the situation. In the West, the necessary Schwerpunkt of Falkenhayn’s new strategy, an offensive did not look feasible, and indeed counterproductive. The overall operational concept of wearing down the French was already being achieved at a lower cost by having them attack, as their offensives only wore them down without adversely affecting the multi-line defense that Wetzell had institutionalized. Additionally, the limited, wearing-down attacks to aid the process while seizing territory were already taking place with existing resources. To launch a full-scale attack with his reserves were likely to only increase his casualties without forcing a decision or important gain in France. Indeed, the limited numbers of shells left after the high intensity battles of the previous months seemed to suggest that any attack in the west was likely to be inadequately supported.
However, in the East the reserves would make a difference and the limited shells could make a larger impact on the rudimentary defenses of the Russian than on their more advanced western compatriots. By late October the decision was made, as Ludendorff pulled his troops back to Silesia. OHL would turn East in November to salvage the situation and free up resources for France in 1915. This decision also was double-pronged, as by actively participating in the East would further deprive H-L of the commodity that they needed to stay relevant in the political struggle for the soul of the German army: headlines. If he just gave the men to Ober Ost to fight the Russians, H-L would just become more famous and a bigger threat to his power. Instead Falkenhayn had a plan to drive them into obscurity without directly confronting them.
Possessing six newly formed corps, Falkenhayn formed the 10th army in Prussia with five of these units and some of the freed up western cavalry divisions to strike at the flank of the Russian advance, as per Ludendorff’s proposed plan. But the backhand blow was to promote Colonel Hoffmann to General and made him Chief of Staff of the 10th army under von Fabeck. Realizing that Hoffmann was the brain of the H-L operation, depriving them of their chief-of-staff would be crippling, while additionally depriving them directly of the fame of commanding the army that would save Germany. Hoffmann was bitter that H-L had gotten the credit for his victory at Tannenberg and was overjoyed by the chance to finally get the recognition that he felt he deserved. Additionally, being a Prussian, Hoffman would get to defend his home directly. Falkenhayn personally promoted him to sever any remaining ties he might have to H-L and was said to have remarked to the newly minted general “hitch your wagon to the right horse and you can go far…”
The 9th army would have a crucial job in the coming battle too. Leaving two corps behind, the remaining units marched south to the area near Tarnow, arriving by November 7th, met by two corps transferred from the west and one newly formed corps from the reserves. The Austrian 2nd army would transfer three corps north to merge with the two former corps of the German 9th army, creating a new 2nd army to the south of the Woyrsch detachment, the link between the Germans and Austrians.
http://www.firstworldwar.com/maps/graphics/maps_24_easternfront_poland_(1600).jpg
So far the Russians had no idea of the transfers and still thought the German 9th army was the new 2nd Austrian army. They were oblivious to the German 10th army to their north, a fact confirmed by radio intercepts. These intercepts also gave a very clear picture of Russian intentions, information Hoffman would put to good use in the coming battle. Ober Ost could only mutely stand by and watch, Ludendorff frothing to himself about the massive interference of OHL in his backyard.
The Russian 1st and 2nd armies moved south to cover Prussia while their southern neighbors moved toward Silesia, confident of victory. Their plans were rudely interrupted by the attack of the 10th army on the 10th of November. The incompetence and miscommunication of the Russian high command was on full display, as the Germans were able to advance hard against the Russian 2nd army without any coordinated resistance by nearby 1st army units. They could have crushed the Germans like a vice, but Hoffmann, aware of the Russian command problems thanks to the radio intercepts, pushed on. This battle, later known as the battle of Lodz for where it ended up, drew in the neighboring 5th army, halting the northern thrust of the invasion. Further south, the 4th and 9th Russian armies were checked by the Austrian 2nd and 1st armies, which put up surprising resistance. The Russian 3rd army was met by an attack along the southern bank of the Vistula by the Austrian 4th army, drawing their focus north. The Russian 8th army pushed into the Carpathians chasing after the Austrian 3rd army. Ivanov, the commander of the Southwestern Front was stunned when he heard that a German army was attacking out of the Tarnow area. Where did these troops come from? The French assured them that the Germans were pinned in the West. But promises meant nothing as the German 9th army poured into the exposed flank of the 3rd army, focused to the north while going after the Austrians.
The German 9th army was able to profit extraordinarily from this wrong-footed stance and drove into the gap between the Russian armies. Both Russian formations were engaged frontally by Austrian units, suddenly on the offensive themselves. The only choice was to fall back, but the damage was done. Advancing between Gorlice and Tarnow, the Germans punished the Russian 3rd army, devastating two corps, before turning south on the 8th army. This group blocked the way to Przemysl, the objective of the offensive. Just as the Russians further north were being forced back to Lodz, the Russians troops of the Southwestern front were inexorably pushed back to the San river. Badly outnumbered, especially after taking casualties in the beginning stages of the offensive while operation surprise reigned, the Russians ultimately moved beyond the San while fleeing from Lodz in December. The 11th army, besieging Przemysl attempted to support their retreating brothers, but confronted by the sallying fortress garrison and the advancing Germans, they too were soon in retreat. The San and Dniester would form the boundaries for the coming year in Galicia, while the Russians pulled back to another set of river lines in Poland.
The offensive had been a smashing success, ending Rennenkampf’s career while sending over 200,000 more Russians into the prison cages of the Central Powers. The Habsburg fortress of Przemysl had been saved with its garrison of 120,000 men, who would be crucial to the rebuilding of the Habsburg armies over the winter months. The invasion of Germany had been halted and OHL took a decisive interest in the Eastern Front. As it was, Falkenhayn became the hero, despite utilizing Conrad and Ludendorff’s plans in Galicia and Poland respectively. It was not Ludendorff that executed the 10th army’s attack, nor was it Conrad’s troops that saved Przemysl. In fact, Conrad’s tarnished reputation was further sullied as the Serbs held off and repelled the third invasion of their nation by the Austrians. Ludendorff was nearly forgotten by the public as the stars of Hoffmann (mentioned on the insistance of Falkenhayn who had the papers mention his contribution to Tannenberg), Fabeck and Mackensen rose in the media. All the while Falkenhayn smugly sat triumphant on the field of battle and in the halls of power. The next year would bring further trials, but he had plans…